SPOUSES ALBERTO and ERLINDA CAUSAPIN filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals^[1] in CA-G.R. No. CV-27272 promulgated 30 September 1992 reversing the trial court and dismissing their complaint for reconveyance.

On 28 December 1992, private respondents filed their Manifestation and Comment alleging that the instant petition was already moot and academic as the decision under review had already become final and executory and an entry of judgment issued by the Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

In this resolution, this Court addresses only the question of whether the entry of judgment and transmittal of records were tainted with irregularity and whether the court employees responsible therefor should be held administratively liable. The merits of the instant petition will be discussed in a separate decision.

The records show that on 27 October 1992, petitioners seasonably filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review, of which motion the Court of Appeals was duly served copy on the same day as evidenced by a registry receipt. We granted the extension and gave petitioners up to 26 November 1992 to file the petition.

The motion for extension notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals, through Atty. Jose V. de Guzman, Jr., Division Clerk of Court, issued on 10 November 1992 an Entry of Judgment stating that the decision rendered in "Erlinda Causapin, et al. v. Sps. Dominador de Guzman, et al." in CA-G.R. No. CV- 27272 had on 28 October 1992 already become final and executory.^[2]

Three (3) days later, or on 13 November 1992, Mr. Arsenio B. Sipin, Chief of the Archives Section, Court of Appeals, transmitted the records to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. On motion of private respondents, the Biñan trial court issued an order of execution and declared its judgment functus officio.^[3]

The extraordinary haste with which the entry of judgment and transmittal of records were made was brought to the attention of the Clerk of Court concerned. Consequently, on 22 January 1993, the Court of Appeals directed the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, "to forthwith send back the records of Civil Case No. B-2466 which, on the mistaken belief that the decision thereon on appeal by this Court dated 30 September 1992, had already become final and executory, were returned to the court of origin."

In a resolution dated 27 January 1993, this Court commended the prompt action of the Court of Appeals in ordering the immediate retrieval of the transmitted records but noted its failure to address the question of why the records of the case had not been properly verified first before entry of judgment was effected and the records sent back to the court of origin despite notice of a pending motion for extension of time to file petition for review before this Court. Considering the far-reaching and serious repercussions of the error, we directed Atty. Jose V. de Guzman, Jr., and Mr. Arsenio B. Sipin of the Court of Appeals to explain within five (5) days from receipt why the entry of judgment was made posthaste in CA G.R. No. CV-27272 and the records transmitted to the court of origin despite receipt of the aforesaid motion for extension of time.

On 15 February 1993, Atty. Jose V. de Guzman, Jr., submitted his letter-explanation. He alleged that in preparing the entry of judgment in CA-G.R. No. CV-27272, he strictly followed the standard procedure of the court, particularly Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals on Entry of Judgment, and that copy of the subject decision was sent by registered mail to counsel of the appellees, Atty. Alfredo U. Malabaguio, and received by him on 12 October 1992. According to Atty. de Guzman, counting fifteen (15) days from 12 October 1992, petitioners had up to 27 October 1992 within which to file their petition for review. A mailing allowance of ten (10) days from 27 October 1992 was observed to give time after receipt of the decision for Atty. Malabaguio, who is based in Quezon City, to file his petition by mail. On 6 November 1992, upon expiration of the ten-day mailing allowance, he issued the entry of judgment four (4) days later, or on 10 November 1992. Then on 12 November 1992 or two (2) days after entry of judgment was made, he verified with and obtained a clearance from their Judicial Records Division which certified that no motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal to this Court was received per docket book regarding subject case. He maintains that the entry of judgment was not made posthaste but was prepared in strict compliance with the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.

On 16 February 1993, Mr. Arsenio B. Sipin submitted his letter-explanation contending that on 12 November 1992, the Division Clerk of Court transmitted the entry of judgment to their Archives Section which prepared the Letter of Transmittal of Records the following day, 13 November 1992; that after four (4) working days, or on 17 November 1992, the letter of transmittal was transferred to the Mailing Section for delivery. Mr. Sipin claims that the function of the Archives Section is purely ministerial; that one of his duties is to remand cases that have become final and executory to the court of origin upon their receipt from the Division Clerks of Court so as not to be held liable for unnecessary delay.

In our Resolution of 9 June 1993, we found unsatisfactory the explanation profferred by Atty. de Guzman, Jr. We noted therein that notwithstanding his contention that he relied on the clearance from the Judicial Records Division of 12 November 1992, it appears that the clearance was only secured two (2) days after the issuance of entry of judgment; hence, it is absurd for him to insist that entry of judgment was based on a clearance issued. Also, he failed to verify first from the records whether any appeal from the decision had been taken, or a motion for reconsideration, a petition for review, or a motion for extension of time to file petition for review had been filed, before finally issuing the entry of judgment.

In the same resolution, we likewise found the letter-explanation of Mr. Sipin unacceptable. The statement of Mr. Sipin in his Letter of Transmittal of 13 November 1992 that the judgment on the Causapin case was entered on 28 October 1992 is erroneous since the judgment became final on 28 October 1992 and was entered only on 10 November 1992.

In view of the deficient explanations of Atty. de Guzman, Jr., and Mr. Sipin, we found a prima facie showing of administrative misconduct on their part. Consequently, we referred the case to the ponente in CA-G.R. No. CV-27272 through the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for the former to conduct an investigation into the surrounding circumstances regarding the premature entry of judgment and transmittal of the records, and to submit a Report and Recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt of our resolution.

After conducting an investigation, the ponente, Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez of the Court of Appeals, submitted his Report and Recommendation dated 3 December 1992. In his report, Justice Galvez found that Atty. de Guzman, Jr., made the entry of judgment on 10 November 1992 without verifying first from the Judicial Records Division whether the losing parties had filed any petition/motion with the Supreme Court; that he made the verification only two (2) days after the entry of judgment, or on 12 November 1992; that when asked why he did not immediately make the verification, he was quite evasive in answering that even if he made the verification before he made the entry of judgment on 10 November 1992, it would not have made any difference since the motion for extension of time to come to this Court filed by petitioner-spouses was received by the Court of Appeals only on 9 November 1992, was recorded in the Judicial Records Division in the afternoon of 12 November 1992, and was transmitted to his office only on 9 December 1992.

Justice Galvez also noted that it has been the standard operating procedure for other Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals to refer first the matter of making an entry of judgment to the ponente through an agendum and it is only after the approval by the members of the Division when the entry of judgment is actually made. In the subject decision, the matter of entry of judgment was not placed in the agenda for the consideration of the members of the Twelfth Division to which the case belonged.

During the investigation, Atty. de Guzman, Jr., admitted that, usually, it takes him about a week to forward the records to the Archives Section after he makes the entry of judgment, but in the subject decision, he transmitted the records to the Archives Section two (2) days after the issuance of the entry of judgment since, according to him, there were no other pending matters to be released to the Archives Section and the clearance had already been secured.

Justice Galvez, while finding no strong evidence of grave professional misconduct in the actuations of Atty. de Guzman, Jr., concluded nevertheless that the latter had not exercised the necessary prudence and caution in the performance of his duties. Considering the hurried issuance of the entry of judgment and the transmittal of records by Atty. de Guzman, Justice Galvez recommends that he be found guilty of misconduct in office only and that a fine of P2,000.00 be imposed upon him.

With regard to Mr. Sipin, Justice Galvez found that notwithstanding his long experience with the Court of Appeals, Mr. Sipin is not aware of the distinction between the date when judgment becomes final and the date when entry of judgment is made. Mr. Sipin claimed that he was only following the practice of his predecessors-in-office of placing the date of finality of judgment in the space alloted for the date of entry of judgment, as shown by samples of letters of transmittals made by the previous heads of the Archives Section. Justice Galvez concluded that while the inefficiency of Mr. Sipin should not be tolerated, it would be too drastic to recommend the imposition upon him of a more severe penalty than censure with warning that a repetition of the same mistake may bring about a more drastic penalty.

Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides the guidelines to be observed by the Division Clerks of Court and the Archives Section in entry of judgments and remand of the records. Section 5 thereof provides that after promulgation of the decision or final resolution, it shall be the duty of the Division Clerks of Court to see to it that the entry of judgment is made in due time without undue delay. As to when final judgments and resolutions should be entered, Sec. 1 provides the general rule that in civil and criminal cases, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties. A motion for extension of time to file petition for review should be considered part of the appeal process. However, Sec. 6 requires that in making entries of judgments, the Division Clerks of Court shall determine the finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails, computed from the last day of the period of appeal from the decision or final resolution, as follows: forty-five days, if the addressee is from Mindanao, including Palawan; thirty days, if the addressee is from Luzon, except Metro Manila; and ten days if the addressee is from Metro Manila.

The records also show that petitioner-spouses received on 12 October 1992 the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 1992. Hence, the fifteen-day period to appeal to the Supreme Court would expire on 27 October 1992. Applying Sec. 6, Rule 11, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, the Division Clerk of Court should enter the judgment after ten (10) more days from 27 October 1992 to give allowance for delay of the mail to petitioner-spouses who might have filed their appeal on time. This ten-day period would expire on 6 November 1992, after which, the Division Clerk of Court should enter the judgment without undue delay if the same has in fact become final and executory.

Before making the entry of judgment on 10 November 1992, Atty. de Guzman, Jr., should have first ascertained that no motion for reconsideration, appeal, petition for review, or motion for extension of time to file said petition had been filed. In the case before us, he made the verification only two (2) days after the judgment had already been entered. His contention that his delay in making the verification would not make any difference because there was nothing yet in the records of the Judicial Records Division to show that the motion for extension of time to file petition for review was received by the Court of Appeals, cannot be accepted as a defense. The fact remains that it is his duty and responsibility to ensure that before entering judgments and resolutions, the same have truly become final and executory. He should not have limited his verification to the records because, as it turned out, petitioner-spouses' Verified Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal By Certiorari was received by the Court of Appeals on 9 November 1992 except that, for unknown reasons, it was not promptly entered in the docket book.

Section 11, par. c(2), Rule 1, of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides that the Division Clerks of Court shall, among other duties and responsibilities, direct and supervise the staff of the Division; maintain the records of the Division in an orderly manner; keep watch over the status and progress of cases assigned to the Division; follow up papers, pleadings, motions, etc., filed with the Receiving Section in connection with any pending case and update the records of all cases. It is also their duty to maintain the correctness of the records by making the proper entries and corresponding certificates of final and executory judgments or orders.^[4]

By his own admission, Atty. de Guzman, Jr., immediately released the entry of judgment to the Archives Section for remand of the records two (2) days after its issuance, which is contrary to his usual practice of waiting for a week after the entry of judgment before transmitting the same to the Archives Section. While the law has always exhorted government employees, those in the Judiciary included, to perform their assigned tasks without undue delay, it should be emphasized that it should be done with prudence and caution to effectuate order in the governmental machinery, and never to defeat the exercise of a legitimate right as in this case.

The failure of Atty. de Guzman, Jr., to exercise the necessary diligence required of his duties is negligence on his part which warrants disciplinary action. Consequently, we impose upon him a fine of P2,000.00 for his failure to discharge the serious responsibility which his position entails.^[5]

As regards the administrative liability of Mr. Sipin for his premature remand of the records to the court of origin, we also fine him P500.00. The fact that it has been the practice of his predecessors-in-­office to put the date of finality of judgment in the blank space reserved for the date of entry of judgment in the prescribed form, assuming it to be true, cannot be a justification for his error. He is bound to adhere only to what the law provides, i.e., the date of entry of judgment is the date of actual recording of the judgment in the book of entries of judgments.^[6] Indeed, the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.^[7]

WHEREFORE, this Court finds Atty. Jose V. de Guzman, Jr., Division Clerk of Court, and Mr. Arsenio B. Sipin, Chief of the Archives Section, both of the Court of Appeals, GUILTY of negligence in the performance of their duties. Consequently, a fine of P2,000.00 is imposed upon Atty. Jose V. de Guzman, Jr., and P500.00 upon Mr. Arsenio B. Sipin, the amounts to be paid by them within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof with a warning to Mr. Sipin, who is still in the service, to be more assiduous in the performance of his duties and that a repetition of his negligence or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Penned by Justice Ricardo P. Galvez, concurred in by Justices Arturo B. Buena (Chairman) and Asaali S. Isnani.

^[2] Rollo, p. 83.

^[3] Rollo, p. 86.

^[4] Angeles v. Bantug, A.M. No. P-89-295, 29 May 1992, 209 SCRA 413.

^[5] It appears that before this Resolution could be formalized, Atty. de Guzman, Jr., opted to retire. His application for optional retirement was approved by this Court on 2 May 1994 (Adm. Matter No. 8293-Ret.).

^[6] Sec. 2, Rule 36, Revised Rules of Court.

^[7] Jereos, Jr. v. Reblando, Sr., Adm. Matter No. P-141, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 126.