DISSENTING OPINION

MELO, J.:

I have to express dissent, regrettably, to the majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and would rather concur wholeheartedly in the opinion penned by Mme. Justice Flerida R. Pineda-Romero. The highest traditions of this Court are best expressed in those cases where, without deviating from time-tested procedures in the prosecution of criminal cases, its latitudinarian approach in the protection of civil rights is manifested.

I agree that a stereotyped, mechanical, and unvarying invocation of the doctrine that appeal, not certiorari or prohibition, is the correct remedy to the denial of a motion to quash ignores fundamental principles of fairness and justice. Rules of procedure are intended to safeguard the interests of justice. Whether or not the prosecution of a criminal case should proceed should not be determined purely on procedural points.

This Court in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento (36 SCRA 247 [1970]) stated that "the right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation ..." It is not alone the right of an accused to have his guilt determined by a court of justice within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of legitimate defenses. Equally important is not to be brought to court at all, to be spared the embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of court litigation in proper cases. We stated in Acebedo that the remedy for the non-observance of the above rule is habeas corpus where the accused is already incarcerated or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. This is precisely what the decision is all about.

When a case like the instant petition, with all its attendant facts and circumstances, reaches us, it is not in the best traditions of the Supreme Court to automatically approach it in the impulsive and unvarying methodology of a criminal trial court and declare that the issues raised are matters of defense to be interposed only at the trial.

Indeed, not infrequently, this court has departed from the general rule and, taking cognizance of petitions for certiorari involving orders denying motions to quash on the ground that it would be unfair and unjust, and violative of the constitutional rights of an accused, to require him to undergo trial under an information which is legally flawed (Yap vs. Inciso, 105 Phil. 1307 [1959]; Pineda vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930 [1954]; Villa vs. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402 [1951]; Mead vs. Angel, 115 SCRA 256 [1982]), and so as to spare the courts from unnecessarily spending precious time and energy and to save the accused from the inconvenience, anxiety, and embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money in undergoing a trial for a case the proceedings in which could possibly be annulled for want of, or excess in, or with grave abuse of, jurisdiction (Villa vs. Ibanez, supra, and Mead vs. Angel, supra).

The inhibiting circumstances to the application of the doctrine that certiorari and prohibition will not lie against an order denying a motion to quash appear on record in this case as follows:

As stated, the criminal information for alleged falsification of public documents against petitioners involves the same charges which had been twice investigated, passed upon, and twice dismissed, for lack or insufficiency of evidence, and based on a positive finding of the genuineness and due execution by Jose Marcelo, Sr. of the Voting Trust Agreements in favor of Edward.

The First Case (I.S. No. 88-5729)

In July 1988, a criminal complaint against Edward and Marfil (I.S. No. 88-5729) for falsification of public documents and use thereof was filed by Mrs. Lilia S. Wells, a first cousin of both Jose, Jr. and Edward Marcelo. The documents alleged to have been falsified and involved were the six (6) Voting Trust Agreements executed by Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in favor of Edward.

In a resolution dated March 29, 1989, Rizal Provincial Prosecutor Mauro M. Castro, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence I.S. No. 88-5729 (Annex "C", Petition). The Provincial Prosecutor found that Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. actually did sign the Voting Trust Agreements. The Resolution, in part, reads:

And so this Office does not find any prima facie case for falsification or use of falsified documents nor that respondents are probably guilty of the crimes charged. For, while complainant relies on her own perception of a difference between signatures, respondents have presented witnesses, not just two, but three at the very least, who stated under oath that they had personally seen the late Marcelo sign the questioned VTAs. In the absence of any evidence showing that these witnesses are biased to the extent of perjury their statements are entitled to full faith and credit. (Annex C, Petition; p. 51, Rollo; Underscoring supplied.)

Wells then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. In a resolution dated August 27, 1989 (Annex D, Petition; p. 53-55, Rollo), the Department dismissed the Wells petition on the following grounds.

... The fact that the late Marcelo had the intention to execute the VTAs, as he did actually sign the same in favor of his son, Edward, has been substantially proven. Edward at the time, was already entrusted with such responsible positions as Secretary, Director, Vice President, Vice-Chairman, etc. and his being "the favorite son", is acknowledged by complainant. In their respective affidavits, Daniel T. Pascual and Celia Caburnay, Director and Asst. Corporate Secretary, respectively, of several Marcelo corporations, who both signed as witnesses to the VTAs attest to the fact that the directors gave their consent to resolutions authorizing the late Marcelo to execute VTAs in favor of Edward. Danilo Ibay, Chief Executive Officer of Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation also attests to the same fact. Magdaleno Cortez and Wilfredo Ersando, both directors of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation likewise swore to the truth that on February 21, 1987, the board in a regular meeting, unanimously passed a resolution authorizing Jose P. Marcelo to execute a Voting Trust Agreement in favor of Edward. The letter of George T. Marcelo (Annex 1 of Supplemental Affidavit, Edward Marcelo) who is residing in Australia confirms that the voting trust given to Edward by their father is genuine, his father having discussed the matter with him. Atty. Clarisa Penalosa of the Far East Bank and Trust Company also confirms that the late Marcelo had inquired on how to preserve the companies' assets and in her reply, dated November 27, 1985, she delineated schemes, among them, the execution of VTAs.

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Petitioner's (Well's) observation as to the difference between the contemporary and questioned signatures of the late Marcelo, the allegations of bias of respondent's witnesses and the issue as to the authenticity of the minutes of the board meetings showing the grant of authority to the late Marcelo to execute the VTAs, are nonetheless inconclusive to prove the alleged falsification. They are insufficient in the light of the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses to the actual signing of the VTAs by the late Marcelo and the uncontroverted proof of his prior intention to execute the same. (pp. 54-55, Rollo; Underscoring supplied.)

The Second Case (I.S. No. 91-3049)

Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285

RTC-Quezon City, Branch 96

After the Department of Justice dismissed the Wells complaint (I.S. No. 88-5729), Jose Marcelo filed a similar criminal complaint against Edward Marcelo, Marfil, Caburnay and Pascual involving the same voting trust agreements. This second complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 91-3049 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. We quote once again the narration by respondent Court of Appeals of the background facts, to wit:

On the basis of the investigating prosecutor's finding of a prima facie case (Annex "F", hereof), an Information for falsification against Edward, Marfil, Caburnay and Pascual was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 (Annex "G" hereof). This criminal case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-­21285.

Petitioners moved for a review of the prima facie finding of the investigating prosecutor (Annex "H" hereof). The review was conducted by the Review Division ("the Review Division") of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, upon motion of the prosecution and petitioners citing the pending Motion for Review, deferred the arraignment in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285.

On 15 November 1991, the Review Division recommended that the Information in Criminal Case Q-91-21285 be withdrawn (Annex "I" hereof).

The prosecution then moved to withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 (Annex "J" hereof). Petitioners, on the other hand, filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 be dismissed (Annex "K" hereof).

On 13 December 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96 dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 (Annex "L" hereof). (Annex A, Petition, p. 39, Rollo.)

In dismissing the Information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin, Presiding Judge of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, ruled:

The Court accords great respect to the findings of the Review Division which it finds to be based on substantial grounds and are highly persuasive. Therein, the Review Division squarely resolved the issue of whether or not the signatures of the late Jose Marcelo, Sr. in the six voting trust agreements (VTAs) were genuine. The Division reasonably concluded that there was no probable cause to hold the accused liable for falsification of the VTAs after agreeing with and adopting the conclusions of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in a case involving the same documents. (I.S. No. 88-5279)

In particular, the Division noted that the late elder Marcelo had intended to execute the VTA's in favor of his son Edward who was at the time already holding responsible positions in their business aside from being "the favorite son"; that Daniel Pascual and Celia Caburnay, accused herein, who were then a director and an assistant corporate secretary, respectively, of several Marcelo corporations and whose signatures were found on the VTAs in their capacities as witnesses, attested to the fact that the directors of the corporation had given their consent to the resolution authorizing the late elder Marcelo to execute the VTA's in favor of Edward; that Danilo Ibay, Chief Executive Officer of Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation, attested to the same facts, that Magdalena Cortez and Wilfredo Irsendo, Directors of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, likewise attested that on February 21, 1987, the Board of Directors had unanimously passed during a regular meeting a resolution authorizing the elder Marcelo to execute a VTA in favor of Edward; that even George Marcelo, now a resident of Australia, and brother of complainant and accused Edward Marcelo, had confirmed by letter the genuineness of the voting trust agreements executed by their father in favor of Edward. For the Court to close its eyes to these circumstances relied upon by the Division in rendering the resolution in question would be unwarranted and unreasonable in view of their persuasiveness.

Since the essence of the crime of falsification is malicious falsehood, the existence and concurrence of all the circumstances set forth in the questioned resolution absolutely exclude falsification.

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ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Dismiss of the accused and the Motion to Withdraw Information of public prosecutor are hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed without costs. (Annex Y, Petition, pp. 80-81, Rollo; Underscoring supplied.)

The Third Case (Crim. Case

No. Q-92-28104, RTC Quezon

City, Branch 101).

As further disclosed in the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals -?

Despite the Regional Trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-91-­21285, Jose Jr. appealed the resolution of the Review Division of the DOJ (Annex "M" hereof).

On 31 January 1992, the DOJ reversed the resolution of the Review Division and ordered the re-filing of an Information against petitioners (Annex "N").

An Information for falsification of public documents was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, against petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104. (Annex A, Petition, p. 40, Rollo.)

Petitioners contend in their instant petition, as they did in their motion to quash (Annex H, Petition, pp. 82-91, Rollo) the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104, RTC Quezon City Branch 101 presided by Judge Pedro Santiago, and in their petition in CA-G.R. No. 27681 (Annex K, Petition, pp. 103-127, Rollo) that:

When the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 96, through Honorable Judge Bersamin, took cognizance of the Resolution of the Review Division of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and on the basis thereof dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285, it did so in the exercise of its discretion and within the limits of its jurisdiction. The Prosecution can no longer question the dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 because in its order, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City Branch 96, made findings of fact and law that the evidence against the petitioners are insufficient to justify continuing with the criminal proceedings against them.

The appeal taken by Jose Jr. to the Secretary of Justice and the latter's review and reversal of the resolution of the Review Division of the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City are, therefore, null and void. The Secretary of Justice cannot interfere with Honorable Judge Bersamin's relative to the disposition of Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285. By taking cognizance of the appeal and issuing the Resolution, the Secretary of Justice usurped the power and authority of the Regional Trial Court to determine whether to continue with, or dismiss, the case.

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... respondent Judge should have granted the motion to quash or the Court of Appeals should have reversed the denial thereof through the writ of certiorari. By refusing to do so, respondent Judge and the Court of Appeals violated said rulings. (pp. 23 & 25, Rollo.)

Earlier cases decided by this Court persuade me that premised on the peculiar contextual background of the case at bench, the conclusions and opinion of Mme. Justice Romero are correct. In said cases (Velasguez vs. Undersecretary of Justice, 182 SCRA 388 [1990]; Balgos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 [1989]; Dungog vs. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 145 [1988]; Sta. Mining vs. Zabala, 153 SCRA 367 [1987]; Marquez vs. Alejo, 154 SCRA 302 [1987]), this Court laid down the rule that once an Information has already been filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over the case and the investigating fiscal or the Secretary of Justice should no longer entertain motions for reinvestigation.

I believe that the doctrine in Crespo vs. Mogul (151 SCRA 462 [1987] should be followed in this case.

The Court ruled in Crespo vs. Mogul that:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendation of the fiscal should be submitted to the court for appropriate action. (p. 463, Ibid; underscoring supplied)

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Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the court, the court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion ... (p. 463, Ibid; underscoring supplied)

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The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence … (p. 471, Ibid; underscoring supplied).

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In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the court. (at p. 47; Underscoring supplied.)

It is not so much the observance of what to me are mere technicalities of procedure and not substantial justice which should be emphasized. It should be the compliance with the principles of fairness and justice underlying the Crespo vs. Mogul and other similar decisions that must concern us. Under the circumstances of this case, we should not be overly apprehensive about the exact time when the trial court acted on a case clearly within its jurisdiction, whether or not petitioners should have withheld their motion to dismiss, whether or not the public prosecutor should have deferred his motion to withdraw the information while the period to appeal from the committee on review had not lapsed, whether or not express permission from the trial court for a reinvestigation is absolutely necessary or it may be impliedly waived if the court knowingly allows such a procedure to be followed and similar questions all revolving around technical rules of procedure. To me, whether or not Crespo vs. Mogul applies, the facts clearly show that to deny this petition would be to deny substantial justice. There is no new evidence in the records. The evidence twice dismissed by state prosecutors remains as inadequate as ever. The important point is not to allow the strong arm of the law to be used in an oppressive manner in such cases as the one before us.

I also respectfully submit that Judge Bersamin did not act hastily in dismissing the case and granting the prosecutor's motion to withdraw the information. I understand that the records of this case are around 400 pages. Judge Bersamin must have gone over the records. He had strong factual and legal grounds to conclude that the signature appearing in the questioned document is genuine.

The trial court had more than ample evidence to act as it did. I also submit with all due respect that even in a case before the Supreme Court, there may be instances when we should not only grant a motion to withdraw a petition but we may emphasize that the withdrawal be with prejudice on the ground that the petition has no merit and warrants dismissal. Indeed, it is not only the adjudicative function but also the more important role of emphasizing legal principles that leads us to decide cases which are technically moot and academic. In this respect Judge Bersamin did not really err.

In this case, whatever the Secretary of Justice says is only advisory and suggestive. The discretion to allow the withdrawal of the information and dismissal of the action is vested in the court. It is a discretion, a function of trial courts which we should honor and respect.

The Secretary of Justice thus, to my mind, exceeded his jurisdictional competence and acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the re-filing of the same criminal information against petitioners involving the same voting trust agreements notwithstanding the fact that Judge Bersamin in the second case (I.S. No. 91-3049; Civil Case No. Q-91-21285, RTC Quezon City, Branch 96) had already ordered its dismissal, as it was actually dismissed on December 13, 1991.

Further, on August 27, 1989, the Department of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the criminal charges filed by Mrs. Wells against Edward, etc. in I.S. No. 88-5279 involving the same voting trust agreements. The flip-flopping of the Department of Justice in the light of its earlier resolution in the first case (Wells) leaves much to be desired.

The re-filing of the same Information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 in Branch 101 of the RTC, Quezon City was unwarranted reprobation and reversal of Judge Bersamin's order dismissing the Information in the second case, which the Secretary of Justice has no authority whatsoever to do. From the time Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the second case and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, thereafter ordered the dismissal thereof for lack or insufficiency of evidence, the Secretary of Justice was divested of any authority to overturn such dismissal or to direct the re-filing of another information involving the same charges and the same voting trust agreements, in the absence, if it must be added, of new evidence. In Peralta vs. CFI (157 SCRA 476 [1988]), we held:

This Court finds no reason to reverse the action taken by the trial court. Once an information or complaint is filed in court, the matter of disposition of the case is left to the sound discretion of the court. When the trial court in the instant case granted the fiscal's motion to dismiss, it was within its prerogative to do so.

On the matter of propriety of appeals to Secretary of Justice for reinvestigation after the information or complaint has been filed in court, the pronouncement made by this Court in the Crespo case is applicable. In that case, the Court, although not entirely disregarding the power of review of the Secretary of Justice over the action of fiscals, imposed a limit on the exercise of such power, thus:

In order therefor(e) to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court; such a review of or appeal should no longer be entertained by the Secretary of Justice when the complaint or information had already been filed in court. The matter should be left entirely for determination of the court. (at p. 480)

In Velasquez vs. Undersecretary of Justice (182 SCRA 388 [1990]), we held:

The petition is meritorious. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that ... (at p. 391.)

The re-filing, therefore, of the Information with Branch 101 of the Quezon City RTC against petitioners by the Quezon City Prosecutor upon orders of the Secretary of Justice long after Branch 96 of the same court ordered the dismissal of the Information in the second case involving the same documents, was flawed and suffered from jurisdictional infirmity. The Information is thus susceptible to quashal. Acts done with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction must be struck down. The Information must be quashed. The peculiar circumstances of this case require no less than the issuance of the privileged writ of certiorari and prohibition to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice (Lopez vs. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616 [1966]). Petitioners have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. Appeal is neither a speedy nor an adequate remedy, given the factual milieu in the case.

To require petitioners to undergo the rigors of trial under an information which is tainted with jurisdictional infirmity, without prejudice to presenting the special defense they had invoked in their motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal, therefrom, which course of action was laid down by Judge Santiago and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals when it denied the petition in CA-G.R. No. 27681, would indeed be oppressive. Further, the trial court would be unnecessarily dragged into spending its precious time and energy, and petitioners exposed to the inconvenience, anxiety, and embarrassment, not to speak of the expenditure of time and money on a case which had been twice the subject of preliminary investigation, passed upon and twice dismissed for lack or insufficiency of evidence and absence of probable cause.

I, therefore, with the highest respect for the majority, must express my dissent and vote to give due course to the petition.

SEPARATE OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

I vote to grant the petition.

The records show that the information for falsification of public document docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 involves the same charges which had been twice investigated and dismissed. The first charge filed by Mrs. Wells was dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal and affirmed by the Department of Justice. On the other hand, the second charge filed by Jose T. Marcelo was the one where the Review Committee of Quezon City reversed the earlier recommendation finding probable cause. These dismissals were based on a positive finding of the genuineness and due execution by Jose T. Marcelo Sr. of the subject voting trust agreements in favor of Edward Marcelo.

The resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the filing of the information for falsification of the VTAs was issued after it found merit in the appeal from the Review Committee's resolution. The Secretary of Justice may, upon petition by a proper party, reverse the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation or dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.^[1] In this case, what is of consequence is the resolution of the Secretary of Justice which came after the lower court had already granted the motion to dismiss and the motion to withdraw information.

The rule regarding motions for reinvestigation once an information has already been filed in court is now settled.^[2] In the case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that:

"The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

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The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation."^[3]

According to the records, before petitioners could be arraigned, they filed a petition for review before the Review Committee which reversed the finding of Prosecutor Israel. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a motion to withdraw and the defense, a motion to dismiss which were granted by Judge Bersamin. This is in accord with Crespo where we said that "[a]fter such reinvestigation the finding and recommendation of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.^[4] Later, the Secretary of Justice reversed the Review Committee. Even conceding the power of the Secretary of Justice to review the action of the prosecutors, the Court has already cautioned him on the propriety of the appeals to him after an information or complaint has been filed in court in this manner:

"x x x the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court."^[5]

It bears stressing that if the Court is encouraging the Secretary of Justice to refrain from entertaining petitions for review or appeal once an information or complaint has been filed, there is greater reason for him to do so in this case where the lower court has already exercised its discretion based on the results of the reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice may no longer interfere once the case is pending before the trial court, with more reason should he avoid another review or appeal after the court has dismissed the same. Thus, in this case, we hold that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction when he reviewed the appeal and ordered the re-filing of the information against petitioners. The ultimate consequence of the Secretary of Justice's act of reviewing the findings of the Review Committee is the indirect reversal of the order of Judge Bersamin who is the "best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it." Such act of the Secretary of Justice is an unmitigated reprobation and reversal of Judge Bersamin's order over which the former has no authority whatsoever. Therefore, the information docketed as Q-92-28104 is susceptible to quashal.

^[1] Rule 112, Sec. 4, last par., Rules on Criminal Procedure.

^[2] Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice, G.R. No. 88442, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA 388; Balgos, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85590, August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA 287; Republic v. Sunga, L-38634, June 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 191; Almazar v. Cenzon, L-46188, May 28, 1988, 161 SCRA 545; Dungog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77850-51, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 145; Peralta v. Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, L-48011, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 476; Sta. Rosa Mining Company v. Zabala, L-44723, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 367; Marquez v. Alejo, L-40575, September 28, 1987, 154 SCRA 302; and Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. 53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462.

^[3] Crespo v. Mogul, supra at pp. 469-471.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Ibid, See also Almazan v. Cenzon and Peralta v. CFI of La Union, supra at 2.