DISSENTING OPINION

ROMERO, J.:

Few issues brought before this Court for resolution have roiled the citizenry as much as the instant case brought by nine petitioners which challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (to be referred to herein as the "Expanded Value Added Tax" or EVAT law to distinguish it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT law proper) that was enacted on May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has galvanized the populace into mass action and strident protest even as the EVAT proponents have taken to podia and media in a post facto information campaign.

The Court is confronted here with an atypical case. Not only is it a vatful of seething controversy but some unlikely petitioners invoke unorthodox remedies. Three Senator-petitioners would nullify a statute that bore the indispensable stamp of approval of their own Chamber with two of them publicly repudiating what they had earlier endorsed. With two former colleagues, one of them an erstwhile Senate President, making common cause with them, they would stay the implementation by the Executive Department of a law which they themselves have initiated. They address a prayer to a co-equal Department to probe their official acts for any procedural irregularities they have themselves committed lest the effects of these aberrations inflict such damage or irreparable loss as would bring down the wrath of the people on their heads.

To the extent that they perceive that a vital cog in the internal machinery of the Legislature has malfunctioned from having operated in blatant violation of the enabling Rules they have themselves laid down, they would now plead that this other Branch of Government step in, invoking the exercise of what is at once a delicate and awesome power. Undoubtedly, the case at bench is as much a test for the Legislature as it is for the Judiciary.

A backward glance on the Value Added Tax (VAT) is in order at this point.

The first codification of the country's internal revenue laws was effected with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 466, commonly known as the 'National Internal Revenue Code' which was approved an June 15, 1939 and took effect on July 1, 1939, although the provisions on the income tax were made retroactive to January 1, 1939.

"Since 1939 when the turnover tax was replaced by the manufacturer's sales tax, the Tax Code had provided for a single-stage value-added tax on original sales by manufacturers, producers and importers computed on the 'cost deduction method' and later, on the basis of the 'tax credit method.' The turnover tax was re-introduced in 1985 by Presidential Decree No. 1991 (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2006)."^[1]

In 1986, a tax reform package was approved by the Aquino Cabinet. It contained twenty-nine measures, one of which proposed the adoption of the VAT, as well as the simplification of the sales tax structure and the abolition of the turnover tax.

"Up until 1987, the system of taxing goods consisted of (a) an excise tax on certain selected articles (b) fixed and percentage taxes on original and subsequent sales, on importations and on milled articles and (c) mining taxes on mineral products. Services were subjected to percentage taxes based mainly on gross receipts."^[2]

On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order No 273 which adopted the VAT. From the former single-stage value-added tax, it introduced the multi-stage VAT system where "the value-added tax is imposed on the sale of and distribution process culminating in sale, to the final consumer. Generally described, the taxpayer (the seller) determines his tax liability by computing the tax on the gross selling price or gross receipt ("output tax") and subtracting or crediting the earlier VAT on the purchase or importation of goods or on the sale of service ("input tax") against the tax due on his own sale."^[3]

On January 1, 1988, implementing rules and regulations for the VAT were promulgated. President Aquino then issued Proclamation No. 219 on February 12, 1988 urging the public and private sectors to join the nationwide consumers' education campaign for VAT.

Soon after the implementation of Executive Order No. 273, its constitutionality was assailed before this Court in the case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc., et al. v. Tan.^[4]The four petitioners sought to nullify the VAT law "for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution."^[5] In dismissing the consolidated petitions, this Court stated:

"The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the VAT The Court can only look into and determine whether or not Executive Order No. 273 was enacted and made effective as law, in the manner required by and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to impede its application or continued implementation."^[6]

Although declared constitutional, the VAT law was sought to be amended from 1992 on by a series of bills filed in both Houses of Congress. In chronological sequence these were:

We now trace the course taken by H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No. 1129.

Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law even as the tax retained its multi-stage character.

At the oral hearing held on July 7, 1994, this Court delimited petitioners' arguments to the following issues culled from their respective petitions.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution?^[13]

Does it violate Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2, of the Constitution?^[14]

What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Does the law violate the following provisions in Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution:

1. Section 1^[15]

2. Section 4^[16]

3. Section 5^[17]

4. Section 10^[18]

Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1.    Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1^[19]

2.    Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3^[20]

As a result of the unedifying experience of the past where the Court had the propensity to steer clear of questions. it perceived to be "political" in nature, the present Constitution, in contrast, has explicitly expanded judicial power to include the duty of the courts, especially the Supreme Court, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."^[21] I submit that under this explicit mandate, the Court is empowered to rule upon acts of other Government entities for the purpose of determining whether there may have been, in fact, irregularities committed tantamount to violation of the Constitution, which case would clearly constitute a grave abuse of discretion on their part.

In the words of the sponsor of the above-quoted Article of the Constitution on the Judiciary, the former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter exhibit its wonted reticence by claiming that such matters constitute a political question"^[22]

In the instant petitions, this Court is called upon, not so much to exercise its traditional power of judicial review as to determine whether or not there has indeed been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Legislature amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Where there are grounds to resolve a case without touching on its constitutionality, the Court will do so with utmost alacrity in due deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored on the respect that must be accorded to the other branches of government which are coordinate, coequal and, as far as practicable, independent of one another.

Once it is palpable that the constitutional issue is unavoidable, then it is time to assume jurisdiction, provided that the following requisites for a judicial inquiry are met: that there must be an actual and appropriate case; a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself; the same being the lis mota of the case.^[23]

Having assured ourselves that the above-cited requisites are present in the instant petitions, we proceed to take them up.

ARTICLE VI, SECTION 24

Some petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 as being in violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution which provides:

"All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."

In G.R. Nos. 115455 and 115781, petitioners argue:

(a) The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The Senate, after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630, and proceeded to vote and approve the same after second and third readings.

(b) The Senate exceeded its authority to "propose or concur with amendments" when it submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630, recommending its approval "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."

(c) H. B. No. 11197 was not deliberated upon by the Senate. Neither was it voted upon by the Senate on second and third readings, as what was voted upon was S.B. No 1630.

Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for word from Article VI, Section 18 of the 1935 Constitution which was, in turn, patterned after Article I, Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the United States, which states:

"All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills."

The historical precedent for requiring revenue bills to originate in Congress is explained in the U.S. case of Morgan v. Murray:^[24]

"The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives stemmed from a remedial outgrowth of the historic conflict between Parliament (i.e., Commons) and the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially appointive and hereditary Lords was patent. See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 267, 268, 8th Ed., 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed. There was a measure of like justification for the insertion of the provision of article I, S 7, cl. 1, of the Federal Constitution. At that time (1787) and thereafter until the adoption (in 1913) of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct election of senators, the members of the United States Senate were elected for each state by the joint vote of both houses of the Legislature of the respective states, and hence, were removed from the people. x x x"

The legislative authority under the 1935 Constitution being unicameral, in the form of the National Assembly, it served no purpose to include the subject provision in the draft submitted by the 1934 Constitutional Convention to the Filipino people for ratification.

In 1940, however, the Constitution was amended to establish a bicameral Congress of the Philippines composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate.

In the wake of the creation of a new legislative machinery, new provisions were enacted regarding the law-making power of Congress. The National Assembly explained how the final formulation of the subject provision came about:

"The concurrence of both houses would be necessary to the enactment of a law. However, all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, although the Senate could propose or concur with amendments.

In one of the first drafts of the amendments, it was proposed to give both houses equal powers in lawmaking. There was, however, much opposition on the part of several members of the Assembly. In another draft, the following provision, more restrictive than the present provision in the amendment, was proposed and for sometime was seriously considered:

'All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular sessions of the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the president for corresponding action.'

However, the special committee voted finally to report the present amending provision as it is now worded; and in that form it was approved by the National Assembly with the approval of Resolution No. 38 and later of Resolution No. 73."^[25] (Underscoring supplied)

Thus: the present Constitution is identically worded as its 1935 precursor. "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." (Underscoring supplied)

That all revenue bills, such as Republic Act No. 7716, should "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives" logically flows from the more representative and broadly-based character of this Chamber.

"It is said that the House of Representatives being the more popular branch of the legislature, being closer to the people, and having more frequent contacts with them than the Senate, should have the privilege of taking the initiative in the proposals of revenue and tax projects, the disposal of the people's money, and the contracting of public indebtedness.

These powers of initiative in the raising and spending of public funds enable the House of Representatives not only to implement but even to determine the fiscal policies of the government. They place on its shoulders much of the responsibility of solving the financial problems of the government, which are so closely related to the economic life of the country, and of deciding on the proper distribution of revenues for such uses as may best advance public interests."^[26]

The popular nature of the Lower House has been more pronounced with the inclusion of Presidentially-appointed sectoral representatives, as provided in Article VI, Section 5 (2), of the Constitution, thus: "The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party- list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Underscoring supplied)

This novel provision which was implemented in the Batasang Pambansa during the martial law regime^[27] was eventually incorporated in the present Constitution in order to give those from the marginalized and often deprived sector, an opportunity to have their voices heard in the halls of the Legislature, thus giving substance and meaning to the concept of "people empowerment."

That the Congressmen indeed have access to, and consult their constituencies has been demonstrated often enough by the fact that even after a House bill has been transmitted to the Senate for concurrence, some Congressmen have been known to express their desire to change their earlier official position or reverse themselves after having heard their constituents' adverse reactions to their representations.

In trying to determine whether the mandate of the Constitution with regard to the initiation of revenue bills has been preserved inviolate, we have recourse to the tried and tested method of definition of terms. The term "originate" is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary (3rd Edition, 1986) as follows: "v.i., to come into being, begin; to start."

On the other hand, the word "exclusively" is defined by the same Webster's Dictionary as "in an exclusive manner; to the exclusion of all others; only; as, it is his, exclusively." Black's Law Dictionary has this definition: "apart from all others; only; solely, substantially all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all others; without admission of others to participation; in a manner to exclude. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex Civ. App. 142 S. W. 2d 519, 521, 522, 523. "

This Court had occasion to define the term "exclusive" as follows:

". . . In its usual and generally accepted sense, the term means possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone; not including, admitting or pertaining to another or others; undivided, sole."^[28]

When this writer, during the oral argument of July 7, 1994, asked the petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 whether he considers the word "exclusively" to be synonymous with "solely," he replied in the affirmative.^[29]

A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in this decision shows that the original VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, was sought to be amended by ten House bills which finally culminated in House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is to be noted that the first House Bill No. 253 was filed on July 22, 1992, and two other House bills followed in quick succession on August 10 and September 9, 1992 before a Senate Resolution, namely, Senate Res. No. 734, was filed on September 10, 1992 and much later, a Senate Bill proper, viz., Senate Bill No. 1129 on March 1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these bills originated or had their start in the House and before any Senate bill amending the VAT law was filed. In point of time and venue, the conclusion is ineluctable that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue measure, originated in the House of Representatives in the form of House Bill No. 253, the first EVAT bill.

Additionally, the content and substance of the ten amendatory House Bills filed over the roughly one-year period from July 1992 to August 1993 reenforce the position that these revenue bills, pertaining as they do, to Executive Order No. 273, the prevailing VAT law, originated in the Lower House.

House Bill Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100 were intended to restructure the VAT system by exempting or imposing the tax on certain items or otherwise introducing reforms in the mechanics of implementation.^[30] Of these, House Bill No. 9210 was favored with a Presidential certification on the need for its immediate enactment to meet a public emergency. Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue performance of the VAT, being far from satisfactory since the collections have always fallen short of projections, "the system is rendered inefficient, inequitable and less comprehensive." Hence, the Bill proposed several amendments designed to widen the tax base of the VAT and enhance its administration.^[31]

That House Bill No. 11197 being a revenue bill, originated from the Lower House was acknowledged, in fact was virtually taken for granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee, the Members agreed to make the House Bill as the "frame of reference" or "base" of the discussions of the Bicameral Conference Committee with the "amendments" or "insertions to emanate from the Senate."^[32]

As to whether the bills originated exclusively in the Lower House is altogether a different matter. Obviously, bills amendatory of VAT did not originate solely in the House to the exclusion of all others for there were P.S. Res. No. 734 filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992 followed by Senate Bill No. 1129 which was filed on March 1, 1993. About a year later, this was substituted by Senate Bill No. 1630 that eventually became the EVAT law, namely, Republic Act No. 7716.

Adverting to the passage of the amendatory VAT bills in the Lower House, it is to be noted that House Bill No. 11197 which substituted all the prior bills introduced in said House complied with the required readings, that is, the first reading consisting of the reading of the title and referral to the appropriate Committee, approval on second reading on November 11, 1993 and on third reading on November 17, 1993 before being finally transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate, its identity was preserved and its provisions were taken into consideration when the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. Report No. 349 which recommended for approval "S.B. No. 1630 in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H B No 11197." At this stage, the subject bill may be considered to have passed first reading in the Senate with the submission of said Committee Report No. 349 by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to which it had been referred earlier. What remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate Bill No. 1630. Thence, the Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to the Lower House for its concurrence and amendments, if any, took a "shortcut," bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate Bill No. 1630 on both second and third readings on the same day, March 24, 1994.

The first irregularity, that is, the failure to return Senate Bill No. 1630 to the Lower House for its approval is fatal inasmuch as the other chamber of legislature was not afforded the opportunity to deliberate and make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no less than the Constitution ordains: "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. . ."^[33] (Underscoring supplied)

It is to be pointed out too, that inasmuch as Senate Bill No. 1630 which had "taken into consideration" House Bill No. 11197 was not returned to the Lower House for deliberation, the latter Chamber had no opportunity at all to express its views thereon or to introduce any amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has considered the Lower House Bill, it returns the same to the House of origin with its amendments. In the event that there may be any differences between the two, the same shall then be referred to a Conference Committee composed of members from both Chambers which shall then proceed to reconcile said differences.

In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter that it had "passed S. No. 1630 entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing provisions of said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the Senate requests a conference . . ." This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349 of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means had already recommended for approval on February 7, 1994 "S.B. No. 1630 . . . taking into consideration H.B. No. 11197." Clearly, the Conference Committee could only have acted upon Senate Bill No. 1630, for House Bill No. 11197 had already been fused into the former.

At the oral hearing of July 7, 1994, petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 admitted, in response to this writer's query, that he had attempted to rectify some of the perceived irregularities by presenting a motion in the Senate to recall the bill from the Conference Committee so that it could revert to the period of amendment, but he was outvoted, in fact "slaughtered."^[34]

In accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate, Republic Act No. 7716 was duly authenticated after it was signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives followed by the certifications of the Secretary of the Senate and the Acting Secretary General of the House of Representatives.^[35] With the signature of President Fidel V. Ramos under the words "Approved: 5 May 1994," it was finally promulgated.

Its legislative journey ended, Republic Act No. 7716 attained the status of an enrolled bill which is defined as one "which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the governor (or president) and filed by the secretary of state."^[36]

Stated differently:

"It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."^[37]

The enrolled bill assumes importance when there is some variance between what actually transpired in the halls of Congress, as reflected in its journals, and as shown in the text of the law as finally enacted. But suppose the journals of either or both Houses fail to disclose that the law was passed in accordance with what was certified to by their respective presiding officers and the President. Or that certain constitutional requirements regarding its passage were not observed, as in the instant case. Which shall prevail: the journal or the enrolled bill?

A word on the journal.

"The journal is the official record of the acts of a legislative body. It should be a true record of the proceedings arranged in chronological order. It should be a record of what is done rather than what is said. The journal should be a clear, concise, unembellished statement of all proposals made and all actions taken complying with all requirements of constitutions, statutes, charters or rules concerning what is to be recorded and how it is to be recorded."^[38]

Article VI, Section 16 (4) of the Constitution ordains:

"Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings." (Underscoring supplied)

The rationale behind the above provision and of the "journal entry rule" is as follows:

"It is apparent that the object of this provision is to make the legislature show what it has done, leaving nothing whatever to implication. And, when the legislature says what it has done, with regard to the passage of any bill, it negatives the idea that it has done anything else in regard thereto. Silence proves nothing where one is commanded to speak. . . . Our constitution commands certain things to be done in regard to the passage of a bill, and says that no bill shall become a law unless these things are done. It seems a travesty upon our supreme law to say that it guaranties to the people the right to have their laws made in this manner only, and that there is no way of enforcing this right, or for the court to say that this is law when the constitution says it is not law. There is one safe course which is in harmony with the constitution, and that is to adhere to the rule that the legislature must show, as commanded by the constitution, that it has done everything required by the constitution to be done in the serious and important matter of making laws. This is the rule of evidence provided by the constitution. It is not presumptuous in the courts, nor disrespectful to the legislature, to judge the acts of the legislature by its own evidence."^[39]

Confronted with a discrepancy between the journal proceedings and the law as duly enacted, courts have indulged in different theories. The "enrolled bill" and "journal entry" rules, being rooted deep in the Parliamentary practices of England where there is no written constitution, and then transplanted to the United States, it may be instructive to examine which rule prevails in the latter country through which, by a process of legislative osmosis, we adopted them in turn.

"There seems to be three distinct and different rules as applicable to the enrolled bill recognized by the various courts of this country. The first of these rules appears to be that the enrolled bill is the ultimate proof and exclusive and conclusive evidence that the bill passed the legislature in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Such has been the holding in California, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, Washington, New Mexico, Mississippi, Indiana, South Dakota, and may be some others.

The second of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill is a verity and resort cannot be had to the journals of the Legislature to show that the constitutional mandates were not complied with by the Legislature, except as to those provisions of the Constitution, compliance with which is expressly required to be shown on the journal. This rule has been adopted in South Carolina, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah, Ohio, New Jersey, United States Supreme Court, and others.

The third of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill raises only a prima facie presumption that the mandatory provisions of the Constitution have been complied with and that resort may be had to the journals to refute that presumption, and if the constitutional provision is one, compliance with which is expressly required by the Constitution to be shown on the journals, then the mere silence of the journals to show a compliance therewith will refute the presumption. This rule has been adopted in Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona, Oregon, New Jersey, Colorado, and others."^[40]

In the 1980 case of D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court of Kentucky which had subscribed in the past to the first of the three theories, made the pronouncement that it had shifted its stand and would henceforth adopt the third. It justified its changed stance, thus:

"We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the 'extrinsic evidence' rule . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met."^[41]

What rule, if any, has been adopted in this jurisdiction?

Advocates of the "journal entry rule" cite the 1916 decision in U.S. v. Pons^[42] where this Court placed reliance on the legislative journals to determine whether Act No. 2381 was passed on February 28, 1914 which is what appears in the Journal, or on March 1, 1914 which was closer to the truth. The confusion was caused by the adjournment sine die at midnight of February 28, 1914 of the Philippine Commission.

A close examination of the decision reveals that the Court did not apply the "journal entry rule" vis-a-vis the "enrolled bill rule" but the former as against what are "behind the legislative journals."

"Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit."^[43]

It is to be noted from the above that the Court "passed over" the probative value to be accorded to the enrolled bill.

Opting for the journals, the Court proceeded to explain:

"From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature."^[44]

Following the courts in the United States since the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after that of the Federal Government, the Court did not hesitate to follow the courts in said country, i.e., to consider the journals decisive of the point at issue. Thus: "The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals."^[45]

The Court made a categorical stand for the "enrolled bill rule" for the first time in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito^[46] where it held that an enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the Members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In this connection, the Court invoked the "enrolled bill rule" in this wise: "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born of that respect."^[47]

Mindful that the U.S. Supreme Court is on the side of those who favor the rule and for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body (i.e., Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210), the Court said that "duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." Without pulling the legal underpinnings from U. S. v. Pons, it justified its position by saying that if the Court at the time looked into the journals, "in all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence" and that "even if both the journals and authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrolled theory; for as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in Section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended."^[48] Three Justices voiced their dissent from the majority decision.

Again, the Court made its position plain in the 1963 case of Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez^[49]when a unanimous Court ruled that: "The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree." According to Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1983, the word "tenor" means, among others, "the general drift of something spoken or written; intent, purport, substance."

Thus, the Court upheld the respondent Auditor General's interpretation that Republic Act No. 2609 really exempted from the margin fee on foreign exchange transactions "urea formaldehyde" as found in the law and not "urea and formaldehyde" which petitioner insisted were the words contained in the bill and were so intended by Congress.

In 1969, the Court similarly placed the weight of its authority behind the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled in Morales v. Subido that "the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. x x x Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes."^[50] The alleged omission of a phrase in the final Act was made, not at any stage of the legislative proceedings, but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof.

But the Court did include a caveat that qualified the absoluteness of the "enrolled bill" rule stating:

"By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution (Art. VI, secs. 10 [4], 20 [1], and 21 [1]) expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide (Cf. e.g., Wilkes Country Comm'rs. v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 [1900]). All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy." ^[51]

More recently, in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,^[52] this Court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the entire hierarchy of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled bill rule alone as to both "enrolled bill and legislative journals." Through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, we stated: "Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted, i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy."

Aware of the shifting sands on which the validity and continuing relevance of the "enrolled bill" theory rests, I have taken pains to trace the history of its applicability in this jurisdiction, as influenced in varying degrees by different Federal rulings.

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.

Certainly, "courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts - whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever - not over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.^[53]

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith.

EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE BICAMERAL

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

One of the issues raised in these petitions, especially in G.R. Nos. 115781, 115543 and 115754, respectively, is whether or not

"Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution) when it approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report which embodied, in violation of Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate, a radically altered tax measure containing provisions not reported out or discussed in either House as well as provisions on which there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and, worse, provisions contrary to what the House and the Senate had approved after three separate readings."^[54]

and

"By adding or deleting provisions, when there was no conflicting provisions between the House and Senate versions, the BICAM acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of jurisdiction. x x x In adding to the bill and thus subjecting to VAT, real properties, media and cooperatives despite the contrary decision of both Houses, the BICAM exceeded its jurisdiction or acted with such abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of jurisdiction. . ."^[55]

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution.^[56]

A conference committee has been defined:

". . . unlike the joint committee is two committees, one appointed by each house. It is normally appointed for a specific bill and its function is to gain accord between the two houses either by the recession of one house from its bill or its amendments or by the further amendment of the existing legislation or by the substitution of an entirely new bill. Obviously the conference committee is always a special committee and normally includes the member who introduced the bill and the chairman of the committee which considered it together with such other representatives of the house as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation [1940] 220. See also Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864 [1952]; Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee [U of III. Press, 1951)."^[57]

From the foregoing definition, it is clear that a bicameral conference committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of the legislative body under its power to determine rules of its proceedings under Article VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its life and vitality from the rules governing its creation. The why, when, how and wherefore of its operations, in other words, the parameters within which it is to function, are to be found in Section 26, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate and Section 85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, respectively, which provide:

Rule XII, Rules of the Senate

"SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 8 of Rule Ill.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members."

Rules of the House of Representatives

"SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports. - In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committee of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General."

Under these Rules, a bicameral conference committee comes into being only when there are disagreements and differences between the Senate and the House with regard to certain provisions of a particular legislative act which have to be reconciled.

Jefferson's Manual, which, according to Section 112, Rule XLIX of the Senate Rules, supplements it, states that a conference committee is usually called "on the occasion of amendments between the Houses" and "in all cases of difference of opinion between the two Houses on matters pending between them."^[58] It further states:

"The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them, and may not include subjects not within the disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. But they may perfect amendments committed to them if they do not in so doing go beyond the differences. x x x Managers may not change the text to which both Houses have agreed."^[59] (Underscoring supplied.)

Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedures which is also considered as controlling authority for any situation not covered by a specific legislative rule,^[60] states that either House may "request a conference with the other on any matter of difference or dispute between them" and that in such a request, "the subject of the conference should always be stated."^[61]

In the Philippines, as in the United States, the Conference Committee exercises such a wide range of authority that they virtually constitute a third House in the Legislature. As admitted by the Solicitor General, "It was the practice in past Congresses for Conference Committees to insert in bills approved by the two Houses new provisions that were not originally contemplated by them."^[62]

In Legislative Procedure, Robert Luce gives a graphic description of the milieu and the circumstances which have conspired to transform an initially innocuous mechanism designed to facilitate legislative action into an all-powerful Frankenstein that brooks no challenge to its authority even from its own members.

"Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be accepted without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matters and so the motion to accept has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal chance to develop more strength.

xxx                                                                     xxx                                                                               xxx

Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who resents and would resist this theft of his rights, finds himself helpless. Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in the matter of any fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record himself as protesting against some one feature while accepting the measure as whole. Worst of all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try to improve what the other branch has done.

This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a degree the abandonment of whatever advantage the bicameral system may have. By so much it in effect transfers the lawmaking power to a small group of members who work out in private a decision that almost always prevails. What is worse, these menare not chosen in a way to ensure the wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as conferees the ranking members of the committee, so that the accident of seniority determines. Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of who are most competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes giving way to favor, rarely to merit.

xxx                                                                     xxx                                                                               xxx

Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is unscientific and therefore defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and judgment by all the wisdom available. Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that process by which every amendment is secured independent discussion and vote. x x x."^[63] (Underscoring supplied)

Not surprisingly has it been said: "Conference Committee action is the most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process; it is an appropriate target for legislative critics."^[64]

In the case at bench, petitioners insist that the Conference Committee to which Senate Bill No. 1630 and House Bill No. 11197 were referred for the purpose of harmonizing their differences, overreached themselves in not confining their "reconciliation" function to those areas of disagreement in the two bills but actually making "surreptitious insertions" and deletions which amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.

At this point, it becomes imperative to focus on the errant provisions which found their way into Republic Act No. 7716. Below is a breakdown to facilitate understanding the grounds for petitioners' objections:

INSERTIONS MADE BY BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (BICAM) TO SENATE BILL (SB) NO. 1630 AND HOUSE BILL (HB) NO. 11197

1. Sec. 99 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)

(1) Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges goods OR PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES PERSONAL PROPERTIES.

(2) The SB completely changed the said section and defined a number of words and phrases. Also, Section 99-A was added which included one who sells, exchanges, barters PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.

(3) The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754).

2. Section 100 (VAT on Sale of Goods)

The term "goods" or "properties" includes the following, which were not found in either the HB or the SB:

- In addition to radio and television time; SATTELITE TRANSMISSION AND CABLE TELEVISION TIME.

- The term "Other similar properties" was deleted, which was present in the HB and the SB

- Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course or business were included, which was neither in the HB nor the SB (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754).

3. Section 102

On what are included in the term "sale or exchange of services," as to make them subject to VAT, the BICAM included/inserted the following (not found in either House or Senate Bills):

1. Services of lessors of property, whether personal or real (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754);

2. Warehousing services;

3. Keepers of resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts;

4. Common carriers by land, air and sea;

5. Services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph;

6. Radio and television broadcasting;

7. All other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this Code (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115852);

8. Services of surety, fidelity, indemnity, and bonding companies;

9. Also inserted by the BICAM (on page 8 thereof) is the lease or use of or the right to use of satellite transmission and cable television time.

4. Section 103 (Exempt Transactions)

The BICAM deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its inclusion in both the House and Senate Bills. Therefore, under Republic Act No. 7716, the "printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is not devoted principally to the publication of advertisements" is subject to VAT (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115931 and G.R. No. 115544).

The HB and SB did not touch Subsection (g) but it was amended by the BICAM by changing the word TEN to FIVE. Thus, importation of vessels with tonnage of more than five thousand tons is VAT exempt.

Subsection L, which was identical in the HB and the SB that stated that medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services were exempted from the VAT was amended by the BICAM by adding the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS, thus subjecting doctors, dentists and veterinarians to the VAT.

Subsection U which exempts from VAT "transactions which are exempt under special laws," was amended by the BICAM by adding the phrase: EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, AND 1590, AND NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES UNDER RA 6938 (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115873), not found in either the HB or the SB, resulting in the inclusion of all cooperatives to the VAT, except non-electric cooperatives.

The sale of real properties was included in the exempt transactions under the House Bill, but the BICAM qualified this with the provision:

"(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS DEFINED BY RA NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS." (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754)

The BICAM also exempted the sale of properties, the receipts of which are not less than P480,000.00 or more than P720,000.00. Under the SB, no amount was given, but in the HB it was stated that receipts from the sale of properties not less than P350,000.00 nor more than P600,000.00 were exempt.

It did not include, as VAT exempt, the sale or transfer of securities, as defined in the Revised Securities Act (BP 178) which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.

5. Section 104

Not included in the HB or the SB is the phrase "INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS" which was inserted by the BICAM in Section 104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax packaging materials and the phrase "ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PAID" in Section 104 (A) (2).

6. Section 107

Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT registration fee but this was increased by BICAM to P1,000.00.

7. Section 112

Regarding a person whose sales or receipts are exempt under Section 103 (w), the BICAM inserted the phrase: "THREE PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER," although the SB and the HB provide only "three percent of his gross quarterly sales."

8. Section 115

The BICAM adopted the HB version which subjects common carriers by land, air or water for the transport of passengers to 3% of their gross quarterly sales, which is not found in the SB.

9. Section 117

The BICAM amended this section by subjecting franchises on electric, gas and water utilities to a tax of two percent (2%) on gross receipts derived x x x, although neither the HB nor the SB has a similar provision.

10. Section 17 (d)

(a) The BICAM defers for only 2 years the VAT on services of actors and actresses although the SB defers it for 3 years.

(b) The BICAM uses the word "EXCLUDE" in the section on deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and services. The HB does not contain any counterpart provision and SB only allows deferment for no longer than 3 years.

11. Section 18 on the Tax Administration Development Fund is an entirely new provision not contained in the House/Senate Bills. This fund is supposed to ensure effective implementation of Republic Act No. 7716.

12. Section 19

No period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations is found in the HB or the SB but BICAM provided "within 90 days" which found its way in Republic Act No. 7716.

Even a cursory perusal of the above outline will convince one that, indeed, the Bicameral Conference Committee (henceforth to be referred to as BICAM) exceeded the power and authority granted in the Rules of its creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the Conference Committee in almost identical language to the settlement of differences in the provisions or amendments to any bill or joint resolution. If it means anything at all, it is that there are provisions in subject bill, to start with, which differ and, therefore, need reconciliation. Nowhere in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or propose completely new matter. Although under certain rules on legislative procedure, like those in Jefferson's Manual, a conference committee may introduce germane matters in a particular bill, such matters should be circumscribed by the committee's sole authority and function to reconcile differences.

Parenthetically, in the Senate and in the House, a matter is "germane" to a particular bill if there is a common tie between said matter and the provisions which tend to promote the object and purpose of the bill it seeks to amend. If it introduces a new subject matter not within the purview of the bill, then it is not "germane" to the bill.^[65] The test is whether or not the change represented an amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of an entirely new and different subject matter.^[66]

In the BICAM, however, the germane subject matter must be within the ambit of the disagreement between the two Houses. If the "germane" subject is not covered by the disagreement but it is reflected in the final version of the bill as reported by the Conference Committee or, if what appears to be a "germane" matter in the sense that it is "relevant or closely allied"^[67] with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a disagreement between the Senate and the House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter or even a "rider" which should never be considered legally passed for not having undergone the three-day reading requirement. Insertion of new matter on the part of the BICAM is, therefore, an ultra vires actwhich makes the same void.

The determination of what is "germane" and what is not may appear to be a difficult task but the Congress, having been confronted with the problem before, resolved it in accordance with the rules. In that case, the Congress approved a Conference Committee's insertion of new provisions that were not contemplated in any of the provisions in question between the Houses simply because of the provision in Jefferson's Manual that conferees may report matters "which are germane modifications of subjects in disagreement between the Houses and the committee.^[68] In other words, the matter was germane to the points of disagreement between the House and the Senate.

As regards inserted amendments in the BICAM, therefore, the task of determining what is germane to a bill is simplified, thus: If the amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of disagreement between the two Houses, then they are not germane to the purpose of the bill.

In the instant case before us, the insertions and deletions made do not merely spell an effort at settling conflicting provisions but have materially altered the bill, thus giving rise to the instant petitions on the part of those who were caught unawares by the legislative legerdemain that took place. Going by the definition of the word "amendment" in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, which means "to change or modify for the better; to alter by modification, deletion, or addition," said insertions and deletions constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated Article VI, Section 26 (2) which provides inter alia:"Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed . . ." This proscription is intended to subject all bills and their amendments to intensive deliberation by the legislators and the ample ventilation of issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections thereon. The same rationale underlies the three-reading requirement to the end that no surprises may be sprung on an unsuspecting citizenry.

Provisions of the "now you see it, now you don't" variety, meaning those which were either in the House and/or Senate versions but simply disappeared or were "bracketed out" of existence in the BICAM Report, were eventually incorporated in Republic Act No. 7716. Worse, some goods, properties or services which were not covered by the two versions and, therefore, were never intended to be so covered, suddenly found their way into the same Report. No advance notice of such insertions prepared the rest of the legislators, much less the public who could be adversely affected, so that they could be given the opportunity to express their views thereon. Well has the final BICAM report been described, therefore, as an instance of "taxation without representation."

That the conferees or delegates in the BICAM representing the two Chambers could not possibly be charged with bad faith or sinister motives or, at the very least, unseemly behavior, is of no moment. The stark fact is that items not previously subjected to the VAT now fell under its coverage without interested sectors or parties having been afforded the opportunity to be heard thereon. This is not to say that the Conference Committee Report should have undergone the three readings required in Article VI, Section 26 (2), for this clearly refers only to bills which, after having been initially filed in either House, negotiated the labyrinthine passage therein until its approval. The composition of the BICAM including as it usually does, the Chairman of the appropriate Committee, the sponsor of the bill and other interested members ensures an informed discussion, at least with respect to the disagreeing provisions. The same does not obtain as regards completely new matter which suddenly spring on the legislative horizon.

It has been pointed out that such extraneous matters notwithstanding, all Congressmen and Senators were given the opportunity to approve or turn down the Committee Report in toto, thus "curing" whatever defect or irregularity it bore.

Earlier in this opinion, I explained that the source of the acknowledged power of this ad hoc committee stems from the precise fact that, the meetings, being scheduled "take it or leave it" basis. It has not been uncommon for legislators who, for one reason or another have been frustrated in their attempt to pass a pet bill in their own chamber, to work for its passage in the BICAM where it may enjoy a more hospitable reception and faster approval. In the instant case, had there been full, open and unfettered discussion on the bills during the Committee sessions, there would not have been as much vociferous objections on this score. Unfortunately, however, the Committee held two of the five sessions behind closed doors, sans stenographers, record-takers and interested observers. To that extent, the proceedings were shrouded in mystery and the public's right to information on matters of public concern as enshrined in Article Ill, Section 7^[69] and the government's policy of transparency in transactions involving public interest in Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution^[70] are undermined.

Moreover, that which is void ab initio such as the objectionable provisions in the Conference Committee Report, cannot be "cured" or ratified. For all intents and purposes, these never existed. Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt. Things that are invalid from the beginning are not made valid by a subsequent act.

Should this argument be unacceptable, the "enrolled bill" doctrine, in turn, is invoked to support the proposition that the certification by the presiding officers of Congress, together with the signature of the President, bars further judicial inquiry into the validity of the law. I reiterate my submission that the "enrolled bill ruling" may be applicable but only with respect to questions pertaining to the procedural enactment, engrossment, printing, the insertion or deletion of a word or phrase here and there, but would draw a dividing line with respect to substantial substantive changes, such as those introduced by the BICAM herein.

We have before us then the spectacle of a body created by the two Houses of Congress for the very limited purpose of settling disagreements in provisions between bills emanating therefrom, exercising the plenary legislative powers of the parent chambers but holding itself exempt from the mandatory constitutional requirements that are the hallmarks of legislation under the aegis of a democratic political system. From the initial filing, through the three readings which entail detailed debates and discussions in Committee and plenary sessions, and on to the transmittal to the other House in a repetition of the entire process to ensure exhaustive deliberations - all these have been skipped over. In the proverbial twinkling of an eye, provisions that probably may not have seen the light of day had they but run their full course through the legislative mill, sprang into existence and emerged full-blown laws.

Yet our Constitution vests the legislative power in "the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. . . ."^[71] and not in any special, standing or super committee of its own creation, no matter that these have been described, accurately enough, as "the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house."

Firstly, that usage or custom has sanctioned this abbreviated, if questionable, procedure does not warrant its being legitimized and perpetuated any longer. Consuetudo, contra rationem introducta, potius usurpatio quam consuetudo appellari debet. A custom against reason is rather an usurpation. In the hierarchy of sources of legislative procedure, constitutional rules, statutory provisions and adopted rules (as for example, the Senate and House Rules), rank highest, certainly much ahead of customs and usages.

Secondly, is this Court to assume the role of passive spectator or indulgent third party, timorous about exercising its power or more importantly, performing its duty, of making a judicial determination on the issue of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by the other branches or instrumentalities of government, where the same is properly invoked? The time is past when the Court was not loathe to raise the bogeyman of the political question to avert a head-on collision with either the Executive or Legislative Departments. Even the separation of powers doctrine was burnished to a bright sheen as often as it was invoked to keep the judiciary within bounds. No longer does this condition obtain. Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution partly quoted in this paragraph has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now safely fulfill its mandate of delimiting the powers of co-equal departments like the Congress, its officers or its committees which may have no compunctions about exercising legislative powers in full.

Thirdly, dare we close our eyes to the presumptuous assumption by a runaway committee of its progenitor's legislative powers in derogation of the rights of the people, in the process, subverting the democratic principles we all are sworn to uphold, when a proper case is made out for our intervention? The answers to the above queries are self-evident.

I call to mind this exhortation: "We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution - by any person corporation, state agency or branch of government - are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our Constitution is not acceptable to this Court."^[72]

I am not unaware that a rather recent decision of ours brushed aside an argument that a provision in subject law regarding the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court itself, not having been included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the Conference Committee Report, was violative of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35, never having been a subject of disagreement between both Houses, could not have been validly added as an amendment before the Conference Committee.

The majority opinion in said case explained:

"While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

'A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).'"^[73] (Underscoring supplied)

At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general rule, as quoted above, is: "Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, leqislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill." What follows, that is, "occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. . ." is the exception. Then it concludes with a declaration that: "This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee." Are we about to reinstall another institution that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past experience, has become anathema to the Filipino people?

The ruling above can hardly be cited in support of the proposition that a provision in a BICAM report which was not the subject of differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill cannot be nullified. It submit that such is not authorized in our Basic Law. Moreover, this decision concerns merely one provision whereas the BICAM Report that culminated in the EVAT law has a wider scope as it, in fact, expanded the base of the original VAT law by imposing the tax on several items which were not so covered prior to the EVAT.

One other flaw in most BICAM Reports, not excluding this one under scrutiny, is that, hastily drawn up, it often fails to conform to the Senate and House Rules requiring no less than a "detailed" and "sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure." The Report of the committee, as may be gleaned from the preceding pages, was no more than the final version of the bill as "passed" by the BICAM. The amendments or subjects of dissension, as well as the reconciliation made by the committee, are not even pointed out, much less explained therein.

It may be argued that legislative rules of procedure may properly be suspended, modified, revoked or waived at will by the legislators themselves.^[74] This principle, however, does not come into play in interpreting what the record of the proceedings shows was, or was not, done. It is rather designed to test the validity of legislative action where the record shows a final action in violation or disregard of legislative rules.^[75] Utilizing the Senate and the House Rules as both guidelines and yardstick, the BICAM here obviously did not adhere to the rule on what the Report should contain.

Given all these irregularities that have apparently been engrafted into the BICAM system, and which have been tolerated, if not accorded outright acceptance by everyone involved in or conversant with, the institution, it may be asked: Why not leave well enough alone?

That these practices have remained unchallenged in the past does not justify our closing our eyes and turning a deaf ear to them. Writ large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very heart of the people's legislative halls, that now stands indicted with the charge of arrogating legislative powers unto itself through the use of dubious "shortcuts." Here, for the people to judge, is the "mother of all shortcuts."

In the petitions at bench, we are confronted with the enactment of a tax law which was designed to broaden the tax base. It is rote learning for any law student that as an attribute of sovereignty, the power to tax is "the strongest of all the powers of government."^[76] Admittedly, "for all its plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions."^[77] Were there none, then the oft-quoted 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy"^[78] would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with, and the people can find comfort in, the reassuring words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."^[79]

Manakanaka, mayroong dumudulog dito sa Kataastaasang Hukuman na may kamangha-manghang hinaing. Angkop na halimbawa ay ang mga petisyong iniharap ngayon sa amin.

Ang ilan sa kanila ay mga Senador na nais mapawalang bisa ang isang batas ukol sa buwis na ipinasa mismo nila. Diumano ito ay hindi tumalima sa mga itinatadhana ng Saligang Batas. Bukod sa rito, tutol sila sa mga bagong talata na isiningit ng "Bicameral Conference Committee" na nagdagdag ng mga bagong bagay bagay at serbisyo na papatawan ng buwis. Ayon sa kanila, ginampanan ng komiteng iyan ang gawain na nauukol sa buong Kongreso. Kung kaya't ang nararapat na mangyari ay ihatol ng Kátaastaasang Hukuman na malabis na pagsasamantala sa sariling pagpapasiya ang ginawa ng Kongreso.

Bagamá't bantulot kaming makialam sa isang kapantáy na sangay ng Pamahalaan, hindi naman nararapat na kami ay tumangging gampanan ang tungkulin na iniatas sa amin ng Saligang Batas. Lalu't-lalo nang ang batas na kinauukulan ay maaaring makapinsala sa nakararami sa sambayanan.

Sa ganang akin, itong batas na inihaharap sa amin ngayon, ay totoong labag sa Saligang Batas, samakatuwid ay walang bisa. Nguni't ito ay nauukol lamang sa mga katiwalian na may kinalaman sa paraan ng pagpapasabatás nito. Hindi namin patakaran ang makialam o humadIang sa itinakdáng gawain ng Saligang Batas sa Pangulo at sa Kongreso. Ang dalawang sanggay na iyan ng Pamahalaan ang higit na maalam ukol sa kung ang anumang panukalang batas ay nararapat, kanais-nais o magagampanan; kung kaya't hindi kami nararapat na maghatol o magpapasiya sa mga bagay na iyan. Ang makapapataw ng angkop na Iunas sa larangan na iyan ay ang mismong mga kinatawan ng sambayanan sa Kongreso.

Faced with this challenge of protecting the rights of the people by striking down a law that I submit is unconstitutional and in the process, checking the wonted excesses of the Bicameral Conference Committee system, I see in this case a suitable vehicle to discharge the Court's Constitutional mandate and duty of declaring that there has indeed been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Legislature.

Republic Act No. 7716, being unconstitutional and void, I find no necessity to rule on the substantive issues as dealt with in the majority opinion as they have been rendered moot and academic. These issues pertain to the intrinsic merits of the law. It is axiomatic that the wisdom, desirability and advisability of enacting certain laws lie, not within the province of the Judiciary but that of the political departments, the Executive and the Legislative. The relief sought by petitioners from what they perceive to be the harsh and onerous effect of the EVAT on the people is within their reach. For Congress, of which Senator-petitioners are a part, can furnish the solution by either repealing or amending the subject law.

For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

---

^[1] Vitug, Jose C., COMPENDIUM OF TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, Third Revised Edition, 1993 at 201.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as ponente.

^[5] Ibid at 378.

^[6] Ibid at 385.

^[7] Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled "Resolution Urging the House Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever They Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses."

^[8] SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real properties, excluding agricultural lands and residential properties with monthly rentals of less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants, eating places, caterers; services by persons in the exercise of their professions; actors, actresses, talents, singers and professional athletes; and lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals registered with the Philippine Regulatory Commission.

^[9] On June 1, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos certified for immediate enactment House Bill No. 9210 entitled "An Act Amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, to meet a public emergency."

^[10] House Bill No. 11197 is entitled "An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance Its Administration, Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237, and 238 of Title IX and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended."

^[11] Senate Bill No. 1630 is entitled "An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Administration, Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other Purposes."

^[12] Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled "An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT) System, Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its Administration, And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes."

^[13] Article VI, Section 24: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."

^[14] Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: "No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal."

^[15] Article III, Section 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

^[16] Article III, Section 4: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."

^[17] Article III Section 5: "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

^[18] Article III, Section 10: "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

^[19] Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."

^[20]Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: "Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation."

^[21] Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.

^[22] Volume One, CONCOM RECORD, p. 436.

^[23] Luz Farms v. The Hon. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 72245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

^[24] 328 P. 2d 644 (1958)

^[25] Aruego, Jose M., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION, University Publishing Co., 1950, pp. 65-66.

^[26] Sinco, Vicente G., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, Eleventh Edition, p. 196.

^[27]Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: "At a time when we did not have a lawmaking body after martial law was declared, there were tripartite conferences called by the President for the purpose of acting as a recommendatory body regarding settlement of labor and management disputes. During the said conferences, labor had shown that it can act with maturity. As a result, in 1976, an amendment was introduced in the Constitution providing for sectoral representation. In the Constitution that was approved, the number of sectors was not indicated. However, in the Election Code of 1978, it provided for three sectors; namely, industrial labor, agricultural labor and the youth. The agricultural labor was given four seats; two for Luzon, one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao. The same is true with the industrial labor sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also given four seats: two for Luzon, one for Mindanao and one for the Visayas, with the condition that there will be an additional two at large. And so, the youth had six representatives plus four from the agricultural labor sector and four from the industrial labor sector - we had 14 seats.

In 1981, the Constitution was again amended. In the course of the amendment, the labor representatives in the Batasang Pambansa proposed that sectoral representation be included as a permanent addition to the lawmaking body.

Again, in that Constitution which was approved in 1981, the number and the name of the sectors were not indicated. However, in the Election Code that was approved before the 1984 election, there was really a definition of who will constitute the sectors and how they will be appointed. Let me quote from that law that was passed in 1984. Under Section 27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the scope of the sectors has been defined as follows:

The agricultural labor sector covers all persons who personally and physically till the land as their principal occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and lessees, rural workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small fishermen.

The industrial labor sector includes all nonagricultural workers and employees.

The youth sector embraces persons not more than twenty-five years of age." (Volume Two, CONCOM RECORD, p. 564).

^[28] City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col. Nicanor Garcia, L-20346, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 673.

^[29] Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7, 1994, pp. 18-19: JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH P. ROMERO:

Q -     Mr. Counsel, may I interrupt at this stage?

When you say that according to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate exclusively from the House. In this instance, did it not originally originate exclusively from the House?

The word used was not "solely"; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.

So, are you using the two (2) words originate "exclusively" and "solely" synonymously?

SENATOR TOLENTINO:

A - The verb "originate" remains the same, Your Honor, but the word "exclusively", as I said, means "solely." x x x

^[30] H.B.771 - exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage, H.B. 2450 - exempting the lessors or distributors of cinematographic films from paying the VAT; H.B. 7033 - amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by EO 273; H.B. 8086 - exempting packaging materials of export products from the VAT; H.B. 9030 - amending Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B. 9210 - amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the NIRC; H.B. 9297 - restructuring the VAT system by expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99, 100 (A), 102 (A), 103, 113, 114, 115 and 116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012 - reducing the rate of VAT imposed on sale and importation of goods, and sale of services; H.B. 10100 -amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.

^[31] Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.

^[32] Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee: "CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all, what would be the basis, no, or framework para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no, because the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame of reference, and then everything will just be inserted?

"HON. MACEDA. Yes, That's true for every revenue measure. There's no other way. The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record, we know that this is an administration bill; this is certified by the president and I was about to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people was already decided when the President and the administration sent this to us and certified it. They have already gotten over that political implication of this bill and the economic impact on prices.

"CHAIRMAN HERRERA. Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in this discussion is something that we can just ….

"CHAIRMAN JAVIER. We will just. . . all the amendments will be coming from the Senate:"

^[33] Article VI, Section 1.

^[34]Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7, 1994, pp. 45-46:

"Justice Romero: Q: Mr. Counsel, is it not a fact that in the Bicameral Conference Committee, you presented a Motion to return the Bill as it was to the Lower House with also your proposal that this be referred to a Referendum for the entire nation to vote upon, then Senator Wigberto Tañada amended your Motion and convinced you to drop that portion about referral to a Referendum and you agreed.

So, that Motion of yours to return to the House was the one voted upon by the Bicameral Conference Committee and it lost.

What can you say to that?

Senator Tolentino: A: No, no, if Your Honor please. My Motion was voted upon by the Senate itself because I presented that said Motion in order to recall the Bill from the Bicameral Conference Committee so that the Senate could go back to the period of amendment and see if we could amend the House Bill itself, but that was defeated. So, it became academic. Thus, what we did we proceeded with the procedure already being followed by the Senate.

I thought, as a matter of fact, that was the one way of correcting this procedural error, but I was only one (1), or two (2), or three (3) of us only, then we were defeated in the voting, if Your Honor please.

Justice Romero: Q:     You mean you were outvoted?

Senator Tolentino: A:      Yes, Your Honor; we were actually slaughtered in the voting, so to speak, if Your Honor please."

^[35] The certification states: "This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively."

^[36] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Ed. (1979).

^[37] Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L ed. 294.

^[38] Mason, Paul, MASON's MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, 1953.

^[39] Cohn v. Kingsley, 49 P. 985 (1897).

^[40] Smith v. Thompson, 258 N.W. 190.

^[41] 602 S.W. 2d 420 (1980).

^[42] 34 Phil. 729 (1916).

^[43] Ibid at 733.

^[44] Ibid at 733-734.

^[45] Ibid at 735.

^[46] 78 Phil. 1 (1947).

^[47] Ibid at 3.

^[48] Ibid at 18.

^[49] 117 Phil. 363 (1963).

^[50] 136 Phil. 405, 409 (1969).

^[51] Ibid at 412.

^[52] G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.

^[53] Davies, Jack, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, 2nd ed., 1986.

^[54] Petition in G.R. No. 115781, p. 18.

^[55] Petition in G.R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.

^[56] Davies, Jack, supra at 90.

^[57] Sutherland, J.G., STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 293-­294.

^[58] Page 261.

^[59] Page 268.

^[60] Davies, supra, at 65.

^[61] Sec. 764, p. 541.

^[62] Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.

^[63] Pages 404-405 and 407.

^[64] Davies, supra, at 81.

^[65] See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd 431, 435, 1 Terry 424 (1940).

^[66] United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698, 71, 363 Mich. 548 (1961).

^[67] BLACK's DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P. 2d 115, 119 (1937).

^[68] CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 3, 1951, p. 885 cited in Orquiola, Annotated Rules of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-41.

^[69] Article Ill, Section 7. "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."

^[70] Article II, Section 28. "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

^[71] Article VI, Section 1.

^[72] D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, supra.

^[73]The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.

^[74] ln Osmeña. Jr. v. Pendatun (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that parliamentary rules are merely procedural and they may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Hence, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

^[75] State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 (1964).

^[76] Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252, 262 (1919).

^[77] Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, L-59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654, 660.

^[78] McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316.

^[79] Quoted in Graves. v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 490.

---

6 pt 6 pt 0 3 style-->