SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 113793, August 11, 1995 ]PEOPLE v. JUAN GANZAGAN +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN GANZAGAN, JR. Y MADAYAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PEOPLE v. JUAN GANZAGAN +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN GANZAGAN, JR. Y MADAYAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
In order for conviction to lie, all the elements of the crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of murder, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to muster the evidence required by the Constitution to show not only that the unlawful
killing was perpetrated by the accused, but also that any of the attendant circumstances that qualify it to murder exists. If it cannot be proven with moral certainty that at least one of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
present, the prosecution fails in its task, and the accused must be freed from liability for murder.
The case at bench commenced upon the filing on June 13, 1988 of an Information before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,[1] charging appellant JUAN MADAYAG GONZAGA, JR.[2] of murdering SERVILLANO VILLANUEVA MANUEL, JR., as follows:
which caused the death of Servillano Manuel, Jr., y Villanueva as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs."
Appellant was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against him. Trial ensued.
The records show that appellant and Servillano Manuel, Jr. lived in the same neighborhood in Sitio Las Vegas, Barangay Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[3] During his lifetime, Servillano worked as a kristo, or cockpit bet caller, and as a collector in carnival shows.[4] Before his arrest, appellant was working part-time as a laborer.[5]
The prosecution produced an eyewitness in the person of ELINO MANUEL,[6] Servillano's younger brother. Elino narrated that sometime after five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, appellant came to their house looking for Servillano.[7] Failing to find him there, appellant boxed the door of the Manuel residence twice and left in a huff. "Hutdon mong tanan, patyon mong tanan," he uttered in Visayan as he left.[8] Chills ran down Elino's spine. In his mind, he translated appellant's threat: "I will kill you all!"[9]
Fearing for his brother's life, Elino rushed to the corner of Las Vegas Road and Sison Street, where he expected Servillano to pass on his way home from the poblacion. Unfortunately, he was wrong, for Servillano opted to take an alternate route back to their house.[10]
After waiting in vain at the corner for about an hour, Elino headed home. On his way, he caught sight of appellant hacking Servillano with a bolo about fifteen (15) meters from where he was. Servillano was then stooped forward and away from appellant, with his head down and backside pointed upward.[11] Immobilized by shock, Elino witnessed appellant strike Servillano four times, and then throw aside the bloodied bolo he used. Appellant escaped on-board a tricycle, together with his brother-in-law, Ernesto Adame.[12]
Servillano's body was autopsied on the morning of April 2, 1988, by rural health unit physician DR. RAMON GONZALES, JR.,[13] who found the cause of death to be "irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage caused by the hacking wound, neck."[14] His findings were reduced to a written report,[15] the contents of which are quoted in and incorporated into the Information filed against appellant.
The defense did not challenge the result of the autopsy conducted on Servillano's body, and did not question the medical findings as to the cause of death. Appellant, in fact, admitted that he inflicted the fatal hacked wounds on Servillano. However, appellant sought shelter behind the doctrine of self-defense. He and his wife, MARILOU GANZAGAN,[16] related a completely different version of what transpired on the day Servillano died.
The Ganzagas testified that at around five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, they were at home. Marilou was then downstairs, preparing some bilo-bilo, while appellant was on the upper level of the house, watching over their two-month-old infant daughter.[17] Suddenly, Servillano Manuel, Jr., who was visibly upset, barged into their house, looking for appellant.[18] He left hurriedly without waiting for appellant to come down.[19]
Not long after, Servillano returned to the Ganzagan residence.[20] This time, he was armed with a bolo, with which he stuck the house near the kitchen.[21] Appellant confronted Servillano who cursed[22] and abruptly assaulted the former with the bolo. He delivered an overhead hacking blow[23] to appellant, who stepped back and parried the same with his right arm. The tip of the bolo hit the appendage and produced a three-centimeter nick on it.[24] Marilou rushed out of their house onto the street, screaming for help. None came to her aid, as everyone was attending a procession along the Urdaneta-Asingan provincial road.[25] When she returned to their house, neither appellant nor Servillano was there.[26] She did not think to look for the two, and merely remained inside their house.[27]
Meanwhile, after a brief tussle with Servillano, appellant was able to wrest the bolo away from him. With bolo in hand, appellant ran to the middle of the road street.[28] He stopped when he remembered his baby, who was left alone in their house.[29] For the next five minutes, appellant stood transfixed on the road.[30] The impasse was broken by Servillano who renewed his attack.[31] In trying to grab the bolo back from appellant, Servillano stumbled and fell forward, face down and with his backside pointing up.[32] It was then that appellant hacked Servillano several times.[33]
Appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He went into hiding,[34] and a week passed after the incident before his wife saw him again.[35] Much later, during the pendency of the trial against him, appellant jumped bail.[36]
In rebuttal, the prosecution submitted in evidence a certification of the death of the Ganzagas' four-month-old son, Michael, on January 15, 1988, barely two-and-a-half (2 1/2) months before Servillano's killing.
At the close of trial, the court a quo decided against appellant. It held:
"The killing was qualified by evident premeditation and treachery because when (appellant) went to the house of the victim armed with a bolo looking for the latter who was not around, he had already the intention to kill him and said intention to kill was never abandoned as he waited for the arrival of the victim whom he saw along the road. There was treachery as the accused hacked the victim by the neck several times and the sudden and frontal attack on the forehead, thus causing his bones on the forehead to be exposed as shown in the medical certificate xxx. The exposure of the bones would only show that the hacking was therefore so strong enough as to insure his premeditated intention to kill the victim.
Appellant now sets forth the following assigned errors:
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is not guilty of murder.
Appellant reiterates his reliance on the doctrine of self-defense to justify the killing of Servillano. He argues that he was able to prove all the elements of defense of self, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
We are not persuaded.
There are strong reasons to doubt the defense version of the facts that led to the killing of Servillano. The account of the Ganzaga spouses is inconsistent with the common experience and observation of mankind.[39] Especially difficult to accept are the following assertions:
Furthermore, appellant's self-contradictions and vacillations in his testimony are patent and numerous. These were exposed in his cross-examination, where he was confronted and asked to explain several of his contradictory statements, viz.:
In any event, even granting the defense's factual assertions, we are still unimpressed by appellant's theory of self-defense.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution. Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution.[41] In cases, however, where the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape liability, the rule is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense. As held in the case of People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993):
"By invoking self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the four (4) victims. The burden is, therefore, upon him to prove the existence, by clear and convincing evidence, of its essential requisites xxx; otherwise stated, the onus probandi was thus shifted to him xxx. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution xxx, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he himself admitted the killing xxx." (Citations omitted)
Thus, in claiming self-defense, appellant needs to convincingly establish that: (1) Servillano acted with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the means he employed to repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) he did not sufficiently provoke Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails to discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission to the killing.
Unlawful aggression, which is an indispensable element of self-defense,[42] is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual peril.[43] It is an offensive act positively strong and determinative of the aggressor's intent to cause harm or injury.[44] It presupposes a material attack which is impending or at the point of happening, and not merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
In the case at bench, appellant testified that after the initial bolo attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and run away from Servillano. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When hostilities resumed five minutes later, appellant was the armed protagonist, and Servillano's act of trying to wrest the bolo back from him cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from his opponent.
There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, he cannot successfully posit the view that he was merely defending himself when he killed Servillano.
Parenthetically, appellant's claim of self-defense is further belied by the physical evidence in the case, specifically the number, location and severity of the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr. Gonzales found five (5) gaping wounds on Servillano's neck, running from the back of the head to the nape which exposed and severed the muscles, veins and arteries in the neck area. These indicate clearly that appellant's act was no longer one of self-preservation, "but a determined effort to kill his victim."[45]
Appellant next postulates that even if self-defense were unavailable to him, he should only have been found guilty of committing homicide, and not murder. He claims that neither treachery nor evident premeditation, which are alleged in the Information, are present in the case at bench.
We are convinced.
The circumstances that qualify murder must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The presence of treachery[46] and evident premeditation[47] must not be deduced from mere presumption or sheer speculation. Unfortunately, in the case at bench, that is exactly what the trial court did in concluding that both qualifying circumstances are present.
Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery thus:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Italics ours.)
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the offended party.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any witness to testify as to the manner by which Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their sole eyewitness, Elino Manuel, only saw the actual hacking of the victim by appellant, and not the events that led to it. The records provide no basis for the trial court's finding of treachery. As we held in the case of People v. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700 (1989)[48]:
"xxx Not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption, much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting the attendance of alevosia."
Evident premeditation suggests the deliberate hatching of a plan to execute a crime. Its elements are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the absence of direct evidence of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived.[49] In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that appellant had planned and prepared to kill Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The records are bereft of any indication of such a plot. Furthermore, the findings of the court a quo that appellant was already armed with a bolo when he went to the Manuel residence looking for Servillano and that he waited in ambush for the latter, are totally unfounded. These were never mentioned in the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elino Manuel.
Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the crime committed by appellant is not murder, but homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR. by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48 in Criminal Case No. U-4850 is AFFIRMED, but he is found GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE. The appealed Decision, dated December 6, 1993, is MODIFIED so that appellant shall instead suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Mendoza, and Franciso, JJ., concur.
[1] The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. U-4850, was raffled off to RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, presided over by Judge Alicia Gonzalez-Decano.
[2] Testified on November 23, 1993. He was then 32 years old, married, and a resident of Las Vegas, Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[3] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 2.
[4] TSN of November 16, 1993, pp. 12-13.
[5] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 2.
[6] Testified on November 15, 1993. He was then 32 years old, single, and a resident of Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[7] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 3, 10.
[8] Ibid., at p. 3.
[9] Ibid., at pp. 3-4. Elino Manuel himself testified that he understood the phrase to mean "I will kill you all!" To verify his statement, the trial court asked the process server of Branch 46 of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Mrs. Thelma Ortiz (she hails from the Visayas) to translate appellant's utterance. Mrs. Ortiz translated it to mean, "Papatayin ko kayong lahat, uubusin ko kayong lahat."
[10] TSN of November 15, 1993, pp. 4-5.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Id., at p. 6.
[13] Testified on November 16, 1993. He was then 52 years old, married, and a resident of Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[14] Exh. "C", Original Records, p. 10.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Testified on November 22, 1993. She was then 32 years old, married, a vendor, and residing in Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[17] TSN of November 22, 1993, p. 7.
[18] Ibid., at p. 3.
[19] Id., at p. 4; TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 5.
[20] Ibid.
[21] TSN of November 15, 1993, at p. 8.
[22] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 13.
[23] Ibid., at p. 14.
[24] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 4; TSN of November 23, 1993, pp. 5, 15.
[25] TSN of November 15, 1993, at pp. 4, 5, 8, 9.
[26] Ibid., at p. 10.
[27] Id., at p. 12.
[28] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 16.
[29] Ibid., at p. 17.
[30] Id., at p. 5.
[31] Id., at pp. 6, 16.
[32] Id.
[33] Id., at pp. 17, 19.
[34] Exh. "B"; Original Records, p. 8.
[35] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 13.
[36] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 21.
[37] Decision in Criminal Case No. U-4850, p. 9.
[38] Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 50.
[39] People v. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991), citing People v. Acusar, 82 Phil. 490 (1948).
[40] TSN of November 23, 1993, pp. 8-19.
[41] See People v. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 (1990); People v. Bustarde, 182 SCRA 554 (1990).
[42] People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 (1993); People v. Bausing, 199 SCRA 355 (1991).
[43] F. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition (1982).
[44] Ibid.
[45] People v. Maceda, op. cit., at p. 509.
[46] See People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989).
[47] See People v. Pastoral, 226 SCRA 219 (1993).
[48] Quoting People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515 (1985).
[49] People v. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532 (1994); People v. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819 (1993).
The case at bench commenced upon the filing on June 13, 1988 of an Information before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,[1] charging appellant JUAN MADAYAG GONZAGA, JR.[2] of murdering SERVILLANO VILLANUEVA MANUEL, JR., as follows:
"That on or about the 1st day of April 1988, in the evening, at Barangay Bayaoas, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a single bladed bolo, called "Panabas", measuring about 26 inches including its handle, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Servillano Manuel, Jr. y Villanueva, inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"Significant External Findings:
- Abrasion, both knees; abrasion, right shoulder, lateral aspect; abrasion, right forefinger and middle finger; abrasion, chin, right half; abrasion with ecchysmosis, right temple near right eye;
- Gaping wound, neck, left half, middle half, with exposed and severed muscles, veins and arteries, measuring 11 cms x 4 cms.;
- Incised wound, forehead, right half, above right eyebrow with exposed bone, measuring 6 cms. x 2 cms.;
- Incised wound, forehead, middle, measuring 5 cms. x 1 cm., with exposed wound;
- Incised wound, forehead, left half, with exposed bone, measuring 5 cms. x 1 cm.;
- Gaping wounds (5) nape and back of skull, beginning from back of head going down to nape;
Wound #1: measures 6 1/2 cms. x 1 cm.;
#2: measures 7 1/2 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.;
#3: measures 3 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.;
#4: 12 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.
#5: 6 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.
"Significant Internal Findings:
- Neck, left half, lateral aspect; severed jugular vein and carotid artery;
- Fracture, linear, right frontal bone, 6 cms. long;
- Fracture, linear, middle half of frontal bone, 2 cms. long;
- Fracture, linear, left half of frontal bone, 5 cms. long;
which caused the death of Servillano Manuel, Jr., y Villanueva as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs."
Appellant was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against him. Trial ensued.
The records show that appellant and Servillano Manuel, Jr. lived in the same neighborhood in Sitio Las Vegas, Barangay Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[3] During his lifetime, Servillano worked as a kristo, or cockpit bet caller, and as a collector in carnival shows.[4] Before his arrest, appellant was working part-time as a laborer.[5]
The prosecution produced an eyewitness in the person of ELINO MANUEL,[6] Servillano's younger brother. Elino narrated that sometime after five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, appellant came to their house looking for Servillano.[7] Failing to find him there, appellant boxed the door of the Manuel residence twice and left in a huff. "Hutdon mong tanan, patyon mong tanan," he uttered in Visayan as he left.[8] Chills ran down Elino's spine. In his mind, he translated appellant's threat: "I will kill you all!"[9]
Fearing for his brother's life, Elino rushed to the corner of Las Vegas Road and Sison Street, where he expected Servillano to pass on his way home from the poblacion. Unfortunately, he was wrong, for Servillano opted to take an alternate route back to their house.[10]
After waiting in vain at the corner for about an hour, Elino headed home. On his way, he caught sight of appellant hacking Servillano with a bolo about fifteen (15) meters from where he was. Servillano was then stooped forward and away from appellant, with his head down and backside pointed upward.[11] Immobilized by shock, Elino witnessed appellant strike Servillano four times, and then throw aside the bloodied bolo he used. Appellant escaped on-board a tricycle, together with his brother-in-law, Ernesto Adame.[12]
Servillano's body was autopsied on the morning of April 2, 1988, by rural health unit physician DR. RAMON GONZALES, JR.,[13] who found the cause of death to be "irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage caused by the hacking wound, neck."[14] His findings were reduced to a written report,[15] the contents of which are quoted in and incorporated into the Information filed against appellant.
The defense did not challenge the result of the autopsy conducted on Servillano's body, and did not question the medical findings as to the cause of death. Appellant, in fact, admitted that he inflicted the fatal hacked wounds on Servillano. However, appellant sought shelter behind the doctrine of self-defense. He and his wife, MARILOU GANZAGAN,[16] related a completely different version of what transpired on the day Servillano died.
The Ganzagas testified that at around five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, they were at home. Marilou was then downstairs, preparing some bilo-bilo, while appellant was on the upper level of the house, watching over their two-month-old infant daughter.[17] Suddenly, Servillano Manuel, Jr., who was visibly upset, barged into their house, looking for appellant.[18] He left hurriedly without waiting for appellant to come down.[19]
Not long after, Servillano returned to the Ganzagan residence.[20] This time, he was armed with a bolo, with which he stuck the house near the kitchen.[21] Appellant confronted Servillano who cursed[22] and abruptly assaulted the former with the bolo. He delivered an overhead hacking blow[23] to appellant, who stepped back and parried the same with his right arm. The tip of the bolo hit the appendage and produced a three-centimeter nick on it.[24] Marilou rushed out of their house onto the street, screaming for help. None came to her aid, as everyone was attending a procession along the Urdaneta-Asingan provincial road.[25] When she returned to their house, neither appellant nor Servillano was there.[26] She did not think to look for the two, and merely remained inside their house.[27]
Meanwhile, after a brief tussle with Servillano, appellant was able to wrest the bolo away from him. With bolo in hand, appellant ran to the middle of the road street.[28] He stopped when he remembered his baby, who was left alone in their house.[29] For the next five minutes, appellant stood transfixed on the road.[30] The impasse was broken by Servillano who renewed his attack.[31] In trying to grab the bolo back from appellant, Servillano stumbled and fell forward, face down and with his backside pointing up.[32] It was then that appellant hacked Servillano several times.[33]
Appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He went into hiding,[34] and a week passed after the incident before his wife saw him again.[35] Much later, during the pendency of the trial against him, appellant jumped bail.[36]
In rebuttal, the prosecution submitted in evidence a certification of the death of the Ganzagas' four-month-old son, Michael, on January 15, 1988, barely two-and-a-half (2 1/2) months before Servillano's killing.
At the close of trial, the court a quo decided against appellant. It held:
"The killing was qualified by evident premeditation and treachery because when (appellant) went to the house of the victim armed with a bolo looking for the latter who was not around, he had already the intention to kill him and said intention to kill was never abandoned as he waited for the arrival of the victim whom he saw along the road. There was treachery as the accused hacked the victim by the neck several times and the sudden and frontal attack on the forehead, thus causing his bones on the forehead to be exposed as shown in the medical certificate xxx. The exposure of the bones would only show that the hacking was therefore so strong enough as to insure his premeditated intention to kill the victim.
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court believes that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the (appellant) beyond reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby finds the (appellant) Juan Ganzagan, Jr., guilty of the crime of Murder and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the provisions of the 1987 Constitution (Art. III, Section 19(1)), and with all the accessory penalties provided by law; and to pay the civil liability of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased; and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, with costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Citations omitted)[37]
Appellant now sets forth the following assigned errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING SELF-DEFENSE AS A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
"II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS AT ALL GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM FOR MURDER INSTEAD OF ONLY HOMICIDE CONSIDERING THAT NEITHER THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY NOR PREMEDITATION WAS DULY ESTABLISHED."[38]
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is not guilty of murder.
Appellant reiterates his reliance on the doctrine of self-defense to justify the killing of Servillano. He argues that he was able to prove all the elements of defense of self, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
We are not persuaded.
There are strong reasons to doubt the defense version of the facts that led to the killing of Servillano. The account of the Ganzaga spouses is inconsistent with the common experience and observation of mankind.[39] Especially difficult to accept are the following assertions:
It took Servillano five minutes to reach appellant, who was standing fifteen (15) meters from where they had previously been wrestling, because he (Servillano) was drunk (TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 20); and
Furthermore, appellant's self-contradictions and vacillations in his testimony are patent and numerous. These were exposed in his cross-examination, where he was confronted and asked to explain several of his contradictory statements, viz.:
In any event, even granting the defense's factual assertions, we are still unimpressed by appellant's theory of self-defense.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution. Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution.[41] In cases, however, where the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape liability, the rule is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense. As held in the case of People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993):
"By invoking self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the four (4) victims. The burden is, therefore, upon him to prove the existence, by clear and convincing evidence, of its essential requisites xxx; otherwise stated, the onus probandi was thus shifted to him xxx. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution xxx, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he himself admitted the killing xxx." (Citations omitted)
Thus, in claiming self-defense, appellant needs to convincingly establish that: (1) Servillano acted with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the means he employed to repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) he did not sufficiently provoke Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails to discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission to the killing.
Unlawful aggression, which is an indispensable element of self-defense,[42] is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual peril.[43] It is an offensive act positively strong and determinative of the aggressor's intent to cause harm or injury.[44] It presupposes a material attack which is impending or at the point of happening, and not merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
In the case at bench, appellant testified that after the initial bolo attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon and run away from Servillano. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When hostilities resumed five minutes later, appellant was the armed protagonist, and Servillano's act of trying to wrest the bolo back from him cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from his opponent.
There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, he cannot successfully posit the view that he was merely defending himself when he killed Servillano.
Parenthetically, appellant's claim of self-defense is further belied by the physical evidence in the case, specifically the number, location and severity of the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr. Gonzales found five (5) gaping wounds on Servillano's neck, running from the back of the head to the nape which exposed and severed the muscles, veins and arteries in the neck area. These indicate clearly that appellant's act was no longer one of self-preservation, "but a determined effort to kill his victim."[45]
Appellant next postulates that even if self-defense were unavailable to him, he should only have been found guilty of committing homicide, and not murder. He claims that neither treachery nor evident premeditation, which are alleged in the Information, are present in the case at bench.
We are convinced.
The circumstances that qualify murder must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The presence of treachery[46] and evident premeditation[47] must not be deduced from mere presumption or sheer speculation. Unfortunately, in the case at bench, that is exactly what the trial court did in concluding that both qualifying circumstances are present.
Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery thus:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Italics ours.)
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the offended party.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any witness to testify as to the manner by which Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their sole eyewitness, Elino Manuel, only saw the actual hacking of the victim by appellant, and not the events that led to it. The records provide no basis for the trial court's finding of treachery. As we held in the case of People v. Bachar, 170 SCRA 700 (1989)[48]:
"xxx Not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption, much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be reached respecting the attendance of alevosia."
Evident premeditation suggests the deliberate hatching of a plan to execute a crime. Its elements are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the absence of direct evidence of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived.[49] In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that appellant had planned and prepared to kill Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The records are bereft of any indication of such a plot. Furthermore, the findings of the court a quo that appellant was already armed with a bolo when he went to the Manuel residence looking for Servillano and that he waited in ambush for the latter, are totally unfounded. These were never mentioned in the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elino Manuel.
Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the crime committed by appellant is not murder, but homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR. by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48 in Criminal Case No. U-4850 is AFFIRMED, but he is found GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE. The appealed Decision, dated December 6, 1993, is MODIFIED so that appellant shall instead suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Mendoza, and Franciso, JJ., concur.
[1] The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. U-4850, was raffled off to RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, presided over by Judge Alicia Gonzalez-Decano.
[2] Testified on November 23, 1993. He was then 32 years old, married, and a resident of Las Vegas, Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[3] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 2.
[4] TSN of November 16, 1993, pp. 12-13.
[5] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 2.
[6] Testified on November 15, 1993. He was then 32 years old, single, and a resident of Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[7] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 3, 10.
[8] Ibid., at p. 3.
[9] Ibid., at pp. 3-4. Elino Manuel himself testified that he understood the phrase to mean "I will kill you all!" To verify his statement, the trial court asked the process server of Branch 46 of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Mrs. Thelma Ortiz (she hails from the Visayas) to translate appellant's utterance. Mrs. Ortiz translated it to mean, "Papatayin ko kayong lahat, uubusin ko kayong lahat."
[10] TSN of November 15, 1993, pp. 4-5.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Id., at p. 6.
[13] Testified on November 16, 1993. He was then 52 years old, married, and a resident of Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[14] Exh. "C", Original Records, p. 10.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Testified on November 22, 1993. She was then 32 years old, married, a vendor, and residing in Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
[17] TSN of November 22, 1993, p. 7.
[18] Ibid., at p. 3.
[19] Id., at p. 4; TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 5.
[20] Ibid.
[21] TSN of November 15, 1993, at p. 8.
[22] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 13.
[23] Ibid., at p. 14.
[24] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 4; TSN of November 23, 1993, pp. 5, 15.
[25] TSN of November 15, 1993, at pp. 4, 5, 8, 9.
[26] Ibid., at p. 10.
[27] Id., at p. 12.
[28] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 16.
[29] Ibid., at p. 17.
[30] Id., at p. 5.
[31] Id., at pp. 6, 16.
[32] Id.
[33] Id., at pp. 17, 19.
[34] Exh. "B"; Original Records, p. 8.
[35] TSN of November 15, 1993, p. 13.
[36] TSN of November 23, 1993, p. 21.
[37] Decision in Criminal Case No. U-4850, p. 9.
[38] Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 50.
[39] People v. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991), citing People v. Acusar, 82 Phil. 490 (1948).
[40] TSN of November 23, 1993, pp. 8-19.
[41] See People v. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 (1990); People v. Bustarde, 182 SCRA 554 (1990).
[42] People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 (1993); People v. Bausing, 199 SCRA 355 (1991).
[43] F. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition (1982).
[44] Ibid.
[45] People v. Maceda, op. cit., at p. 509.
[46] See People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989).
[47] See People v. Pastoral, 226 SCRA 219 (1993).
[48] Quoting People v. Duero, 136 SCRA 515 (1985).
[49] People v. Manuel, 234 SCRA 532 (1994); People v. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819 (1993).