This petition for certiorari  provides an occasion to revisit the doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal.

Petitioner Florentino Pedrosa filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent spouses Evelyn and Rex Hill.^[1] On 8 April 1994 the trial court rendered judgment ordering respondent spouses to pay petitioner the sum of P148,153.24 with legal interest plus costs of the suit.

The Hill spouses elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On 8 December 1994 they were required by the appellate court to pay the docket fees within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof with a warning that non-compliance therewith would necessarily warrant the abandonment and dismissal of their appeal. Respondent spouses failed to pay the docket fees within the fifteen-day (15-day) period prescribed by the Court of Appeals.

On 7 April 1995 counsel for the Hill spouses filed a Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee admitting inadvertence on his part as he failed to take note of the period to pay the docket fees and for having completely forgotten the appealed case. Pedrosa filed not only an Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docketing Fee but also a Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

On 19 May 1995 the appellate court denied petitioner Pedrosa's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and granted instead the Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee filed by the Hill spouses. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

On 7 August 1995 we required respondents Evelyn and Rex Hill to comment on the petition until 9 September 1995. But respondent spouses did not still take advantage of this accommodation by the Court. Consequently for failure to file their comment we required their counsel to explain why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.

By way of explanation Atty. Ignacio Moleta averred that he misplaced the resolution of the Court requiring them to file comment. As regards the favorable resolution on the admission of the payment of the docket fees despite the delay he maintained that the appellate court did not abuse its discretion.

We disagree. In Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon^[2] we held-

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

Section 5 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court emphasizes the duty of appellant upon receipt of the notice to pay docket fees-

It shall be the duty of the appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing appeal x x x

Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. Non-compliance therewith may cause the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court-

Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds x x x (d) Failure of the appellant to pay the docketing fee as provided in section 5 of Rule 46 x x x

Squarely in point is Guevarra v. Court Appeals.^[3] In that case docket fees were not paid within fifteen (15) days as required by the Court of Appeals. Instead, they were paid forty-one (41) days late allegedly due to "inadvertence, oversight and pressure of work." The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. When the case was elevated to us, we said-

It is the "duty of the appellant" in the Court of Appeals," "within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred in the preceding section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal." The appellants did not comply seasonably with this duty. Concededly, they paid forty one (41) days late. For such tardiness, they must suffer the sanction imposed by the Rules of Court- dismissal of their appeal x x x

In Palteng v. Court of Appeals^[4] we pronounced that there was no abuse of discretion in the Court of Appeals' ruling that there had been proper and adequate notice to defendants (petitioners) to pay the docket fees, a requirement that they failed to observe, and as failure to pay the docket fee is ground for dismissal of an appeal, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in issuing the resolution in question. Earlier in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines^[5] we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona^[6] we reiterated that if the appellate docket fee of P20.00 is not paid in full within the reglementary period the decision of the municipal court becomes final and no longer appealable.

Appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with. In Bello v. Fernando^[7] we stressed that "(t)he right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."

In the instant case the requirements for the perfection of an appeal were not religiously complied with despite timely notice and admonition from the appellate court for non-compliance. Respondents herein not only failed to pay the docket fees within the 15-day reglementary period; they paid the docket fees four (4) months from date of notice. They also ignored this Court's resolution requiring them to comment on the petition for certiorari.

The reasons adduced by private respondents are far from satisfactory. According to their counsel, the reason for their failure to pay the docket fees seasonably was that appellants were in Australia while some of their children were sick thus lending to their inability to attend to his communications. Thus, counsel "by sheer inadvertence, failed to note the period of payment of the docket fee and/or forgot about the instant appeal x x x" Counsel also claims he misplaced his copy of the Court resolution requiring comment. Under the circumstances we are convinced more than ever that the actuations of counsel and his clients merely reflect their lack of interest if not their inexcusable lethargy in pursuing their appeal. The Court of Appeals therefore gravely erred in admitting appellants' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee and in denying appellee's (petitioner's) Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

In Rodillas v. Commission on Elections^[8]we held that the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other words, the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal.^[9] This requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.

While the strict application of the rule on the payment of docket fees has been relaxed in some cases the Court took cognizance of the peculiar circumstances attendant to said cases. The case before us is no exception as we explained in Galang v. Court of Appeals.^[10]

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 19 May 1995 denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and granting instead private respondents' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the decision dated 8 April 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Br. 32, is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

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^[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 3960 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Br. 32, presided over by Judge Diomedes M. Eviota.

^[2] G.R. No. 73974, 31 May 1995, 244 SCRA 543, citing Goulds Pumps (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102748, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 127; U-Sing Button and Buckle Industry v. NLRC, G.R. No. 94754, 11 May 1993, 221 SCRA 680 and companion case.

^[3] No. L-43714, 15 January 1988, 154 SCRA 33.

^[4] No. L-25739, 31 January 1969, 26 SCRA 736.

^[5] No. L-15027, 31 January 1964, 10 SCRA 565.

^[6] No. L-32719, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 753.

^[7] No. L-16970, 30 January 1962, 4 SCRA 138.

^[8] G.R. No. 119055, 10 July 1995, 245 SCRA 702.

^[9] Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51670 15, December 1982, 119 SCRA 306.

^[10] G.R. No. 76221, 29 July 1991, 199 SCRA 683.