PUBLIC POLICY dictates that unlawful detainer cases be resolved with the least possible delay and judgments in favor of plaintiff are executed immediately.^[1] The beneficence of this rule however continues to elude the prevailing party in the bizarre turns and twists in this ejectment suit. We must succor.

Andres S. Flores and Ligaya Flores were the registered owners of a parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon, located along Milagros Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. On this property stood an apartment building consisting of four (4) units, one of which was occupied by petitioner Purificacion Chua under a lease agreement with Ligaya Flores who personally or through her authorized representative Consolacion Protacio collected the monthly rentals from the lessee. Sometime in 1976 Ligaya sold her share in the property to Andres S. Flores and Mariano Flores Jr. who caused the title to be transferred in their names. In 1979 Andres and his wife Josefina sold their share in the property to Mariano Jr. and his wife Luz who eventually sold the entire property to private respondent Marilu Flores - Samaco. A new title was thereafter issued in the name of Marilu and her husband Reynaldo Samaco. Thereafter, beginning 1980 Consolacion Protacio was authorized by the new owners to continue collecting rentals on the apartment in their behalf. In 1989 Consolacion stopped collecting rentals and respondent Marilu Samaco herself approached petitioner who refused to pay her rent.

On 13 February 1989 petitioner filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila an action for consignation of rentals. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 127777 entitled "Purificacion Chua v. Marilu Samaco, In Trust for the Heirs of Ligaya Flores Collantes." On 27 February 1989 private respondent Marilu Samaco filed an action^[2] for the ejectment of petitioner Purificacion Chua from the apartment for non-payment of rentals, subleasing without authority and termination of the month-to-month lease contract. Although the case for consignation of petitioner Chua bore a lower docket number, it was consolidated with the later ejectment suit.

Applying the rule on summary procedure, the trial court rendered judgment in both cases against petitioner who appealed the consolidated decision to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.^[3] While the case was pending appeal, petitioner filed a "Motion To Set Aside Judgment and/or Motion for Leave to Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses," alleging that since the question of ownership was raised in the lower court, this effectively removed the case from the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Regional Trial Court denied the motion, hence, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari^[4] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Still not satisfied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court^[5] which denied the petition on 28 February 1990, ruling that -

x x x x

Deliberating on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has not shown any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in rendering its decision dated 22 December 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19002. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, the RTC is still seized of the petitioner's appeal from the MTC judgment, and the RTC has yet to render judgment on the merits. In the interest of orderly procedure, petitioner must wait until the RTC has rendered judgment both on the question of applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure and on the merits of the consolidated cases. The recourse taken by petitioner to the Court of Appeals and to this Court can only prolong the litigation.

Moreover, contrary to the suggestion of petitioner, the mere raising of a question of ownership of the premises involved does not necessarily result in non-applicability of the Rule on Summary Procedure; for the question of possession may well be determinable without deciding the issue of ownership. Finally, the mere raising of the question of ownership does not have the effect of removing the case from the jurisdiction of the MTC (Section 33[2], B.P. Blg. 129; Bacani v. Hon. Macadaeg, etc., et al. 105 Phil. 635, 640 [1959]; and Loo Soo et al. v. Osorio, et al, 89 Phil 135, 137 [1951]).^[6]

Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Manila affirmed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in the ejectment case. Petitioner assailed the decision before the Court of Appeals and on 31 August 1990 the appellate court rendered judgment reversing the trial court and ordered that the case be remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court for re-trial under the regular rules on civil procedure. After the case was retried, the trial court rendered a decision^[7]ordering petitioner to vacate the apartment in question and deliver peaceful possession thereof to private respondent. It also directed petitioner to pay the sum of P40,114.46 representing unpaid monthly rentals minus the total rental amount deposited by petitioner in the consignation case which respondent could withdraw any time, plus P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila^[8] which sustained the lower court in a judgment dated 5 January 1993.^[9] Petitioner prayed for reconsideration of the decision. On 5 March 1993 pending resolution of the motion, at the instance of private respondent, the trial court issued a writ of execution in Civil Cases Nos. 92-61101 and 92-61102.

Petitioner sought to annul the writ of execution by filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus^[10] with the Court of Appeals. On 15 December 1993 the appellate court dismissed the petition, stating that -

All in all, therefore, We are convinced that the respondent court did not err in affirming the decision of the MTC. By preponderance of evidence, plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have established their cause of action for the inevitable ejectment of the defendant, herein petitioner, from the leased premises.

Wherefore, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision of the respondent court in Civil Case No. 92-61101 is hereby affirmed by the Court.^[11]

Petitioner now lays her cause before us arguing that the appellate court erred in: (a) ignoring the issues raised in the original petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus and in rendering a decision on the merits of the main case which is still pending reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Manila; (b) not ruling that the property has long been disposed of and there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution pending appeal oppressive, unjust and inequitable; and, (c) not resolving the motion for contempt against the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, his Branch Clerk of Court and the counsel of the adverse party.

In a Resolution dated 7 March 1994 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned Order and Writ of Execution pending appeal in Civil Cases Nos. 92-61101 and 92-61102 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Petitioner contends that in filing with the Court of Appeals an original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court she only prayed that the order of the Regional Trial Court dated 5 March 1993 for the issuance of the writ of execution be set aside. However instead of resolving this issue, respondent appellate court overstepped its bounds by rendering judgment on the merits of the main cases still pending reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

The doctrine is that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and that no error or mistake committed by a court will be corrected by certiorari unless said court acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction. The writ is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of procedure or mistake in the findings or conclusions of the judge.

Indeed, respondent Court of Appeals acted ultra jurisdictio in affirming the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court on the ejectment and consignation cases. Elevated by petitioner to the Court of Appeals was only the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution of the judgment by the trial court. The decision on the merits affirming the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court was never appealed, and rightfully so since petitioner earlier filed a motion for reconsideration with the trial court and was awaiting resolution thereof. Therefore, the authority of respondent appellate court was confined only to ruling upon the issue of whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order directing the issuance of a writ of execution against petitioner. Whether the trial court committed a mistake in deciding the case on the merits is an issue way beyond the competence of respondent appellate court to pass upon in a certiorari proceeding.^[12]

It is a rule of procedure that this Court endeavor to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. While the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction in acting as it did on the petition to annul the writ of execution, a review of the record nevertheless shows that it was correct in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed writ since not only did it find that petitioner did not possess any ground to stay execution but also because judgment in the cases had already become final and executory.

Section 8, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court provides that immediate execution in ejectment cases is proper if the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff. It can be stayed by the defendant only by perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond, and making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.^[13] Thus, if defendant fails to comply with all these requisites, the trial court upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant and upon proof of such failure can order the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement so that if this is not complied with, execution will ensue as a matter of right. This cannot be stayed unless there is a showing of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly deposit or that supervening events which have brought about a material change in the situation of the parties have occurred in the meantime.

Petitioner does not refute or deny the factual finding of the trial court in the questioned Order dated 5 March 1993 holding that petitioner failed to file the required supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals. Neither did she successfully show that her failure to do so was attended by a valid excuse. The main theory of petitioner is that the subsequent sale or transfer of ownership to a third person of the property subject of the ejectment case is a supervening event which makes the execution inequitable and oppressive. She additionally proposes that execution should not lie on account of a pending action for quieting of title over the same property before the Regional Trial Court. The argument is unacceptable. The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is physical or material possession. Hence, the pendency of an action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court does not divest the city or municipal trial court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property. The subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case.^[14]

This Court notes that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision ordering her ejectment with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It appears that the same has not been resolved up to now perhaps due to the fact that the Court of Appeals had taken cognizance of the merits of the case by affirming the decision of the trial court although, clearly, it was bereft of authority to do so. Just the same, the remand of this case to the trial court for resolution of the motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary since this Court can resolve the dispute based on the records before it; besides, the ends of justice will not be subserved by a remand which will only unduly prolong the agony of the prevailing party.

A perusal of the joint motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court shows that it is merely pro forma and does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 37, in relation to Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. Petitioner merely reiterated the issues already passed upon by the trial court in its decision. A repetition of the grounds already disposed of may be considered as merely for purposes of delay thus rendering the motion pro forma.^[15] Moreover, the notice of hearing of the motion was directed to the clerk of court and not to the party. This violates the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule of the Rules of Court which expressly provide that the notice shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. A notice of hearing addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties is no notice at all. The rule commanding the movant that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned does not provide for any qualification much less exception.^[16] The violation of the above directive is fatal and in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.^[17]

In the instant case, the fatally defective joint motion for reconsideration did not prevent the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 92-61101 and 92-61102 from becoming final and executory. With the finality of the decision of the trial court in the ejectment case, execution in favor of the prevailing party, private respondent herein, has become a matter of right. In finding that the ejectment of petitioner was lawful and proper, the trial court held that -

The issue as to who between Marilu Samaco and Luzviminda Flores-Collantes, alleged heir of Ligaya Flores-Collantes, is entitled to the rentals has to be resolved in conjunction with the issue of whether Marilu Samaco can eject defendant - appellant (petitioner herein) because the same is a right flowing from the right of ownership.

Appellant simply relies on the fact that Ligaya Flores-Collantes was the original lessor. But there have since been various transactions involving the property until plaintiffs - appellees (private respondent herein) acquired ownerhip over it. Whatever agreement there was between the former owner and lessee, like the appellant, the same is binding upon the new owners, plaintiff-appellants, who stepped into the shoes of the former owner. (Mirasol v. Musngi, 18 SCRA (sic); Guzman v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 81949, Sept. 15, 1989). Hence, whatever rights the original lessor had, the new owner was subrogated thereto.

It is significant, too, that appellant's action for consignation was filed against Marilu Samaco. This is a recognition of Marilu Samaco's right to collect rentals incidental to ownership rights. Appellant cannot now question the title of plaintiff-appellees. She is estopped.^[18]

This is a simple ejectment suit against petitioner who has been adjudged by the trial court to have no right to continue occupying the premises in question. From the time this case was filed in 1989 it has not seen final resolution, for aside from appealing the decision of the trial courts on the merits, petitioner instituted several special civil actions of certiorari to annul the interlocutory orders rendered thereon. While technicalities may have their uses, petitioner and her counsel have taken undue advantage of such technicalities at the expense of the substantial merits of the case to make a travesty of our judicial process. This we cannot tolerate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 December 1993 insofar as it prematurely affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 92-61101 and 92-61102 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 5 January 1993 in Civil Cases Nos. 92-61101 and 92-61102 is considered final and executory and the questioned order of the Regional Trial Court dated 5 March 1993 for the issuance of a writ of execution in the same cases is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 7 March 1994 is LIFTED. Treble costs against petitioner.

This decision is immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman),Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., on leave.

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^[1] Salientes v. IAC, G.R. No. 66211, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 150.

^[2] Docketed as Civil Case No. 127924, MeTC-Br. 21, Manila.

^[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-49804.

^[4] Docketed as CA GR SP No. 198002.

^[5] Docketed as G. R. No. 91771.

^[6] Rollo, pp. 200-202.

^[7] Penned by Presiding Judge Godofredo CA. Fandialan, MeTC-Br. 21, Manila; Rollo. pp. 212-222.

^[8] Docketed as Civil Case No. 92-61101.

^[9] Penned by Judge Ruben T. Reyes, RTC-Br.50, Manila (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals); Rollo. pp. 235-240.

^[10] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 30441.

^[11] Rollo, p. 57.

^[12] Municipality of Biñan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94733, 17 February 1993, 219 SCRA 69.

^[13] Galan Realty Corp. v. Arranz, Adm. Matter No. MTJ - 93-878, 27 October 1994, 237 SCRA 770.

^[14] Oblea v. Court of Appeals, 11 May 1995, G.R. No. 117389, 244 SCRA 101.

^[15] BA Finance Corp. v. Pineda, G.R. No. 61628, 29 December 1982, 119 SCRA 493

^[16] Prado v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 98118, 6 December 1991, 204 SCRA 654.

^[17] BPI v. Far East Molasses Corporation, G.R. No. 89125, 2 July 1991, 198 SCRA 689.

^[18] Rollo, p. 239.