In our Decision in this case promulgated on 5 July 1996, we ordered Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnoñgon-Bugasong-Valderrama, Antique, and Atty. Marcelo C. Josue to show cause, within ten days from receipt of a copy of the said decision, why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law and violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.

The following findings in the decision compelled the issuance of this "show-cause" order on Judge Del Rosario:

It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991, the MCTC Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15 December 1992 order. While it may be true that this did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars adopted by this Court which affect the conduct of cases before them.

Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 262 since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG and MAGDATO, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, does not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which reads:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. -- The following pleadings, motions, or petition shall not be allowed in the case covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;

. . .Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO "to remove his house ... before judgment becomes final and executory," and the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy [MAGDATO'S] house on the ... land of [BAYOG] in case [MAGDATO] should fail to remove the same ... before judgment against him becomes final and executory. This was clearly in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such orders of "removal" and "demolition" before the judgment becomes final and executory were obviously intended to render futile any appeal which MAGDATO could interpose therefrom pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC, in its Order of Execution of 16 December 1993, directed the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's [MAGDATO's] home standing in the above-described parcel of land in case defendant should fail to remove the same therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and executory." And, in strict obedience to this said order, Sheriff IV Amando S. Lapos, acting for the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff, accompanied by Edgar Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro Pojo, members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts, and BAYOG himself, served on MAGDATO the order of execution on 24 January 1994 and forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question and demolished and destroyed MAGDATO's house.

This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the law. No demolition of MAGDATO's house could have been validly effected on the day of service of the order of execution. MAGDATO should have been afforded a reasonable period of time to remove his house, and only after he failed to comply within the given period could a demolition order have been issued by the court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

In his Comment filed on 12 August 1996, Judge Del Rosario explains that in his honest understanding and interpretation of Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in relation to Sections 6 and 19(e) of the said rules and Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129, and defendant-respondent's answer which was filed few days late was deemed never filed, and, therefore, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, should render judgment as would be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. But, despite plaintiffs-petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 10 February 1993 he rendered judgment only after more than seven months, or on 20 September 1993. This indicates that the said order was not issued with haste.

He also calls the attention of this Court to the following allegation in plaintiffs-petitioners' Answer to Counterclaim with the the MCTC:

4. That, since 1975 until August 31, 1987 defendant used to be a lessee of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog's on another parcel of land. ...

According to him Magdato's failure to deny the said allegation amounted to an admission that "he has nothing at all to do with the parcel of land described in ... the complaint in Civil Case "No. 262. Thus, the claim of tenancy is false and a sham.

The respondent Judge admits his "misgivings" in his Order of 20 September 1993, especially with reference to the phrase "before judgment become final and executory." He avers that the said phrase "was never meant to be"; as a matter of fact, the Order of Execution was issued only on 16 December 1993, long after the Order of 20 September 1993 had indeed become final and executory. "IT IS JUST MOST UNFORTUNATE that the sheriff executed literally the said Order." At any rate, his Order of 20 September 1993 is the product of what he honestly believed to be right and just under the circumstances.

We find unsatisfactory the above explanation of Judge Del Rosario. The fact remains that, in his orders dated 15 December 1992 and 20 September 1993, he applied the previous Rule on Summary procedure despite the effectivity of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991 yet.

That he never meant his order of 20 September 1993 to be executed before the judgment became final and executory is a lame excuse, which no rational mind can accept. He explicitly ordered Magdato to remove his house standing on Bayog's lot "before judgment became final and executory." To carry out that order, he also directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy Magdato's house in case Magdato should fail to remove the same "before judgment against him becomes final and executory." He reiterated this command in no uncertain terms in his Order of Execution of 16 December 1993 when he directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy Magdato's house Magdato failed to remove the same "before judgment against him becomes final and executory." He cannot then be allowed to make the sheriff who enforced his order as a scapegoat. He knew, or ought to know, that his order could not be executed before the finality of the judgment and that the removal or destruction of Magdato's house could only be done after Magdato has failed to remove it within a reasonable period of time.

We have time and again stated that judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. We have reminded them that under Canons 4 and 18 of he Canons of Judicial Ethics, they are required to be studious of the principles of law and to administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 [1994]).

Judges of trial courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should never forget that they are in the forefront in the sacred task of administering justice. Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting in oppression or failure of justice would have a negative effect in the Judiciary itself. Judges must not allow this to happen. Judge Del Rosario must then be held responsible for what he did in this case.

As to Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, it appears that he has not complied with the order of this Court for him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He must then be also required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in failing to comply with the said order.

WHEREFORE, for ignorance of procedural laws resulting in abuse of authority and oppression, Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderrama, Antique, is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

For his failure to comply with the 5 July 1996 Decision of this Court requiring him to explain his apparent violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue is hereby further DIRECTED to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court and to SUBMIT his compliance with the decision of 5 July 1996, both within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be immediately served on Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario and Atty. Marcelo C. Josue.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.