FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 167518, March 23, 2011 ]BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA +
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA, JR., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA +
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, VS. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA, JR., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] dated December 14, 2004 and Resolution[3] dated March 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230,
which affirmed the Resolution[4] dated December 17, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), holding the dismissal of respondent Pio Roque S. Coquia, Jr. (respondent Coquia) as illegal and ordering petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands
(petitioner BPI) to pay him separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Coquia's stint with petitioner BPI lasted for 26 years commencing in 1972 when he was assigned as bookkeeper and was thereafter promoted to various positions in different BPI branches, such as examiner in 1975, senior examiner in 1977, assistant auditor in 1981, assistant manager in 1984, senior assistant manager in 1987, manager in 1989 and as senior manager in Dagupan Branch from 1992 to 1998.
Respondent Coquia alleged that on June 3, 1998, he was instructed to take a vacation leave starting June 4, 1998 on account of an internal audit to be conducted in BPI Dagupan Branch. Two days after he returned to work on June 15, 1998, he was asked to continue his leave of absence until the auditors shall have concluded their examination. In a notice dated July 16, 1998,[5] he was placed under preventive suspension for 30 days due to further investigation of the various irregularities found to have been committed by him, as follows:
On August 18, 1998, respondent Coquia received a show cause memo dated August 17, 1998[6] directing him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for committing serious offenses/violations of bank policies[7] on the basis of the internal auditor's findings. He was also advised in the memo that a hearing will be held to give him an opportunity to ventilate his side.
On November 23, 1998, a Notice of Termination dated November 18, 1998[8] was served on respondent Coquia. Thus, on November 27, 1998, he filed a complaint[9] for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and other monetary claims
against petitioner BPI and some of its corporate officers.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
In its Position Paper,[10] petitioner BPI posited that respondent Coquia's conduct in causing the issuance of Manager's Check No. 9303[11] payable to a certain Mario Santiago for payment of accrued expenses for the painting of the bank's stairway hall in 1997, as well as Manager's Check No. 9302[12] payable to AVS Termite and Pest Control Services for payment of pest/termite control treatment performed in 1997, and the subsequent encashments thereof, when there was no painting job or pest control treatment performed within such period of time, manifests his intent and criminal design to defraud the bank. Petitioner BPI presented the affidavit of Mario Santiago,[13] the purported payee of Manager's Check No. 9303, attesting to the fact that the signatures found on the dorsal portion of the check and its supporting voucher are not his, and the affidavit of the branch's head security guard[14] attesting to the falsity of the purpose for which the checks were issued. In addition, it presented the joint affidavit of the branch's operations manager, Ferdinand M. Rabago (Rabago), and operations assistant manager, Mario A. Gabrillo (Gabrillo),[15] declaring that the checks were prepared and issued upon the instruction and initiative of respondent Coquia. On account of these anomalies, a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents before the City Prosecutor's Office of Dagupan City was filed against respondent Coquia. Petitioner BPI also claimed that respondent Coquia's actuation in permitting the encashment of an uncleared check beyond banking hours, known as overnight borrowing, and in resorting to temporary or daylight borrowings from tellers were evidently irregular transactions violative of bank policies. Further, allowing his driver/bodyguard unlimited access to the bank's restricted areas, facilities and records, as well as to perform clerical functions inside the bank's premises, constitutes flagrant and gross violation of bank rules and orders from superior management. Petitioner BPI likewise presented sworn statements of its employees[16] attesting to the so-called overnight and daylight borrowings of respondent Coquia and to the activities being performed inside the bank by his driver/bodyguard, Jess Coquia. Indeed, according to petitioner BPI, as respondent Coquia's position requires the highest degree of trust, such reprehensible conduct warrants his termination from employment.
Respondent Coquia, on the other hand, claimed innocence of the charges of serious misconduct and breach of trust as grounds for his dismissal. On the charge of spurious expenses, he denied liability by explaining that Rabago and Gabrillo were the ones who caused the preparation of the checks and vouchers containing forged signatures of payees and that he merely approved and signed the same for being regular on its face. According to him, after being informed of the real purpose for the issuance of the checks (as payment for valid contingent expenses) he consented to the disbursements. As regards the alleged overnight borrowings, he claimed justification for authorizing irregular encashment upon the request of important clients and after confirmation from his assistant manager. Likewise, his resort to temporary or daylight borrowing, which involves the borrowing of money from tellers but returning the amount loaned before the close of banking hours, did not cause any prejudice to the bank but in fact was done for the benefit of valued clients. Lastly, he denied having allowed his driver/bodyguard access to confidential bank records and operations.[17]
On July 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[18] finding respondent Coquia's dismissal illegal. The Labor Arbiter held that there is no factual basis for the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon respondent Coquia since, while he may have involved himself in some irregular transactions, the same nevertheless had redounded to the benefit of the bank and without fraudulent intent on his part. First, respondent Coquia's issuance of spurious checks was not driven by any criminal design to defraud the bank. In fact, the expenditures have promoted the bank's business interest. Second, the overnight and daylight borrowings were mere favors extended to clients deserving of such accommodation which did not result in any damage to the bank's operation. Lastly, the driver/bodyguard's actions in performing irregular functions inside the bank did not in any way compromise confidential bank records.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Coquia's involuntary leave of absence is considered as an illegal suspension for being in excess of the maximum period of suspension of 30 days allowed under the Labor Code. It also declared respondent Coquia entitled to moral and exemplary damages for the anxiety he had gone through while being investigated in an oppressive manner. Only petitioner BPI, excluding its corporate officers, was held liable for the awards granted to respondent Coquia. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed of the case as follows:
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
Aggrieved, petitioner BPI appealed to the NLRC on the ground that the Labor Arbiter committed serious error in holding that respondent Coquia was illegally suspended and dismissed. The NLRC, in its Decision dated April 19, 2000,[20] reversed the assailed decision and declared that there exist sufficient bases for the dismissal. The NLRC ruled that respondent Coquia has conducted unsound banking practice in transgression of Central Bank rules and regulations in authorizing and approving fictitious expenses, in accommodating the encashment of a check instead of sending it first for clearing and in maliciously engaging in irregular transactions.
Respondent Coquia filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 24, 2001.[21] This time, the NLRC sustained the merits of respondent Coquia's explication of absence of bad faith and malice in his actions and considered his satisfactory performance and loyal dedication to the bank. The NLRC thus reinstated and affirmed the awards rendered by the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner BPI then filed its own motion for reconsideration. The NLRC, in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003,[22] denied the motion and affirmed the illegality of respondent Coquia's termination from employment but this time, modified the awards granted to him. It noted that respondent Coquia was not entirely faultless of the charges which stripped him of entitlement to backwages. Likewise, he has no right to damages since his termination was in compliance with due process and not attended by any ill-motive on the part of petitioner BPI. Furthermore, since reinstatement is no longer possible due to strained relation between the parties, separation pay is proper under the circumstances. Thus, the decretal portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
From the said NLRC Resolution, petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia filed their separate petitions before the CA. Petitioner BPI's Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order[24] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83883. On the other hand, respondent Coquia's Petition for Certiorari[25] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84230.
The CA, however, resolved the petitions differently. In CA-G.R. SP No. 84230, the CA, through its Special Sixteenth Division, rendered a Decision[26] dated December 14, 2004 which denied respondent Coquia's petition and sustained the NLRC's deletion of the award of backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The CA likewise sustained the award of separation pay as reinstatement was no longer possible due to strained relation between petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia.
Petitioner BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 16, 2005.[28] Hence, petitioner BPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:
Petitioner BPI submits that the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ruling that respondent Coquia is entitled to separation pay because its jurisdiction is confined only to the lone issue of whether the deletion of the award of damages and attorney's fees was proper, as advanced by respondent Coquia in his petition. Petitioner BPI also argues that the propriety of the payment of separation pay is the subject matter of an earlier petition it filed, so that the portion granting such award in favor of respondent Coquia should not be binding on the parties. At any rate, according to petitioner BPI, the CA ruling on the matter is erroneous since respondent Coquia's acts of fraud and dishonesty amounted to serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence which justify his dismissal and do not give him the right to separation pay.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
The issues regarding the validity of respondent
Coquia's dismissal and the correctness of the
award of separation pay have been barred by
the principle of res judicata by virtue of a final
and executory judgment rendered in CA G.R.
SP No. 83883 involving the same parties,
issues and cause of action.
On March 4, 2009, the Special Former Eleventh Division of the CA rendered a Decision[30] in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883, holding the dismissal of respondent Coquia as legal since violations of bank's policies, rules and regulations, amount to an abuse of the trust reposed in him by his employer. As a result, the NLRC's award of separation pay and accumulated leave credits were reversed and set aside. However, the CA, on equitable grounds, still granted respondent Coquia financial assistance for his 26 years of service to the bank. The dispositive part the Decision reads as follows:
This Decision became final and executory on September 9, 2010. Moreover, Entry of Judgment was made on December 16, 2010.
Therefore, in view of this significant development, petitioner BPI's prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay in favor of respondent Coquia has already become moot as the same has already been set aside in the March 4, 2009 Decision of the CA which had long become final and executory.
Moreover, petitioner BPI's prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay is likewise barred by the principle of res judicata. In its concept as a bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,[31] res judicata dictates that a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same cause of action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.[32] To apply this doctrine, the following essential requisites should be satisfied: 1) finality of the former judgment; 2) the court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[33]
As mentioned, the judgment rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 has
already become final and executory. It was rendered based on the merits by a court which has jurisdiction thereon. The parties involved in that case and in the present petition are the same as well as the subject matter and cause of action, which revolves around the validity of respondent Coquia's termination from employment and the propriety of the award of separation pay in his favor.
Clearly, then, this Court may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the Supreme Court.[34] This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing further can be done except to execute it.[35] A judgment must be final at some definite time as it is only proper to allow the case to take its rest on grounds of public policy and sound practice.[36] Although there are recognized exceptions to this fundamental principle, such as nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments and cases which would not cause any prejudice to any party,[37] none of these exceptions obtain in the case at bench.
Thus, the Court may not dwell on petitioner BPI's assigned errors since to resolve the same would allow the revival or review of an already immutable judgment. In the same perspective, the Court cannot affirm the findings and ruling of the herein assailed Decision because to allow its affirmance would permit a reversal of a duly promulgated decision that has become final and executory. As the Decision of the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 completely varies with the final and executory Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 upholding the legality of respondent Coquia's dismissal, the former has to be set aside to conform to what has already been finally adjudicated between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 14, 2004 Decision and March 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 which affirmed the December 17, 2003 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission finding the dismissal of respondent Pio Roque S. Coquia, Jr. as illegal and ordering petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay the former separation pay are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in view of the March 4, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Perez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-49.
[2] Annex "T" of the Petition, id. at 539-553; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[3] Annex "A" of the Petition, id. at 51-52.
[4] Annex "O" of the Petition, id. at 400-403; penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.
[5] Id. at 104 and 141.
[6] Id. at 105-107.
[7]1. Conflict of Interest; Lending Business. You are either engaged in the lending business or, at the very least, actively participating in the lending business of third parties in violation of the Bank's policy on conflict-of-interest. A certain Josephine Boright directly communicated to you by fax regarding her past due loan. You also admitted that you monitor the lending business of three (3) clients, namely; Lao, P. Merza and P. Quinto. In fact, you do more than simply monitor their business. Your active participation includes using your own account for the funding of loans and directly releasing loans to borrowers.
2. Irregular Accruals; Spurious Payments. Set up and reversal of accrued expenses totaling P49,200.00. This amount was part of the total accruals which you ordered set up on December 29, 1997 without supporting documents except a yellow pad containing the accounting entries in your own handwriting. The corresponding payment via Manager's Checks were also made upon your instruction and approval. There were still no supporting invoices and/or official receipts submitted when you authorized the payments except for the P10,000.00 paid to AVS Termite and Pest Control Services. Attached hereto as Attachment I is the schedule of the manager's checks issued to various payees. Needless to say, these payments are considered spurious without the required supporting documents and/or actual service rendered.
In the case of MC No. 9303 dated March 31, 1998 for P18,000.00 payable to Mario Santiago purportedly for the repainting (labor and materials) of the branch's stairways, Mr. Santiago has denied receiving the amount, endorsing the check and signing the voucher. The evidence show that you ordered the accrual of this amount on December 29, 1997 despite the fact that no service was rendered as of that date, you authorized the payment (thus reversing the accrual) by signing the voucher, and authorized the encashment of the check by your signature on the dorsal side of the check. According to Mr. Santiago, he charged only the amount of P8,000.00 for his service (labor only) performed from April 9-12, 1998 and was paid via MC No. 9353 for P7,920.00, net of tax, on April 13, 1998. He did not perform any repainting job at the branch in 1997. Neither was there any corresponding service rendered for the P18,000.00 payment.
For pest control treatment, the branch issued MC No. 9302 for P10,000.00 on March 31, 1998 (encashed on 04/08/98) for treatment purportedly made in 1997 (OR was dated Nov. 14, 1997) by AVS Termite and Pest Control Services. Earlier, on March 16 and March 26, 1998, two payments aggregating P48,000.00 were also made. The signatures of Angelito Seen, proprietor of AVS Termite and Pest Control Services, on MC No. 9302 and the corresponding voucher differ materially from his signature on the service contract for the P48,000.00 job. Records in the branch also indicate that no pest control treatment was performed in the branch by AVS in the year 1997.
4. Fraudulent, Overnight Borrowings from Cash-in-Vault. You authorized the irregular encashment of a UCPB-Dagupan check for P200,000.00 belonging to your relative, Editha Coquia on 09-24-97. The money was drawn from the Cash-in-Vault after banking hours. To conceal the irregular transaction, it was made to appear in the records that the money was loaded in the Automated Teller Machine (ATM). Since no actual loading took place, the ATM had a shortage of P200,000.00 that day. This was reversed the following day when the UCPB check was sent for clearing.
A similar infraction was committed in accommodation of the same Editha Coquia on October 16, 1997 but with a different concealment method. Another UCPB check for P150,000.00 was encashed from the CIV after banking hours and purposely misrouted by sending it to BPI-Urdaneta for clearing. The debit advice was reversed the following day when BPI-Urdaneta sent it back and refused to pass an accounting entry.
5. "Daylight" Borrowings from Tellers. In a number of instances, you have reportedly resorted to temporary or "daylight" borrowings from various tellers against IOUs written on pieces of paper signed by you or your driver/bodyguard, Jess Coquia. Though these were paid at the end of the day or before balancing time, we have a stern prohibition against this practice for very obvious reasons.
6. Jess Coquia: Non-employee's Access to Bank Records. You were unduly allowing your personal driver and bodyguard, Jess Coquia, access to the branch's restricted areas, facilities and records in gross violation of control, security and confidentiality laws, rules and regulations. The said driver/bodyguard was also reported to be performing clerical functions inside the bank premises. In February, 1997, you were already instructed by VP JV Razon to stop this practice. (Id. at 106.)
[8] Id. at 108-109 and 145-146.
[9] Annex "C" of respondent Coquia's Petition for Certiorari before the CA, CA rollo, pp. 29-30.
[10] Annex "B" of the Petition, rollo, pp. 53-72.
[11] Id. at 75.
[12] Id. at 77.
[13] Id. at 79-80.
[14] Id. at 88-89.
[15] Id. at 87.
[16] Affidavits of Mario P. Gabrillo, Leticia B. Cacho, Marjorie R. Macaraeg, Araceli T. Antineo, Pearlene Ma. M. Gumapos and Teresita B. Ocoma, id. at 94-96, 97, 98, 99-100, 101 and 102-103, respectively.
[17] Respondent Coquia's Complaint/Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Annex "B-1" of the Petition, id. at 110-135.
[18] Annex "C" of the Petition, id. at 157-163.
[19] Id. at 163.
[20] Annex "E" of the Petition, id. at 226-253.
[21]Annex "H" of the Petition, id. at 290-299.
[22]Annex "O" of the Petition, id. at 400-403.
[23] Id. at 402-403.
[24] Annex "P" of the Petition, id. at 404-441.
[25] Annex "Q" of the Petition, id. at 442-453.
[26] Annex "T" of the Petition, id. at 539-553. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolution dated December 17, 2003 of the public respondent NLRC in NLRC Case SUB-RAB-01-07-11-0304-98 DC, NLRC NCR CA No. 020987-99 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 552.)
[27]Annex "U" of the Petition, id. at 554-569.
[28] Annex "A" of the Petition, id. at 51-52.
[29] Id. at 28-29.
[30] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[31] SEC. 47. Effect of judgments of final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; x x x
[32] Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 162868, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 171, 187-188.
[33] Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007, 537 SCRA 571, 584.
[34] Barnes v. Judge Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
[35] Tamayo v. People, G.R. No. 174698, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 312, 322-323.
[36] Id.
[37] Lalican v. Insular Life Assurance Company Limited, G.R. No. 183526, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 159, 173.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Coquia's stint with petitioner BPI lasted for 26 years commencing in 1972 when he was assigned as bookkeeper and was thereafter promoted to various positions in different BPI branches, such as examiner in 1975, senior examiner in 1977, assistant auditor in 1981, assistant manager in 1984, senior assistant manager in 1987, manager in 1989 and as senior manager in Dagupan Branch from 1992 to 1998.
Respondent Coquia alleged that on June 3, 1998, he was instructed to take a vacation leave starting June 4, 1998 on account of an internal audit to be conducted in BPI Dagupan Branch. Two days after he returned to work on June 15, 1998, he was asked to continue his leave of absence until the auditors shall have concluded their examination. In a notice dated July 16, 1998,[5] he was placed under preventive suspension for 30 days due to further investigation of the various irregularities found to have been committed by him, as follows:
- Possible conflict-of-interest on account of lending activities;
- Reversal of accrued expense and their corresponding payments without supporting invoices and/or official receipts;
- Questionable payments for re-painting services and pest control treatment;
- Irregular encashment of another bank's check against cash-in-vault beyond banking hours;
- Reported temporary or "daylight" borrowings from the tellers; and
- Allowing your driver/bodyguard access to the branch's restricted areas, facilities and records.
On August 18, 1998, respondent Coquia received a show cause memo dated August 17, 1998[6] directing him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for committing serious offenses/violations of bank policies[7] on the basis of the internal auditor's findings. He was also advised in the memo that a hearing will be held to give him an opportunity to ventilate his side.
On November 23, 1998, a Notice of Termination dated November 18, 1998[8] was served on respondent Coquia. Thus, on November 27, 1998, he filed a complaint[9] for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and other monetary claims
against petitioner BPI and some of its corporate officers.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
In its Position Paper,[10] petitioner BPI posited that respondent Coquia's conduct in causing the issuance of Manager's Check No. 9303[11] payable to a certain Mario Santiago for payment of accrued expenses for the painting of the bank's stairway hall in 1997, as well as Manager's Check No. 9302[12] payable to AVS Termite and Pest Control Services for payment of pest/termite control treatment performed in 1997, and the subsequent encashments thereof, when there was no painting job or pest control treatment performed within such period of time, manifests his intent and criminal design to defraud the bank. Petitioner BPI presented the affidavit of Mario Santiago,[13] the purported payee of Manager's Check No. 9303, attesting to the fact that the signatures found on the dorsal portion of the check and its supporting voucher are not his, and the affidavit of the branch's head security guard[14] attesting to the falsity of the purpose for which the checks were issued. In addition, it presented the joint affidavit of the branch's operations manager, Ferdinand M. Rabago (Rabago), and operations assistant manager, Mario A. Gabrillo (Gabrillo),[15] declaring that the checks were prepared and issued upon the instruction and initiative of respondent Coquia. On account of these anomalies, a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents before the City Prosecutor's Office of Dagupan City was filed against respondent Coquia. Petitioner BPI also claimed that respondent Coquia's actuation in permitting the encashment of an uncleared check beyond banking hours, known as overnight borrowing, and in resorting to temporary or daylight borrowings from tellers were evidently irregular transactions violative of bank policies. Further, allowing his driver/bodyguard unlimited access to the bank's restricted areas, facilities and records, as well as to perform clerical functions inside the bank's premises, constitutes flagrant and gross violation of bank rules and orders from superior management. Petitioner BPI likewise presented sworn statements of its employees[16] attesting to the so-called overnight and daylight borrowings of respondent Coquia and to the activities being performed inside the bank by his driver/bodyguard, Jess Coquia. Indeed, according to petitioner BPI, as respondent Coquia's position requires the highest degree of trust, such reprehensible conduct warrants his termination from employment.
Respondent Coquia, on the other hand, claimed innocence of the charges of serious misconduct and breach of trust as grounds for his dismissal. On the charge of spurious expenses, he denied liability by explaining that Rabago and Gabrillo were the ones who caused the preparation of the checks and vouchers containing forged signatures of payees and that he merely approved and signed the same for being regular on its face. According to him, after being informed of the real purpose for the issuance of the checks (as payment for valid contingent expenses) he consented to the disbursements. As regards the alleged overnight borrowings, he claimed justification for authorizing irregular encashment upon the request of important clients and after confirmation from his assistant manager. Likewise, his resort to temporary or daylight borrowing, which involves the borrowing of money from tellers but returning the amount loaned before the close of banking hours, did not cause any prejudice to the bank but in fact was done for the benefit of valued clients. Lastly, he denied having allowed his driver/bodyguard access to confidential bank records and operations.[17]
On July 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[18] finding respondent Coquia's dismissal illegal. The Labor Arbiter held that there is no factual basis for the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon respondent Coquia since, while he may have involved himself in some irregular transactions, the same nevertheless had redounded to the benefit of the bank and without fraudulent intent on his part. First, respondent Coquia's issuance of spurious checks was not driven by any criminal design to defraud the bank. In fact, the expenditures have promoted the bank's business interest. Second, the overnight and daylight borrowings were mere favors extended to clients deserving of such accommodation which did not result in any damage to the bank's operation. Lastly, the driver/bodyguard's actions in performing irregular functions inside the bank did not in any way compromise confidential bank records.
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that respondent Coquia's involuntary leave of absence is considered as an illegal suspension for being in excess of the maximum period of suspension of 30 days allowed under the Labor Code. It also declared respondent Coquia entitled to moral and exemplary damages for the anxiety he had gone through while being investigated in an oppressive manner. Only petitioner BPI, excluding its corporate officers, was held liable for the awards granted to respondent Coquia. Thus, the Labor Arbiter disposed of the case as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the dismissal of the complainant is hereby declared to be illegal and respondent BPI is hereby ORDERED to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority or other benefits and to pay him the following:
a) P520,800.04 [1 month 12 days (1998) and 7 months (1999) x P62,000.00] as backwages for the period from the time of his dismissal on November 23, 1998 up to the promulgation of this decision[:]
b) P1,000,000.00 by way of moral damages;
c) P500,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
d) Attorney's fees equivalent [to] 10% of the aggregate award.
In addition, the respondent company is ORDERED to refrain from deducting from complainant's accumulated sick and vacation leaves the period from June 3, 1998 to November 23, 1998.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
Aggrieved, petitioner BPI appealed to the NLRC on the ground that the Labor Arbiter committed serious error in holding that respondent Coquia was illegally suspended and dismissed. The NLRC, in its Decision dated April 19, 2000,[20] reversed the assailed decision and declared that there exist sufficient bases for the dismissal. The NLRC ruled that respondent Coquia has conducted unsound banking practice in transgression of Central Bank rules and regulations in authorizing and approving fictitious expenses, in accommodating the encashment of a check instead of sending it first for clearing and in maliciously engaging in irregular transactions.
Respondent Coquia filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by the NLRC in its Resolution dated September 24, 2001.[21] This time, the NLRC sustained the merits of respondent Coquia's explication of absence of bad faith and malice in his actions and considered his satisfactory performance and loyal dedication to the bank. The NLRC thus reinstated and affirmed the awards rendered by the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner BPI then filed its own motion for reconsideration. The NLRC, in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003,[22] denied the motion and affirmed the illegality of respondent Coquia's termination from employment but this time, modified the awards granted to him. It noted that respondent Coquia was not entirely faultless of the charges which stripped him of entitlement to backwages. Likewise, he has no right to damages since his termination was in compliance with due process and not attended by any ill-motive on the part of petitioner BPI. Furthermore, since reinstatement is no longer possible due to strained relation between the parties, separation pay is proper under the circumstances. Thus, the decretal portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, the awards of backwages and moral and exemplary damages are hereby deleted.
In lieu of reinstatement, complainant is hereby awarded separation pay in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Twelve Thousand Pesos (P1,612,000.00).
Finally, the Order directing respondents to refrain from deducting from complainant's accumulated sick and vacation leaves the period from June 3, 1998 to September 23, 1998 is hereby REITERATED. Considering however complainant's non-reinstatement, reference to company practice, policy or the Collective Bargaining Agreement may be made to determine if said accumulated leaves may be converted to their cash equivalent.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
From the said NLRC Resolution, petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia filed their separate petitions before the CA. Petitioner BPI's Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order[24] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83883. On the other hand, respondent Coquia's Petition for Certiorari[25] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84230.
The CA, however, resolved the petitions differently. In CA-G.R. SP No. 84230, the CA, through its Special Sixteenth Division, rendered a Decision[26] dated December 14, 2004 which denied respondent Coquia's petition and sustained the NLRC's deletion of the award of backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The CA likewise sustained the award of separation pay as reinstatement was no longer possible due to strained relation between petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia.
Petitioner BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 16, 2005.[28] Hence, petitioner BPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, assigning the following errors:
- .WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT RULED ON THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ANOTHER DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER SAID SUBJECT MATTER, AS REPEATEDLY MANIFESTED BY PETITIONER.
- WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDIGN (SIC) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING THAT THE TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WAS FOR JUST CAUSE.
IT IS WELL SETTLED IN THIS JURISDICTION THAT THE AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY, OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IS JUSTIFIED ONLY WHERE THE EMPLOYEE IS VALIDLY DISMISSED FOR CAUSES OTHER THAN SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR THOSE ADVERSELY AFFECTING HIS MORAL CHARACTER.
FURTHER, THIS JURISDICTION IS REPLETE WITH JURISPRUDENTIAL DOCTRINES THAT THE POSITION OF A MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE ENTAILS A HIGH DEGREE OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. THE EMPLOYER UPON WHOSE DISCRETION LIES THE CONTINUITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE ONLY REQUIRES REASONABLE BASIS TO DETERMINE THE QUALIFICATION OF THE OCCUPANT. UNLESS TAINTED WITH MALICE AND ARBITRARINESS, THE EMPLOYER'S DECISION TO DISMISS AN EMPLOYEE UPON LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE CANNOT BE SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE.[29]
Petitioner BPI submits that the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction in ruling that respondent Coquia is entitled to separation pay because its jurisdiction is confined only to the lone issue of whether the deletion of the award of damages and attorney's fees was proper, as advanced by respondent Coquia in his petition. Petitioner BPI also argues that the propriety of the payment of separation pay is the subject matter of an earlier petition it filed, so that the portion granting such award in favor of respondent Coquia should not be binding on the parties. At any rate, according to petitioner BPI, the CA ruling on the matter is erroneous since respondent Coquia's acts of fraud and dishonesty amounted to serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence which justify his dismissal and do not give him the right to separation pay.
We grant the petition.
The issues regarding the validity of respondent
Coquia's dismissal and the correctness of the
award of separation pay have been barred by
the principle of res judicata by virtue of a final
and executory judgment rendered in CA G.R.
SP No. 83883 involving the same parties,
issues and cause of action.
On March 4, 2009, the Special Former Eleventh Division of the CA rendered a Decision[30] in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883, holding the dismissal of respondent Coquia as legal since violations of bank's policies, rules and regulations, amount to an abuse of the trust reposed in him by his employer. As a result, the NLRC's award of separation pay and accumulated leave credits were reversed and set aside. However, the CA, on equitable grounds, still granted respondent Coquia financial assistance for his 26 years of service to the bank. The dispositive part the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Resolution of December 13, 2003 (sic) is SET ASIDE. The dismissal is held legal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence; The award of separation pay and accumulated leave credits is likewise SET ASIDE. A financial assistance of P260,000.00 is, however, ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.
This Decision became final and executory on September 9, 2010. Moreover, Entry of Judgment was made on December 16, 2010.
Therefore, in view of this significant development, petitioner BPI's prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay in favor of respondent Coquia has already become moot as the same has already been set aside in the March 4, 2009 Decision of the CA which had long become final and executory.
Moreover, petitioner BPI's prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay is likewise barred by the principle of res judicata. In its concept as a bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,[31] res judicata dictates that a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same cause of action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.[32] To apply this doctrine, the following essential requisites should be satisfied: 1) finality of the former judgment; 2) the court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[33]
As mentioned, the judgment rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 has
already become final and executory. It was rendered based on the merits by a court which has jurisdiction thereon. The parties involved in that case and in the present petition are the same as well as the subject matter and cause of action, which revolves around the validity of respondent Coquia's termination from employment and the propriety of the award of separation pay in his favor.
Clearly, then, this Court may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the Supreme Court.[34] This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing further can be done except to execute it.[35] A judgment must be final at some definite time as it is only proper to allow the case to take its rest on grounds of public policy and sound practice.[36] Although there are recognized exceptions to this fundamental principle, such as nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments and cases which would not cause any prejudice to any party,[37] none of these exceptions obtain in the case at bench.
Thus, the Court may not dwell on petitioner BPI's assigned errors since to resolve the same would allow the revival or review of an already immutable judgment. In the same perspective, the Court cannot affirm the findings and ruling of the herein assailed Decision because to allow its affirmance would permit a reversal of a duly promulgated decision that has become final and executory. As the Decision of the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 completely varies with the final and executory Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 upholding the legality of respondent Coquia's dismissal, the former has to be set aside to conform to what has already been finally adjudicated between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 14, 2004 Decision and March 16, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84230 which affirmed the December 17, 2003 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission finding the dismissal of respondent Pio Roque S. Coquia, Jr. as illegal and ordering petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay the former separation pay are REVERSED and SET ASIDE in view of the March 4, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, and Perez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-49.
[2] Annex "T" of the Petition, id. at 539-553; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[3] Annex "A" of the Petition, id. at 51-52.
[4] Annex "O" of the Petition, id. at 400-403; penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.
[5] Id. at 104 and 141.
[6] Id. at 105-107.
[7]1. Conflict of Interest; Lending Business. You are either engaged in the lending business or, at the very least, actively participating in the lending business of third parties in violation of the Bank's policy on conflict-of-interest. A certain Josephine Boright directly communicated to you by fax regarding her past due loan. You also admitted that you monitor the lending business of three (3) clients, namely; Lao, P. Merza and P. Quinto. In fact, you do more than simply monitor their business. Your active participation includes using your own account for the funding of loans and directly releasing loans to borrowers.
2. Irregular Accruals; Spurious Payments. Set up and reversal of accrued expenses totaling P49,200.00. This amount was part of the total accruals which you ordered set up on December 29, 1997 without supporting documents except a yellow pad containing the accounting entries in your own handwriting. The corresponding payment via Manager's Checks were also made upon your instruction and approval. There were still no supporting invoices and/or official receipts submitted when you authorized the payments except for the P10,000.00 paid to AVS Termite and Pest Control Services. Attached hereto as Attachment I is the schedule of the manager's checks issued to various payees. Needless to say, these payments are considered spurious without the required supporting documents and/or actual service rendered.
In the case of MC No. 9303 dated March 31, 1998 for P18,000.00 payable to Mario Santiago purportedly for the repainting (labor and materials) of the branch's stairways, Mr. Santiago has denied receiving the amount, endorsing the check and signing the voucher. The evidence show that you ordered the accrual of this amount on December 29, 1997 despite the fact that no service was rendered as of that date, you authorized the payment (thus reversing the accrual) by signing the voucher, and authorized the encashment of the check by your signature on the dorsal side of the check. According to Mr. Santiago, he charged only the amount of P8,000.00 for his service (labor only) performed from April 9-12, 1998 and was paid via MC No. 9353 for P7,920.00, net of tax, on April 13, 1998. He did not perform any repainting job at the branch in 1997. Neither was there any corresponding service rendered for the P18,000.00 payment.
For pest control treatment, the branch issued MC No. 9302 for P10,000.00 on March 31, 1998 (encashed on 04/08/98) for treatment purportedly made in 1997 (OR was dated Nov. 14, 1997) by AVS Termite and Pest Control Services. Earlier, on March 16 and March 26, 1998, two payments aggregating P48,000.00 were also made. The signatures of Angelito Seen, proprietor of AVS Termite and Pest Control Services, on MC No. 9302 and the corresponding voucher differ materially from his signature on the service contract for the P48,000.00 job. Records in the branch also indicate that no pest control treatment was performed in the branch by AVS in the year 1997.
4. Fraudulent, Overnight Borrowings from Cash-in-Vault. You authorized the irregular encashment of a UCPB-Dagupan check for P200,000.00 belonging to your relative, Editha Coquia on 09-24-97. The money was drawn from the Cash-in-Vault after banking hours. To conceal the irregular transaction, it was made to appear in the records that the money was loaded in the Automated Teller Machine (ATM). Since no actual loading took place, the ATM had a shortage of P200,000.00 that day. This was reversed the following day when the UCPB check was sent for clearing.
A similar infraction was committed in accommodation of the same Editha Coquia on October 16, 1997 but with a different concealment method. Another UCPB check for P150,000.00 was encashed from the CIV after banking hours and purposely misrouted by sending it to BPI-Urdaneta for clearing. The debit advice was reversed the following day when BPI-Urdaneta sent it back and refused to pass an accounting entry.
5. "Daylight" Borrowings from Tellers. In a number of instances, you have reportedly resorted to temporary or "daylight" borrowings from various tellers against IOUs written on pieces of paper signed by you or your driver/bodyguard, Jess Coquia. Though these were paid at the end of the day or before balancing time, we have a stern prohibition against this practice for very obvious reasons.
6. Jess Coquia: Non-employee's Access to Bank Records. You were unduly allowing your personal driver and bodyguard, Jess Coquia, access to the branch's restricted areas, facilities and records in gross violation of control, security and confidentiality laws, rules and regulations. The said driver/bodyguard was also reported to be performing clerical functions inside the bank premises. In February, 1997, you were already instructed by VP JV Razon to stop this practice. (Id. at 106.)
[8] Id. at 108-109 and 145-146.
[9] Annex "C" of respondent Coquia's Petition for Certiorari before the CA, CA rollo, pp. 29-30.
[10] Annex "B" of the Petition, rollo, pp. 53-72.
[11] Id. at 75.
[12] Id. at 77.
[13] Id. at 79-80.
[14] Id. at 88-89.
[15] Id. at 87.
[16] Affidavits of Mario P. Gabrillo, Leticia B. Cacho, Marjorie R. Macaraeg, Araceli T. Antineo, Pearlene Ma. M. Gumapos and Teresita B. Ocoma, id. at 94-96, 97, 98, 99-100, 101 and 102-103, respectively.
[17] Respondent Coquia's Complaint/Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, Annex "B-1" of the Petition, id. at 110-135.
[18] Annex "C" of the Petition, id. at 157-163.
[19] Id. at 163.
[20] Annex "E" of the Petition, id. at 226-253.
[21]Annex "H" of the Petition, id. at 290-299.
[22]Annex "O" of the Petition, id. at 400-403.
[23] Id. at 402-403.
[24] Annex "P" of the Petition, id. at 404-441.
[25] Annex "Q" of the Petition, id. at 442-453.
[26] Annex "T" of the Petition, id. at 539-553. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolution dated December 17, 2003 of the public respondent NLRC in NLRC Case SUB-RAB-01-07-11-0304-98 DC, NLRC NCR CA No. 020987-99 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 552.)
[27]Annex "U" of the Petition, id. at 554-569.
[28] Annex "A" of the Petition, id. at 51-52.
[29] Id. at 28-29.
[30] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[31] SEC. 47. Effect of judgments of final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; x x x
[32] Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 162868, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 171, 187-188.
[33] Del Rosario v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 150134, October 31, 2007, 537 SCRA 571, 584.
[34] Barnes v. Judge Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
[35] Tamayo v. People, G.R. No. 174698, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 312, 322-323.
[36] Id.
[37] Lalican v. Insular Life Assurance Company Limited, G.R. No. 183526, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 159, 173.