PANGANIBAN, J.:

In denying this petition, the Court reiterates that the gathering, collection and/or possession, without license, of lumber, which is considered timber or forest product, are prohibited and penalized under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.

The Case

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside the Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals^[2] in CA-GR No. CR-12815 promulgated on July 30, 1993, and its Resolution^[3] promulgated on April 28, 1994. The assailed Decision affirmed the judgment^[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81,^[5] which, in the complaint against petitioners for violation of Section 68, PD 705 (Forestry Reform Code) as amended, disposed as follows: 

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds:

a) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, and

b) the accused ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and CRISPIN CABUDOL GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of lumber under the Information, dated March 16, 1990, under Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, and sentences each of them to an indeterminate sentence of SIX (6) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.   

The two (2) terms of imprisonment of each of the accused shall be served successively under Article 70, RPC.   

The preventive imprisonment which any of the accused may have suffered is credited in his favor to its full extent.   

The Court further orders the confiscation of the lumber described in the aforesaid Informations in favor of the government.   

SO ORDERED."

The Facts

On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were confiscated.

On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero with violation of Section 68,^[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277, in an Information^[7] which reads:

"That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening, in the Poblacion, municipality of Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber about 171 board feet and 41 pieces tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued at P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount."

In another Information,^[8] Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for the same violation in connection with the October 30, 1989 incident.

On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on the basis of the aforementioned Informations; each pleaded not guilty.^[9] The cases were thence jointly tried, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.^[10]

During the trial, the defense did not contest the above factual circumstances except to deny that the forest guards demanded, on either of the two occasions, papers or documents showing legal possession of the lumber. Additionally, Prisco Marin, who claimed to have been the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan, testified that the seized pieces of lumber were bought by Tan's Cajidiocan Trading, one of the licensed lumber dealers in the island, from Matzhou Development Corporation ("Matzhou") which thus delivered to the former Auxiliary Invoice No. 763850^[11] dated March 19, 1987 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue office in Romblon. According to Marin, the director of forestry had granted Matzhou a Tree Recovery Permit covering the entire island of Sibuyan. He added that he had inspected the lumber in question in the compound of A & E Construction or Cajidiocan Trading, where he was shown the auxiliary invoice covering the subject.^[12]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and ruled that the confiscated pieces of lumber which were admittedly owned by Accused Tan were not legitimate deliveries but aborted nocturnal haulings. It convicted all the accused as charged for their failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code, which requires the following legal documents: (1) an auxiliary invoice, (2) a certificate of origin, (3) a sales invoice, (4) scale/tally sheets and (5) a lumber dealer permit.

Ruling of Respondent Court of Appeals

On appeal, the accused assigned to the trial court these ten errors: (1) holding them liable under Section 68 of EO 277; (2) ruling that their possession of the lumber were unauthorized or illegal; (3) retroactively applying E.O. 277; (4) ruling that the accused did not have the necessary documents to make their possession legal; (5) convicting them despite the absence of the corpus delicti; (6) admitting in evidence the alleged seizure receipts or, assuming their admissibility, considering them as evidence of corpus delicti; (7) finding that the deliveries were aborted nocturnal haulings; (8) convicting Alejandro Tan on the ground of conspiracy; (9) ruling that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (10) sustaining the constitutionality of EO 277.^[13]

As regards the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals held petitioners' "artful distinction between timber and lumber" "to be fallacious and utterly unmeritorious." It thereby upheld the solicitor general's manifestation that "forest products" include "wood" which is defined by Webster's Dictionary as "the hard fibrous substance beneath the back of trees and shrubs." Respondent Court succinctly ruled that to construe "sawn lumber" as not covered by "sawn timber" would defeat the evident intent and purpose of the law, for "what would prevent an illegal logger [from bringing] with him a portable saw and having the timber illegally cut/gathered [and] sawn right on the spot, thus gaining immunity for himself[?]"^[14]

As to the next three assigned errors which relied heavily on Prisco Marin's testimony, Respondent Court dismissed the said witness' account as "anything but credible." It added that Marin's testimony largely focused on a certification he made stating that, five years ago, he inspected the same confiscated lumber which were to be used for the repair of school buildings by A & E Construction in Sibuyan. But during the cross-examination, he admitted that he made the inspection in December 1989. The appellate tribunal noted that, by then, he had already been relieved of his position as OIC of the Bureau of Forest Development in Romblon; hence, he had no business inspecting the lumberyard of Petitioner Tan. In fact, he admitted that in December 1989, it was Romulae Gadaoni who was already the highest forest officer in the island.^[15]

As to the fifth and sixth alleged errors, Respondent Court ruled that corpus delicti does not refer literally to the object of the crime -- in this case, the forest products possessed without the required legal documents. The fact that the crimes charged were perpetrated by the petitioners was credibly and amply proven by the detailed testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including the admission of Defense Witness Ismael Ramilo. The seizure receipts merely served to corroborate their testimonies.^[16]

The seventh and ninth assigned errors were deemed answered in the foregoing discussions. As to the eighth, no other than the admission of his caretaker or katiwala, Co-Accused Ramilo, proved that Tan was involved in the conspiracy. Ramilo testified that the deliveries of lumber on the subject dates (October 26 and 30, 1989) were made pursuant to the instruction of Tan; and that the latter owned said lumber, the trucks and the construction firm. The two accused truck drivers who were caught in flagrante delicto were mere employees of Tan.^[17]

The last assigned error was set aside by Respondent Court as unnecessary. Absolutely of no concern to the petitioners, who were caught in possession of lumber without the required legal documents, was the alleged unconstitutionality of the inclusion of "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish" in EO 277. There being other grounds to resolve the case, the constitutionality of said phrase was not passed upon.^[18]

In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners raised these additional grounds: (1) the Forestry Reform Code and the laws and regulations of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) distinguish between timber and lumber and between lumber and other forest products; (2) the Informations alleged and the facts proved that lumber is not covered by the provision supposedly violated; (3) judicial interpretation or construction may not be resorted to in order to fill a gap or clear an ambiguity in penal statutes and, assuming the propriety thereof, construction should be in favor of the accused; (4) lack of documents for possession of lumber is not punishable under the law; and (5) the perceived weakness in the testimony of Defense Witness Prisco Marin should not strengthen the case for the prosecution. In its April 28, 1994 Resolution, Respondent Court found "no cogent reason for the reversal or modification" of its Decision. Hence, this petition.^[19]

The Issues

Petitioners now ask this Court to likewise pass upon their foregoing submissions. Many of the errors raised, however, involve factual questions, the review of which is not within the ambit of this Court's functions, particularly in this case where the findings of the trial court were affirmed by the appellate court and where petitioners failed to show any misappreciation of the evidence presented.^[20] We shall therefore limit our review only to questions of law.

Accordingly, we shall rule on the following legal issues: (1) the constitutionality of Section 68 of EO 277, (2) the treatment by the lower courts of lumber as timber and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended, and (3) the alleged retroactive application of EO 277.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:                                                           
    Constitutionality of Sec. 68, E.O. 277

The impugned legal provision reads:

"Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:

Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found." Petitioners aver that the above provision is violative of substantive due process, because it requires the possession of certain legal documents to justify "mere possession" of forest products which, under Section 3(q) of PD 705, includes, among others, "firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, 'the associated water' or fish" and penalizes failure to present such required documents. One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination.^[21] As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not "charged with the [unlawful] possession of 'firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the associated water' or fish;" thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 "is absolutely of no concern" to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision.^[22] A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.^[23]

Main Issue: Under PD 705 and EO 277,
Is Lumber Considered Timber or Forest Product?

Petitioners contend that possession of manufactured lumber is not punishable under the Forestry Reform Code, as amended. As explicitly provided in Section 68 of both PD 705 and EO 277 (the law that amended the former), only the cutting, gathering, collecting and/or possession, without license, of timber and other forest products are prohibited. As expressly defined under Section 3(q) of PD 705, lumber is not timber or a forest product. It is only in Section 79 of the same law where the sale of lumber, without compliance with established grading rules and standards, is prohibited. Petitioners submit that the forest laws and regulations sufficiently differentiate between timber and lumber; therefore, courts should not construe lumber as timber.

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, has been settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,^[24] in which this Court expressly ruled that "lumber is included in the term timber."^[25] We quote at length the Court's discussion:

"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads:   

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.   

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus."^[26]

Mustang was recently reiterated in Lalican vs. Vergara,^[27] where we also said that '[t]o exclude possession of 'lumber' from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. x x x After all, the phrase 'forest products' is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber." Indeed, to mention lumber in the aforesaid section would simply result in tautology.

In addition, under American jurisprudence, lumber has been legally accepted as a term referring to the manufactured product of logs^[28] or to timber sawed or split into marketable form, especially for use in buildings.^[29]

Consistent with Mustang, we find no error in the holding of both lower courts. Clearly, petitioners are liable for violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Reform Code, as amended.

Corollary Issue:
  No Retroactive Application of EO 277

Petitioners insist that EO 277 is not applicable to them, because the seized lumber had been lawfully possessed by Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987, while the amendatory law was issued only on July 25, 1987, and took effect fifteen days after publication. This strained reasoning deserves scant consideration. First, at no time during the apprehensions did petitioners claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. In fact, Petitioner Ramilo and the drivers openly claimed that the lumber and the trucks belonged to A & E Construction which was, in turn, owned by Petitioner Tan. It was only during the course of the trial, through the testimony of Prisco Marin (characterized by the appellate court as "anything but credible"), that the alleged ownership thereof by Cajidiocan Trading was brought out. Second, the supposed sale of the subject lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading, as evidenced by the auxiliary invoice, occurred in March 1987, or more than two and a half years prior to the apprehension and seizure that gave rise to this case. It is highly doubtful if the lumber bought at the earlier date was the very same lumber confiscated in October 1989. No evidence was presented to overcome this veritable doubt. Third and most important, assuming that indeed they were the very same lumber, forest laws and regulations also require the following documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) sales invoice, (3) delivery receipt, (4) tally sheet, and (5) certificate of transport agreement.^[30] None of these documents were proffered in court or elsewhere.

Petitioners' unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in October 1989. EO 277, which specifically included "possession" of timber and other forest products within the contemplation of PD 705, had already been issued and in effect more than two years previous thereto. Nothing will prevent the indictment of petitioners for violation of EO 277 at the time they were caught by the forest guards in flagrante delicto. The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or criminal intent will not save the day for them.^[31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.                                                                               

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. Vitug, J., reiterates his separate opinion in Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. CA, 257 SCRA 430.

^[2] Twelfth Division composed of JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona, ponente; Antonio M. Martinez, chairman and now a member of this Court; and Eubulo G. Verzola, concurring.

^[3] Rollo, p. 98.

^[4] Ibid., pp. 67-78.

^[5] Presided by Judge Placido C. Marquez.

^[6] "Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."

^[7] Docketed as Crim. Case No. 1745; records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 1.

^[8] Docketed as Crim. Case No. 1746; records for Crim. Case No. 1746, p. 1.

^[9] Records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 17, and for Crim. Case No. 1746, p. 14.

^[10] RTC Decision, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 68-69.

^[11] Exh. "1"; records for Crim. Case No. 1745, p. 116.

^[12] RTC decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 73.

^[13] Assailed Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 53.

^[14] Ibid., p. 6; ibid., p. 54.

^[15] Assailed Decision, pp. 8, 10, 11 & 13.

^[16] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

^[17] Ibid., p. 15.

^[18] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

^[19] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 27, 1998 when the Court noted the letter dated December 12, 1997 of Sheriff Nowell Lim, RTC of Romblon, Branch 88, stating that the accused are residing in Cajidiocan, Romblon and that their bail bonds are current.

^[20] Gobonseng Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 472, July 17, 1995; Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 119, February 16, 1994.

^[21] Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, July 1, 1993.

^[22] Dimaporo vs. Mitra Jr., 202 SCRA 779, October 15, 1991.

^[23] National Press Club vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1, March 5, 1992; Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748, April 7, 1992.

^[24] 257 SCRA 430, June 18, 1996, per Davide, Jr., J.

^[25] At p. 448.

^[26] At pp. 448-449.

^[27] GR No. 108619, July 31, 1997, per Romero, J.

^[28] 54 C.J.S. §1, citing White's Case, 128 A. 739, 124 Me. 343. Also in McKinney vs. Matthews, 82 S.E. 1036, 1037, 166 N.C. 576, cited in Words & Phrases, Vol. 41A, p. 327; Craddock Mfg. Co. vs. Faison, 123 S.E. 535, 536, 138 Va. 665, 39 A.L.R. 1039, cited in Words & Phrases, Vol. 25A, p.519.

^[29] Ibid., p. 673, citing American Tie & Timber Co. vs. Kansas City Southern R. Co., Texas, 175 F. 28, 99 C.C.A. 44.

^[30] Primer on Illegal Logging, Legal Affairs Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, pp. 13-14; CA Rollo, pp. 162-163.

^[31] Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 279, May 18, 1993; People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994.