EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 128790, November 25, 1998 ]EDUARDO P. PILAPIL v. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA +
EDUARDO P. PILAPIL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; HON. JOSE S. BALAJADIA, HON. HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU, AND HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, AS MEMBERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
EDUARDO P. PILAPIL v. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA +
EDUARDO P. PILAPIL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; HON. JOSE S. BALAJADIA, HON. HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU, AND HON. ROBERTO M. LAGMAN, AS MEMBERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, raises the following issues:
After the finality of the aforementioned decision, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, to which the case was originally raffled. That division granted the motion.
On 15 February 1995, after a reinvestigation was conducted, then Special Prosecution Officer III Leonardo Tamayo and Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner. However, then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez disapproved the recommendation and, in a marginal note, stated: "The allegations of the accused are matters of defense for him to prove in Court."[2]
Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza issued a Memorandum[3] recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Leonardo P. Tamayo, then Deputy Special Prosecutor and OIC of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, recommended the approval of Mendoza's recommendation.[4] On 12 February 1996, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved Mendoza's recommendation.
On 26 February 1996, Special Prosecution Officer II Humphrey T. Monteroso, with the approval of Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo, filed with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Withdraw Information.[5]
On 5 March 1996, Associate Justice Cipriano A. del Rosario, Chairman of the Third Division, voluntarily inhibited[6] himself from resolving the Motion to Withdraw Information and from further sitting in the case. On the same date the Third Division promulgated a resolution[7] directing that in view of the inhibition of Justice del Rosario, the case be returned to the Office of the Presiding Justice for re-raffle pursuant to the rules and practice of the Sandiganbayan.
On 6 March 1996, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 79-96[8] assigning the case to the Second Division "[i]n view of the inhibition of Hon. Cipriano A. del Rosario, Chairman, Third Division, - and considering that he, [the Presiding Justice and Chairman of the First Division, was] likewise the complainant/relator in the case."
On 15 March 1996, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued an order giving the Presiding Justice ten days within which to comment on the Motion to Withdraw Information and also giving the prosecution ten days to file a reply.[9]
On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96[10] on the ground that it violated Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides, inter alia, that when the required quorum for a division of the Sandiganbayan cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or due to a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division. Petitioner further alleged that since the Presiding Justice was himself the complainant or relator in the case, his administrative order would "not be free from suspicion even if it [was] untainted with unfairness and partiality." Petitioner then prayed that the case be referred to the Presiding Justice for him to act on the motion to set aside the administrative order and thereafter to return the case to the Third Division; and for the most Senior Associate Justice to designate an Associate Justice to sit temporarily in the Third Division pursuant to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975.
On 11 April 1996, the prosecution, through Special Prosecution Officer II Monteroso, filed an opposition[11] to the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96, alleging that said order was valid and legal, since it involved an administrative matter which was within the prerogative of the Presiding Justice and the Sandiganbayan.
On 16 April 1996, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, as complainant/ relator in the case, filed the required comment[12] on the Motion to Withdraw Information.
On 29 May 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition[13] wherein he prayed that the Justices of the Second Division, namely, herein public respondents Balajadia, Demetriou, and Lagman, inhibit themselves from the case and recommend to the President the designation of three Justices of the Court of Appeals to temporarily sit in the case. He alleged that said Justices of the Second Division could not be expected to act with independence or administer justice impartially for or against a brother in the Court who was the complainant/relator in the case.
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 15 March 1996 and to Strike Out the Comment of the Presiding Justice on the ground that the latter was not the offended party in the case. His personality as complainant/relator in the case ceased when the case was elevated to the court upon the filing of the information where the only parties were the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and the petitioner as accused.
On 28 January 1997, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution[14] denying for lack of merit the motions (a) for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 79-96, (b) for voluntary inhibition, (c) for reconsideration of the resolution of 15 March 1996 and for the striking out of the comment of the Presiding Justice, and (d) for the withdrawal of the Information. At the same time, it set the arraignment of petitioner on 29 April 1997.
As to the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96, the Second Division ruled that the said order was supported by the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which reads: "Should the Chairman of a Division decide to inhibit himself from trying a particular case or cases, the case or cases shall be reassigned to any of the two other Divisions by raffle." The Sandiganbayan had the authority to promulgate said rule pursuant to Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. The Presiding Justice then could not be faulted for doing something which the law allowed him to do in the promotion of fair and speedy administration of justice.
Anent the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, the Second Division found as totally baseless petitioner's apprehension that he would become a victim of injustice in the Second Division, for as vanguards of justice the Justices' sacred duty is loyalty or fealty not to the Presiding Justice but to the laws and the Constitution. Besides, there was really no reason why the Presiding Justice would use his influence on any member of the Division because his role as a relator was merely to bring to the attention of the proper authorities the possible transgression of the law committed by the petitioner. The Presiding Justice had no personal interest to protect and no personal benefit to derive from in this case as so emphatically stated by him in his comment.
In respect of the 15 March 1996 Resolution, the Second Division stressed that the same was issued to clarify the position of the Presiding Justice as the relator of the case and thus enhance the right of the people to due process. Its aim was to enable the Division to render a sound judgment on the Motion to Withdraw Information. Under Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Division had the duty or prerogative to make an independent finding on the merits of the case before consenting to the withdrawal of the information; it could not act as a mere rubber stamp of the prosecution as regards the disposition of cases. Crespo v. Mogul[16] has already settled the matter.
Finally, on the Motion to Withdraw the Information, the Second Division held:
Then on 7 April 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Arraignment[18] in view of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration.
On 18 April 1997, the Second Division denied[19] the Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Arraignment. Believing that the denial of such motion was also an implied denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this petition on the ground that the respondent Second Division had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying (1) the motion to set aside Administrative Order No. 79-96 dated 6 March 1996; (2) the motion for voluntary inhibition; (3) the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 15 March 1996 and to strike out the comment of respondent Garchitorena; and (4) the Ombudsman's motion to withdraw the information.
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General begged off in light of Section 3 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides: "In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman through its Special Prosecutor shall represent the People of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-1."
The Office of the Special Prosecutor manifested that it was not in a position to comment on, much less oppose, the petition considering its previous stand and motion to withdraw the information.
The Court thereafter required public respondents Francis Garchitorena, Jose Balajadia, Harriet Demetriou and Roberto Lagman to file their comment on the petition. Having failed to do so, the said respondents were deemed to have waived the filing of their Comment. The Court then gave due course to the petition.
The foregoing antecedents show acts or events deliberately done in trickles to unduly delay the proceedings below and, perforce, abuse judicial process and successfully prevent for several years petitioner's arraignment, initially set on 21 October 1991.
First, no less than this Court in G.R. No. 101978 had sustained the finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The motion for reinvestigation should not have been given due course, neither should a reinvestigation been conducted. The Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman should not have failed to see the dilatory character of the motion. If indeed petitioner had new or additional evidence which if presented would have altered the result of the earlier finding of probable cause, then he could have asked for a reinvestigation or a reopening of the preliminary investigation either before the filing of the motion to quash or even during the pendency of G.R. No. 101978. Either of such moves would be consistent with his vigorous claims of innocence and good faith. In any event, he has not convincingly shown that some new or additional evidence could alter the finding of probable cause and that such evidence could not have been produced during the preliminary investigation or, at the latest, during the pendency of G.R. No. 101978. There being no such evidence, this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101978 deserved utmost respect by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman. That decision was the best argument against any reinvestigation or review by any office or agency below this Court. The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan then acted properly and judiciously in denying the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Settled is the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case, as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.[20] This rule does not foreclose a reinvestigation or a review by a superior authority of the resolution finding probable cause.[21] Nevertheless, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw information is thereafter filed, the court may grant or deny it in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative, not out of subservience to the prosecution arm, i.e., the Office of the Special Prosecutor or the Ombudsman, or the Department of Justice, as the case may be.[22] This Court said so in Martinez v. Court of Appeals;[23] thus:
Second, the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition filed only on 29 May 1996 could not have been motivated by an honest belief on the incapacity of the Members of the Second Division to be fair and impartial in this case. From the moment the information was filed and even before that, petitioner was fully aware of the fact that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan was the complainant/relator in the case. If indeed petitioner entertained any suspicion that the Presiding Justice might influence one way or the other any of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, then his grievance should have been raised as early as 3 April 1991 when the information was filed or, at the latest, on 12 October 1991 when the action in G.R. No. 101978 was instituted.
Third, the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was another dilatory strategy. There was no basis therefor other than the imagined fear of partiality for the Presiding Justice.
The message conveyed by the foregoing is that petitioner has not come to this Court with clean hands. It is settled that he who seeks the equitable relief of injunction, which petitioner asks, must come with clean hands. Among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair, dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[24]
Now on the propriety or validity of Administrative Order No. 76-96. That order was evidently issued pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan as approved by this Court's en banc resolutions of 16 July 1991 in A.M. No. 91-7-368-SB and of 3 September 1992 in A.M. No. 92-8-418-SB. The Section reads in full as follows:
This Court is not persuaded by the argument of petitioner that Section 2 of Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan was repealed or modified by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides in part; thus:
It is needless to argue that the inhibition of Chairman Del Rosario of the Third Division was not covered by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. He inhibited himself in the exercise of his discretion for a "just and valid reason" under, obviously, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, not for any legal ground for disqualification under the first paragraph thereof. The "legal disqualification" contemplated in Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is the disqualification for any of the legal grounds provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
The denial then of the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-76 was in order.
Finally, there was absolutely nothing wrong with the resolution of 15 March 1996, which required the Presiding Justice to comment on the Motion to Withdraw Information. It must be stressed that at that stage of the proceedings, the State had lost its representative and advocate, the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The latter had moved for the withdrawal of the information because of its belief that no probable cause existed against petitioner. Considering then that the Presiding Justice was himself the complainant/relator, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan had only in mind giving the State due process before acting on the Motion to Withdraw Information. It is a sound doctrine that the judge's action in criminal cases must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the State and the complainant to due process.[26] Justice must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on the one hand, and the State and the complainant, on the other. It must be noted that the Presiding Justice's role as complainant/relator in the case against the petitioner met the approval of this Court in G.R. No. 101978; thus:
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., On Official Leave.
Quisumbing, J., No Part: Close relations to a party.
[1] 221 SCRA 349.
[2] Rollo, 66.
[3] Id., 66-67.
[4] Id., 67.
[5] Rollo, 63-64.
[6] Id., 68.
[7] Id., 69.
[8] Id., 70.
[9] Id., 100.
[10] Id., 71.
[11] Rollo, 75.
[12] Id., 78.
[13] Id., 93-97.
[14] Rollo, 98-107. Per Demetriou, H., J., with the concurrence of Balajadia, J. and Lagman, R., JJ.
[15] 237 SCRA 575 (1994).
[16] 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
[17] Rollo, 108-138.
[18] Id., 139.
[19] Id., 141.
[20] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 16, at 471.
[21] See Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, 48-49 [1994].
[22] Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, 334 [1996].
[23] Supra note 15, at 585. See Dee v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 254 [1994], Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 [1997].
[24] University of the Philippines v. Catungal, 272 SCRA 221, 237 [1997] citing 27 AM JUR 2d Equity, Sec. 129, 131, 136 [1996].
[25] The Section reads:
Rules of Procedure. -- The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court.
[26] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 16, at 470, citing People v. Zabala, 58 O.G. 5028 and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 101 [1986].
[27] Supra note 1, at 361
[1] May the Sandiganbayan try and decide Criminal Case No. 16672 where its presiding justice, Hon. Francis E. Garchitorena, is a party thereto without violating the impartiality requirement in the due process clause?This case is a sequel to G.R. No. 101978, entitled Eduardo P. Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, which we decided on 7 April 1993.[1] We found therein as duly established the following factual antecedents:
[2] May Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena assign said case to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan upon voluntary inhibition of Justice Cipriano del Rosario of the Third Division where the case was originally raffled, without violating R.A. [No.] 7975, which provides that when the required quorum for a particular division cannot be had due to legal disqualification of a justice the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division?
[3] May respondent Second Division deny the motion to withdraw information filed by the Ombudsman who found no prima facie case against petitioner without any valid reason?
On October 16, 1987, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) donated one ambulance (a Mitsubishi L-300) to the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Petitioner, who [was] the Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, received the ambulance in behalf of the municipality. However, he did not deliver the ambulance to said municipality.In our decision in G.R. No. 101978, we found that respondent Sandiganbayan had not acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioner and, consequently, in denying the motion to quash and motion for reconsideration. We dismissed as clearly unfounded the insinuations of petitioner that Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena had used the influence of his office in initiating the complaint against petitioner. Likewise, we agreed with the Sandiganbayan that "the act of bringing to the attention of appropriate officials possible transgression of the law is as much an obligation of the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility of any private citizen."
Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality passed a resolution (Resolution No. 16, Series of 1988) requesting PCSO for an ambulance. Said request was reiterated in their Resolution No. 117, Series of 1988. The mayor of the municipality, Eleanor P. Lelis, thereafter sought the intercession of Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, who is from the said municipality, regarding said request. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena contacted the PCSO and learned about the ambulance previously donated by the latter to Tigaon through petitioner. He accordingly informed Mayor Lelis that the munipality's request [could not] be favorably acted upon in view of the previous donation.
Mayor Lelis reiterated the municipality's request for an ambulance making reference to the certification of the municipal treasurer that no vehicle from the PCSO or from anyone has been received.
Upon verification of the whereabouts of the Mitsubishi L-300 by the PCSO from the petitioner, the latter indicated his willingness to return the ambulance. In a letter dated December 22, 1988, he requested that said vehicle be donated instead to the Municipality of Tinambac, same province. Finally, on December 26, 1988, he personally returned the ambulance, then already painted to cover the logo of the PCSO and the other markings thereon.
With the return of the Mitsubishi L-300 to the PCSO, the Municipality of Tigaon, through Mayor Lelis, finally received a brand new Besta Kia Ambulance unit complete with all accessories.
On January 2, 1989, Justice Garchitorena wrote the then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan relating to him the whole story of the ambulance.
On January 25, 1989, Justice Garchitorena also sent Deputy Ombudsman Jose C. Colayco a letter-complaint against petitioner regarding said ambulance. Said letter-complaint was referred by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Manuel C. Domingo, for appropriate action. Thereupon, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo required Justice Garchitorena to submit all relevant records and documents, as well as his affidavit and those of his witnesses. Failing in this regard, Justice Garchitorena was requested anew to comply. In his stead, Anthony D. Jamora, the Regional manager of the Special Projects Department of the PCSO, and Mayor Lelis of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, submitted their respective affidavits.
On October 3, 1990, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo issued an order requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, affidavits of his witnesses and other controverting evidence. This order was captioned as Case No. OMB-1-89-0168 for "Malversation of Public Property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code."
On October 22, 1990, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit denying the imputation of said offense claiming that the vehicle was not equipped with any medical attachments or facilities so he was constrained to request PAGCOR for assistance to finance its conversion into a medical ambulance which is evidenced by his letter dated November 15, 1987 to Mrs. Alice Reyes. He claimed that it was only on April 28, 1988 that PAGCOR acted on his request, but in lieu of financial assistance, said office donated accessories, which can be installed at an estimated cost of P5,000.00. Thus, he allegedly made personal representations with PAGCOR for the latter to shoulder the expenses of the installation. While awaiting for the financial assistance, petitioner claimed, in explanation why the logo of PCSO and the other markings on the vehicle were removed, that he acceded to the suggestion of his staff to include the name of PAGCOR on the sides of the ambulance in view of the substantial contribution of the latter.
On December 5, 1990, Ombudsman Investigator Isaac D. Tolentino issued a resolution finding no probable cause for malversation and recommended that the case be dismissed, which recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Domingo.
On January 5, 1991, Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera, Jr., recommended the disapproval of the aforesaid resolution and instead, suggested the filing of criminal information for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. This was followed by another resolution to the same effect by Special Prosecution Officer Wilfredo Orencia dated February 14, 1991.
On April 1, 1991, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez issued a resolution sustaining the finding of Ombudsman Investigator Tolentino that there is no malversation but found in the same resolution, a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019".
On April 3, 1991, an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16672, against petitioner was filed".
On April 12, 1991, a warrant of arrest was issued against petitioner. On April 18, 1991, he was allowed to deposit the sum of P15,000.00 in court to be considered as bail bond and the warrant of arrest was recalled.
On May 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that respondent Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed without probable cause since there is absolutely no proof adduced in the preliminary investigation of any of the elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On June 27, 1991, respondent court denied the said motion to quash holding that the factual and legal issues and/or questions raised are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the validity of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. On September 5, 1991, respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution and set the arraignment of petitioner on October 21, 1991 at 8:30 a.m.
On October 12, 1991, petitioner filed the present petition [G.R. No. 101978] and by reason of such filing, respondent court ordered that the arraignment be held in abeyance.
After the finality of the aforementioned decision, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, to which the case was originally raffled. That division granted the motion.
On 15 February 1995, after a reinvestigation was conducted, then Special Prosecution Officer III Leonardo Tamayo and Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner. However, then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez disapproved the recommendation and, in a marginal note, stated: "The allegations of the accused are matters of defense for him to prove in Court."[2]
Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza issued a Memorandum[3] recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. Leonardo P. Tamayo, then Deputy Special Prosecutor and OIC of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, recommended the approval of Mendoza's recommendation.[4] On 12 February 1996, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved Mendoza's recommendation.
On 26 February 1996, Special Prosecution Officer II Humphrey T. Monteroso, with the approval of Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo, filed with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Withdraw Information.[5]
On 5 March 1996, Associate Justice Cipriano A. del Rosario, Chairman of the Third Division, voluntarily inhibited[6] himself from resolving the Motion to Withdraw Information and from further sitting in the case. On the same date the Third Division promulgated a resolution[7] directing that in view of the inhibition of Justice del Rosario, the case be returned to the Office of the Presiding Justice for re-raffle pursuant to the rules and practice of the Sandiganbayan.
On 6 March 1996, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 79-96[8] assigning the case to the Second Division "[i]n view of the inhibition of Hon. Cipriano A. del Rosario, Chairman, Third Division, - and considering that he, [the Presiding Justice and Chairman of the First Division, was] likewise the complainant/relator in the case."
On 15 March 1996, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued an order giving the Presiding Justice ten days within which to comment on the Motion to Withdraw Information and also giving the prosecution ten days to file a reply.[9]
On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96[10] on the ground that it violated Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides, inter alia, that when the required quorum for a division of the Sandiganbayan cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or due to a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division. Petitioner further alleged that since the Presiding Justice was himself the complainant or relator in the case, his administrative order would "not be free from suspicion even if it [was] untainted with unfairness and partiality." Petitioner then prayed that the case be referred to the Presiding Justice for him to act on the motion to set aside the administrative order and thereafter to return the case to the Third Division; and for the most Senior Associate Justice to designate an Associate Justice to sit temporarily in the Third Division pursuant to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975.
On 11 April 1996, the prosecution, through Special Prosecution Officer II Monteroso, filed an opposition[11] to the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96, alleging that said order was valid and legal, since it involved an administrative matter which was within the prerogative of the Presiding Justice and the Sandiganbayan.
On 16 April 1996, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, as complainant/ relator in the case, filed the required comment[12] on the Motion to Withdraw Information.
On 29 May 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition[13] wherein he prayed that the Justices of the Second Division, namely, herein public respondents Balajadia, Demetriou, and Lagman, inhibit themselves from the case and recommend to the President the designation of three Justices of the Court of Appeals to temporarily sit in the case. He alleged that said Justices of the Second Division could not be expected to act with independence or administer justice impartially for or against a brother in the Court who was the complainant/relator in the case.
Petitioner also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 15 March 1996 and to Strike Out the Comment of the Presiding Justice on the ground that the latter was not the offended party in the case. His personality as complainant/relator in the case ceased when the case was elevated to the court upon the filing of the information where the only parties were the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and the petitioner as accused.
On 28 January 1997, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution[14] denying for lack of merit the motions (a) for the nullification of Administrative Order No. 79-96, (b) for voluntary inhibition, (c) for reconsideration of the resolution of 15 March 1996 and for the striking out of the comment of the Presiding Justice, and (d) for the withdrawal of the Information. At the same time, it set the arraignment of petitioner on 29 April 1997.
As to the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-96, the Second Division ruled that the said order was supported by the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which reads: "Should the Chairman of a Division decide to inhibit himself from trying a particular case or cases, the case or cases shall be reassigned to any of the two other Divisions by raffle." The Sandiganbayan had the authority to promulgate said rule pursuant to Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. The Presiding Justice then could not be faulted for doing something which the law allowed him to do in the promotion of fair and speedy administration of justice.
Anent the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, the Second Division found as totally baseless petitioner's apprehension that he would become a victim of injustice in the Second Division, for as vanguards of justice the Justices' sacred duty is loyalty or fealty not to the Presiding Justice but to the laws and the Constitution. Besides, there was really no reason why the Presiding Justice would use his influence on any member of the Division because his role as a relator was merely to bring to the attention of the proper authorities the possible transgression of the law committed by the petitioner. The Presiding Justice had no personal interest to protect and no personal benefit to derive from in this case as so emphatically stated by him in his comment.
In respect of the 15 March 1996 Resolution, the Second Division stressed that the same was issued to clarify the position of the Presiding Justice as the relator of the case and thus enhance the right of the people to due process. Its aim was to enable the Division to render a sound judgment on the Motion to Withdraw Information. Under Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Division had the duty or prerogative to make an independent finding on the merits of the case before consenting to the withdrawal of the information; it could not act as a mere rubber stamp of the prosecution as regards the disposition of cases. Crespo v. Mogul[16] has already settled the matter.
Finally, on the Motion to Withdraw the Information, the Second Division held:
The special reason given by Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza for the dismissal of the present case is contained in his resolution on the preliminary investigation. To quote:On 18 February 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the Resolution of 28 January 1997.
"Granting for the sake of argument that undue injury/damage was caused to the Municipality because of the delayed delivery of the vehicle, it would not still be sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, in the absence of evident bad faith. The above observation and established facts would show that we cannot attribute bad faith on the part of accused. There was no clear and satisfactory breach of sworn duty through the same motives or ill will of the accused (Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, March 30, 198, [sic] SCRA 43). On the contrary, it was the complained act of accused that made the vehicle fit to be used as an ambulance after its return.
While it may be true that the allegation of the accused are matters of defense, it is likewise true that Prosecutors/Fiscals should protect the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and also protect the state from useless and expensive trials (Trocio vs. Mata, 118 SCRA 241)."
This is not the first time that the issue of the accused's supposed good faith has been raised to support a reversal of an original indictment for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. In fact, the Court had occasion to pass upon it for the first time when it ruled on the accused's motion to quash. The Court's denial order was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court by decreeing a full-blown trial on the evidentiary issues of good faith and other matters raised by the accused in the said pleading. The Court has no authority, much less discretion, to overturn or ignore this particular ruling of the Supreme Court.
Then on 7 April 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Arraignment[18] in view of the pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration.
On 18 April 1997, the Second Division denied[19] the Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Arraignment. Believing that the denial of such motion was also an implied denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this petition on the ground that the respondent Second Division had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying (1) the motion to set aside Administrative Order No. 79-96 dated 6 March 1996; (2) the motion for voluntary inhibition; (3) the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 15 March 1996 and to strike out the comment of respondent Garchitorena; and (4) the Ombudsman's motion to withdraw the information.
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General begged off in light of Section 3 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides: "In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman through its Special Prosecutor shall represent the People of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-1."
The Office of the Special Prosecutor manifested that it was not in a position to comment on, much less oppose, the petition considering its previous stand and motion to withdraw the information.
The Court thereafter required public respondents Francis Garchitorena, Jose Balajadia, Harriet Demetriou and Roberto Lagman to file their comment on the petition. Having failed to do so, the said respondents were deemed to have waived the filing of their Comment. The Court then gave due course to the petition.
The foregoing antecedents show acts or events deliberately done in trickles to unduly delay the proceedings below and, perforce, abuse judicial process and successfully prevent for several years petitioner's arraignment, initially set on 21 October 1991.
First, no less than this Court in G.R. No. 101978 had sustained the finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The motion for reinvestigation should not have been given due course, neither should a reinvestigation been conducted. The Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman should not have failed to see the dilatory character of the motion. If indeed petitioner had new or additional evidence which if presented would have altered the result of the earlier finding of probable cause, then he could have asked for a reinvestigation or a reopening of the preliminary investigation either before the filing of the motion to quash or even during the pendency of G.R. No. 101978. Either of such moves would be consistent with his vigorous claims of innocence and good faith. In any event, he has not convincingly shown that some new or additional evidence could alter the finding of probable cause and that such evidence could not have been produced during the preliminary investigation or, at the latest, during the pendency of G.R. No. 101978. There being no such evidence, this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101978 deserved utmost respect by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman. That decision was the best argument against any reinvestigation or review by any office or agency below this Court. The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan then acted properly and judiciously in denying the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Settled is the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case, as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.[20] This rule does not foreclose a reinvestigation or a review by a superior authority of the resolution finding probable cause.[21] Nevertheless, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw information is thereafter filed, the court may grant or deny it in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative, not out of subservience to the prosecution arm, i.e., the Office of the Special Prosecutor or the Ombudsman, or the Department of Justice, as the case may be.[22] This Court said so in Martinez v. Court of Appeals;[23] thus:
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.It has not been satisfactorily shown that the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied arbitrarily or despotically the Motion to Withdraw the Information. On the contrary, the Division made its own assessment of the evidence, taking into account this Court's pronouncement in G.R. No. 101978.
Second, the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition filed only on 29 May 1996 could not have been motivated by an honest belief on the incapacity of the Members of the Second Division to be fair and impartial in this case. From the moment the information was filed and even before that, petitioner was fully aware of the fact that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan was the complainant/relator in the case. If indeed petitioner entertained any suspicion that the Presiding Justice might influence one way or the other any of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, then his grievance should have been raised as early as 3 April 1991 when the information was filed or, at the latest, on 12 October 1991 when the action in G.R. No. 101978 was instituted.
Third, the Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was another dilatory strategy. There was no basis therefor other than the imagined fear of partiality for the Presiding Justice.
The message conveyed by the foregoing is that petitioner has not come to this Court with clean hands. It is settled that he who seeks the equitable relief of injunction, which petitioner asks, must come with clean hands. Among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair, dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[24]
Now on the propriety or validity of Administrative Order No. 76-96. That order was evidently issued pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan as approved by this Court's en banc resolutions of 16 July 1991 in A.M. No. 91-7-368-SB and of 3 September 1992 in A.M. No. 92-8-418-SB. The Section reads in full as follows:
SEC. 2. Absence or Vacancy; How Filled. -- In case of any temporary absence or permanent vacancy in the composition of a Division, the following rules will apply:The Rules was promulgated by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to its authority under Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 7975.[25]
a. If a temporary absence occurs in the position of Chairman of a Division, the Senior Member of said Division shall act and preside as Chairman, and in the absence of both the Chairman and Senior Member of a Division, the Junior Member of said Division shall act and preside as Chairman, notwithstanding the seniority of the Special Member or Members designated to complete the quorum of said Division.
b. If a temporary absence occurs in the position of a Senior or Junior Member of a Division, the Presiding Justice may designate any Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined either by rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence or as may otherwise be convenient, to sit as a Special Member of said Division.
In both instances (a and b), the Acting Chairman or Special Member shall enjoy the authority and prerogatives of a Chairman or Regular Member of said Division, as the case may be, in the trial or determination of cases assigned thereto.
c. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the position of a Chairman of a Division, the Presiding Justice shall fill the vacancy with either the Chairman of another Division or with the most senior Justice of the Court.
d. Where a permanent vacancy occurs in the position of a Senior or Junior Member in a Division, the new Justice appointed to fill the vacancy shall be assigned to the Division where the vacancy exists, without disturbing the composition of the other Divisions and without prejudice to the consequential changes in the ranking or seniority among Justices.
Should the Chairman of a Division decide to inhibit himself from trying a particular case or cases, the case or cases shall be reassigned to any of the two other Divisions by raffle.
This Court is not persuaded by the argument of petitioner that Section 2 of Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan was repealed or modified by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 1 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides in part; thus:
Three justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.Note that the aforequoted paragraph refers to instances where no quorum of a Division can be had because of (a) a member's legal disqualification or temporary disability, or (b) a vacancy occurring therein. On the other hand, Section 2 of Rule III covers instances of (a) temporary absence of a chairman or member of a Division, (b) permanent vacancy in a Division, and (c) inhibition of a chairman of a Division.
It is needless to argue that the inhibition of Chairman Del Rosario of the Third Division was not covered by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. He inhibited himself in the exercise of his discretion for a "just and valid reason" under, obviously, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, not for any legal ground for disqualification under the first paragraph thereof. The "legal disqualification" contemplated in Section 3 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is the disqualification for any of the legal grounds provided for in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. -- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.Consequently, the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rule III of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan was applicable. But since the case could not have been reassigned by raffle to the First Division because the Presiding Justice was its Chairman, who was also expected to inhibit himself for being the complainant/relator, the outright reassignment to the Second Division was not only logical but proper as well.
The denial then of the Motion to Set Aside Administrative Order No. 79-76 was in order.
Finally, there was absolutely nothing wrong with the resolution of 15 March 1996, which required the Presiding Justice to comment on the Motion to Withdraw Information. It must be stressed that at that stage of the proceedings, the State had lost its representative and advocate, the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The latter had moved for the withdrawal of the information because of its belief that no probable cause existed against petitioner. Considering then that the Presiding Justice was himself the complainant/relator, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan had only in mind giving the State due process before acting on the Motion to Withdraw Information. It is a sound doctrine that the judge's action in criminal cases must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the State and the complainant to due process.[26] Justice must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on the one hand, and the State and the complainant, on the other. It must be noted that the Presiding Justice's role as complainant/relator in the case against the petitioner met the approval of this Court in G.R. No. 101978; thus:
We agree with the respondent court that the act of bringing to the attention of appropriate officials possible transgression of the law is as much an obligation of the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility of any private citizen.[27]WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to proceed with the arraignment of the petitioner and trial of Criminal Case No. 16672 with reasonable dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., On Official Leave.
Quisumbing, J., No Part: Close relations to a party.
[1] 221 SCRA 349.
[2] Rollo, 66.
[3] Id., 66-67.
[4] Id., 67.
[5] Rollo, 63-64.
[6] Id., 68.
[7] Id., 69.
[8] Id., 70.
[9] Id., 100.
[10] Id., 71.
[11] Rollo, 75.
[12] Id., 78.
[13] Id., 93-97.
[14] Rollo, 98-107. Per Demetriou, H., J., with the concurrence of Balajadia, J. and Lagman, R., JJ.
[15] 237 SCRA 575 (1994).
[16] 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
[17] Rollo, 108-138.
[18] Id., 139.
[19] Id., 141.
[20] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 16, at 471.
[21] See Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, 48-49 [1994].
[22] Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, 334 [1996].
[23] Supra note 15, at 585. See Dee v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 254 [1994], Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 [1997].
[24] University of the Philippines v. Catungal, 272 SCRA 221, 237 [1997] citing 27 AM JUR 2d Equity, Sec. 129, 131, 136 [1996].
[25] The Section reads:
Rules of Procedure. -- The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court.
[26] Crespo v. Mogul, supra note 16, at 470, citing People v. Zabala, 58 O.G. 5028 and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, 101 [1986].
[27] Supra note 1, at 361