FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 125498, February 18, 1999 ]CONRADO B. RODRIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN () +
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO AND REYNALDO G. MEJICA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CONRADO B. RODRIGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN () +
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO AND REYNALDO G. MEJICA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same
municipality.
On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring:
On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent to P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one second-hand unit was delivered. The same generator broke down after only two nights of operation. In addition, instead of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
The graph below serves to illustrate the conflicts between Mejica's report and the COA's:
On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and Ramil Ang, President and General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.
On 10 June 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019[6] before the Sandiganbayan.
On 28 July 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22 April 1996.
On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the charges against petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said memorandum.
Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same information charged more than one offense. Petitioners, however, did not elaborate on these grounds. They instead faulted the Provincial Auditor for instituting the complaint against them notwithstanding the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance. They also argued that the evidence against them did not establish the element of damage nor the presence of any conspiracy between them.
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion in an Order dated 18 March 1996.
On 18 March 1996, the prosecution moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. In a Resolution dated 2 July 1996, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over petitioners and ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite.
Petitioners thus filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the Court annul: (a) the order of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners' motion to quash, and (b) the resolution of the same court upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners. Petitioners likewise prayed that this Court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case.
On 28 August 1998, the court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of their petition:
I
After a meticulous scrutiny of petitioners' arguments, we find the petition devoid of merit.
I
Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due process. They submit that "the issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or adjudicate and decide on `the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance."'[8]
The italicized portion above is an excerpt from Section 44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which states in full:
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements.[12] A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.[13]
As stated in Section 82, supra, however, the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned." The ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown."
Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First, petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance. Second, the "written explanation" referred to in said section is "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.
On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke Sections 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B, which respectively provide:
SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
It bears stressing that the exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds.[14]
Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners' motions before the auditor.
II
Petitioners argue that their opposition to the disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of acceptance and completion, would betray the absence of the elements of evident bad faith or negligence, and damage. They likewise claim that the evidence does not establish conspiracy among them.
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime, however, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[15] The same applies to the alleged absence of any conspiracy between the accused.
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.[16] In a recent decision,[17] this Court, quoting Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[18] stated the rationale for this rule:
III
Petitioners next question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo occupies a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7975[19] on 30 March 1995, the pertinent portions of section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[20] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[21] read as follows:
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a catchall in Section 4 a. (5), thus:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Such a catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758,[31] otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of "Municipal Mayor I":
Petitioners, however, claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758: *
Petitioners conclude that Mayor Rodrigo, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, was occupying a Grade 24 position and, thus, not within the Sandiganbayan's original and exclusive jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.
This is a simplistic, and altogether incorrect, interpretation of the law.
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:
However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to "(take) into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required" for the positions of government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as:
Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades[34] of officials holding constitutional positions, as follows:
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by (a) the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9,[36] and (b) the following factors:
That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758, which respectively provide:
SEC. 10. Local Government Units (LGUs). -- The rates of pay in LGUs shall be determined on the basis of the class and financial capability of each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not exceed the following percentages of the rates in the salary schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court's jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 28 August 1996 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 44.
[2] Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, p. 39.
[3] Annex "B" of Petition, id., at 40.
[4] Annex "C" of Petition, id., at 41.
[5] Annex "D" of Petition, id., at 42.
[6] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[7] Rollo, pp. 20-21. Italics in the original.
[8] Id., at. 188. Italics in the original.
[9] Presidential Decree No. 1445.
[10] Section 2k, Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B. Section 3.9 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993) (Commission on Audit Circular No. 94-001) which superseded COA Circular No. 85-156-B, defines disallowance as "the disapproval in audit of a transaction, either in whole or in part."
[11] Section 19, id. See also Section 14 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
[12] Section 2r, id. Under Section 3.18 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993), a suspension is "the deferment of action to allow or disallow in audit a transaction pending compliance with certain requirements."
[13] Section 21, id. See also Section 16, Manual on Certificates of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
[14] Cf. Ramos vs. Aquino, 39 SCRA 585 (1971).
[15] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995); Ocampo III vs. Sandiganbayan, 236 SCRA 1 (1994).
[16] Bienvenido Tan, Jr., vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 128764, 10 July 1998; Rene Knecht and Cristina de Knecht vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 121916, 26 June 1998; Leonila Garcia-Rueda vs. Wilfred L. Pacasio et al., G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997; Camanag vs. Guerrero, 268 SCRA 473 (1997); Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 659 (1996); Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 15.
[17] Annie Tan vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. Nos. 114332 &114895, September 10, 1998.
[18] 228 SCRA 718 (1995).
[19] Entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606 , as amended."
[20] Entitled "Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to be known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes," promulgated 10 December 1978.
[21] Entitled "Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for other purposes," promulgated 23 March 1983.
[22] 249 SCRA 212 (1995).
[23] Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[24] Entitled, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceeding Therefor."
[25] Article 210, Direct Bribery; Article 211, Indirect Bribery; and Article 212, Corruption of Public Officials.
[26] Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
[27] Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees.
[28] Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of Their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, and Nominees.
[29] Amending E.O. No. 14.
[30] Introduced by Representatives Garcia (P.), Starke, Damasing, Apostol, Abueg, Abaya, Sator, Panes and other members of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice.
[31] An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and Other Purposes. R.A. No. 6758 went into effect on July 1, 1989 per Section 23 thereof.
[32] A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government, and integrating the same.
[33] Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.
[34] "Salary Grade" is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class." (Section 2s, P.D. No. 985.)
[35] GRADE 33 - This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest position in the government. No other position in the government service is considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 32 - This Grade is limited to the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines and those positions which head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No other positions in the government service are considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 31 - This Grade is assigned to Senators and members of the House of Representatives and those with equivalent rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank, Presidential Adviser, National Economic and Development Authority Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and President of the University of the Philippines.
An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of coverage ranging from top level policy formulation to the provision of technical and administrative support to the units under it, with functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be considered organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a Department Secretary.
GRADE 30 - Positions included are those of Department Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Presidential Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director General, Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy Ombudsman, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines President and President of other state universities and colleges of the same class.
Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose operations cut across offices or departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or whose functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding paragraph, may be placed at this level.
The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that may be created hereafter shall be determined based on these guidelines.
xxx
[36] Benchmark Position Schedule
On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring:
On 2 September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On the basis of said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner Facundo, to Philwood Construction.
- Installation of the two (2) units diesel power generator (20) KVA, 220 W, Battery start and other accessories);
- Installation of 24 rolls feeder lines with nos. 6, 8 and ten wires;
- Installation of 40 units 4 x 4 wooden post with accessories; and
- Construction of powerhouse with concrete foundation double throw safety switches (double pole, 250 amperes capacity of 220 V with fuse).[1]
On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent to P291,915.07) was actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one second-hand unit was delivered. The same generator broke down after only two nights of operation. In addition, instead of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
The graph below serves to illustrate the conflicts between Mejica's report and the COA's:
In September 1993, petitioners requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance[2] and to re-inspect the project.[3] Petitioners reiterated their plea in a letter to the Provincial Auditor dated 3 November 1993,[4] attaching therewith a "Certificate of Acceptance and Completion"[5] signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, and Eusebio Doton, President of the Cabaloan Electric Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on petitioners' requests.
Percentage Accomplished
Amount paid By Municipality P452,825.53 93.0090% (accdg. to Mejica's report) Cost of Actual Accomplishment P291,915.07 60.0171% (accdg. to COA report) Amount Disallowed P160,910.46 33.08% (difference)
On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and Ramil Ang, President and General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.
On 10 June 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019[6] before the Sandiganbayan.
On 28 July 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22 April 1996.
On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending that the charges against petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said memorandum.
Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same information charged more than one offense. Petitioners, however, did not elaborate on these grounds. They instead faulted the Provincial Auditor for instituting the complaint against them notwithstanding the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance. They also argued that the evidence against them did not establish the element of damage nor the presence of any conspiracy between them.
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion in an Order dated 18 March 1996.
On 18 March 1996, the prosecution moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. In a Resolution dated 2 July 1996, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over petitioners and ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite.
Petitioners thus filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the Court annul: (a) the order of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners' motion to quash, and (b) the resolution of the same court upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners. Petitioners likewise prayed that this Court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case.
On 28 August 1998, the court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of their petition:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALLOWING THE LITIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATING SECTION 3(E) OF THE ANTI- GRAFT ACT (R.A. 3019) WHEN THE NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE STILL PENDS WITH THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR UNDER PETITIONER' PROTEST SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REQUIRED ELEMENT OF 'CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT' AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE.The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether petitioners' right to due process was violated by the filing of the complaint against them by the Provincial Auditor, and (2) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in filing the information against petitioners. The second questions the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioners. The third and fourth grounds are related to the first and are subsumed thereunder.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROCEED AGAINST ALL THE PETITIONERS AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, PARTICULARLY THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE PENDENTE LITE, ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
III
THE ONGOING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS IT WAS PRECEDED BY HASTY, MALICIOUS, SHAM AND HASTY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INEVITABLY EXPOSING THEM TO A PROLONGED ANXIETY, AGGRAVATION, EXPENSES, AND HUMILIATION OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.
IV
THE PRECIPITATE SANDIGANBAYAN ORDER OF SUSPENSION IS A LEGAL ERROR AS THE SAME EVIDENTLY THE LACK OF THE REQUIRED COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATING PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND BILL OF RIGHTS.[7]
After a meticulous scrutiny of petitioners' arguments, we find the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due process. They submit that "the issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or adjudicate and decide on `the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance."'[8]
The italicized portion above is an excerpt from Section 44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which states in full:
Sec. 44.6.4. Auditor's Responsibility re Evaluation of Disallowance. - It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise professional judgment in evaluating, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, rules and regulations, the grounds for a charge or suspension/disallowance of an account or transaction.The aforequoted provision should be read in conjunction with Section 82 of the State Audit Code,[9] which states that:
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise sound judgment in evaluating the written explanation of the accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance. (Underscoring supplied.)
(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor concerned shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days.At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations.[10] Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper.[11]
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with certain requirements.[12] A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by the parties concerned.[13]
As stated in Section 82, supra, however, the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is "not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned." The ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown."
Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First, petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance. Second, the "written explanation" referred to in said section is "for the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.
On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke Sections 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B, which respectively provide:
SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is convinced that the evidence sufficiently discloses the fraud and other unlawful activities and identifies the perpetrators thereof, he shall prepare the sworn statements of the examining witnesses and/or other witnesses and make a report to the Manager/Regional Director concerned, attaching thereto copies of the pertinent affidavits and other supporting documents.SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
If criminal prosecution is warranted, the Regional Director/Manager concerned with respect to National Government Agencies/government Owned or Controlled Corporations or Provincial/City Auditors with respect to local government units shall prepare a letter-complaint and file the same with the Tanodbayan or the local deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor within ten (10) days from receipt of the report from the examining auditor, attaching thereto copies of the sworn statements or affidavits of witnesses and other pertinent documents.Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondents' motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision. The prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its proper weight.
It bears stressing that the exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first involves the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative aspect of the expenditure of public funds.[14]
Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners' motions before the auditor.
Petitioners argue that their opposition to the disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of acceptance and completion, would betray the absence of the elements of evident bad faith or negligence, and damage. They likewise claim that the evidence does not establish conspiracy among them.
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime, however, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[15] The same applies to the alleged absence of any conspiracy between the accused.
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.[16] In a recent decision,[17] this Court, quoting Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[18] stated the rationale for this rule:
... The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the court will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.Petitioners have failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7975[19] on 30 March 1995, the pertinent portions of section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[20] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[21] read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 subsequently redefined the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court such that the pertinent portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:Then Associate, now Chief Justice, Hilario Davide explained the effects of these amendments in People vs. Magallanes:[22]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
x x x
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,[23] as amended; R.A. No. 1379,[24] and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,[25] it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,[26] 2,[27] 14,[28] and 14-A.[29]The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti-Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial "big fish." Section 4, as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan from the task of trying cases involving lower-ranking government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular courts instead. The present structure is also intended to benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro Manila. As the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9825[30] states:
One is given the impression that only lowly government workers or the so-called `small fry' are expediently tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that at present, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over graft cases committed by all officials and employees of the government, irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the highly-placed government official. This jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only those occupying high positions in the government and the military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this was, the Sandiganbayan can devote its time to big time cases involving the "big fishes" in the government. The regular courts will be vested with the jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials (those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twenty-seven (27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to people in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila to file their complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be.To distinguish the "big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts'. (While H.B. No. 9825 originally intended only officials of Grade 28 and above as within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the resulting law included officials of Grade 27.) Thus, officials occupying positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes referred to in Section 4 a. and b., are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a catchall in Section 4 a. (5), thus:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Such a catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758,[31] otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of "Municipal Mayor I":
Assistant Commissioner of Internal RevenueEarlier, in the 1989 version of the same Index, the Municipal Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of 27. It appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Assistant Regional Cabinet Secretary
Assistant Regional Executive Secretary
Board Member I
Chairman, Police Regional Appellate Board
Chief of Mission, Class II
City Government Department Head III
City Trial Court Judge
Clerk of the Commission
Commission Member I
Court Attorney VI
Court of Appeals Reporter II
Deputy Administrator I
Deputy Commissioner I
Deputy Executive Director III
Deputy Insurance Commissioner
Director III
Executive Clerk of Court II
Executive Director II
Government Corporate Attorney III
Graft Investigation Officer II
Municipal Mayor I
Professor IV
Project Manager III
Prosecutor II
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
Public Attorney IV
Regional Treasurer
Register of Deeds IV
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II
Scientist II
Solicitor II
Special Prosecution Officer II
State Counsel IV
SUC President I
SUC Vice-President III
Petitioners, however, claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758: *
SEC. 7. Salary Schedule. - The Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to implement the Salary Schedule prescribed below:
Salary Schedule | ||||||||
Grade | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th | 5th | 6th | 7th | 8th |
Xxx | ||||||||
24 | 10,135 | 10,236 | 10,339 | 10,442 | 10,646 | 10,652 | 10,768 | 10,866 |
Xxx |
Petitioners conclude that Mayor Rodrigo, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, was occupying a Grade 24 position and, thus, not within the Sandiganbayan's original and exclusive jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.
This is a simplistic, and altogether incorrect, interpretation of the law.
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII thereof, contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then President Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985.[32]
However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions."
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to "(take) into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required" for the positions of government officials and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar salaries. This scheme is known as the "Grade," defined in P.D. No. 985 as:
Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.[33]The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work" so that they may be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation."
Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades[34] of officials holding constitutional positions, as follows:
SEC. 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent. - Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the Salary Grades indicated hereunder:As indicated in the aforequoted section, Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing Salary Grades) to the DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing the DBM to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable," and to assign them the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.[35]
Salary Grade
President of the Philippines 33 Vice-President of the Philippines 32 President of the Senate 32 Speaker of the House of Representatives 32 Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 32 Senator 31 Member of the House of Representatives 31 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 31 Chairman of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 Constitution
31Member of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, 1987 Constitution
30
The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the same Salary Grades based on the following guidelines:
x x x
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by (a) the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9,[36] and (b) the following factors:
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position;Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary Grade 27.
(2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections 10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758, which respectively provide:
SEC. 10. Local Government Units (LGUs). -- The rates of pay in LGUs shall be determined on the basis of the class and financial capability of each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not exceed the following percentages of the rates in the salary schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:
SEC. 19. Funding Source. - The funding sources for the amounts necessary to implement this Act shall be as follows:
For Provinces/Cities For Municipalities Special Cities 100%
1st Class 100% 90% 2nd Class 95% 85% 3rd Class 90% 80% 4th Class 85% 75% 5th Class 80% 70% 6th Class 75% 65%
(a) x x xThus, a local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official's Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, on official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the nature of his position - the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners' argument that Mayor Rodrigo's salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
(b) For local government units, the amount shall be charged against their respective funds. Local government units which do not have adequate or sufficient funds shall only partially implement the established rates as may be approved by the Joint Commission under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1188: Provided, That any partial implementation shall be uniform and proportionate for all positions in each local government unit: Provided further, That savings from National Assistance to Local Government Units (NALGU) funds may be used for this purpose.
x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court's jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 28 August 1996 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 44.
[2] Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, p. 39.
[3] Annex "B" of Petition, id., at 40.
[4] Annex "C" of Petition, id., at 41.
[5] Annex "D" of Petition, id., at 42.
[6] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[7] Rollo, pp. 20-21. Italics in the original.
[8] Id., at. 188. Italics in the original.
[9] Presidential Decree No. 1445.
[10] Section 2k, Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B. Section 3.9 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993) (Commission on Audit Circular No. 94-001) which superseded COA Circular No. 85-156-B, defines disallowance as "the disapproval in audit of a transaction, either in whole or in part."
[11] Section 19, id. See also Section 14 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
[12] Section 2r, id. Under Section 3.18 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993), a suspension is "the deferment of action to allow or disallow in audit a transaction pending compliance with certain requirements."
[13] Section 21, id. See also Section 16, Manual on Certificates of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
[14] Cf. Ramos vs. Aquino, 39 SCRA 585 (1971).
[15] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 SCRA 700 (1995); Ocampo III vs. Sandiganbayan, 236 SCRA 1 (1994).
[16] Bienvenido Tan, Jr., vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 128764, 10 July 1998; Rene Knecht and Cristina de Knecht vs. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 121916, 26 June 1998; Leonila Garcia-Rueda vs. Wilfred L. Pacasio et al., G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997; Camanag vs. Guerrero, 268 SCRA 473 (1997); Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 659 (1996); Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 15.
[17] Annie Tan vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. Nos. 114332 &114895, September 10, 1998.
[18] 228 SCRA 718 (1995).
[19] Entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606 , as amended."
[20] Entitled "Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to be known as "Sandiganbayan" and for Other Purposes," promulgated 10 December 1978.
[21] Entitled "Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for other purposes," promulgated 23 March 1983.
[22] 249 SCRA 212 (1995).
[23] Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[24] Entitled, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceeding Therefor."
[25] Article 210, Direct Bribery; Article 211, Indirect Bribery; and Article 212, Corruption of Public Officials.
[26] Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
[27] Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees.
[28] Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of Their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, and Nominees.
[29] Amending E.O. No. 14.
[30] Introduced by Representatives Garcia (P.), Starke, Damasing, Apostol, Abueg, Abaya, Sator, Panes and other members of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice.
[31] An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and Other Purposes. R.A. No. 6758 went into effect on July 1, 1989 per Section 23 thereof.
[32] A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government, and integrating the same.
[33] Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.
[34] "Salary Grade" is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class." (Section 2s, P.D. No. 985.)
[35] GRADE 33 - This Grade is assigned to the President of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest position in the government. No other position in the government service is considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 32 - This Grade is limited to the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines and those positions which head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the government, namely: the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No other positions in the government service are considered to be of equivalent rank.
GRADE 31 - This Grade is assigned to Senators and members of the House of Representatives and those with equivalent rank as follows: the Executive Secretary, Department Secretary, Presidential Spokesman, Ombudsman, Press Secretary, Presidential Assistant with Cabinet Rank, Presidential Adviser, National Economic and Development Authority Director General, Court of Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and President of the University of the Philippines.
An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and wide area of coverage ranging from top level policy formulation to the provision of technical and administrative support to the units under it, with functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the preceding paragraph, can be considered organizationally equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a Department Secretary.
GRADE 30 - Positions included are those of Department Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Presidential Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate Counsel, Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President, National Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director General, Presidential Management Staff Executive Director, Deputy Ombudsman, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, Special Prosecutor, University of the Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State University President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines President and President of other state universities and colleges of the same class.
Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar entities whose operations cut across offices or departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the general public and whose coverage is nationwide or whose functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in the preceding paragraph, may be placed at this level.
The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or those that may be created hereafter shall be determined based on these guidelines.
xxx
[36] Benchmark Position Schedule
Position Title | Salary Grade |
Laborer I | 1 |
Messenger | 2 |
Clerk I | 3 |
Driver I | 3 |
Stenographer I | 4 |
Mechanic I | 4 |
Carpenter II | 5 |
Electrician II | 6 |
Secretary I | 7 |
Bookkeeper | 8 |
Administrative Assistant | 8 |
Education Research Assistant I | 9 |
Cashier I | 10 |
Nurse I | 10 |
Teacher I | 10 |
Agrarian Reform Program Technologist | 10 |
Budget Officer I | 11 |
Chemist I | 11 |
Agriculturist I | 11 |
Social Welfare Officer I | 11 |
Engineer I | 12 |
Veterinarian I | 13 |
Legal Officer I | 14 |
Administrative Officer II | 15 |
Dentist II | 16 |
Postmaster IV | 17 |
Forester III | 18 |
Associate Professor I | 19 |
Rural Health Physician | 20 |