The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of the action^[1] and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.^[2]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision^[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it.  Also assailed is the CA Resolution^[4] dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The  controversy  between  petitioners Manuel  and  Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.

Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of said land.  The respondent did not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.^[5]

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint^[6] for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391.  Said complaint contains, among others, the following significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex "A".

4.  Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

x  x  x  x

7.  Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.  Hence, defendant's possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

8.  But [plaintiffs'] patience has come to its limits.  Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.

x  x  x  x

10.  Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters.  Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.^[7]

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer^[8] dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:

3.  The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to the effect that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation "shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease" (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex "2" hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;

x x x x

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "1" and "2" and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

x x x x

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant;

x x x x

As and by way of -

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs.  The property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex "3" and made an integral part hereof.  While, admittedly, the said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to it.  Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.  It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.  Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "3"), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas.  Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the same.  It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes "1" and "2" hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the subject property;^[9]

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action.  Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for "Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529" docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City.  Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order^[10] resolving the respondent's Motion.  In the said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant.  The defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question.  There has been no previous contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation.  The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor.  Its right to the physical possession of the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties' pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore.  The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened.  Plaintiff[s] have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.  Hence, defendant's possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

x x x x

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant "took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same" and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.

That the defendant's possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundation's occupation of the property.  In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyer's immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint.  With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.^[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision^[12] dated July 9, 2004 affirming the MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision^[13] dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[14] which was, however, denied in a Resolution^[15] dated November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II.  Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.^[16]

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioner's Complaint constitute judicial admissions. 

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis.  Petitioners thus conclude that respondent's possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4.  Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.  x x x

"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with."^[17]  Correspondingly, "facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him."^[18] "The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader."^[19]

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondent's use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,^[20] citing Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,^[21] this Court held that "what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought."

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,^[22] differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-à-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.^[23]

"The words `by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth' shall include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom."^[24]  "The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."^[25]

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary."^[26]  The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners' allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.

"`Stealth,' on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,"^[27] while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.^[28]  The CA found that based on the petitioners' allegations in their complaint, "respondent's entry on the land of the petitioners was by stealth x x x."^[29]  However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent  into the property appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners' allegation in their complaint that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is plaintiff's nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their property."^[30]  To this Court's mind, this allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.

"In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."^[31] "[W]here the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio," the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.^[32]

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.^[33] Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondent's possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners' complaint is one for forcible entry - that is "the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right."^[34]  Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent's possession was illegal at the inception.^[35]

Corollarily, since  the deprivation  of  physical possession,  as  alleged in

petitioners' Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject property in 1991.  Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,^[36] the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003.  As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ.     

---

^[1] Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003).

^[2] Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 683-684 (1946).

^[3] CA rollo, pp. 98-104; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.

^[4] Id. at 118-119

^[5] Id. at 99.

^[6] Rollo, pp. 139-141.

^[7] Id. at 140-141.

^[8] Id. at 129-138.

^[9] Id. at 129-132.

^[10] CA rollo, pp. 69-73; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Filpia D. Del Castillo.

^[11] Id. at 71-73.

^[12] Id. at 22-27; penned by Judge Edward B. Contreras. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit, and the questioned Order of the court a quo in Civil Case No. V-2391 is affirmed.

^[13] Id. at 98-104.  The dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed decision and order of the RTC in Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-009-04.

^[14] Id. at 105-111.

^[15] Id. at 118-119.

^[16] Rollo, p. 9.

^[17] FRANCISCO VICENTE J., THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE, Volume VII Part I, 1997 edition, p. 90 citing 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 894; Anderson's Dict.; Bouv. Dict.; 1 Green on Evidence, Sec. 27.

^[18] Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 328, 401 (1981).

^[19] Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460.

^[20] Supra note 1 at 175.  Emphasis supplied.

^[21] 335 Phil. 1107 (1997).

^[22] G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.

^[23] Id. at 382-383, citing 3 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 312 (1980 ed.). Emphasis supplied.

^[24] Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil 752, 756 (1918).

^[25] Id.

^[26] Id.

^[27] Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 384.

^[28] Id.

^[29] Rollo, p. 23.

^[30] Id. Emphasis supplied.

^[31] Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 382.

^[32] Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572 citing Emilia v. Bado, 131 Phil. 711 (1968).

^[33] Rollo, p. 21

^[34] Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118, 124.

^[35] Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216, 224.

^[36] RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.