In the criminal justice systems of modern civilized nations, insanity is invariably recognized as a valid defense against punishment for crime.  The proverbial bone of contention, however, is in the ascertainment of the veracity of the claimed affliction and the determination of the degree of mental aberration, as a ground for acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability.  We have such a situation before us in the present appeal.

Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to wit:

"That on or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion,* province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on the occasion thereof the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the use of stone which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.

"Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code"^[1]

In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for the indefinite suspension of the trial and asked for the commitment of the accused to the National Mental Hospital.^[2] In its order dated July 1, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case.^[3] On January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health submitted the clinical case report on the mental and physical condition of appellant.^[4] He was later returned to the custody of the court for trial and was arraigned on April 27, 1988.^[5]

The material and established facts of this case, as well as the points in dispute between the parties, having been succinctly but thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to quote at length therefrom.

"On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as member of the Integrated National Police of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, received a report that there was a victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr. Padlan in the poblacion.  He proceeded to the clinic and found the victim lying down with her head bleeding.  He asked her how she felt and when she replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem statement (TSN, November 4, 1988, pp. 3-5).  The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped and struck with a stone by Juanito Aquino, appellant herein.  Frias took down her statement which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos.  The written statement was also thumbmarked by Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp. 3-5, 8, 10, November 4, 1988, Armando Frias).  Pat. Jaime Datuin and Pat. Renato Solomon were also among the people who were present when Frias took the statement of the victim.  After the victim gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the hospital because she was weak (Id., p. 9).  Carmelita Morado was taken to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center in San Carlos City and admitted at 11:35 p.m. of that same evening in serious condition.  Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified that Carmelita Morado sustained the following injuries;

1.  lacerated wound about 10 cm. at the front of the head;

2.  skull fracture located on the front portion of the skull;

3.  hemorrhage or bleeding on the left eye;

4.  laceration of the brain;

5.  laceration perineum; (sic)

6.  laceration of the urethal (sic)

(TSN pp. 2-3, November 18, 1988; Dr. Saturnino Posadas; Medico Legal Certificate, Exhibit 'C')

"She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed (TSN, p. 4 November 18, 1988, Dr. Saturnino Posadas).

"A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanito Aquino.  He was found and arrested inside the town auditorium at around 11:00 that same evening of February 13, 1987 attending a Valentine dance (TSN, pp. 7-8, September 15, 1988).

"Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan.  However, it was only on February 17, 1987 that the statement of appellant was taken as the police officers waited for the parents of appellant (TSN, pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988).

"Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a lawyer.  As he had none, Armando Frias and the Station Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to assist appellant during the investigation.  Atty. Rosario, upon arrival at the office of Frias where the investigation was to take place, interviewed appellant (supra at pp. 14-16).

"At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant of his constitutional rights, of his right to remain silent and to counsel.  Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario throughout the investigation (TSN, p. 10, August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24, 1988).  After appellant signed his statement, Frias took appellant and his counsel to the office of Judge Juan C. Austria, of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, who called the Interpreter and the Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to appellant to ensure that appellant understood what was written.  Judge Austria made appellant sign the statement in his presence (TSN, pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988).

"However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could be arraigned, a Motion to Commit appellant to the National Center for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was filed by appellant's counsel as appellant was allegedly manifesting unstable behavior with fits of violence.  Appellant was duly committed sometime in July, 1987.  He was released in 1988 whereupon he was duly arraigned.  Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the defense of insanity.

"To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed.  After Juanito Aquino was admitted to the mental hospital in July 1987, he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him to be suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-­5, 7, May 23, 1988).  Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanito Aquino committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind (supra at pp. 15-16).

"Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was already mentally ill even when he was still young.  Appellant was suspended from school because he was very playful, overactive and naughty especially with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24, 1988); that appellant was cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes naked, and oftentimes not coming home for extended periods of time (supra at pp. 5, 8).  Appellant was previously confined at the Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering around naked (supra at p. 10).

"Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's custody and who transferred appellant for commitment to the National Center for Mental Health, recalled that while appellant was in his custody, appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting, dancing and generally disturbing the other inmates (TSN, p. 7, July 21, 1988).  After appellant was treated and released from the National Center for Mental Health, he acted queerly by singing and shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine (supra at p. 15).

"Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having certified that he could withstand trial.  However, the gist of appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of the crime, the persons, things and events connected with it.  He admitted he knew that he has some mental illness and had undergone treatment like electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-19, July 14, 1988).

"On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment.

"Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and during the investigation, appellant acted normally, and gave responsive answers to all the questions propounded to him (TSN, pp. 5, 9, 13-15 August 23, 1988).  Frias knew appellant even prior to the incident because he worked as a laborer in the construction of the theatre in the town proper.  He believed appellant to be normal.

"Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan whose house is located near the theatre being constructed, also knew appellant who worked there as a laborer and sometimes cooked the laborer's meals.  Baysic became closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes they drank together with other laborers after work.  During these times, he observed appellant to act normally and was responsive to conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988).

"Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant at the town auditorium, testified that when appellant was arrested during the valentine dance, he was appropriately dressed and behaved normally and in fact was just about to sit down after dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp. 8-9, 17 September 15, 1988).

"Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant escaped from prison on May 3, 1987.  While appellant was confined in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not observe any queer behavior from appellant (TSN, pp. 34-35, 41, 43, September 15, 1988)."^[6]

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P35,000.00 as damages.^[7]

Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals.^[8] The case was, however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court below to task on the following assignment of errors:

1.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;

2.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT;

3.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.^[9]

The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense, has overcome the presumption of sanity.

Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the first instance upon the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was committed.  The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense.^[10] The basis for the presumption of sanity is well explained by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Davis vs. United States,^[11] in this wise:  "If that presumption were not indulged, the government would always be under the necessity of adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused.  But a requirement of that character would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime and in most cases be unnecessary.  Consequently, the law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required proof of capacity to commit crime."

As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it is well to restate and keep in mind certain basic principles in law, viz:  that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; that a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.^[12]

It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals how the crime charged against him was perpetrated.  This confession is, however, being assailed as inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was executed without the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that he did not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional rights.^[13]

We do not agree with this submission.  The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.  Atty. Liliosa Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted appellant when he was placed under custodial investigation.  The same lawyer represented him during the early part of the trial.  In People vs. Layuso,^[14] we strongly denounced the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the right to counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him.  The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.  The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.  Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.  As explained in Gamboa vs. Cruz, etc.,^[15] the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of persons undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense.

The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately precluded the possibility of extracting from appellant any false or coerced confession or admission.  Furthermore, it was shown that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant was explained to him in his dialect when he was brought before Judge Juan C. Austria where such confession was subscribed and sworn to by appellant.^[16] The records also show that the validity of the extrajudicial confession is not being questioned.  Only the reliability of its contents is being placed in doubt, ostensibly because of the main submission of the defense that appellant was insane when the crime was committed.^[17] Moreover, the CLAO attorney would not have affixed her signature in the extrajudicial confession had she known of any legal infirmity in its execution.

Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on the clinical case report regarding his mental and physical condition.  He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, Physician-In-Charge, Male Court Case Pavilion of the National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly shown that appellant was supposedly insane immediately before, during and after the commission of the crime and that the evidence adduced explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he has no lucid intervals.^[18] He explains that the normal appearance and behavior of appellant while testifying in court is not suprising.  He says that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition during the trial of the case where he had been regularly taking medicine should not be confused with his mental status at the time of the commission of the offense.^[19]

Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a dearth in plausible explanations.  Nor was the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the witness stand, including his manner of testifying and the answers he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least bit impressed by appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his decision.  And well must it be so, for the rule is that insanity must be positively proven.  The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of sanity.  The rule has consistently been that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.^[20]

Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should be directed is that transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of the act or acts under prosecution.^[21] In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the freedom of the will.  Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.  The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear and positive evidence.^[22]

Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing.  It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this fact is due the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once proven to exist.  As no man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be measured as the same is reflected in the actions of the body it is created to govern.  Thus, we have held that mind can only be known by outward acts.  Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.^[23] In interpreting these physical manifestations, scientific knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our judicial agencies.

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim.  After consummating his lustful desire, he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear that the victim would report him, and thereafter he left her in the belief that she was already dead.^[24] The victim did not immediately die.  In the clinic of Dr. Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Frias saw the victim with her head bleeding.  He took the statement of the victim in the local dialect.^[25] Thereafter, he translated the statement to English and reduced it into writing.^[26] The statement disclosed the identity of appellant.  That same evening, the victim was still brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was treated.  She was serious but still conscious, and was able to narrate to Dr. Saturnino Posadas what happened to her.  She died the following morning.^[27]

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very moment the crime was committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing.  While Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health described the mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with psychosis,"^[28] he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong.^[29] The same witness also testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid intervals,^[30] but he, however, also observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off.^[31]

The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the crime.^[32] This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion thereof, killed her.^[33] It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence.  The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies.  The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.

One more thing.  The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant.  In a judgment of conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case should be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties, unlike those generally provided for crimes in special laws.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, and the reduction of the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

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* The Municipality of Urbiztondo, as the locus of the crime, was inadvertently omitted in the information filed and in the decision rendered by the trial court in this case, but is established as such by the evidence.

^[1] Rollo, 5.

^[2] Original Record, 50-51.

^[3] Ibid., 58.

^[4] Ibid., 61.

^[5] Ibid., 73.

^[6] Brief for Appellee, 4-10.

^[7] Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr., presiding; Rollo, 42.

^[8] Original Record, 458.

^[9] Brief for Accused-Appellant, 1.

^[10] People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs. Morales, 121 SCRA 426 (1983); People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 (1922).

^[11] 160 U.S. 469.

^[12] People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 (1974).

^[13] Rollo, 79-81.

^[14] G.R. No. 69210, July 5, 1989.

^[15] 162 SCRA 642 (1988).

^[16] TSN, Aug. 24, 1988, 165.

^[17] TSN, July 6, 1988, 75-78.

^[18] Rollo, 67-68.

^[19] Ibid., 74, 76.

^[20] People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288 (1960); People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87 (1937); U.S. vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547 (1914).

^[21] People vs. Aldemita, ante.

^[22] People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 69251, Sept. 13, 1989; People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 (1980); People vs. Renegado, supra.

^[23] People vs. Bonoan, supra.

^[24] Original Record, 11-12.

^[25] TSN, Nov. 4, 1988, 259.

^[26] Ibid., id., 263-264.

^[27] Ibid., Nov. 18, 1988, 271-272.

^[28] Ibid., May 23, 1988, 24.

^[29] Ibid., id., 34.

^[30] Ibid., id., 13.

^[31] Ibid., id., 28.

^[32] Original Record, 64.

^[33] Ibid., 11.