SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 138033, February 22, 2006 ]RENATO BALEROS v. PEOPLE +
RENATO BALEROS, JR., PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
RENATO BALEROS v. PEOPLE +
RENATO BALEROS, JR., PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in
its March 31, 1999 resolution[2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.[3]
The accusatory portion of the information[4] dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.[3]
The accusatory portion of the information[4] dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ...) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this ...the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her attacker's clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He ... was wearing a t-shirt and shorts ... Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed ... topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue ... (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate ..., was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. .... (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with "'...a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) ΣǾ' and below the quoted letters the word '1946' 'UST Medicine and Surgery'" (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand name "Adidas" (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] .... S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard's logbook ...:
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ....
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."(Exhibit "A-2")
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o'clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO's knocking on the door woke him up, .... He was able to fix the time of CHITO's arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the door....
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. .... It was at around 3 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ....
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU's room and thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to CHITO .... He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o'clock that same morning .... They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ....
An occupant of Room 310 ... Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO's because CHITO had lent the very same one to him .... The t-shirt with CHITO's fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan's testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o'clock that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o'clock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted.... Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: xxx xxx xxx: 1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked 'UNIMART' with the following: xxx xxx xxx 2) One (1) small white plastic bag marked 'JONAS' with the following: Exh. 'D' One (1) printed handkerchief. Exh. 'E' One (1) white T-shirt marked 'TMZI'. Exh. 'F' One (1) black short (sic) marked 'ADIDAS'. PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION: To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above stated specimens. FINDINGS: Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results: Exhs. 'C' and 'D' POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison. Exhs. 'A', 'B', 'E' and 'F' are insufficient for further analysis. CONCLUSION: Exhs. 'C' and 'D' contain chloroform, a volatile poison."[6] (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish
the following, as culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her father's house.[8] Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.[9]
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision[10] convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction, to wit:
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner's acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.[13] In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[14]
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
We quote with approval the CA's finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou's face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner's actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner's intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.[15]
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[16]
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,[17] stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.[18]
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[19]
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody's guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (ret.) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.); Rollo, pp. 198-237.
[2] Id., p. 273.
[3] Id., pp. 120-155.
[4] Original Records, pp. 1-3.
[5] Id., p. 42.
[6] Rollo, pp. 201-212.
[7] TSN, December 15, 1993, pp. 18-19; TSN, December 20, 1993, pp. 23-24.
[8] TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 7-10.
[9] TSN, January 17, 1994, p. 24.
[10] Rollo, pp. 120-155.
[11] See Note #1, supra.
[12] See Note #2, supra.
[13] People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249 (2001), citing People vs. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).
[14] People vs. Sevileno, 425 SCRA 247 (2004), citing People vs. Navarro, 407 SCRA 221 (2003).
[15] Comment, pp. 20-21; Rollo, pp. 302-303.
[16] People vs. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912 (2000).
[17] 61 Phil. 703, 705 (1935).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1998 Edition, p. 91.
[20] Rollo, pp. 222-223.
[21] People vs. Canlas, et al., 423 Phil. 665 (2001).
[22] 431 Phil. 786 (2002).
[23] 416 SCRA 506 (2003).
[24] Sec. 14(2), Art. III.
[25] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. III, p. 81.
[26] Ibid., citing People vs. Lilian Gozum, CA 54 O.G. 7409; People vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369 [1934].
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of ... (UST). With Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity .... MALOU, ..., was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner's fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran's place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.[7] Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building ..., CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at ... Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o'clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool .... Soon after, ... the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn ... and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, ..., offered each ... dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity's symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto's car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day ....
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and ..., S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry .... xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 .... xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, ... approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 ... but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, ..., at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , ...changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up .... He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building .... When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306....
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame ..., Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital ..... At the hospital, ... CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ....
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o'clock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 o'clock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her father's house.[8] Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.[9]
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision[10] convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney's fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
SO ORDERED.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.[12]
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
- In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.
- In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.
- In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
- In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
- In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
- In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner's acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.[13] In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[14]
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction ifIn the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
We quote with approval the CA's finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder's apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
From CHITO's bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOU's night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou's face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner's actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner's intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.[15]
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[16]
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,[17] stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.[18]
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[19]
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody's guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.[20]At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.[21]
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.Likewise in People vs. Pancho,[23] the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant's sexual organ. xxx.
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant's feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,[24] it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.[25] The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.[26] That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (ret.) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.); Rollo, pp. 198-237.
[2] Id., p. 273.
[3] Id., pp. 120-155.
[4] Original Records, pp. 1-3.
[5] Id., p. 42.
[6] Rollo, pp. 201-212.
[7] TSN, December 15, 1993, pp. 18-19; TSN, December 20, 1993, pp. 23-24.
[8] TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 7-10.
[9] TSN, January 17, 1994, p. 24.
[10] Rollo, pp. 120-155.
[11] See Note #1, supra.
[12] See Note #2, supra.
[13] People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 413 Phil. 249 (2001), citing People vs. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).
[14] People vs. Sevileno, 425 SCRA 247 (2004), citing People vs. Navarro, 407 SCRA 221 (2003).
[15] Comment, pp. 20-21; Rollo, pp. 302-303.
[16] People vs. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912 (2000).
[17] 61 Phil. 703, 705 (1935).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1998 Edition, p. 91.
[20] Rollo, pp. 222-223.
[21] People vs. Canlas, et al., 423 Phil. 665 (2001).
[22] 431 Phil. 786 (2002).
[23] 416 SCRA 506 (2003).
[24] Sec. 14(2), Art. III.
[25] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., Vol. III, p. 81.
[26] Ibid., citing People vs. Lilian Gozum, CA 54 O.G. 7409; People vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369 [1934].