Assailed via Petition for Review on Certiorari are the September 28, 2004 Decision^[1] and January 25, 2005 Order^[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 59 affirming the July 22, 2002 Order^[3] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granting the "Motion to Withdraw Informations and to Dismiss the [Criminal] Cases" filed against respondents Ramon P. Jacinto (Jacinto), Jaime C. Colayco (Colayco), Antonio P. Tayao (Tayao) and Glicerio Perez (Perez) for falsification of private document and grave coercion.

First Women's Credit Corp. (the corporation), represented by stockholder and director Shig Katayama (Katayama), filed on November 12, 1997 a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the corporation's officers Jacinto, Colayco, Concepcion T. Sangil (Sangil) and Asuncion Cruz (Cruz), for alleged mismanagement of the corporation.  The case was docketed as SEC No. 11-97-5816.^[4]

The SEC, in SEC Case No. 11-97-5816, created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) for the corporation by Order of November 17, 1999.  The Order was upheld by the SEC en banc on July 4, 2000.

The IMC thereupon issued directives to the corporation's president Antonio Tayao (Tayao) and corporate secretary and treasurer Glicerio Perez (Perez) toward the preservation of assets and records of the corporation.^[5]

Allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, Tayao and Perez defied the implementation of the SEC November 17, 1999 Order^[6] when IMC attempted to enter the main office of the corporation in Makati on December 3, 1999, December 29, 1999 and January 28, 2000.^[7]

On April 6, 2000, Tayao filed a request with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) to include Katayama in its watch list.

The IMC, on April 14, 2000, later preventively suspended Tayao and Perez. Despite their preventive suspension, however, the two, allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, still issued various directives/memoranda to the employees of the corporation to disobey the IMC.

On May 9, 2000, the IMC dismissed Tayao and Perez.^[8]

In two follow-up letters to the BID both dated August 1, 2000, Tayao represented himself as president of the corporation.^[9]

Hence, the filing before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office (CPO) on December 27, 2000 of criminal complaints against Jacinto, Colayco, Tayao and Perez by the corporation, represented by Katayama, for violation of the following offenses defined and punishable under the Revised Penal Code:

a)   Article 151 which punishes resistance and disobedience to person in authority or the agents of such person (20 counts);

b)   Article 154 which punishes the unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances (2 counts);

c)   Article 172(2) which punishes falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents (2 counts);

d)   Article 315, paragraph 2(a) Estafa by falsely pretending to be officers of FWCC (23 counts).^[10]

Jacinto, Colayco, Tayao and Perez (hereafter respondents) denied the charges.^[11]  They claimed that the SEC Order creating the IMC was pending appeal at the Court of Appeals;^[12] that there was no danger that the assets of the corporation would be dissipated or lost at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed; and that Katayama had no authority to institute the criminal charges in behalf of the corporation as he was merely a minority stockholder, aside from his lack of personal knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the filing of the charges.^[13]

The Investigating Prosecutor, by Resolution of August 28, 2001, found probable cause to hale respondents into court for falsification of private documents under Article 172(2), and three informations for grave coercion against private respondent Tayao and three unnamed security guards. The decretal text of the resolution reads:

Wherefore, finding sufficient evidence to charge respondents Ramon P. Jacinto, Jaime P. Colayco, Antonio P. Tayao and Glicerio Perez for the offense of Falsification of Private Document under Art. 172(2) on two (2) counts and, only as against respondent Tayao with three (3) other unnamed security guards, three (3) counts of Grave Coercion under Art. 286, both of the Revised Penal Code, but insufficient evidence for the offenses defined under Articles 151, 154 and 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as against all four (4) respondents, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the charges for the latter three (3) offenses as against all respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence as these are dismissed upon approval but the attached informations be approved for filing in court.

x x x x^[14]

In finding probable cause, the Investigating Prosecutor declared:

On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence for the charge of Falsification of Private Document as defined in Art. 172 (2) against respondents as the two (2) letters addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation both dated 1 August 2000 but the first, received at the BID on 10 August 2000 and the second, on 21 August 2000, clearly showed that respondents colluded and connived with each other in making it appear in the said letters that respondent Tayao was the President of complainant FWCC when as early as 9 May 2000, he has already been dismissed as officer of the said corporation by the Management Committee. It has also been shown that as a result of these two (2) letters, complainant Katayama suffered not only pecuniary and material damage but also damage to his honor as well.

Finally, sufficient evidence has shown that respondent Tayao and three (3) other armed security guards whose identities can be established later, without authority of law, with the use of physical force and threats, prevented the Management committee from implementing their legal mandate on 3 December 1999, on 29 December 1999 and 28 January 2000, by refusing them entry into the FWCC's main office at 51 Polaris St., Makati City. They may therefore be held liable for Grave Coercion under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. No evidence, however, has been presented showing the other respondents' culpable participation in these three (3) aforementioned instances.^[15]  (Underscoring supplied)

The City Prosecutor approved the Investigating Prosecutor's resolution.

Respondents appealed the CPO resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ) via Petition for Review.

The DOJ, by Resolution^[16] dated April 29, 2002, reversed the Resolution of the CPO which was directed to move for the withdrawal of the information for falsification of private document against private respondents and the informations for grave coercion against respondent Tayao and the three John Does.

The corporation and Katayama (hereafter petitioners) moved to reconsider the DOJ April 29, 2002 Resolution but it was denied by Resolution of September 24, 2002.^[17]

Petitioners thereupon assailed the DOJ Resolutions before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.^[18]

In the meantime, respondents filed with Branch 65, MeTC Makati where the criminal cases were raffled, a "Motion to Withdraw Informations and to Dismiss the Cases"^[19] to which motion petitioners filed their Opposition.^[20]  By Order^[21] of July 22, 2002, Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay found respondents' motion to be well-taken and accordingly dismissed the criminal cases.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the July 22, 2002 Order of the trial court was denied by Order^[22] of December 3, 2002.

Petitioners assailed the trial court's orders via certiorari with the RTC of Makati which Branch 59 thereof dismissed by Decision^[23] of September 28, 2004 for lack of merit.

In denying their petition for certiorari, the RTC held that the grounds relied upon by petitioners were mere errors of judgment, not necessarily of jurisdiction, and there being other legal remedies to question the assailed orders, e.g., the filing of a Notice of Appeal, petitioners' petition for certiorari would not lie.^[24]

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, petitioners contending that

IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RTC DECISION AND ASSAILED RTC ORDER, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECIDED NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN THAT:

1. PURSUANT TO PEREZ V. HAGONOY RURAL BANK AND DEE V. COURT OF APPEALS, PETITIONERS' ONLY REMEDY FROM THE ASSAILED MTC ORDERS WAS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND NOT AN ORDINARY APPEAL.
   
   
2. CONTRARY TO ROBERTS V. COURT OF APPEALS, THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DISCHARGE ITS JUDICIAL MANDATE TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
   
   
3. AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHES THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE THAT RESPONDENTS COMMITTED FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS AND GRAVE COERCION.^[25]  (Italics in the original)
   

It is settled that the determination of whether probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of public prosecutors.^[26]  The court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final,^[27] albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized.^[28]  The rule is also consistent with this Court's policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and of leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed offender.^[29]

While prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice.^[30]

Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, any disposition of the case, e.g., its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the Court.^[31]

In thus resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused.^[32]  It is its bounden duty to independently assess the merits of the motion. For while the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.^[33]

As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accused's motion to withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs:  "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."

In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTC's grant of the motion.

The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against  appeal  in  case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply.

Petitioners not having availed of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the cases, the dismissal had become final and executory.   On this score alone, the present petition must fail.

Technicality aside, the petition just the same fails.

Petitioners' assertion that the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to make an independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence before granting the motion does not persuade.

The trial court did stress in its December 3, 2002 Order^[34] denying the motion for reconsideration that it was bound to make, as it did, a preliminary finding independently of those of the Secretary of Justice.

The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision.  It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused.

The trial judge's grant of the motion after his independent finding that there was indeed lack of probable cause to indict respondents should not then be brushed aside absent any evidence showing that he overlooked relevant and material facts which, if considered, would glaringly point to the presence of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

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*  Being assailed in the present petition are the issuances of the Makati Regional Trial Court.  At any rate, Section 4 of Rule 45 provides that in petitions for review on certiorari, the lower courts or judges either as petitioners or respondents are not to be impleaded.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 40-45. Penned by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

^[2] Id. at 46.

^[3] Id. at 309-310. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay.

^[4] Id. at 67.

^[5] Id.  at  224.

^[6] Id. at  225.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Id. at  65-66.

^[11] Id. at  226.

^[12] Id. at 227.

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Id. at 186.

^[15] Id. at 185.

^[16] Id. at  224-230.

^[17] Id. at  41.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Id. at  277.

^[20] Id. at 18.

^[21] Id. at  309-310.

^[22] Id. at 337-338.

^[23] Id. at 40-45.

^[24] Id. at  43.

^[25] Id. at 24.

^[26] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307, 349 (Narvasa, Separate Opinion)

^[27] Id. at 345; Webb v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 139120, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA 532, 541.

^[28] (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

^[29] Samson v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 123504, Dec. 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 32, 37 (citation omitted); Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 52.

^[30] Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 599, 611-612.

^[31] Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 471; Webb v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 139120, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA 532, 540; People v. Tan, G.R. No. 144707, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 234, 256.

^[32] Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 158236, September 1, 2004, 437 SCRA 504, 515.

^[33] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207.