Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 5, 1998 Decision^[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 29904, which affirmed the October 29, 1992 and December 23, 1992 Orders of the Lucena City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58; and its January 31, 2000 Resolution^[3] denying Marquez's Motion for Reconsideration.  It raises the core issue of the propriety of the denial by respondent former Lucena City RTC Presiding Judge Ludivico C. Lopez of Marquez's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 92-150 entitled Marcial M. Marquez v. The Development Bank of the Philippines and the Provincial Sheriff of Quezon Province  for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order.


Marcial M. Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena Entrepreneur and Agri-Industrial Development Corporation (LEAD), which was incorporated on November 26, 1975 primarily to venture into and engage in commercial deep-sea or "purse seine" fishing.  LEAD's principals were graduates of the Development Bank of the Philippines' (DBP's) Entrepreneurship Development Program.

To carry out its objectives, LEAD needed capital for the construction of a fishing vessel and the procurement of the required equipment and other accessories.  It applied for a loan with respondent DBP, which, on November 9, 1977, granted LEAD an agricultural loan of PhP 2,105,000.00 that would cover the construction and procurement of the fishing vessel and the required equipment,^[4] subject to the required level of capitalization or equity ratio by LEAD's principals.^[5]

Moreover, DBP required that the principals, including Marquez, be held jointly and severally liable with borrower-corporation DEAL.^[6]  To secure the loan, some of the principals of LEAD, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Venuso Bibit and Mr. and Mrs. Eduardo Murallon, entered into a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) of two (2) properties with DBP, particularly those covered by TCT Nos. T-136995 and T-140765 with areas of 6,859 square meters and 7,222 square meters, respectively.^[7]

To protect itself from manipulated and/or overpriced contract, the construction of the fishing vessel and the procurement and installation of the equipment and other accessories were subjected to DBP's local competitive bidding in consonance with its standing policies.^[8]  Consequently, Trigon Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation (Trigon), based in Cebu City, won the bid and was duly approved by DBP.^[9]  Thus, the corresponding Boat-building Contract^[10] was executed by and between LEAD and Trigon on June 2, 1978, which stipulated, inter alia, that Trigon would complete the work within 150 calendar days from the perfection of the contract and, as consideration, LEAD would pay Trigon PhP 1,955,000.00.^[11]

However, there were some problems encountered in the implementation of the loan.  First, some scheduled releases of the loan were withheld by DBP as the capitalization or equity ratio of the principals of LEAD was not complied with.  Second, there were defects in the construction of the fishing vessel which required compliance by Trigon before any subsequent releases of the loan could be made.  These contretemps delayed the construction of the fishing vessel for over two (2) years, yet the fishing vessel was only 77.14% complete by then.  Third, the delay aggravated the situation for the boat construction was overtaken by increases in costs of materials and machinery.  Thus, the project could not be completed at the original cost stipulated in the boat construction contract.

After threshing out the problem through a tripartite conference between LEAD, Trigon, and DBP, it was agreed that LEAD would get the fishing vessel at its present state and LEAD would complete the construction and installation of the equipment and accessories, for which DBP would grant LEAD an additional loan of PhP 714,600.00.^[12]  The additional loan was granted on July 29, 1981 and was consolidated with the first loan.  To secure the additional loan, an additional REM, a second mortgage, was undertaken by Marquez and his wife on their property covered by TCT No. T-24506 with an area of 3,315 square meters.^[13]  The loan was fully released on February 8, 1982.  In short, the fishing vessel christened "F/B LEAD 1" was completed and launched; and because a chattel mortgage was constituted on the fishing vessel, together with the machineries and equipment on it, to secure the loan with DBP, it was insured with the GSIS Property Insurance Fund in favor of DBP and/or LEAD.

Meanwhile, shortly after the additional loan was fully released to LEAD, on September 3, 1982, DBP informed LEAD of the arrearage of PhP 906,887.58 of its outstanding loan and to remit PhP 363,022.01 for the loan's interest.  When LEAD was not able to pay, DBP formed a collection committee; however, the conferences with LEAD principals yielded negative results.

Subsequently, on the nights of June 21-22, 1985, disaster struck F/B LEAD 1 as it sank off the coast of Unisan, Quezon at the height of a typhoon.  Upon receiving notice of such event, DBP filed an insurance claim with the GSIS, which covered the fishing vessel for the period 1985-1986, and collected the proceeds of PhP 1,186,145.00 which DBP applied to the loan account of LEAD on December 9, 1986.

For having defaulted on its contractual obligations, on July 21, 1992, DBP demanded LEAD and its principals to settle their outstanding loan obligation, with warning that non-settlement would compel DBP to institute the necessary legal action to protect its interest, including appropriate actions to foreclose the mortgaged properties.  With the inaction of LEAD and its principals, on August 25, 1992, DBP was compelled to file with the Clerk of Court of the Quezon RTC an application for foreclosure sale of the REMs constituted to secure its loan with DBP.

On September 3, 1992, the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Quezon issued a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale on October 6, 1992 of the following properties covered by TCT Nos. T-136995, T-140765, and T-24506 to satisfy the mortgaged indebtedness of PhP 4,595,450.00.^[14]  The spouses Bibit and spouses Murallon did not contest the scheduled sale.

Marquez, however, on October 5, 1992, instituted the instant action for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Lucena City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-150, to forestall the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property covered by TCT No. T-24506.^[15]  In gist, Marquez alleged that LEAD's involvement in purse seine fishing was premised substantially on a "partnership" with DBP and not that of a simple debtor-creditor relationship; that the loan contracts and REM constituted for them were legally impaired, bereft of consideration, and did not reflect the true and proper relationship between LEAD and DBP; that DBP was liable for breach of agreement when it failed to deliver a seaworthy and well-equipped fishing vessel; that DBP reneged on its commitment to render technical expertise on purse seine fishing when needed most; that LEAD was prejudiced by DBP's bureaucracy and the controversy with its commissioned boat-builder, Trigon; that having collected the insurance proceeds from GSIS after the sinking of the fishing vessel, it had extinguished whatever obligations LEAD had with DBP; and that DBP refused in bad faith to render an updated accounting or allow Marquez to scrutinize the loan account.

On October 6, 1992, the scheduled day for the extra-judicial sale, respondent Presiding Judge issued an Order^[16] granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and set the hearing on October 14, 1992 for said action.

On October 14, 1992, respondent judge heard Marquez and DBP on the propriety of issuing the injunctive writ.  Parenthetically, on October 16, 1992, DBP filed its Answer^[17] with counterclaims against Marquez.  On October 29, 1992, respondent Judge issued the first assailed Order^[18] denying Marquez's prayed for injunctive writ, to which he filed his Motion for Reconsideration.^[19]  On December 2, 1992, Marquez filed an Urgent Motion to Restrain^[20] the extra-judicial foreclosure sale scheduled on December 28, 1992.  Earlier, after the order of denial was issued on October 29, 1992, DBP applied for an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property covered by TCT No. T-24506, which was granted through the Notice of Extra-judicial Sale^[21] issued on November 24, 1992 by respondent provincial sheriff.

Subsequently, on December 23, 1992, respondent Judge issued the second assailed Order^[22] denying Marquez's Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Motion to Restrain.  Consequently, on December 28, 1992, as scheduled, Marquez's property covered by TCT No. T-24506 was sold to DBP as the highest bidder.^[23]


However, the certificate of sale was not issued as Marquez was granted a TRO^[24] by the CA through a Petition for Certiorari^[25] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, where he assailed the Orders denying the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  After DBP filed its Comment^[26] on April 23, 1993, the CA rendered the assailed Decision^[27] on November 5, 1998 affirming the RTC Orders.  Marquez's Motion for Reconsideration^[28] of said Decision was however denied on January 31, 2000.^[29]

The appellate court held that P.D. 385 applied in the instant case and found neither manifest abuse committed by the trial court nor any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the issuance of the injunctive writ.

Unfortunately, Marcial M. Marquez died on January 24, 1995.^[30]  He was then substituted by his heirs on January 20, 1999.^[31]


In the instant petition for review filed by the heirs of Marcial M. Marquez, the crucial issue to be dealt with in this petition is whether the trial court's refusal to grant an injunction against the threatened extra-judicial foreclosure sale by DBP constitutes grave abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In support of the instant petition, petitioners raise the issues of applicability of P.D. 385, denial of due process, and the extent of the loan covered by the REM constituted on petitioners' realty under TCT No. T-24506.

However, the petition lacks merit.

Requisites for issuance of injunctive writ

The writ of preliminary injunction is issued to

prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.  Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.  Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated.  Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.^[32]

Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds are established, thus:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Prescinding from the provisions mentioned above, we have consistently held that the requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following:


Requisites for injunctive writ not present

We have reviewed the records and the pleadings of the parties and found that, as contended by respondent DBP, Marquez and petitioners failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.  Hence, the trial court did not commit any manifest abuse nor gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the writ of preliminary injunction as well as Marquez's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issuance of injunctive writ on sound discretion of the trial court

It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected.  It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.^[34]  Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion.^[35]  It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.^[36]  The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.  Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.^[37]

In the instant case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that Marquez was not entitled to the injunctive writ.  Verily, the trial court has exercised its sound discretion in denying the writ.  The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court in injunctive matters should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.^[38]  Indeed, a scrutiny of the records fails to show any manifest abuse committed by respondent Presiding Judge.


P.D. 385 is clearly applicable in the instant case. The trial and appellate courts' primary basis for denying the injunction sought by Marquez was P.D. 385, which makes it

mandatory for government financial institutions x x x to foreclose the collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit, accommodation and/or guarantees granted by them whenever their arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other charges, amount to at least twenty percent (20%) of the total outstanding obligations, including interests and other charges, as appearing in the books of account and/or related records of the financial institution concerned.^[39]

Pursuant to the aforesaid law:

Sec. 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages had been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings x x x (emphasis supplied).

A close examination of the attendant factual milieu of the instant case shows that it is an undisputed fact that LEAD loaned from DBP PhP 2.105 million and PhP 714,600.00.  It is also undisputed that the spouses Marquez were constituted jointly and severally liable in their personal capacity with LEAD as regards the loan obligation.  And, for the additional loan of PhP 714,600.00, the Marquez spouses entered into a second mortgage (REM) of their property covered by TCT No. T-24506.  As of September 3, 1992, the loan balance with the arrearages amounted to PhP 4,595,450.00 despite the previous application of PhP 1,186,145.00 insurance proceeds from the GSIS.  The account clearly reveals that LEAD was in arrears in the payment of the loans.  As a consequence, the agreed 14% per annum interest had to be imposed.  Absent any showing by petitioners that LEAD had complied with the required 20% payment of the arrearages, P.D. 385 must be obeyed.

Petitioners rely on Filipinas Marble Corporation (FMC) v. Court of Appeals^[40] to bolster their position that the trial court committed manifest abuse and gravely abused its discretion in denying the issuance of the prayed for injunctive writ.

We are not convinced.

The FMC case is not on all fours with the instant case.  FMC had a $5 million loan with DBP conditioned on its entering into a three (3)-year management contract with Bancom Systems Control, Inc. (Bancom), whose key officers shall be appointed only with DBP's approval and made directly responsible to DBP.  In a complaint for annulment of the deeds of mortgage and deed of assignment in favor of DBP, FMC averred failure of consideration as regards the execution of the deeds and that DBP and Bancom mismanaged and misspent the loan.

We ruled that we cannot make any conclusions on whether DBP and Bancom actually misappropriated and misspent the $5 Million loan as this should properly be litigated in the main action; thus, pending the outcome of such litigation, P.D. 396 cannot automatically be applied for if it is really proven that respondent DBP was responsible for the misappropriation of the loan, even if only in part, then the foreclosure of the petitioners' properties under the provisions of P.D. 385 to satisfy the whole amount of the loan would be a gross mistake and would unduly prejudice FMC.  It is only after trial on the merits can the true amount of the loan which was applied wisely or not, for the benefit of the petitioner, be determined.  And consequently, the foreclosure proceedings under P.D. 385 will have to await the determination of the trial on the merits. Thus, since the issue of misappropriation of the proceeds of the loan was still being litigated, the liability of FMC for the loan which was the basis of the mortgage being foreclosed was not yet settled; hence, the Court granted an injunction against the foreclosure sale.

In the instant case, the factual antecedents of FMC could hardly find parallelism with the factual milieu of LEAD.  While it is true that DBP released most of the 2.105 million loan to Trigon, nonetheless, it was LEAD which dealt and entered the contract with Trigon and the boat-building contract duly signed by LEAD principal, Bibit.  Moreover, while petitioners questioned the outstanding amount of the mortgage loan, nevertheless, given the undisputed loans extended to LEAD and the 14% per annum interest stipulated in the loan contracts, the outstanding amount could hardly be contested given the undisputed delinquency of LEAD.  Besides, unlike in FMC, the instant case does not involve the issues of a management contract and misappropriation of the proceeds of the loan.

It is our ruling in FMC that:

P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of government lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation, lead that corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.

The designated officers of the government financing institution cannot simply walk away and then state that since the loans were obtained in the corporation's name, then P.D. 385 must be peremptorily applied and that there is no way the borrower corporation can prevent the automatic foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties once the arrearages reach twenty percent (20%) of the total obligation no matter who was responsible.^[41]

This ruling could hardly find application in the instant case.  Thus, we now hold that P.D. 385, proscribing the issuance of an injunctive writ, applies.  More so, during the hearing for the issuance of the injunctive writ, Marquez and petitioners had not shown that 20% of the arrearages of the mortgage loan had been duly paid.

Petitioners failed to show a right in esse to be protected

We uphold the trial court and CA in their finding that Marquez had not shown a right in esse to be protected.  Indeed, the applicant's right must be clear or unmistakable, that is, that the right is actual, clear and positive especially calling for judicial protection.^[42]  Thus, an injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.

While not preempting the disposition of the main case, a close review of the records at hand would show that the loan and the REM seem to be above scrutiny.  Respondent DBP had shown documentary evidence of how the assailed transactions transpired, and how and why Marquez and other LEAD principals signed and agreed to be solidarily liable for LEAD's loans as well as their voluntary mortgage of their properties to secure said loans.

We need to stress that the original loan was granted in 1977 while the additional loan was granted in 1981.  Marquez signed as solidarily liable for both loans but constituted a REM of his property (TCT No. T-24506), on second mortgage, only for the additional loan.  It cannot be gainsaid by the foregoing facts that there was bad faith or malice in DBP's part in granting the loan, much less were there circumstances shown that Marquez and the other LEAD principals were compelled to enter into said contracts.  Indeed, the acknowledgements in front of a notary public of the loan and REM contracts show the dealings between the parties to be apparently at arms length.  Be that as it may, if indeed there were defects and lack of consideration in the contracts, Marquez was in delay in pursuing an action to defend his rights until the time that the foreclosure sale was already well nigh imminent.

Application for injunctive relief construed strictly

The allegations in Marquez's complaint did not clearly make out his entitlement to the injunctive relief prayed for.  The rule requires that in order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the requisites.^[43]  It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.^[44]  As previously discussed, the trial court and the CA were not convinced, based on the pleadings and the evidence presented in the hearing for the issuance of the injunctive writ, that petitioners demonstrated a strong basis for the grant of the injunctive writ.  The allegations of the complaint on the defense that the agreement was that of a partnership is at war with the loan and mortgage documents they signed.  Apparently, in resolving the prayer for injunction, the courts a quo relied more on these documents than the bare averments of petitioners on the alleged partnership.


We find no denial of due process as alleged by petitioners.  They contend that Marquez was denied his day in court as regards the hearing for the issuance of the injunctive writ on October 14, 1992.  A close scrutiny of the records, specifically the excerpt of the transcript^[45] of the October 14, 1992 hearing, shows otherwise.  In that hearing, the trial court properly ruled to dispense with the testimony of Marquez as it already involved the merit of the case.  Besides, the points that Marquez wanted to testify on were included in the verified complaint to prove that the relationship between LEAD and DBP was not that of a mere debtor-creditor but a form of partnership.  This issue has already been tackled, but we will resolve the main case which cannot be done in a hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that is a mere ancillary remedy.

Due process is served when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard for the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.^[46]  In the instant case, Marquez was present at the October 14, 1992 hearing and was able to argue his case for the issuance of the injunctive writ.  Thus, he cannot claim that respondent judge denied him due process.  Verily, the trial court must not delve into the primary issues raised in the main action in the hearing for the issuance of an injunctive writ.  The grant of an injunctive writ, being an ancillary remedy, which could result in a premature resolution of the case-or will grant the principal objectives of the parties-before the merits can be passed upon, is proscribed, and the prayer for the relief will be properly denied,^[47] as in the instant case.  Indeed, the evidence required for the trial court to consider during the hearing was only a sample and intended merely to give it an idea of the justification for the injunctive writ pending decision of the case on the merits, which must rest on solid grounds.^[48]  As it is, Marquez had been given ample opportunity to present evidence to support his prayer for the injunctive writ and was therefore not denied due process.


The issue of the property being a family home and not a corporate property veers away from the clear contractual agreement of the REM.  Undeniably, the subject REM was a second mortgage as Marquez already mortgaged his property (TCT No. T-24506) to another bank.  Besides, it bears stressing that the Marquez spouses were solidarily liable with LEAD for the loans.  Thus, respondent DBP could have even gone after the other properties of the Marquez couple given such solidary liability for the outstanding loan with DBP.  DBP has reasonably and properly exercised its right to have the property covered by TCT No. T-24506 subjected to an extra-judicial foreclosure sale.

WHEREFORE, we DENY this petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the assailed CA Decision and Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 8-15.

^[2] Id. at 16-20.  The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and concurred in by Associate Justices Corona Ibay-Somera (Chairman) and Mariano M. Umali.

^[3] Id. at 21.

^[4] Records, pp. 39-41.

^[5] Id. at 40-41.

^[6] Id. at 41.

^[7] Id. at 40.

^[8] Id. at 42-44; see Minutes No. 32, Resolution No. 2451 (Head Office), dated August 17, 1977.  Four (4) prequalified boat-builders submitted their bids, with Trigon Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation (Cebu City) and Solomon Desamporado (Bacolod City) approved as winning bidders.

^[9] Id. at 44.

^[10] Id. at 45-49.

^[11] Id.

^[12] Id. at 50-55.

^[13] Id. at 54.

^[14] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.

^[15] Records, pp. 1-6; see October 2, 1992 Complaint.

^[16] Id. at 13-13A.

^[17] Id. at 29-38.

^[18] Id. at 56-60.

^[19] Id. at 61-67.

^[20] Id. at 75-77.

^[21] Id. at 78.

^[22] Id. at 81-82.

^[23] CA rollo, p. 99; see January 4, 1993 Letter of Provincial Sheriff to the RTC Executive Judge requesting for approval of Certificate of Sale of TCT No. T-24506.

^[24] Id. at 102; CA January 15, 1993 Resolution.

^[25] Id. at 1-16.

^[26] Id. at 114-128.

^[27] Supra note 2.

^[28] CA rollo, pp. 139-142.

^[29] Id. at 152.

^[30] Id. at 144-145; see November 26, 1998 Manifestation.

^[31] Id. at 149; CA January 20, 1999 Resolution.

^[32] First Realty and Development Corporation v. San Agustin, G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 341. See also Tayag v. Lacson, G.R. No. 134971, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 282; Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 110.

^[33] Hutchison Ports Philippines Ltd. v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000, 339 SCRA 434; and Biñan Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 142013 & 148430, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 90.

^[34] Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, G.R. No. 49529, March 31, 1989, 17 SCRA 501.

^[35] Bataclan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78148, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 764.

^[36] Olalia v. Hizon, G.R. No. 87913, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 665, 672-673.

^[37] Id., citing Golding v. Balatbal, 36 Phil. 941 (1917).

^[38] Detective and Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-23428, November 29, 1968, 28 SCRA 255.

^[39] P.D. 385, Sec. 1.

^[40] G.R. No. 68010, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 180.

^[41] Supra at 188-189.

^[42] See Republic v. Villarama, G.R. No. 117733, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 736.