THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 162342, October 11, 2006 ]JAIME H. BALLAO v. CA +
JAIME H. BALLAO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
JAIME H. BALLAO v. CA +
JAIME H. BALLAO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated August 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65955 and its Resolution dated February 6, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court affirmed the Decision dated February 2, 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Jaime H. Ballao was an employee of respondent China Banking Corporation (Chinabank). As a "runner" in the cash department of Chinabank's Binondo Branch, he was tasked, among others, to get cash from the vault upon request of the teller.
On August 27, 1997, the cashier's record reflected that the amount requisitioned did not tally with the records of the tellers. The discrepancy was P150,000, which from the record of the cashier was the same amount teller Anna Margaret Ngo requisitioned. The cash custodian Lauro Villapando allegedly gave the cash to Ballao to be delivered to Ngo. Ballao and Ngo denied receiving the amount.
After investigation, Chinabank found petitioner Ballao guilty of (1) serious misconduct; (2) fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by Chinabank; (3) stealing or attempting to steal from the bank or from others within the premises; and (4) falsifying bank records or documents and tampering bank equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the bank or committing a dishonest act. Chinabank terminated Ballao's services.
Seasonably, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Quezon City. The Labor Arbiter found Ballao's termination illegal, and ordered Chinabank to pay his backwages and to reinstate him.
On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to file it within the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the NLRC decision already became final and executory, considering that no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by Ballao. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner maintains that:
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the motion was filed out of time despite submission of proof, namely, the certification from the Frisco (Main) Post Office and the registry return card, that the same was filed on the tenth day of the reglementary period.[3] Further, petitioner argues that the lack of verification is merely a formal defect which may be corrected by requiring compliance by petitioner to submit an oath, considering that he has a meritorious case.[4]
Chinabank, for its part, maintains that the motion was fatally defective because of petitioner's failure to verify it, and it should be considered as an unsigned pleading. Private respondent also avers that there was no proof on record that the motion was filed on time and served on Chinabank. In sum, Chinabank insists that petitioner was not illegally terminated.[5]
The Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari found that the motion was not filed on time and it was not under oath, and there was no proof of service on the other party, nor to its counsel. It added that petitioner did not comply with the rules of the NLRC, and the motion should have been treated as a mere scrap of paper, as if no motion for reconsideration was filed, thus making the NLRC decision final and executory.[6]
Under Section 15,[7] Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision must be under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision.
In the present case, we note that petitioner received the NLRC decision on February 23, 2001, thus the tenth day for filing a motion for reconsideration was March 5, 2001.[8] In his manifestation[9] filed on March 9, 2001 with the NLRC, petitioner stated that he filed the motion through registered mail on March 5, 2001, and that the pleadings attached therein were just copies of the motion. A registry return receipt[10] was also submitted which shows that the motion was posted on March 5, 2001 and received by the NLRC on March 21, 2001. Furthermore, on record is another registry return receipt[11] showing that Chinabank, through counsel, received a copy of the motion on March 9, 2001. Chinabank filed an opposition to said motion, thus, it could not claim that it was not served a copy. These matters could not be ignored as these served as proofs that clearly, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on time.
Time and again, we have said the lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case, the court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.[12] It should be stressed that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts cannot be enslaved by technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat vis-à-vis substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court's power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.[13] This is more so in labor cases where social justice should be emphasized. In light of the circumstances of this case, we find that the lack of verification may be excused, so that the case could be decided on its merits.
Was petitioner illegally dismissed?
As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Again, this applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.[14] Our perusal of the records shows that petitioner's dismissal was unjustified.
The acts allegedly committed by petitioner were (1) making an unauthorized and fraudulent requisition of P150,000 from the vault and taking possession of the same without bank approval; (2) falsifying bank document to make it appear that teller Ngo supposedly requested the said amount; and (3) concealing the Teller's Cash Transaction Documents to suppress/delay the discovery of the fraud.[15]
In a memorandum[16] dated April 13, 1998, private respondent dismissed Ballao for the following reasons:
In this case, the requisition slip for the lost P150,000 forwarded to cash custodian Lauro Villapando was a duplicate copy and was stamped "posted" but without the teller's signature. It was nevertheless honored by Villapando who admitted releasing the money. He said he gave the money to Ballao as the slip bore Ballao's initials. The initials on the slip do not prove, however, that petitioner received the money when it was not even shown that it was customary for the cash custodian to indicate the runner's initials. The initials were not made by petitioner himself, and could not indicate that he himself signed for the amount. Further, Chinabank's claim that petitioner admitted having received the money from Villapando did not appear on the records. As found by the Labor Arbiter, the acts of stealing or attempting to steal from Chinabank and the falsification of documents were not sufficiently established by these cited facts alone.[18] On this point, we are in agreement with the Labor Arbiter.
Article 282[19] of the Labor Code, provides that serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust are valid causes for the employer to terminate an employee. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. But such serious misconduct must nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his termination.[20] However, as earlier discoursed, the serious misconduct of which petitioner is accused has not been sufficiently, definitively and convincingly shown.
Now, to validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the following requisites must be established: (a) the loss of confidence must not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; (c) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and (e) the employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but substantial evidence is vital and the burden rests on the employer to establish such evidence. Any other rule would place the employee absolutely at the mercy of the employer. Moreover, the term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees only.[21]
Nothing on record shows that Chinabank had established the petitioner's culpability for the loss of the cited amount. Neither did Chinabank's investigation reveal that petitioner committed the acts complained of. While he handles money to be delivered to the requesting teller, the decision to release the requested amount is made by the cash custodian. What is so obvious in this case is that the money was released without following bank procedures. The bank, with all its expertise and mastery of banking operations and procedure could not make its employee take the blame for any loss without convincing proof nor sufficient evidence of the latter's misconduct. In this case, we are convinced that private respondent Chinabank failed to discharge the burden of showing a just cause to dismiss the petitioner. To dismiss a lowly employee on mere suspicions and innuendos without substantial proof by management of his alleged misconduct could result in unfairness and injustice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65955 and its Resolution dated February 6, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-21. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando, and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.
[2] Id. at 11.
[3] Id. at 100; CA rollo, p. 148.
[4] Rollo, p. 14.
[5] Id. at 123-132.
[6] Id. at 20.
[7] SEC. 15. Motions for Reconsideration. Motion for reconsideration of any decision/resolution/order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision/resolution/order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party, and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
x x x x (As amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002.)
[8] Rollo, p. 19.
[9] CA rollo, p. 147.
[10] Id. at 148.
[11] Rollo, p. 106.
[12] Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240, 247.
[13] Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435.
[14] Tres Reyes v. Maxim's Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 288, 298.
[15] CA rollo, p. 203.
[16] Id. at 203-204.
[17] Rollo, pp. 125-126 and CA rollo, pp. 243-244.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 144-145.
[19] ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
x x x x
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representatives;
x x x x
[20] Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 767-768.
[21] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Uy, G.R. No. 156994, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 633, 647.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Jaime H. Ballao was an employee of respondent China Banking Corporation (Chinabank). As a "runner" in the cash department of Chinabank's Binondo Branch, he was tasked, among others, to get cash from the vault upon request of the teller.
On August 27, 1997, the cashier's record reflected that the amount requisitioned did not tally with the records of the tellers. The discrepancy was P150,000, which from the record of the cashier was the same amount teller Anna Margaret Ngo requisitioned. The cash custodian Lauro Villapando allegedly gave the cash to Ballao to be delivered to Ngo. Ballao and Ngo denied receiving the amount.
After investigation, Chinabank found petitioner Ballao guilty of (1) serious misconduct; (2) fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by Chinabank; (3) stealing or attempting to steal from the bank or from others within the premises; and (4) falsifying bank records or documents and tampering bank equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the bank or committing a dishonest act. Chinabank terminated Ballao's services.
Seasonably, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Quezon City. The Labor Arbiter found Ballao's termination illegal, and ordered Chinabank to pay his backwages and to reinstate him.
On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to file it within the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the NLRC decision already became final and executory, considering that no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by Ballao. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner maintains that:
x x x [THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED] IN HAPHAZARDLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE NLRC'S FEBRUARY 2, 2001 DECISION WAS FILED ON MARCH 9, 2001 DESPITE NLRC'S RECEIPT OF THE MOTION THAT WAS FILED THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL ON MARCH 5, 2001 AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE REGISTRY RETURN CARD AND THE CERTIFICATION FROM THE FRISCO (MAIN) POST OFFICE THAT THE MOTION WITH REGISTRY NUMBER 8388 WAS ADDRESSED TO THE NLRC, BANAWE STREET, QUEZON CITY AND WAS MAILED ON MARCH 5, 2001, THE TENTH DAY TO FILE SAID MOTION.Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether Ballao's motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was properly denied by the Court of Appeals.
x x x THE LACK OF A VERIFICATION OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A FORMAL, RATHER THAN A SUBSTANTIAL, DEFECT AND IS NOT FATAL.[2]
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the motion was filed out of time despite submission of proof, namely, the certification from the Frisco (Main) Post Office and the registry return card, that the same was filed on the tenth day of the reglementary period.[3] Further, petitioner argues that the lack of verification is merely a formal defect which may be corrected by requiring compliance by petitioner to submit an oath, considering that he has a meritorious case.[4]
Chinabank, for its part, maintains that the motion was fatally defective because of petitioner's failure to verify it, and it should be considered as an unsigned pleading. Private respondent also avers that there was no proof on record that the motion was filed on time and served on Chinabank. In sum, Chinabank insists that petitioner was not illegally terminated.[5]
The Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari found that the motion was not filed on time and it was not under oath, and there was no proof of service on the other party, nor to its counsel. It added that petitioner did not comply with the rules of the NLRC, and the motion should have been treated as a mere scrap of paper, as if no motion for reconsideration was filed, thus making the NLRC decision final and executory.[6]
Under Section 15,[7] Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision must be under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision.
In the present case, we note that petitioner received the NLRC decision on February 23, 2001, thus the tenth day for filing a motion for reconsideration was March 5, 2001.[8] In his manifestation[9] filed on March 9, 2001 with the NLRC, petitioner stated that he filed the motion through registered mail on March 5, 2001, and that the pleadings attached therein were just copies of the motion. A registry return receipt[10] was also submitted which shows that the motion was posted on March 5, 2001 and received by the NLRC on March 21, 2001. Furthermore, on record is another registry return receipt[11] showing that Chinabank, through counsel, received a copy of the motion on March 9, 2001. Chinabank filed an opposition to said motion, thus, it could not claim that it was not served a copy. These matters could not be ignored as these served as proofs that clearly, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on time.
Time and again, we have said the lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case, the court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.[12] It should be stressed that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts cannot be enslaved by technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat vis-à-vis substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court's power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.[13] This is more so in labor cases where social justice should be emphasized. In light of the circumstances of this case, we find that the lack of verification may be excused, so that the case could be decided on its merits.
Was petitioner illegally dismissed?
As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Again, this applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.[14] Our perusal of the records shows that petitioner's dismissal was unjustified.
The acts allegedly committed by petitioner were (1) making an unauthorized and fraudulent requisition of P150,000 from the vault and taking possession of the same without bank approval; (2) falsifying bank document to make it appear that teller Ngo supposedly requested the said amount; and (3) concealing the Teller's Cash Transaction Documents to suppress/delay the discovery of the fraud.[15]
In a memorandum[16] dated April 13, 1998, private respondent dismissed Ballao for the following reasons:
We note that the bank procedure for request of cash is that the runner forwards the original copies of the machine-validated requisition slip of the tellers to the cashier or cash custodian. The latter will thereafter release the requested denomination of cash and retains the original copy of the slip. The tellers keep the duplicate copies of the requisition slips. The runners do not sign anything evidencing receipt of the cash. During "off-line" hours, the slips must be stamped "posted" with the teller's signature.[17]
- Serious misconduct (par. [a], of Article 282 Title I, Book Six, Labor Code);
- Fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in [him] by the Bank (par. [c], Ibid.);
- Stealing or attempting to steal from the Bank or from others within the Bank premises (Table 6.1. Honesty, No. 1, CBC Code of Ethics); and
- Falsifying Bank records or documents and tampering with Bank equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the Bank or to commit a dishonest act. (No. 11, Ibid.)
In this case, the requisition slip for the lost P150,000 forwarded to cash custodian Lauro Villapando was a duplicate copy and was stamped "posted" but without the teller's signature. It was nevertheless honored by Villapando who admitted releasing the money. He said he gave the money to Ballao as the slip bore Ballao's initials. The initials on the slip do not prove, however, that petitioner received the money when it was not even shown that it was customary for the cash custodian to indicate the runner's initials. The initials were not made by petitioner himself, and could not indicate that he himself signed for the amount. Further, Chinabank's claim that petitioner admitted having received the money from Villapando did not appear on the records. As found by the Labor Arbiter, the acts of stealing or attempting to steal from Chinabank and the falsification of documents were not sufficiently established by these cited facts alone.[18] On this point, we are in agreement with the Labor Arbiter.
Article 282[19] of the Labor Code, provides that serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust are valid causes for the employer to terminate an employee. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant. But such serious misconduct must nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his termination.[20] However, as earlier discoursed, the serious misconduct of which petitioner is accused has not been sufficiently, definitively and convincingly shown.
Now, to validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the following requisites must be established: (a) the loss of confidence must not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; (c) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and (e) the employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but substantial evidence is vital and the burden rests on the employer to establish such evidence. Any other rule would place the employee absolutely at the mercy of the employer. Moreover, the term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees only.[21]
Nothing on record shows that Chinabank had established the petitioner's culpability for the loss of the cited amount. Neither did Chinabank's investigation reveal that petitioner committed the acts complained of. While he handles money to be delivered to the requesting teller, the decision to release the requested amount is made by the cash custodian. What is so obvious in this case is that the money was released without following bank procedures. The bank, with all its expertise and mastery of banking operations and procedure could not make its employee take the blame for any loss without convincing proof nor sufficient evidence of the latter's misconduct. In this case, we are convinced that private respondent Chinabank failed to discharge the burden of showing a just cause to dismiss the petitioner. To dismiss a lowly employee on mere suspicions and innuendos without substantial proof by management of his alleged misconduct could result in unfairness and injustice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65955 and its Resolution dated February 6, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-21. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando, and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.
[2] Id. at 11.
[3] Id. at 100; CA rollo, p. 148.
[4] Rollo, p. 14.
[5] Id. at 123-132.
[6] Id. at 20.
[7] SEC. 15. Motions for Reconsideration. Motion for reconsideration of any decision/resolution/order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision/resolution/order, with proof of service that a copy of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party, and provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.
x x x x (As amended by Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002.)
[8] Rollo, p. 19.
[9] CA rollo, p. 147.
[10] Id. at 148.
[11] Rollo, p. 106.
[12] Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001, 358 SCRA 240, 247.
[13] Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435.
[14] Tres Reyes v. Maxim's Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 288, 298.
[15] CA rollo, p. 203.
[16] Id. at 203-204.
[17] Rollo, pp. 125-126 and CA rollo, pp. 243-244.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 144-145.
[19] ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
x x x x
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representatives;
x x x x
[20] Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 767-768.
[21] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Uy, G.R. No. 156994, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 633, 647.