In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.

In 1960, Restar's eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit^[1] he executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 6696^[2] in Restar's name covering a 5,918^[3] square meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name.

Flores died on June 10, 1989.

On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 11134^[4] in his name.

On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores' sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores' surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint^[5] against Flores' heirs for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.

Flores' brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being unwilling co-plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores, they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991; after Flores' death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, to which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.

By Answer^[6] filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores' death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children's education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already finished their respective courses.^[7]

The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the "new Tax Declaration in 1945," Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar;^[8] and an extra-judicial partition was subsequently executed on September 28, 1973 by Restar's heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. ^[9]

The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,^[10] alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.

As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer^[11] acknowledged Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was sold to him as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981.^[12]  He thus prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot among Restar's heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores.^[13]

After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores' share in Restar's estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183.  Nevertheless, the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by  prescription.^[14]

Respecting  the defendant Policarpio's claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores' signature in the purported Deed of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his name in a "straight" manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was "crooked," and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores' wife's signature which read "Esmeña" in the deed, and not as "Esmenia."^[15]

The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999.^[16]

On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, by Decision of October 29, 2002.^[17] reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance to them by Restar.

The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs' claim of ownership.^[18]

And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his children's education.^[19]

Respecting the defendant Policarpio's claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial court's rejection thereof.

Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant Policarpio Restar.  The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30, 1999 is MODIFIED.  The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
   
   
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.^[20]
   

The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 494.  No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

x x x

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription^[21] where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.^[22]

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.  Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years.  Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

Thus, the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.

While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.^[23]

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners' claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession.  Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.

In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.

The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot.  And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim.^[24]

Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.

The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Court's approval.

The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name.  It was admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar.  So that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10).  This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x

Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit "20").  If they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so.  They filed the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death.

From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to run from this date.  Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.  Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs. ^[25]

While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight^[26] and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.^[27]

As for respondents' claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.

[P]laintiffs' claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained.  A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping.  One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for cultivation and production.  If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan.^[28]

Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial court's findings of facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect, they must remain.  Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial court's findings of facts.

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs:  the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.  And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The appellate court's crediting of respondents' justification for failing to immediately take legal action to protect their  rights forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their children's education does not impress.  For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their college education in 1977?

The trial court's finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription.  It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

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^[1] Records at 8.

^[2] Id. at 7.

^[3] As eventually determined by court appointed Commissioner Crispulo M. Vega, Id. at 100-102.

^[4] Id. at 9.

^[5] Id. at 1-6.

^[6] Id. at 31-36.

^[7] Id at 32-33.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Exhibits Folder Exhibit 20.

^[10] Records at 19-21.

^[11] Id. at 128-130.

^[12] Exhibit "1" - Policarpio Restar , vide Records at 131-132 (the List of Exhibits prepared by the RTC Clerk of Court identifies the deed as such Exhibit "1" but the deed on pages 131-132 bears no such marking.

^[13] Id. at 129.

^[14] RTC Decision, Records at 161-171.

^[15] Records at 170.  The records disclose, however, that Esmenia Restar signed as "Esmenia" in the deed of sale whereas she always signed as "Esmeña."

^[16] Records at 161-171.

^[17] CA Rollo at 158-165.

^[18] Id at 163.

^[19] Ibid.

^[20]  Rollo at 17.

^[21] Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil 857, 868 (1920).

^[22] Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601, 608 (1997).

^[23] Ferrer v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 302, 305 (1993).

^[24] De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 307, 321 (1993).

^[25] Records at 168-169.

^[26] Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601, 606 (1997).

^[27] Cequeña v. Bolante, 330 SCRA 216, 226-227 (2000).

^[28] Records at 170.