Before the Court is private respondents' motion for reconsideration^[1] seeking a referral to the Court en banc and reversal of the Decision^[2] of the Second Division of this Court, dated September 30, 2004.

For a proper perspective of the issues on hand, it is necessary that the Court reiterates the factual backdrop of the case.

A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed by private respondents against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 34, Quezon City.  After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment, finding that: petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with private respondents' late mother, Natividad Crisostomo, whereby the latter leased to the former the subject property from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1997 at P60,000.00 per month; in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 5, 1995, petitioner and Natividad extended the term of lease until December 31, 2007, whereby the petitioner has the obligation to pay lease rentals and at the same time, he is given the option to purchase a portion of the disputed property; petitioner has not been paying rentals since September 1996.  As a result, the MeTC ordered petitioner to vacate the disputed premises.  Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 227, Quezon City (Branch 227 for brevity).

In the interim, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City (Branch 215 for brevity) a complaint for specific performance with damages. He prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor ordering private respondents to abide with the MOA executed on December 5, 1995 between him and the late Natividad with respect to all the terms and conditions of the contract to sell a 403.41-square meter portion of the subject property, the payment of P60,000.00 a month as lease and P80,000.00 as amortization payment for the sale.

Later, Branch 227 set aside the MeTC decision and dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case since it is not for ejectment but for specific performance of contract, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court in its original and exclusive jurisdiction.  When their motion for reconsideration was denied, private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55949.

Private respondents, in Branch 215, moved for outright dismissal of the complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping in view of the pendency of the appeal on the ejectment case with the CA.  Branch 215 dismissed the complaint for specific performance.

When his motion for reconsideration was denied by Branch 215, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 with the CA.  The CA in its Resolution, dated August 18, 2003, dismissed the petition for certiorari, ruling that petitioner committed forum-shopping in view of the pendency of the appeal on the ejectment case.  Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration but the CA, in its Resolution dated September 25, 2003, denied the motion on the ground that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court but the CA, in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003, also denied it on the ground that the motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Thus, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

On September 30, 2004, the Court, through the Second Division, promulgated herein assailed decision setting aside the Resolution, dated November 17, 2003, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 which denied petitioner's manifestation and motion to admit his motion for reconsideration; and reversing and setting aside the Resolution dated August 18, 2003 of the CA which affirmed the Resolution dated April 20, 2001 of Branch 215, dismissing the complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping.  The Court remanded the case to Branch 215 with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with the case with all deliberate dispatch.

Private respondents assail the decision of the Court arguing that while the Court had categorically declared that the CA's resolutions had attained finality; yet, despite their finality, the Court proceeded to set aside the same in violation of its own rules and the law of the land.  They claim that the Court erroneously decided to relax procedural rules and the relaxation of the rules run afoul of the doctrine of immutability of judgments.  Moreover, they posit that the Court failed to realize that its power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can only be exercised if it is within its jurisdiction to act.  They submit that the decision in this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this Court, which can only be done by the Court en banc.

On January 24, 2005, the Court required the parties to submit a report on the present status of CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 (Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth C. Pasion, Ma. Elsa C. Garcia, Imelda C. Trillo, Ricardo P. Crisostomo, and Ma. Elena C. Dinglasan vs. Jimmy L. Barnes) and to discuss their respective positions on the significance of said case on the issues raised before the Court.^[3]

In his Compliance, petitioner manifests that he is awaiting the order of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 requiring him to comment on private respondents' petition for review therein after this Court in G.R. No. 144533 (Jimmy L. Barnes a.k.a. James L. Barnes, Petitioner, versus Teresita Reyes, et al., Respondents) denied petitioner's petition for review of the Resolution of the CA dated May 25, 2000 giving due course to the private respondents' petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55949.^[4] As to the significance of the said case on the issue of forum-shopping, petitioner submits that there is none since said case involves the ejectment case anchored on non-payment of rentals based on a pure lease agreement only; that the ejectment suit calls for de facto possession, while the specific performance case involves issues of ownership and enforcement of a right or a de jure possession.

In their Compliance Memorandum, private respondents manifest that they are awaiting the comment of the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949.  As to the significance of the said case on the issue of forum-shopping presently before the Court, private respondents submit that the principal issue before CA-G.R. SP No. 55949 is whether or not the MOA is valid.  They contend that until said issue is resolved, the action for specific performance on the provisions of the MOA is premature.  They emphasize that the action for specific performance is a mere off-shoot of the decision rendered by Branch 227.

We are not persuaded by the arguments of private respondents.

Private respondents harp on the fact that the Court applied procedural rules liberally in favor of the petitioner which they consider an injustice.  They, however, must realize that the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal construction, with the view of promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.^[5] The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.  However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.  Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.^[6] In numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals, when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.^[7] As the Court has expounded in Aguam vs. Court of Appeals:^[8]

…The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal.  It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.  The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case."  Technicalities, however, must be avoided.  The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.  The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice.  "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."  "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.  Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality.  Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.  Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice.  It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.^[9] (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed decision, indeed, the Court upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson.^[10] However, we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice in accordance with Ginete vs. Court of Appeals^[11] and Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals.^[12]

In the Ginete case, the Court held:

The Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to appellant's failure to perfect an appeal.  Hence, with more reason would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case.  This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance such as the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases.

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.  Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.  Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.  The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.  Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.^[13] (Emphasis supplied)

In the Sanchez case, the Court restated the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure, enumerating the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.^[14] Elements or circumstances (a), (d), (e) and (f) exist in the present case.

A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner.  Petitioner's counsel was understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the IRCA.  The lawyer's negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.^[15]

More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219, as both are patently erroneous.  Both dismissed petitioner's complaint for specific performance on the ground of forum-shopping.  It is elementary that petitioner is not guilty of forum-shopping because there is no identity of issues and causes of action between the ejectment case which was appealed by petitioner from the MeTC to Branch 227, and the specific performance suit filed by petitioner in Branch 215.  Without pre-empting the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, it cannot be ignored that the primary issue before Branch 227, now pending review in CA-G.R. SP No. 55949, is not actually the validity of the MOA, as advanced by private respondents, but whether, based on private respondents' allegations in their complaint, the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case and whether private respondents have a cause of action for ejectment.  It is well to state, by way of reminder, that while petitioner may have brought up the MOA in the ejectment suit, by way of defense, any ruling therein is merely provisional, only for purposes of resolving the issue of physical possession and is not res judicata or conclusive on the issue of the enforceability of the MOA, as such determination is not clothed with finality.^[16] This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.^[17] The Court has long recognized that suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions; an ejectment case for non-payment of rentals is not prejudicial to an action to enforce the right of preemption or prior purchase of the leased premises.^[18] Moreover, the consistent case law is that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.^[19]

Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the rules.  What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum-shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each party's respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject property.  Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.^[20] Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.^[21]

In essence, the Court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations which we have set in Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals^[22] has been adequately met by petitioner to justify a suspension of procedural rules.

Thus, when the Second Division referred the issue on the suspension of the rule that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration per the Habaluyas case, the Court en banc in its Resolution dated June 14, 2005 referred back the case to the Second Division and allowed it pro hac vice to relax the case law on the matter in view of the merits of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration and referral to the Court en banc is DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Rollo, p. 1034.

^[2] Id., p. 1016.

^[3] Rollo, p. 1059.

^[4] Id., p. 1132.

^[5] Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

^[6] Reyes vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131686, March 18, 2002, 379 SCRA 368, 373; Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121251, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 271, 278; Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28, 1995, 250 SCRA 371, 373.

^[7] Jose vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128646, March 14, 2003, 399 SCRA 83, 87; Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563, 567.

^[8] G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 784.

^[9] Id. at pp. 789-790.

^[10] G.R. No. L-70895, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 208.

^[11] G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1988, 292 SCRA 38.

^[12] G.R. No. 152766, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 540.

^[13] Id., at pp. 49, 51, 52.

^[14] Note 11, p. 546.

^[15] Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 53.

^[16] Montañez vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 144116, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 541, 548; Bongato vs. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA 327, 333; Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136080, January 16, 2002, 373 SCRA 513, 522; Pengson vs. Ocampo, Jr., G.R. No. 131968, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 420, 425.

^[17] Palattao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131726, May 7, 2002, 381 SCRA 681, 689; Amagan vs. Marayag, G.R. No. 138377, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 581, 589.

^[18] Palattao vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 688; Dizon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122544, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 288, 300; Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108, 115.

^[19] Barba vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126638, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 211, 220; Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121865, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 420, 426.

^[20] Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 545.

^[21] Vidal vs. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 617, 627.

^[22] Supra.