SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 149580, March 16, 2005 ]ROSARIO DALTON-REYES v. CA +
ROSARIO DALTON-REYES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, MA. ELENA MIRIAM A. CANDELARIA, MERJELINA L. ALGODON AND ERLINDA S. ROJAS, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ROSARIO DALTON-REYES v. CA +
ROSARIO DALTON-REYES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, MA. ELENA MIRIAM A. CANDELARIA, MERJELINA L. ALGODON AND ERLINDA S. ROJAS, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Omnibus Motion to File Notice of Appeal and for Extension to File Petition for Review filed by petitioner Rosario Dalton-Reyes, and the
Resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner Rosario Dalton-Reyes was a Stenographic Reporter III of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication and Monitoring Office (PAMO), Office of the Ombudsman, while private respondents Ma. Elena Miriam A. Candelaria, Merjelina L. Algodon, and Erlinda Rojas are Associate Graft Investigation Officers of the PAMO Screening Committee.
The Antecedents
On August 5, 1999, the petitioner filed a grievance complaint[2] with the Office of the Ombudsman against the private respondents, alleging that the latter committed "harassment/oppression and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties." On September 2, 1999, the private respondents separately filed their respective Comment/Answer with Counter-Charge to the petitioner's complaint. They denied the petitioner's charges and alleged that it was the latter who was arrogant, discourteous, troublesome, disobedient and dishonest. The private respondents also countered that the petitioner had bad working habits, was a habitual absentee, catered to the needs of her daughters even while in the office, and was one who isolated herself from the others because she thinks she is a prima donna. The private respondents further alleged that during her detail to the Screening Committee, the petitioner would perform her duties only at her convenience. They also alleged that the petitioner even falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR), particularly the entry on June 10, 1999, by "punching in and out" even without actually reporting for work on the said day.[3]
After the Conciliatory Conference between the parties, the Grievance Committee submitted its Memorandum Report recommending that the grievance proceedings be terminated and closed, and that the counter-charges made by the private respondents in their respective answers be referred to the PAMO for appropriate action.[4] On January 14, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation, and referred the complaint to the PAMO in a Memorandum dated February 7, 2000.[5]
The Ombudsman rendered a Decision on February 19, 2001 dismissing the petitioner from the service. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Furthermore, the Ombudsman found the testimonies of the witnesses sufficient to establish that the petitioner's work attitude amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He found that the petitioner failed to live up to the mandate that public officers and employees must perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.[8]
On March 12, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[9] of the decision, and a supplement[10] thereto on March 14, 2001. In the said motion, the petitioner argued that the hearing officer failed to consider the following: (1) that there was no wrongful intent on her part to injure the government; (2) that the decision was based on the conclusions of the witnesses and not on the facts proven; (3) that the alleged acts of discourtesy, disrespect or resentment and the time when they occurred were not established; (4) that the charges have already prescribed; (5) that there was no evidence of actual prejudice to the government; (6) that the penalty imposed was too harsh and oppressive; and (7) that the decision did not consider any of the following mitigating circumstances: (a) she did not intend to commit so grave a wrong; (b) she has not been previously charged or penalized with any administrative sanctions; (c) her performance evaluation was satisfactory; and (d) that she has served the government for fourteen (14) years.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[11] dated March 22, 2001. According to the Ombudsman, the element of wrongful intent to injure a third person is not controlling in this case because the administrative offense of dishonesty goes to the very core of the fitness of a public officer or employee to remain in office. Moreover, the petitioner's claim of leaving the office in order to enroll at the PLM for a master's degree does not erase nor mitigate her liability.
The Ombudsman maintained that the penalty imposed on the petitioner was neither harsh nor oppressive, considering that the inherent administrative disabilities of perpetual disqualification for re-employment and forfeiture of benefits, provided under Section 58(a)[12] of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, were not imposed. Any mitigating circumstance that may have existed in favor of the petitioner was offset by the presence of an aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to Section 55[13] of the same rules, since the petitioner was found guilty of two charges, the penalty imposed was that corresponding to the most serious charge, while the other charge was considered an aggravating circumstance. In fine, the Ombudsman reiterated that the evidence effectively established the petitioner's administrative guilt.[14]
The petitioner received a copy of the order on May 24, 2001.[15] On June 11, 2001, she filed an Omnibus Motion to File Notice of Appeal and For Extension to File Petition for Review with the CA.
On June 22, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution[16] denying the said motion, thus:
Hence, this petition for review.
The petitioner stresses that she has never been subjected to any disciplinary action in the past and has received satisfactory ratings with respect to the performance of her duties. She posits that her act of going to the PLM to enroll for a master's degree did not prejudice the government but will, in fact, benefit the latter. Finally, she maintains that the penalty meted upon her is disproportionate to her alleged infractions and clearly has no basis.[20]
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its part, maintains that the CA correctly denied the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and dismissed the case outright, considering that the petitioner failed to file the same within the reglementary period, and even failed to attach proof of service thereof.[21] It avers that the petitioner did not allege anything that would warrant the reversal of the resolution of the CA.[22]
In her reply, the petitioner denies having admitted that she falsified her DTR for June 1999. She justifies the payment of her salary for June 10, 1999 by stating that she still had leave credits then, and, as such, would still be paid her salary for that day even if she had been absent. The petitioner asserts that when she filed the appeal with the CA, she did so on her own because she could not find a competent lawyer to assist her at the time. She claims that she did not know anything about the Rules of Procedure, which was why the 15-day period had already lapsed when she filed the motion for extension of time to file her petition.[23]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that a litigant who appears by himself and conducts his own litigation will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applicable to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be unjustifiably rewarded.[24] Hence, the petitioner cannot just be excused from complying with the rules for filing an appeal simply because she was not assisted by a lawyer at the time she did so.
It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.[25] The Rules of Civil Procedure provide, among others, that the appeal should be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that, upon motion and payment of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an extension to file the petition for review.[26] Moreover, there must be a proof of service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party and the court a quo,[27] and a written explanation why service was not done personally, in case the service is made through registered mail or other modes of services.[28] Undisputedly, the petitioner failed to meet these requirements.
In this case, the petitioner received the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration on May 24, 2001; hence, she had until June 8, 2001 to file the petition for review with the CA. However, the petitioner filed a motion for extension of time on June 11, 2001, three days after the expiration of the reglementary period.
As a rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period provided by law must be strictly followed. Nonetheless, the Court, in some instances, has been liberal and has excused a litigant's procedural defects and lapses in the interest of substantial justice.[29] Some of the reasons considered by the Court in justifying a liberal application of the rules of procedure are the following:
Although the granting of a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review is within the discretion of the CA, we rule that the CA incorrectly denied the same solely on the basis of the petitioner's procedural lapses, especially considering the special and exceptional circumstances surrounding the case.
The records of the case buttress the petitioner's contention that the delay in filing the motion was not intended to delay the administration of justice. We note that the last day for filing the petition for review, June 8, 2001, fell on a Friday. On the other hand, the petitioner filed her motion for extension of time to file the petition for review on June 11, 2001, Monday, which was the next working day. Therefore, the delay in filing the motion for extension was actually for one (1) day only. Considering the petitioner's assertion that she was not assisted by a lawyer at that time and did not know about the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review, the one-day delay may be considered as an excusable negligence on her part. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to the petitioner, a one-day delay does not justify the appeal's denial.[32] Moreover, under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law;[33] more so in the case of one who pursues her case even without the assistance of counsel. Social justice would be a meaningless term if an element of rigidity would be affixed to the procedural precepts.[34]
Further, the petitioner was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, an extreme penalty that will have injurious effects on her career and even her personal life. The petitioner claims that the penalty is too harsh and not commensurate to the infractions she allegedly committed. We are inclined to allow a review of such decision in order to prevent any doubts as to the propriety of the penalty, and to insure that no injustice would be done to the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 2001 and August 17, 2001 are SET ASIDE. The petitioner is given a period of fifteen (15) days from the finality of the decision of the Court within which to file her petition for review in the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 116.
[3] Id. at 120-121.
[4] Id. at 123.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 142-143.
[7] Id. at 133-135.
[8] Id. at 141.
[9] Id. at 164-173
[10] Id. at 174-176.
[11] Id. at 177-183.
[12] Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
[13] Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
[14] Rollo, p. 183.
[15] CA Rollo, p. 3.
[16] Rollo, p. 155.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Id. at 145.
[19] Id. at 7.
[20] Id. at 109-110.
[21] Id. at 238.
[22] Id. at 240.
[23] Id. at 250.
[24] Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 6th ed., 1997, p. 40.
[25] Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, 391 SCRA 192 (2002).
[26] Section 4, Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[27] Section 5, Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[28] Section 11, Rule 13, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[29] Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Celebrity Travel and Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 155524, August 12, 2004.
[30] Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence Bureau, 394 SCRA 21 (2002), citing Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 38 (1998)
[31] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 501 (2001).
[32] Samala v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 535 (2001).
[33] Uy v. Commission on Audit, 328 SCRA 607 (2000).
[34] Ibid.
Petitioner Rosario Dalton-Reyes was a Stenographic Reporter III of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication and Monitoring Office (PAMO), Office of the Ombudsman, while private respondents Ma. Elena Miriam A. Candelaria, Merjelina L. Algodon, and Erlinda Rojas are Associate Graft Investigation Officers of the PAMO Screening Committee.
On August 5, 1999, the petitioner filed a grievance complaint[2] with the Office of the Ombudsman against the private respondents, alleging that the latter committed "harassment/oppression and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties." On September 2, 1999, the private respondents separately filed their respective Comment/Answer with Counter-Charge to the petitioner's complaint. They denied the petitioner's charges and alleged that it was the latter who was arrogant, discourteous, troublesome, disobedient and dishonest. The private respondents also countered that the petitioner had bad working habits, was a habitual absentee, catered to the needs of her daughters even while in the office, and was one who isolated herself from the others because she thinks she is a prima donna. The private respondents further alleged that during her detail to the Screening Committee, the petitioner would perform her duties only at her convenience. They also alleged that the petitioner even falsified her Daily Time Record (DTR), particularly the entry on June 10, 1999, by "punching in and out" even without actually reporting for work on the said day.[3]
After the Conciliatory Conference between the parties, the Grievance Committee submitted its Memorandum Report recommending that the grievance proceedings be terminated and closed, and that the counter-charges made by the private respondents in their respective answers be referred to the PAMO for appropriate action.[4] On January 14, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation, and referred the complaint to the PAMO in a Memorandum dated February 7, 2000.[5]
The Ombudsman rendered a Decision on February 19, 2001 dismissing the petitioner from the service. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondent ROSARIO D. REYES, Guilty of DISHONESTY and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, for which the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, with TEMPORARY DISQUALIFICATION FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION, FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION is hereby imposed pursuant to Sections 52 and 58(a), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. However, no cancellation of Civil Service Eligibility, nor Forfeiture of Leave and Retirement Credits shall be imposed on the respondent.The Ombudsman ruled that as clearly established and substantiated by evidence, the petitioner was guilty of dishonesty for tampering her June 10, 1999 DTR, and for collecting the corresponding salary for that day. Moreover, the petitioner deliberately made it appear that she reported for work on June 10, 1999 when, in fact, she left the office after punching in her DTR without permission from her immediate superior, in order to enroll at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). The Ombudsman noted that dishonesty and falsification of official document are classified as grave offenses under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, punishable by dismissal from service even for the first offense.[7]
SO ORDERED.[6]
Furthermore, the Ombudsman found the testimonies of the witnesses sufficient to establish that the petitioner's work attitude amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He found that the petitioner failed to live up to the mandate that public officers and employees must perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill.[8]
On March 12, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[9] of the decision, and a supplement[10] thereto on March 14, 2001. In the said motion, the petitioner argued that the hearing officer failed to consider the following: (1) that there was no wrongful intent on her part to injure the government; (2) that the decision was based on the conclusions of the witnesses and not on the facts proven; (3) that the alleged acts of discourtesy, disrespect or resentment and the time when they occurred were not established; (4) that the charges have already prescribed; (5) that there was no evidence of actual prejudice to the government; (6) that the penalty imposed was too harsh and oppressive; and (7) that the decision did not consider any of the following mitigating circumstances: (a) she did not intend to commit so grave a wrong; (b) she has not been previously charged or penalized with any administrative sanctions; (c) her performance evaluation was satisfactory; and (d) that she has served the government for fourteen (14) years.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[11] dated March 22, 2001. According to the Ombudsman, the element of wrongful intent to injure a third person is not controlling in this case because the administrative offense of dishonesty goes to the very core of the fitness of a public officer or employee to remain in office. Moreover, the petitioner's claim of leaving the office in order to enroll at the PLM for a master's degree does not erase nor mitigate her liability.
The Ombudsman maintained that the penalty imposed on the petitioner was neither harsh nor oppressive, considering that the inherent administrative disabilities of perpetual disqualification for re-employment and forfeiture of benefits, provided under Section 58(a)[12] of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, were not imposed. Any mitigating circumstance that may have existed in favor of the petitioner was offset by the presence of an aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to Section 55[13] of the same rules, since the petitioner was found guilty of two charges, the penalty imposed was that corresponding to the most serious charge, while the other charge was considered an aggravating circumstance. In fine, the Ombudsman reiterated that the evidence effectively established the petitioner's administrative guilt.[14]
The petitioner received a copy of the order on May 24, 2001.[15] On June 11, 2001, she filed an Omnibus Motion to File Notice of Appeal and For Extension to File Petition for Review with the CA.
On June 22, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution[16] denying the said motion, thus:
Considering that the motion itself shows that the assailed Order of the Ombudsman was received by petitioner on May 24, 2001, hence when the motion for extension of time was filed on June 11, 2001, the filing thereof was already beyond the 15-day reglementary period to file petition for review as prescribed by Rule 43, [S]ec. 4, Rules of Civil Procedure and additionally, that said motion does not contain an affidavit of service as required under Sec. 11, Rule 13 or any written explanation, the motion is DENIED, and this case is accordingly DISMISSED.The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution which the CA, likewise, denied in a Resolution[18] dated August 17, 2001.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, this petition for review.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE OMNIBUS MOTION TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL AND EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON A MERE TECHNICALITY AND THEREBY SEVERELY AFFECTING AND DEFEATING THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF YOUR PETITIONER-APPELLANT.[19]The petitioner argues that the delay in the filing of the appeal does not justify its dismissal, considering that she did not intend to delay the administration of justice and such delay did not prejudice the other party. She maintains that the failure to attach an affidavit of service was not sufficient ground to dismiss the appeal since she was able to furnish the respondents a copy of the motion through the Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether the appellate court erred in denying the motion for extension of time to file the petition for review filed by the petitioner despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing the petition for review has already lapsed.
The petitioner stresses that she has never been subjected to any disciplinary action in the past and has received satisfactory ratings with respect to the performance of her duties. She posits that her act of going to the PLM to enroll for a master's degree did not prejudice the government but will, in fact, benefit the latter. Finally, she maintains that the penalty meted upon her is disproportionate to her alleged infractions and clearly has no basis.[20]
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its part, maintains that the CA correctly denied the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review and dismissed the case outright, considering that the petitioner failed to file the same within the reglementary period, and even failed to attach proof of service thereof.[21] It avers that the petitioner did not allege anything that would warrant the reversal of the resolution of the CA.[22]
In her reply, the petitioner denies having admitted that she falsified her DTR for June 1999. She justifies the payment of her salary for June 10, 1999 by stating that she still had leave credits then, and, as such, would still be paid her salary for that day even if she had been absent. The petitioner asserts that when she filed the appeal with the CA, she did so on her own because she could not find a competent lawyer to assist her at the time. She claims that she did not know anything about the Rules of Procedure, which was why the 15-day period had already lapsed when she filed the motion for extension of time to file her petition.[23]
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that a litigant who appears by himself and conducts his own litigation will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applicable to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be unjustifiably rewarded.[24] Hence, the petitioner cannot just be excused from complying with the rules for filing an appeal simply because she was not assisted by a lawyer at the time she did so.
It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.[25] The Rules of Civil Procedure provide, among others, that the appeal should be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of judgment or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that, upon motion and payment of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an extension to file the petition for review.[26] Moreover, there must be a proof of service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party and the court a quo,[27] and a written explanation why service was not done personally, in case the service is made through registered mail or other modes of services.[28] Undisputedly, the petitioner failed to meet these requirements.
In this case, the petitioner received the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration on May 24, 2001; hence, she had until June 8, 2001 to file the petition for review with the CA. However, the petitioner filed a motion for extension of time on June 11, 2001, three days after the expiration of the reglementary period.
As a rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period provided by law must be strictly followed. Nonetheless, the Court, in some instances, has been liberal and has excused a litigant's procedural defects and lapses in the interest of substantial justice.[29] Some of the reasons considered by the Court in justifying a liberal application of the rules of procedure are the following:
… (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsel's negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[30]Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[31]
Although the granting of a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review is within the discretion of the CA, we rule that the CA incorrectly denied the same solely on the basis of the petitioner's procedural lapses, especially considering the special and exceptional circumstances surrounding the case.
The records of the case buttress the petitioner's contention that the delay in filing the motion was not intended to delay the administration of justice. We note that the last day for filing the petition for review, June 8, 2001, fell on a Friday. On the other hand, the petitioner filed her motion for extension of time to file the petition for review on June 11, 2001, Monday, which was the next working day. Therefore, the delay in filing the motion for extension was actually for one (1) day only. Considering the petitioner's assertion that she was not assisted by a lawyer at that time and did not know about the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review, the one-day delay may be considered as an excusable negligence on her part. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to the petitioner, a one-day delay does not justify the appeal's denial.[32] Moreover, under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law;[33] more so in the case of one who pursues her case even without the assistance of counsel. Social justice would be a meaningless term if an element of rigidity would be affixed to the procedural precepts.[34]
Further, the petitioner was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service, an extreme penalty that will have injurious effects on her career and even her personal life. The petitioner claims that the penalty is too harsh and not commensurate to the infractions she allegedly committed. We are inclined to allow a review of such decision in order to prevent any doubts as to the propriety of the penalty, and to insure that no injustice would be done to the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 2001 and August 17, 2001 are SET ASIDE. The petitioner is given a period of fifteen (15) days from the finality of the decision of the Court within which to file her petition for review in the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
[2] Rollo, p. 116.
[3] Id. at 120-121.
[4] Id. at 123.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 142-143.
[7] Id. at 133-135.
[8] Id. at 141.
[9] Id. at 164-173
[10] Id. at 174-176.
[11] Id. at 177-183.
[12] Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.
[13] Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
[14] Rollo, p. 183.
[15] CA Rollo, p. 3.
[16] Rollo, p. 155.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Id. at 145.
[19] Id. at 7.
[20] Id. at 109-110.
[21] Id. at 238.
[22] Id. at 240.
[23] Id. at 250.
[24] Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 6th ed., 1997, p. 40.
[25] Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, 391 SCRA 192 (2002).
[26] Section 4, Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[27] Section 5, Rule 43, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[28] Section 11, Rule 13, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[29] Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Celebrity Travel and Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 155524, August 12, 2004.
[30] Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence Bureau, 394 SCRA 21 (2002), citing Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 38 (1998)
[31] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 501 (2001).
[32] Samala v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 535 (2001).
[33] Uy v. Commission on Audit, 328 SCRA 607 (2000).
[34] Ibid.