THIRD DIVISION
[ A.M. NO. MTJ-05-1611 [FORMERLY A.M. OCA I.P.I. NO. 04-1574-MTJ], September 30, 2005 ]ANTONIO L. DEL MUNDO v. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES +
ANTONIO L. DEL MUNDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC), BRANCH 60, MANDALUYONG CITY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
ANTONIO L. DEL MUNDO v. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES +
ANTONIO L. DEL MUNDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (METC), BRANCH 60, MANDALUYONG CITY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The filing of the present administrative case spawned from a simple ejectment case filed on January 28, 2003 by Antonio L. Del Mundo et al. (the plaintiffs) against Victoriano G. Sanchez (the defendant), docketed as Civil Case No. 18756 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City and raffled to Branch 60 thereof, presided by Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, herein respondent.[1]
The defendant in the ejectment case filed a Motion to Dismiss which was opposed by the plaintiffs. After hearing, respondent granted the defendant five days from March 21, 2003 to file his reply to the opposition. Defendant failed to file a reply, however, drawing the plaintiffs to file on June 3, 2003 a Motion to Resolve the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.[2]
On June 9, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a Motion [for the defendant] to Deposit Rentals.[3] And on October 1, 2003 the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Resolve Motions to Dismiss and to Deposit Rentals.[4] Still on January 15, 2004 , the plaintiffs filed an Urgent Second Motion to Resolve Motions to Dismiss and to Deposit Rentals.[5]
The pending motions having remained unresolved, one of the plaintiffs, Antonio L. del Mundo (complainant), filed the present administrative complaint, by letter dated May 3, 2004 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).[6]
The OCA forthwith required respondent, by 1st Indorsement of May 21, 2004,[7] to file her Comment within ten (10) days on the letter-complaint charging her with Inefficiency or Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent failed to file any comment, drawing the OCA to send her 1st Tracer dated September 8, 2004[8] reiterating its directive requiring her to file Comment within five (5) days. Just the same, no comment was filed by respondent.
By Report and Recommendation dated April 12, 2005,[9] the OCA, noting from the allegations in the letter-complaint and its annexes filed by complainant that respondent failed to act upon the pending incidents within the 90-day reglementary period, recommended that respondent be required by this Court to file her Comment to the complaint, and to explain why no administrative sanction(s) be meted against her for ignoring the OCA's prior directives requiring her to file Comment.
The recommendation for respondent to file Comment was adopted by this Court by Resolution[10] dated July 4, 2005 which gave her five (5) days for the purpose.
By letter of August 1, 2005[11] which was received at the OCA on August 2, 2005, respondent finally broke her silence, she informing that she received this Court's Resolution of July 4, 2005 on July 27, 2005 and proffering as follows, quoted verbatim:
This Court finds respondent guilty of gross inefficiency.
As a trial judge, respondent ought to know that by clear mandate of the Constitution,[14] she must promptly dispose of cases or matters within 90 days.
Any unreasonable delay in resolving motions or pending incidents is also a violation of the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
After conducting a hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, respondent granted defendant a period of until March 26, 2003 to file a reply to the plaintiff's opposition. While a reply is a prohibited pleading under Section 13 of Rule 70,[17] the Motion to Dismiss should have been deemed submitted for resolution after it was heard on March 21, 2003. But even if the 90-day reglementary period for which respondent is mandated to resolve the motion were to be reckoned from March 26, 2003, she had until June 24, 2003 to resolve the same.
But she resolved the Motion to Dismiss only on May 18, 2004, about eleven months beyond the reglementary period. Notably, the resolution of the motion came two weeks after Mr. Del Mundo filed the instant complaint.
With regard to the plaintiff's Motion [for the defendant] to Deposit Rentals, there is nothing in the record which indicates that it was ever acted upon by respondent.
Trial court judges being the paradigm of justice in the first instance have, time and again, been exhorted to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required period, for delays undermine the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforce in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.[18]
An ejectment case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of first level courts, hence, respondent as MeTC judge must not only be familiar with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure - the rules governing ejectment, among other cases, but must exhibit professional competence in deciding and resolving cases of such nature and all cases for that matter.
Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure[19] and Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court[20] expressly prohibit the filing of a motion to dismiss in a case for ejectment, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or failure to refer the case for conciliation to the Lupon.
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss was based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there being no previous demand to pay and vacate made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant as provided for under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[21]
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not made to depend upon the allegations in a motion to dismiss, for if it were, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.[22]
Thus, respondent had only to peruse the complaint for ejectment and determine whether it contained an allegation, which was clearly present, that the plaintiffs made a demand upon the defendant not only to pay the rentals, but also to vacate the premises. That did not entail much time.
As for respondent's claim of oversight in failing to submit her comment on the present complaint as required by the OCA, the same is untenable as it betrays her ignorance, if not insubordination. For a complainant's desistance from an administrative complaint against a member of the bench does not, by itself, warrant its dismissal.[23] And judges are called upon to comply with directives of the OCA which under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 828,[24] as amended by P.D. No. 842, is mandated to assist this Court in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over all courts.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross inefficiency or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
So must respondent be penalized, in the determination of the degree of which her repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA for her to file Comment is taken into account.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding Judge of Branch 60 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, is found GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency and is hereby FINED an amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo at 1.
[2] Id. at 22.
[3] Id. at 21-24.
[4] Id. at 25-28.
[5] Id. at 29-32.
[6] Id. at 1-4.
[7] Id. at 33.
[8] Id. at 34.
[9] Id. at 35-38.
[10] Id. at 39.
[11] Id. at 40.
[12] Id. at 40.
[13] Id. at 48.
[14] CONSTITUTION, art. VIII, sec. 15.
[15] Pesayco v. Judge Layague, 447 SCRA 450, 463 (2004).
[16] Hilario v. Judge Concepcion, 327 SCRA 96, 103-104 (2000).
[17] RULES OF COURT (1997), Rule 70, Section 13 provides to wit:
[19] REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (1991), Section 19 provides to wit:
[23] Chan v. Judge Majaducon, 413 SCRA 354, 363 (2003).
[24] CREATING THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR IN THE SUPREME COURT AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 18, 1975).
The defendant in the ejectment case filed a Motion to Dismiss which was opposed by the plaintiffs. After hearing, respondent granted the defendant five days from March 21, 2003 to file his reply to the opposition. Defendant failed to file a reply, however, drawing the plaintiffs to file on June 3, 2003 a Motion to Resolve the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.[2]
On June 9, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a Motion [for the defendant] to Deposit Rentals.[3] And on October 1, 2003 the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Resolve Motions to Dismiss and to Deposit Rentals.[4] Still on January 15, 2004 , the plaintiffs filed an Urgent Second Motion to Resolve Motions to Dismiss and to Deposit Rentals.[5]
The pending motions having remained unresolved, one of the plaintiffs, Antonio L. del Mundo (complainant), filed the present administrative complaint, by letter dated May 3, 2004 addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).[6]
The OCA forthwith required respondent, by 1st Indorsement of May 21, 2004,[7] to file her Comment within ten (10) days on the letter-complaint charging her with Inefficiency or Violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent failed to file any comment, drawing the OCA to send her 1st Tracer dated September 8, 2004[8] reiterating its directive requiring her to file Comment within five (5) days. Just the same, no comment was filed by respondent.
By Report and Recommendation dated April 12, 2005,[9] the OCA, noting from the allegations in the letter-complaint and its annexes filed by complainant that respondent failed to act upon the pending incidents within the 90-day reglementary period, recommended that respondent be required by this Court to file her Comment to the complaint, and to explain why no administrative sanction(s) be meted against her for ignoring the OCA's prior directives requiring her to file Comment.
The recommendation for respondent to file Comment was adopted by this Court by Resolution[10] dated July 4, 2005 which gave her five (5) days for the purpose.
By letter of August 1, 2005[11] which was received at the OCA on August 2, 2005, respondent finally broke her silence, she informing that she received this Court's Resolution of July 4, 2005 on July 27, 2005 and proffering as follows, quoted verbatim:
Some incidents needed to be resolved in Civil Case No. 18756 even before the case was deemed submitted for decision. Two of said issues were ruled upon in Orders dated May18, 2004 and July 20, 2004, hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B". The setting of hearings in said case was as regular as that in other cases, considering the caseload of over three thousand active cases in MeTC Branch 60. The resolution of pending incidents and the rendition of judgment in Civil Case No. 18756 were accomplished in a regular time frame that said overload of cases allowed and/or equally urgent resolution of incidents/issues pertaining to other cases permitted. Decision dated August 18, 2004 in Civil Case No. 18756 and Order dated July 6, 2005 granting appeal of defendant and execution of judgment were already issued, and are hereto attached as Annexes "C" and "D".[12] (Underscoring supplied)And respondent apologized in her letter for her oversight in submitting the comment required by the OCA, she claiming that she was under the belief that the complaint had already been previously withdrawn by complainant, photocopy of whose letter dated August 1, 2005 addressed to the members of the Third Division of this Court was attached as Annex "E" to her Comment,[13] stating that he "h[ad] long foregone/desisted from the pursuit of the complaint, proceedings have gone fairly for the parties. . ."
This Court finds respondent guilty of gross inefficiency.
As a trial judge, respondent ought to know that by clear mandate of the Constitution,[14] she must promptly dispose of cases or matters within 90 days.
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.This mandate applies even to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before a magistrate.[15]
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Any unreasonable delay in resolving motions or pending incidents is also a violation of the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
CANON 1. A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.and constitutes gross inefficiency which warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction.[16]
x x x
Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
CANON 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
x x x
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. (Underscoring supplied),
After conducting a hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, respondent granted defendant a period of until March 26, 2003 to file a reply to the plaintiff's opposition. While a reply is a prohibited pleading under Section 13 of Rule 70,[17] the Motion to Dismiss should have been deemed submitted for resolution after it was heard on March 21, 2003. But even if the 90-day reglementary period for which respondent is mandated to resolve the motion were to be reckoned from March 26, 2003, she had until June 24, 2003 to resolve the same.
But she resolved the Motion to Dismiss only on May 18, 2004, about eleven months beyond the reglementary period. Notably, the resolution of the motion came two weeks after Mr. Del Mundo filed the instant complaint.
With regard to the plaintiff's Motion [for the defendant] to Deposit Rentals, there is nothing in the record which indicates that it was ever acted upon by respondent.
Trial court judges being the paradigm of justice in the first instance have, time and again, been exhorted to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required period, for delays undermine the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforce in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.[18]
An ejectment case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of first level courts, hence, respondent as MeTC judge must not only be familiar with Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure - the rules governing ejectment, among other cases, but must exhibit professional competence in deciding and resolving cases of such nature and all cases for that matter.
Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure[19] and Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court[20] expressly prohibit the filing of a motion to dismiss in a case for ejectment, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or failure to refer the case for conciliation to the Lupon.
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss was based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, there being no previous demand to pay and vacate made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant as provided for under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.[21]
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not made to depend upon the allegations in a motion to dismiss, for if it were, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.[22]
Thus, respondent had only to peruse the complaint for ejectment and determine whether it contained an allegation, which was clearly present, that the plaintiffs made a demand upon the defendant not only to pay the rentals, but also to vacate the premises. That did not entail much time.
As for respondent's claim of oversight in failing to submit her comment on the present complaint as required by the OCA, the same is untenable as it betrays her ignorance, if not insubordination. For a complainant's desistance from an administrative complaint against a member of the bench does not, by itself, warrant its dismissal.[23] And judges are called upon to comply with directives of the OCA which under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 828,[24] as amended by P.D. No. 842, is mandated to assist this Court in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over all courts.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross inefficiency or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
So must respondent be penalized, in the determination of the degree of which her repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA for her to file Comment is taken into account.
WHEREFORE, Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding Judge of Branch 60 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, is found GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency and is hereby FINED an amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo at 1.
[2] Id. at 22.
[3] Id. at 21-24.
[4] Id. at 25-28.
[5] Id. at 29-32.
[6] Id. at 1-4.
[7] Id. at 33.
[8] Id. at 34.
[9] Id. at 35-38.
[10] Id. at 39.
[11] Id. at 40.
[12] Id. at 40.
[13] Id. at 48.
[14] CONSTITUTION, art. VIII, sec. 15.
[15] Pesayco v. Judge Layague, 447 SCRA 450, 463 (2004).
[16] Hilario v. Judge Concepcion, 327 SCRA 96, 103-104 (2000).
[17] RULES OF COURT (1997), Rule 70, Section 13 provides to wit:
SEC. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:[18] Yu-Asensi v. Judge Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255, 263 (2000).
x x x
10. Reply;
x x x
[19] REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (1991), Section 19 provides to wit:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.[20] RULES OF COURT (1997), Rule 70, Section 13 provides to wit:(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
x x x
SEC. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:[21] RULES OF COURT (1997), Rule 70, Section 2 provides to wit:
- Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12.
x x x
SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. - Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in case of buildings.[22] Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503, 508-509 (1993).
[23] Chan v. Judge Majaducon, 413 SCRA 354, 363 (2003).
[24] CREATING THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR IN THE SUPREME COURT AND PROVIDING FUNDS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 18, 1975).