The facts of the case as summarized in the Report dated July 10, 2006 of the Investigating Justice^[1] are as follows:

A "Pinagsanib na Salaysay" dated April 22, 2005 was filed by the complainants, Allan Macrohon, Rodrigo Gonzales and Redeem Ongtinco, before the Office of the Court Administrator x x x against respondent Judge Francisco D. Ibay charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority.

In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator in a 1st Indorsement dated May 10, 2005, the respondent judge submitted his comment on the complainants' Pinagsanib na Salaysay through a 3rd Indorsement dated June 10, 2005.

x x x x

On April 28, 2006, an Order was issued x x x ordering the complainants and the respondent judge, with their respective counsels, to appear for a preliminary conference and initial presentation of evidence on May 11, 2006 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Copies of the said Order were thence sent to the complainants at their given address at HIS Construction, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, as well as to the respondent judge, thru the Process Server of this Court.

In a Certification dated May 3, 2006, signed by Process Server Adrian C. Aggabao and attested by the Chief, Mailing and Delivery Section of this Court, it is stated that the copy of the Order was served upon the respondent judge on May 2, 2006, but the copies of the Order intended for the complainants were not delivered as the said Process Server was not able to find the given address which was insufficient. Thus, the Acting Division Clerk of Court caused the sending of the copies of the Order to the complainants by Express Mail Services but the envelopes containing these copies were also returned with the notation "No longer connected."

In the hearing on May 11, 2006 x x x only the respondent judge with his counsel, Atty. Apolonio A. Padua, Jr., appeared, while the complainants were absent. Atty. Padua moved for the dismissal of the case for failure of the complainants to inform the Court of their latest address, x x x but [the Investigating Justice] proceeded with the investigation. Atty. Padua manifested that respondent judge is adopting his Comment contained in the 3rd Indorsement dated June 10, 2005, as his Answer to the complaint.

Finding the Answer to be vague, the [Investigating Justice] asked clarificatory questions which were answered by the respondent judge and his counsel. Thereafter, upon motion of the latter, respondent judge was given fifteen (15) days from May 11, 2006 or until May 27, 2006, within which to submit a memorandum. x x x

In their Pinagsanib na Salaysay, the complainants alleged that they are laborers of HIS Construction x x x. which, in August, 2002, was engaged to paint the Gusali ng Katarungan in Makati City; that after completing the painting of the building, they x x x dismantle[d] the metal scaffoldings which they used as support in their painting; x x x that while they were removing these metal tubes at the 2nd floor level of the building, a small amount of water from one of the metal tubes, flowed to a closed window jalousie; that they had the impression that the said metal tube collected water from the rain the night before; that considering that said window jalousie was closed, they did not bother so much about the water which flowed from the tube and they continued with their work; that several minutes later, a policeman arrived and took their names and when they asked him why, the policeman replied that they will be informed of the reason when they reach the sala of the respondent judge; that when they reached the chamber of the respondent judge at around 9:30 in the morning, the latter who was then very angry ("galit na galit"), met them and showed to them the flooring of his chamber which was drenched with water, that they apologized as they did not intend to cause such damage and complainant Redeem Ongtinco even volunteered to clean the wet floor, but the respondent judge replied, "Huwag na, baka sampalin pa kita;" that they were brought by the policeman to the courtroom and presented to the respondent judge who was already wearing a black robe; that they were surprised when a charge was read to them in English which they did not understand, except the portion that they will be imprisoned for five (5) days, and they were detained at the police precinct infront of the Gusali ng Katarungan.

In his Comment, x x x respondent judge alleged that x x x the careless attitude of the three (3) complainants in carrying out their tasks and their obvious indifference to the safety and well-being of others, resulted in the damage of his computer x x x [that] he was not able to use the same computer for at least a week and was forced to handwrite his decisions, draft them and have them typed by his staff. The belated filing of the instant complaint about an incident which occurred in August 2002, together with other complaints against him involving other complainants, are indications that an invisible hand is orchestrating these actions against him.

In answer to the clarificatory questions x x x respondent judge stated that sometime in August, 2002, while he was inside his chamber at the 2nd floor of the building typing a decision using his computer, water suddenly seeped in as if it was poured, through the closed window jalousie of his chamber. He put off his computer and asked his Sheriff to look for those who were responsible and to ask their names. The Sheriff saw the three complainants outside the building as there was a repair going on. He felt that what the complainants did was contemptuous as the incident in question occurred while he was typing one of his decisions. Thus, he set the hearing of the incident and when the complainants appeared before him, he informed them that they were being charged with contempt of court. He gave the complainants an opportunity to explain what happened, which they did. They could hardly speak, but they admitted that they were the ones working outside his window. Not being satisfied with their explanation, he cited them in contempt of court and issued an Order sentencing all the complainants with imprisonment up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. Before noontime of the same day, Executive Judge Leticia Morales called him up by telephone and requested him to reconsider his decision. Hence, he dictated an Order immediately after lunch, releasing the complainants. This Order was delivered to the jail before 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He did not, however, inquire anymore whether the complainants were released on the same day. He denied having uttered the words "Huwag na, baka sampalin pa kita" and said that complainant Redeem Ongtinco did not offer to clean the wet flooring of his chamber. He admitted that he does not have any record of the proceedings and he cannot even remember the date of the subject incident which transpired four (4) years ago.

In his Memorandum x x x the respondent judge maintained that the spillage of water into his chamber x x x could have been prevented if due care was observed by the complainants; that the incident could not be considered as an accident because everything that complainants did in carrying out their duties were deliberate and supervised; that they were formally summoned to appear before him about their obvious imprudence and were given the opportunity to be heard but he found their explanation unacceptable x x x as a consequence of which, the administration of justice was delayed; that finding the complainant's act to be contemptuous, he cited them in direct contempt of court and meted the penalty of imprisonment; that complainants were detained before noon on that clay but were released immediately after lunch of the same day; that the proceedings he observed were not arbitrary and the imposition of the sanction of imprisonment for a few hours was not abuse of authority; and that he observed and felt that someone is all out to harass and embarrass him through the simultaneous filing of the complaint-affidavits against him^[2]

At the outset, the Investigating Justice observed that although the complainants did not appear during the hearing, "|t]he facts in their Pinagsanib na Salaysay on the circumstances surrounding their incarceration upon the order of respondent judge, are substantially correct and true."

We agree. The apparent desistance of complainants from further pursuing their charges against respondent is of no moment. As has been said in Abalde v. Roque, Jr.,^[3] the desistance of the complainant against respondent is not a bar to disciplinary sanction. The overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary demands that erring personnel be sanctioned, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the complaints. Indeed, these proceedings do not depend upon the whims and caprice of the concerned employees, for the aggrieved party is the court system. The issue in administrative cases is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the judiciary.

It is the Court's duty to root out misconduct among those who are engaged in the dispensation of justice regardless of the parties' desistance.^[4] Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent judge innocent of the charges or declare him guilt thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. If innocent, respondent judge merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.^[5]

While respondent judge denies having said "Huwag na, baka sampalin pa kita" he admits ordering the incarceration of complainants whom he found guilty of direct contempt. Respondent judge insists he was justified in holding complainants for direct contempt due to the tatter's carelessness and imprudence, as he was drafting a decision when water seeped into the chamber's closed window jalousie.

According to respondent, the complainants could be punished even without hearing but still, he gave them the opportunity to explain themselves but he found their explanations unsatisfactory, He further alleges that someone is out to harass and embarrass him as shown by the simultaneous filing, of the complaint-affidavits of six individuals, He claims that under such situation, he has nothing to shield himself from the onslaught of complainants and those behind them except his inherent contempt power as a judge.

The pivotal question, given the foregoing arguments proffered by respondent judge is whether or not he abused his authority in citing the complainants in contempt and ordering their incarceration.

In the Motion for Leave To Admit Herein Supplement to the June 30, 2006 Memorandum of the Respondent and Manifestation filed on October 11, 2006, respondent judge admits that he erred in citing the complainants in contempt but insists that it was "a mistake of judgment" and "an innocent error."^[6]

In finding respondent administratively liable for abusing his contempt powers, the Investigating Justice reasoned thus:

In this case, the respondent judge admitted that because of the subject incident, he cited the complainants in contempt of court and ordered their incarceration. As a justification for his action, he explained, thus -

Complainants x x x in a very careless manner, caused the spillage of water xxx causing damage not only to the carpeted flooring of his chamber, but also his computer. All these could have been prevented if due care was observed. It could not be treated as an accident because everything the complainants did in carrying out their duties were deliberate and supervised. Obviously, the complainants manifested complacency and did not care at all whether their omissions would result to any damage to the occupants of the premises. They were not working on an unoccupied building. They were working on the Hall of Justice completely occupied by the Regional Trial Court, by the Municipal Trial Courts, by the offices of the City Prosecutor and the Public Attorney's Office. This is not to mention that the incident in issue occurred on a regular working day where all the courts and the offices in the building were carrying out their respective functions. Judges, litigants and office workers abound the building, xxx

Complainants xxx were formally summoned before the respondent judge xxx [and] were given the chance to explain why they [did] not observe care and prudence in carrying out their functions. They did; but, their explanation was not acceptable x x x. Their indifference to the safely of others was obvious. The respondent judge did not consider the material damage to his computer and to his chamber; but, he considered with deep concern the delay in the administration of justice. He would not be able to write down his decisions as expediently as when he has the full use of his computer. And, that he would not he able then to meet on time the requirements of decision-making. Thus, they were cited in contempt of court and meted the penalty of imprisonment. Truly, they were detained before noon on that day; but they were released immediately after lunch on the same day. (Emphasis supplied)

Nothing on the records, however, substantiates the respondent judge's claim that the subject incident is not an accident and that the complainant's manner in carrying out their duties is contemptuous. What is glaring is that because of the subject incident that caused damage to his chamber's carpeted flooring and to his computer, he blamed the complainants for their alleged carelessness. As a consequence, he used his contempt power in order to give them a lesson.

Clearly, the respondent judge used his contempt power in a vindictive and retaliatory manner. The fact that "he would not be able to write down his decisions as expediently as when he has the full use of his computer and meet on time the requirements of decision-making" is no excuse nor justification for utilizing such power for retaliation and vindication.

The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. The court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint. (Emphasis supplied)

Neither does the [Investigating Justice| agree with the respondent judge's assertion that the proceedings he observed were not arbitrary and the imposition of the sanction of imprisonment for a few hours was not abuse of authority. The respondent judge was x x x inside his chamber xxx |h]ence, he did not know what happened outside of the building which caused the water spillage, respondent judge had no legitimate basis to hold the complainants liable thereto and cite them in contempt based on the flimsy reason that he (respondent judge) was not satisfied with their explanation about the said incident.

Moreover, the respondent judge's assertion that the alleged contempt proceedings were recorded, was negated by his (respondent judge's) failure to substantiate the same. He failed to even present a copy of the Order he allegedly issued, holding the complainants in contempt and imposing the penalty of imprisonment up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.

Finally, respondent judge's statement in his Memorandum in defense of his actuation, which is obviously an afterthought, is very revealing. He stated that he felt someone, through the complainants, was all out to harass and embarrass him and he has nothing to shield himself from the onslaught of the complainants but to exercise his inherent power to cite them in contempt of court.

The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation as, in this case, is appalling and violative of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which mandates that "the behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the Investigating Justice but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to respondent judge's misdeed.

Contempt is defined as "[a] disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity."^[7] Under the Rules of Court, contempt may either be direct or indirect.

Direct contempt consists of or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71^[8] of the Rules of Court which provides that -

SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be a lower court.

On the other hand, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.^[9] Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for the mode of commencing proceedings for and enumerates the particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, to wit:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real properly, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be emit led thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.

Forthwith sending the complainants to jail because water accidentally flowed into respondent judge's chambers cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered a mere "mistake of judgment" and "an innocent error."^[10] While respondent attempts to project himself as a conscientious magistrate in professing that he was more deeply concerned with "the delay in the administration of justice" because he would not be able "[t]o meet on time the requirements of decision-making," what, in fact, comes across is a picture of an irate magistrate who spitefully jailed the complainants for the inconvenience caused by the drenching of the carpet in his chamber and damage to his computer. Indeed, his acts are tainted with personal hostility and passion against the persons to whom it is directed. That the acts of the complainants hardly fit into any of the circumstances described in Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 71 only underscores the vindictiveness of its exercise.

Those who don the judicial robe have been reminded time and again that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.^[11] It has repeatedly been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice^[12] is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."^[13]

A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain^[14] because courts are looked upon by people with high respect and are regarded as sacred places where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within and around their vicinity diminishes their sanctity and dignity.^[15] Such an image is, however, evoked by the acts of respondent judge in this case as underscored by the heavy-handed use of the contempt powers against complainants. Certainly respondent judge should not take advantage of his public office to oppress or abuse others. He should always, remember that boorish and overbearing behavior can only bring his office into disrepute and erode public respect for it.^[16]

Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.^[17]

The present case is not respondent's first offense because only recently, he had been similarly administratively sanctioned for Grave Abuse of Authority. In Panaligan v. Ibay^[18] respondent was fined for improperly citing in contempt the complainant and sending him to jail because the latter switched off the electric power on the floor where respondent's sala is located during the latter's tour of duty the night before. In taking him to task for his ill-advised exercise of his contempt powers, the Court said:

A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required, x x x

The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system have done justice. The assumption of office by a judge places upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. He is the visible representation of law and justice, He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the rule of law. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must be seen to be done. In the present case, respondent Judge may not have been urged by ulterior motives in citing complainant in contempt and in subsequently sending him to jail for putting off the lights in the 12th floor including his sala; nevertheless, his actuation can easily be perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power. His actuation must never serve to fuel suspicion over a misuse of the prestige of his office to enhance his personal interest.

We cannot simply shrug off respondent Judge's failure to exercise that degree of care and temperance required of a judge in the correct and prompt administration of justice; more so in this case where the exercise of the power of contempt resulted in the complainant's detention and deprivation of liberty. Respondent Judge's conduct amounts to grave abuse of authority.^[19]

Obviously his previous chastisement has not reformed the respondent because in addition to the instant administrative complaint, he has two other pending cases^[20] for the same charges. If at all, the similarity of the charges in these administrative complaints against him betrays a deplorable proclivity for the use of contempt powers at the slightest provocation. Interestingly, respondent proffered the same excuse in this proceeding to justify his order incarcerating the complainant in the above-cited case and in citing in contempt the complainants in the other pending cases.

Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing, respondent judge, for all his claims to the contrary, did not just commit a simple lapse of judgment but a gross and grievous abuse of his authority. Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule which provides that -

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
   
   
2. Suspension from office with salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
   A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering that the instant case is a second transgression of a similar offense, respondent should be meted a stiffer penalty commensurate to his misdeed.

WHEREFORE, for improperly citing complainants in contempt and ordering their detention, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, is FINED P25,000.00 for gravely abusing his authority. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

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^[1] Court of Appeals Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

^[2] Report of the Investigating Justice dated July 10,2006.

^[3] 448 Phil. 246, 252 (2003).

^[4] Id.

^[5] Gallo v. Cordero, 315 Phil. 210, 220 (1995).

^[6] Motion For Leave To Admit Herein Supplement To The June 30, 2006 Memorandum Of The Respondent And Manifestation, p. 3.

^[7] Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 348 Phil. 158, 163 (1998).

^[8] Wicker v. Arcangel, G.R. No. 112869, January 29, 1996, 252 SCRA 444, 451.

^[9] Guerrero v. Villamor, G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 335, 359.

^[10] Motion For Leave To Admit [Herein Supplement To The June 30, 2006 Memorandum Of The Respondent And Manifestation, p. 3.

^[11] Torcende v. Sardido, 444 Phil. 12, 29 (2003).

^[12] Royeca v. Animas, 162 Phil. 851, 862 (1976).

^[13] Visitation v. Libre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1918, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 398, 410.

^[14] Torcende v. Sardido, supra note 11.

^[15] Cervantes v. Cerdeño, A.M. No. P-05-2021, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 324, 330-331.

^[16] Gonzales v. Gatcheco, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1879, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 51, 55-56.

^[17] Cañas v. Castigador 401 Phil. 618, 628 (2000).

^[18] A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972, June 21, 2006, SC E-Library.

^[19] Id.

^[20] A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984 (Nunez v. Ibay) for Grave Abuse of Authority and Oppression; OCA-IPI No. 05-2248-RTJ (Inonog v. Ibay) for Grave Abuse of Authority.