SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 165482, July 23, 2008 ]SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. FAR S. ALBA +
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND APOLONIO LAMBOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. FAR S. ALBA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. FAR S. ALBA +
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION AND APOLONIO LAMBOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. FAR S. ALBA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J,:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated 12 November 2004 is the Decision[2] dated 20 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72607 and its Resolution[3] dated
30 September 2004 reversing the Resolution[4] dated 28 November 2001 of the Social Security Commission (the Commission) in SSC Case No. 12-14618-96.
Following are the antecedents.
Sometime in 1991, petitioner Apolonio Lamboso (Lamboso) filed a claim for retirement benefit before the Social Security System (SSS). However, his claim was denied on the ground that he could not qualify for monthly pension under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161[5] ( the Social Security Act of 1954) as he then had only thirty-nine (39) paid contributions. On 11 December 1996, Lamboso appealed the denial of his claim by filing a petition before the Commission wherein he alleged that he should be entitled to monthly retirement pension. He prayed for the adjustment of the date of his Social Security (SS) coverage and for the remittance of his delinquent monthly contribution.[6] On 28 November 2001, the Commission rendered its resolution, to wit:
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside both the resolution and the order of the Commission. It held that Far Alba cannot be considered as an employer of Lamboso prior to 1970 because as administrator of the family-owned hacienda, he is not an employer under Section 8 (c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 who carries on a "trade or business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment,"[12] unlike under Article 212 (e) of the Labor Code which defines an employer as, among others, any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer. As such, the appellate court declared, Far Alba had no obligation to remit to SSS the monthly contributions of Lamboso prior to 1970. It also held that inasmuch as Far Alba had duly remitted Lamboso's monthly contributions to the SSS for the period of January 1970 to March 1973, which totaled 39 contributions, he as Lamboso's employer should be absolved from the adjudged liability.[13]
Furthermore, in its Resolution[14] denying the Commission's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated that since it was Arturo Alba, Sr., Far Alba's father, who had failed to remit the SS contributions prior to 1970, Lamboso should have asserted his claim before the estate proceedings of his deceased employer in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.[15]
Now, before the Court, the Commission insists that the term "employer" under the Social Security Act of 1954 may be applied to Far Alba, the administrator-son of the owner, Arturo Alba, Sr., who is directly and actively involved in the operation of the agricultural undertaking. The Commission likewise asserts that a petition for payment of SS contributions and SS retirement benefit may not be filed before the estate proceedings of the deceased employer as a claim of this nature is not a money claim arising from contract, express or implied, entered into by the decedent in his lifetime but is rather akin to claims for taxes which may be enforced against the decedent's executor, administrator or legal heirs within the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years as provided for in Section 22 (b) of R.A. No. 8282 (the Social Security Act of 1997).[16]
In his Memorandum[17] dated 26 May 2006, Far Alba stresses that he was not Lamboso's employer prior to 1970 and that he neither had been the administrator of the hacienda because in 1960, he was in Manila studying law and was in fact admitted into the practice of the law the following year.[18] He agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claim for the payment of SS contributions should have been filed before the estate proceedings of Arturo Alba, Sr.[19]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the question of whether Far Alba had been Lamboso's employer, under the Social Security Act of 1954, prior to 1970 is a question of fact. And while generally, factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court, the rule is not without exception. Where there are conflicting and contradictory findings of fact, this Court will not hesitate to scrutinize the records to determine the facts for itself.[20]
Section 8 (c), Social Security Act of 1954 (as amended by Presidential Decree [P.D.] No. 1202 and P.D. No. 1636) defines an employer as "any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade or business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government." Section 8 (d) defines an employee as "any person who performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services where there is an employer-employee relationship."[21]
Far Alba denies having been Lamboso's employer before 1970. More than that, he denies having served as the hacienda's administrator before that year. These disavowals, however, are undermined by Lamboso's clear and direct testimony that Far Alba served as the hacienda's administrator from 1960 to 1965 and solely ran the place from 1965 onwards. Pertinently, Lamboso testified as follows:
We answer in the affirmative.
First, the Court observes that Far Alba was no ordinary administrator. He was no less than the son of the hacienda's owner and as such he was an owner-in-waiting prior to his father's death. He was a member of the owner's family assigned to actively manage the operations of the hacienda. As he stood to benefit from the hacienda's successful operation, he ineluctably took his job and his father's wishes to heart. As emphasized by the Commission his and the owner's interests in the business where plainly and inextricably linked by filial bond. He more than just acted in the interests of his father as employer, and could himself pass off as the employer, the one carrying on the undertaking.
Second, nomenclature aside, Far Alba was not merely an administrator of the hacienda. Applying the control test which is used to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship for purposes of compulsory coverage under the SSS law, Far Alba is technically Lamboso's employer.[26]
The essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control being the most determinative factor.[27]
Lamboso testified that he was selected and his services were engaged by Far Alba himself. Corollarily, Far Alba held the prerogative of terminating Lamboso's employment. Lamboso also testified in a direct manner that he had been paid his wages by Far Alba. This testimony was seconded by Lamboso's co-worker, Rodolfo Sales. Anent the power of control with regard to the work of the employee, the element refers merely to the existence of the power and not the actual exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power.[28]
Third, not to be forgotten is the definition of an employer under Article 167(f) of the Labor Code which deals with employees' compensation and state insurance fund. The said provision of the law defines and employer as " any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee." It also defines a person as "any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal representative thereof." Plainly, Far Alba, as the hacienda administrator, acts as the legal representative of the employer and is thus an employer within the meaning of the law liable to pay the SS contributions.
Finally, the Court believes that Section 8 (c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 is broad enough to include those persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that the said provision does not contain the definitive phrase contained in Article 212 (e) of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that administrators such as Far Alba, whose interests are closely linked with his father-employer, do not come within the purview of the law. If under Article 212 (e), persons acting in the interest of the employer, directly or indirectly, are obliged to follow the government labor relations policy, it could be reasonably concluded that such persons may likewise be held liable for the remittance of SS contributions which is an obligation created by law and an is employee's right protected by law.
Having established Far Alba's accountability to the SSS for Lamboso's unremitted contributions form 1960 to 1970, a discussion on the propriety of filing a claim of such nature against the estate proceedings of Arturo Alba, Sr. becomes unnecessary.[29] In any event, the Court sustains the jurisdiction of the Commission over disputes under the Social Security Act "with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto.[30] Moreover, the Court agrees with the Commission's assertion that an action for remittance of SS monthly contributions is not a type of money claim which needs to be filed against the estate proceedings. In the case of Vera, et al. v. Judge Fernandez,[31] the Court declared that claims by the government for unpaid taxes are not covered by the statute of non-claims as these are monetary obligations created by law. Even after the distribution of the estate, claims for taxes may be enforced against the distributes in proportion to their shares in the inheritance.[32] Similarly, employers are required to remit the contributions to the SSS by mandate of law. As such, actions of this type should be treated in much the same way as taxes that they are not required to be filed against the estate and that they be claimed against the heirs of the errant decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72607 and its Resolution dated 30 September 2004 insofar as they absolved respondent Far Alba from liability to remit to the Social Security System petitioner Apolonio Lamboso's monthly contributions prior to January 1970 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated 28 November 2001 of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. 12-14618-96 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-28.
[2] Id. 30-41; Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[3] Id. 43-45.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 18-20.
[5] AN ACT TO CREATE A SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM PROVIDING SICKNESS, UNEMPLOYMENT, RETIREMENT, DISABILITY AND DEATH BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES.
[6] Rollo, p. 11.
[7] Id. 32-34.
[8] CA rollo, p. 30.
[9] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 4-15.
[11] Id. at 8-12.
[12] Republic Act No. 1161 (1951), Sec. 8 (c).
[13] Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[14] Supra note 3.
[15] Id. at 44-45.
[16] Id. at 208-220.
[17] Id. at 231-263.
[18] Id. at 244-245.
[19] Id. at 250-251.
[20] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 132, 141 (2000).
[21] Republic Act No. 1161 (1954), Sec. 8 (d).
[22] CA rollo, p. 86.
[23] Id. at 91.
[24] Id. at 93.
[25] Id. at 104-106.
[26] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.
[27] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28] MAM Realty Dev't. Corp. v. NLRC, 314 Phil. 838, 842 (1995).
[29] RULES OF COURT, Sec. 5 which states as follows:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, or not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an actions already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
[30] SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
[31] 178 Phil. 154 (1979).
[32] REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II (Ninth Revised Edition), citing Government v. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13; See Commission of Internal Revenue v. Pineda, 128 Phil. 146 (1967).
Following are the antecedents.
Sometime in 1991, petitioner Apolonio Lamboso (Lamboso) filed a claim for retirement benefit before the Social Security System (SSS). However, his claim was denied on the ground that he could not qualify for monthly pension under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161[5] ( the Social Security Act of 1954) as he then had only thirty-nine (39) paid contributions. On 11 December 1996, Lamboso appealed the denial of his claim by filing a petition before the Commission wherein he alleged that he should be entitled to monthly retirement pension. He prayed for the adjustment of the date of his Social Security (SS) coverage and for the remittance of his delinquent monthly contribution.[6] On 28 November 2001, the Commission rendered its resolution, to wit:
Petitioner (Apolonio Lamboso) herein alleged that he worked in Hda. La Roca (owned by Far Alba) from 1960 to 1973 as 'cabo', in Hda. Alibasao from 1973 to 1979 as overseer and in Hda. Kamandag from 1979 to 1984; that the latter two (2) haciendas are both owned by Ramon S. Benedicto; and that when he filed a claim for retirement pension benefit with the SSS, however, the same was denied on the ground that he had 39 monthly contributions to his credit.Herein respondent Far Alba moved for reconsideration of the Commission's resolution, citing lack of notice and denial of due process. The Commission denied the motion in an Order[8] dated 26 June 2002 stating as follows:
Private respondent Ramon S. Benedicto alleged that he was only a lessee of Hdas. Albasao and Kamandag; that when he took over as lessee thereof, there was no available records to support the petitioner's claim of employment; and that he, therefore, prays that the petition be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Respondent Far Alba (Hda. La Roca) was motu propio declared in default on November 14, 1997 for failure to file his answer. On the other hand, public respondent SSS merely cited the provisions of Section 8 (d), 9, 12-B, 22 (a) and (b) and 24 (a) and (b) of R.A. 1161, as amended, by way of responsive pleading.
The petitioner reiterated the averments in his pleading in the Position Paper which he filed on November 20, 1998. He further averred that he received from Far Alba a monthly salary of P45.00 from 1960 to 1965 and P180.00 from 1965 to 1973 and from employer Ramon S. Benedicto, a monthly salary of P500.00 from 1973 to 1984; and that he was reported to the SSS fro coverage in 1973 and only a total of 39 monthly contributions were remitted in his name.
In its Position Paper, public respondent SSS avers that Apolonio Lamboso, whose date of birth is April 10, 1930, was reported for SS coverage, effective April 1, 1970 by employer Far Alba (ID No. 07-0869300) on December 11, 1972; that he was, likewise, reported for SSS coverage effective May 1, 1980, by employer Kamandag Agri & Dev. Corp. (ID No. 07-2024250-4) on September 1, 1980; and that Apolonio Lamboso has only 39 monthly contributions (remitted in his favor by Far alba) for the period January 1970 to March 1973, but none under Kamandag Agri. Dev. Corp.
Private respondent Ramon Benedicto, in his Position Paper dated September 6, 2000, avers that the petitioner was employed by him from 1973 to 1984 (1973 to 1979 in Hda. Alibasao and from 1979 to 1984 in Hda. Kamandag); and that all of his employment records were already destroyed and damaged by termites.
In the testimonial evidence for the petitioner presented on March 17 and June 15, 1999 and August 10, 2000, witnesses Rodolfo Sales, Falconeri Fierro and Romulo Fierro collectively corroborated the petitioner's employment with Far Alba from 1960 to April 1973 in Hda. La Roca and with employer Ramon Benedicto in Hdas. Alibasao and Kamandag from 1973 to 1984.
The failure on the part of respondent Far Alba to file his responsive pleading to the petition filed by petitioner Apolonio Lamboso strongly indicates lack or absence of evidence, by way of rebuttal, to the positive assertion of the petitioner regarding his employment with the former from 1960 to April 1973. Besides, defrauding respondent Far Alba reported Apolonio Lamboso to the SSS for coverage effective April 1, 1970 and this act of reporting is already an incontrovertible proof of employment.
xxx
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Commission hereby orders:
Should the respondents pay their respective contribution liabilities within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof, their other liabilities for the 3% per month penalty are deemed condoned pursuant to SSC Resolution No. 982-S.99.
- Respondent Far Alba to pay to the SSS the delinquent monthly contributions of Apolonio Lamboso from June 18, 1960 to April 1973 (based on his monthly salary of P45.00 from 1960 to 1965 and P180.00 from 1966 to April 1973) in the amount of P1,115.00, the 3% per month penalty due thereon in the amount of P12,387.57, computed as of December 5, 2001 and the damages under Section 24 (b) of RA 1161, as amended, in the amount of P4,895.38; and
- Respondent Ramon Benedicto to pay to SSS the delinquent monthly contributions due the petitioner for the period May 1973 to 1984 (based on his monthly salary of P500.00) in the amount of P8,865.60, the 3 % per month penalty due thereon in the amount of P65,879.70, computed as of December 5, 2001 and that damages under Section 24 (b) of RA 1161, as amended, in the amount of P26,919.75
The SSS, on the other hand, is ordered to pay Apolonio Lamboso his retirement benefit upon the filing of the claim therefore, subject to existing rules and regulations, and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.[7]
We find respondent Far Alba's motion for reconsideration utterly bereft of merit as the case records clearly show that summons was served upon herein respondent through his wife, Tina Alba, on September 15, 1997 as herein respondent was not at his residence at the time of service. After the lapse of the reglementary period within which to file his responsive pleading, this Commission motu propio declared him in default on November 14, 1997. Thus, when respondent Far Alba failed to file a motion to lift the default order until the promulgation of the questioned Resolution, he could not argue that he was deprived of due process that would warrant the reversal of the judgment.[9]Alba subsequently filed a Petition for Review[10] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the Commission: (1) the Order of the Commission was rendered in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection; (2) he was not obligated by law to remit contributions to the SSS prior to 1970 and after 1973 in the absence of employer-employee relationship; and (3) Lamboso's claim had already prescribed.[11]
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside both the resolution and the order of the Commission. It held that Far Alba cannot be considered as an employer of Lamboso prior to 1970 because as administrator of the family-owned hacienda, he is not an employer under Section 8 (c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 who carries on a "trade or business, industry, undertaking or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment,"[12] unlike under Article 212 (e) of the Labor Code which defines an employer as, among others, any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer. As such, the appellate court declared, Far Alba had no obligation to remit to SSS the monthly contributions of Lamboso prior to 1970. It also held that inasmuch as Far Alba had duly remitted Lamboso's monthly contributions to the SSS for the period of January 1970 to March 1973, which totaled 39 contributions, he as Lamboso's employer should be absolved from the adjudged liability.[13]
Furthermore, in its Resolution[14] denying the Commission's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated that since it was Arturo Alba, Sr., Far Alba's father, who had failed to remit the SS contributions prior to 1970, Lamboso should have asserted his claim before the estate proceedings of his deceased employer in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.[15]
Now, before the Court, the Commission insists that the term "employer" under the Social Security Act of 1954 may be applied to Far Alba, the administrator-son of the owner, Arturo Alba, Sr., who is directly and actively involved in the operation of the agricultural undertaking. The Commission likewise asserts that a petition for payment of SS contributions and SS retirement benefit may not be filed before the estate proceedings of the deceased employer as a claim of this nature is not a money claim arising from contract, express or implied, entered into by the decedent in his lifetime but is rather akin to claims for taxes which may be enforced against the decedent's executor, administrator or legal heirs within the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years as provided for in Section 22 (b) of R.A. No. 8282 (the Social Security Act of 1997).[16]
In his Memorandum[17] dated 26 May 2006, Far Alba stresses that he was not Lamboso's employer prior to 1970 and that he neither had been the administrator of the hacienda because in 1960, he was in Manila studying law and was in fact admitted into the practice of the law the following year.[18] He agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claim for the payment of SS contributions should have been filed before the estate proceedings of Arturo Alba, Sr.[19]
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the question of whether Far Alba had been Lamboso's employer, under the Social Security Act of 1954, prior to 1970 is a question of fact. And while generally, factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court, the rule is not without exception. Where there are conflicting and contradictory findings of fact, this Court will not hesitate to scrutinize the records to determine the facts for itself.[20]
Section 8 (c), Social Security Act of 1954 (as amended by Presidential Decree [P.D.] No. 1202 and P.D. No. 1636) defines an employer as "any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade or business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government." Section 8 (d) defines an employee as "any person who performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services where there is an employer-employee relationship."[21]
Far Alba denies having been Lamboso's employer before 1970. More than that, he denies having served as the hacienda's administrator before that year. These disavowals, however, are undermined by Lamboso's clear and direct testimony that Far Alba served as the hacienda's administrator from 1960 to 1965 and solely ran the place from 1965 onwards. Pertinently, Lamboso testified as follows:
Significantly, Lamboso's testimony is corroborated by the testimony of his co-worker, Rodolfo Sales, as follows:
Evidently, Far Alba had indeed served as Lamboso's employer from 1965 to 1970 or, at the very least, he had served as the hacienda's administrator before 1970. Now, the question is whether an administrtor could be considered an employer within the scope of the Social Security Act of 1954.
We answer in the affirmative.
First, the Court observes that Far Alba was no ordinary administrator. He was no less than the son of the hacienda's owner and as such he was an owner-in-waiting prior to his father's death. He was a member of the owner's family assigned to actively manage the operations of the hacienda. As he stood to benefit from the hacienda's successful operation, he ineluctably took his job and his father's wishes to heart. As emphasized by the Commission his and the owner's interests in the business where plainly and inextricably linked by filial bond. He more than just acted in the interests of his father as employer, and could himself pass off as the employer, the one carrying on the undertaking.
Second, nomenclature aside, Far Alba was not merely an administrator of the hacienda. Applying the control test which is used to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship for purposes of compulsory coverage under the SSS law, Far Alba is technically Lamboso's employer.[26]
The essential elements of an employer-employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the power of control being the most determinative factor.[27]
Lamboso testified that he was selected and his services were engaged by Far Alba himself. Corollarily, Far Alba held the prerogative of terminating Lamboso's employment. Lamboso also testified in a direct manner that he had been paid his wages by Far Alba. This testimony was seconded by Lamboso's co-worker, Rodolfo Sales. Anent the power of control with regard to the work of the employee, the element refers merely to the existence of the power and not the actual exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power.[28]
Third, not to be forgotten is the definition of an employer under Article 167(f) of the Labor Code which deals with employees' compensation and state insurance fund. The said provision of the law defines and employer as " any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee." It also defines a person as "any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal representative thereof." Plainly, Far Alba, as the hacienda administrator, acts as the legal representative of the employer and is thus an employer within the meaning of the law liable to pay the SS contributions.
Finally, the Court believes that Section 8 (c) of the Social Security Act of 1954 is broad enough to include those persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that the said provision does not contain the definitive phrase contained in Article 212 (e) of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that administrators such as Far Alba, whose interests are closely linked with his father-employer, do not come within the purview of the law. If under Article 212 (e), persons acting in the interest of the employer, directly or indirectly, are obliged to follow the government labor relations policy, it could be reasonably concluded that such persons may likewise be held liable for the remittance of SS contributions which is an obligation created by law and an is employee's right protected by law.
Having established Far Alba's accountability to the SSS for Lamboso's unremitted contributions form 1960 to 1970, a discussion on the propriety of filing a claim of such nature against the estate proceedings of Arturo Alba, Sr. becomes unnecessary.[29] In any event, the Court sustains the jurisdiction of the Commission over disputes under the Social Security Act "with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto.[30] Moreover, the Court agrees with the Commission's assertion that an action for remittance of SS monthly contributions is not a type of money claim which needs to be filed against the estate proceedings. In the case of Vera, et al. v. Judge Fernandez,[31] the Court declared that claims by the government for unpaid taxes are not covered by the statute of non-claims as these are monetary obligations created by law. Even after the distribution of the estate, claims for taxes may be enforced against the distributes in proportion to their shares in the inheritance.[32] Similarly, employers are required to remit the contributions to the SSS by mandate of law. As such, actions of this type should be treated in much the same way as taxes that they are not required to be filed against the estate and that they be claimed against the heirs of the errant decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72607 and its Resolution dated 30 September 2004 insofar as they absolved respondent Far Alba from liability to remit to the Social Security System petitioner Apolonio Lamboso's monthly contributions prior to January 1970 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated 28 November 2001 of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. 12-14618-96 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-28.
[2] Id. 30-41; Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[3] Id. 43-45.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 18-20.
[5] AN ACT TO CREATE A SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM PROVIDING SICKNESS, UNEMPLOYMENT, RETIREMENT, DISABILITY AND DEATH BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES.
[6] Rollo, p. 11.
[7] Id. 32-34.
[8] CA rollo, p. 30.
[9] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 4-15.
[11] Id. at 8-12.
[12] Republic Act No. 1161 (1951), Sec. 8 (c).
[13] Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[14] Supra note 3.
[15] Id. at 44-45.
[16] Id. at 208-220.
[17] Id. at 231-263.
[18] Id. at 244-245.
[19] Id. at 250-251.
[20] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 132, 141 (2000).
[21] Republic Act No. 1161 (1954), Sec. 8 (d).
[22] CA rollo, p. 86.
[23] Id. at 91.
[24] Id. at 93.
[25] Id. at 104-106.
[26] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.
[27] Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28] MAM Realty Dev't. Corp. v. NLRC, 314 Phil. 838, 842 (1995).
[29] RULES OF COURT, Sec. 5 which states as follows:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, or not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an actions already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
[30] SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
[31] 178 Phil. 154 (1979).
[32] REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II (Ninth Revised Edition), citing Government v. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13; See Commission of Internal Revenue v. Pineda, 128 Phil. 146 (1967).