578 Phil. 377

FIRST DIVISION

[ A.M. No. P-05-1971 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1915-P), June 26, 2008 ]

JORGE Q. GO v. VINEZ A. HORTALEZA +

JORGE Q. GO, COMPLAINANT, VS. VINEZ A. HORTALEZA, DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, DAGUPAN CITY, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified complaint dated April 26, 2004 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Jorge Q. Go, charging the respondent, Vinez A. Hortaleza, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court-Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Dagupan City, with Abuse of Authority and Illegal Exaction in connection with the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 1512, entitled "Spouses Gromeo Evangelista and Jovita Abuan vs. Spouses Jorge Go and Teresita Geronimo," for Ejectment.

The record shows that complainant and his spouse were the defendants in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 1512.  The MTC of Mangaldan, Pangasinan rendered an adverse decision against the said defendants-spouses.

On November 25, 2002, the MTC granted the Motion for Execution filed by the plaintiff in the said civil case, prompting the defendant therein to file a motion for reconsideration dated April 14, 2003.

On August 21, 2003 and pending resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, respondent seized and levied upon the complainant's Toyota Corolla car with Plate No. ADV-767.  Respondent impounded and stored said vehicle at the parking lot of the Hall of Justice in Dagupan City, which according to complainant exposed it to the elements.  To secure the release of the car, complainant deposited, under protest, the amount of P161,042.00[1] with the OCC.

On October 8, 2003, a Resolution was issued by the MTC denying complainant's Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2003 but granted his Motion for Release of Motor Vehicle dated August 25, 2003 in view of the deposit of P161,042.00.[2]

Accordingly, upon order of the MTC, respondent released to the complainant, through Melanio Balolong, complainant's Toyota Corolla.  However, according to complainant, before effecting the release of the said vehicle, respondent demanded from complainant's representative, Melanio Balolong, the amount of P5,000.00, which purportedly would answer for the expenses in the implementation of the writ of execution.  Respondent did not deny his receipt of the said sum of money as he in fact issued an ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT[3] on October 29, 2003.

Complainant claimed to have repeatedly demanded to no avail the return of the said P5,000.00 or the issuance of an official receipt if the aforementioned expenses could properly be charged to complainant, the losing party in the MTC case.

Hence, this complaint praying for the imposition of appropriate sanctions on respondent.

As required by the Court Administrator, respondent filed his comment dated June 24, 2004[4] which prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.   Respondent cited Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, requiring the requesting party to pay sheriff's expenses incurred in enforcing writs of execution.  He explained that he paid P4,000.00 to  a mechanic and P500.00 to a key master and the balance of P500.00 was spent for his transportation expenses and other expenses in serving the writ. The mechanic removed the vehicle's wheel to prevent it from being taken by bad element and also watched over the same while it was stored in the courtyard.

In its Memorandum Report, the OCA recommended that the present case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be suspended for one (1) month, pursuant to Section 52(B)(1) of CSC Resolution No. 99-19 dated August 31, 1999, with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the OCA's recommendation that respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct but with modification as to the proposed penalty.

The culpability of the respondent lies not in the implementation of the writ of execution during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the MTC Resolution granting the Motion for Writ of Execution of the judgment, since the latter was already final and executory. Rather, he is answerable for his act of demanding and receiving money from complainant without observing the proper procedure prescribed in Section 9, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Time and again we have ruled that high standards of conduct are expected of sheriffs who play an important role in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute final judgments of the courts. Thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate.  This duty, in the proper execution of a valid writ, is not just directory, but mandatory.  He has no discretion whether to execute the writ or not.[5]   He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision.  As we explained in Zarate v. Untalan:[6]
...the primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile.
Thus, respondent sheriff cannot be faulted for immediately implementing the writ of execution, there being no injunction nor temporary restraining order being issued by the court.   However, the OCA correctly found him accountable administratively for his failure to adhere to the rules governing the acceptance of money from parties-litigants as well as to respond to the letter of the complainant inquiring about the nature of the P5,000.00 exacted from the latter's representative and to issue an official receipt for the said amount.

Section 9, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribes the procedure to be followed by the sheriffs in implementing a writ of execution, as follows:
SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving processes.-

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In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff's expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards' fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex-oficio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor.
In accordance with the above-quoted Rule, the steps that must be followed before an interested party pays the sheriff's expenses are:  1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; 2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; 3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio sheriff; 4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and 5) the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ.[7]  Any unspent amount should be refunded to the party making the deposit.  Thereafter, the sheriff must render a full report.

Here, respondent demanded and received the sum of P5,000.00 from complainant without first making an estimate of the sheriff's expenses.  Hence, nothing was submitted to the court for approval.  Also, it was respondent sheriff, and not the Clerk of Court, who took custody of the fund.   While in his comment, respondent was able to show the breakdown of all the expenses amounting to P5,000.00, this, however, does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid down in the above-quoted rule.   The Court also doubts the veracity of the belated manifestation of respondent that he turned over the P5,000.00 to the counsel of the judgment creditor, the plaintiff in the MTC case.

Likewise, respondent, failed to comply with a duty imposed on  public officials and employees by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:

(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.

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(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. All public officials and employees must attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and expeditiously.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 08-99 dated July 2, 1999 reminds all officials and employees in the judiciary to strictly follow the mandate of the above-quoted provision in this wise:
TO:  ALL OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARY

RE: PROMPT ACTION ON LETTERS AND REQUESTS AND PUBLIC'S PERSONAL TRANSACTION

It has been observed by, and brought to the attention of, the Chief Justice that in some instances complaints, letters or requests from the public addressed to the officials of the Judiciary are belatedly answered or not answered at all.

All concerned are reminded of paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which explicitly mandate as follows:

. . .

The Presiding Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, the Court Administrator, the Deputy Court Administrators, the Assistant Court Administrators, the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Tax Appeals, and all Executive Judges and clerks of court of all other courts shall see to it that this Circular is immediately disseminated and strictly observed.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

City of Manila, 02 July 1999.

(Sgd.) HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

  Chief Justice
Respondent had been remiss in his duties as a court officer.  He did not respond to complainant's letter and he ignored complainant's  request for an official receipt for the P5,000.00 he received in the course of the performance of his official duties.

Respondent as an officer of the court should have shown a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties.  Instead, he failed to comply with his duties under the law and to observe proper procedure dictated by the rules.   A sheriff is a front-line representative of the justice system in this country.  Once he loses the people's trust, he diminishes the people's faith in the judiciary.[8]   Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty as the image of the Supreme Court is mirrored in the conduct, not only of the Justices, but of every man and woman working thereat. Any act which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.[9]

Nonetheless, there is no clear showing in the records that in demanding the amount of P5,000.00, respondent was motivated by intent to gain which warrants a finding of dishonesty or serious misconduct on his part.  Indubitably, however, respondent sheriff departed from the procedure prescribed by the Rules in the collection of payment for sheriff's expenses in implementing a writ of execution.   Respondent's violation of the Rules constitutes simple misconduct, as ruled in the similar case of Danao v. Franco, Jr.[10]

Under Section 52, B(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct, classified as a less grave offense, is punishable by suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six  (6) months for the first offense, while violation of Section 5 (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 is punishable by reprimand for the first offense, being classified as a light offense, under Section 52, C(13) of the same rule.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Vinez A. Hortaleza guilty of simple misconduct.  He is hereby SUSPENDED from the service for two (2) months without pay.   Respondent is likewise guilty of violating Sec. 5(a) and (d) of  R.A. No. 6713 for which he is hereby REPRIMANDED.   Respondent is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Carpio, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.



[1] Annex "A" of Complaint, rollo, p. 5.

[2] Annex "B," id. at 6-10.

[3] Annex "C," id. at 11.

[4] Id. at 17.

[5] Zarate v. Untalan, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1584, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 206, 215.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Abalde v. Roque, A.M. No. P-02-1643, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 210, 214.

[8] Visitacion, Jr. v. Ediza, A.M. No. P-01-1495,  August 9, 2001, 362  SCRA 403, 406.

[9] Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I, and Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, A.M. No. 2001-7-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 1, 15.

[10] A.M. No. P-02-1569,  November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 516, 521.