This petition for certiorari^[1] assails the 17 September 1997 Decision^[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50035. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners Oscar R. Badillo, Giovanni C. Ong, Edgar A. Ragasa, Rolando Sancada, and Dionisio Umbalin (petitioners) questioning the 5 June 1995 Order^[3] of Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10510 for Annulment of Documents with Prayer for Issuance of Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and Damages.


Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a road lot known as Lot 369-A-29 or Apollo Street of subdivision plan Psd-37971 (road lot). The road lot is a short access road which connects petitioners' properties to the main road known as Road 20. The road lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-20895 (22682) and registered in the name of respondent Pedro del Rosario (del Rosario). Annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-20895 is a court-ordered Entry No. 605/T-22655 which reads as follows: "It is hereby made of record that as per order of the Court, the street lot covered by this title shall not be closed or disposed of by the registered owner without previous approval of the court."^[4]

Petitioners alleged that in gross violation of the court order, del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the road lot to his co-respondents Josefa Conejero (Conejero) and Ignacio Sonoron (Sonoron) without obtaining prior court approval. Del Rosario, Conejero, and Sonoron then entered into a partition agreement to divide the road lot into four lots which resulted in the partial cancellation of TCT No. RT-20895 and the subsequent issuance of TCT Nos. 35899 and 35100 in the name of Conejero, TCT No. 35101 in the name of del Rosario, and TCT No. 35102 in the name of Sonoron.^[5]

Petitioners stated that del Rosario sold TCT No. 35101 to Goldkey Development Corporation (Goldkey).^[6]

Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds violated the court order when it allowed the registration of the sales and the subsequent issuance of new titles without first obtaining judicial approval. Petitioners claimed that Goldkey had built cement fences on the lot, thus blocking the ingress and egress of petitioners.^[7]

Petitioners prayed that the sales made in favor of Conejero, Sonoron, and Goldkey and the partition of the road lot be declared void.^[8]

In its Comment, Goldkey alleged that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the cases mentioned in Section 1 of Presidential Decree  No. (PD) 1344.^[9] Goldkey argued that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners' appeal because petitioners merely assigned an error involving a pure question of law.  Goldkey added that petitioners are using the present petition  as a substitute for an already lost appeal since petitioners' counsel had received the decision on 17 October 1997 and the present petition was posted only on 16 December 1997.^[10]

In May 1991, petitioners filed an initial complaint with the Office of the Building Official (building official) of Quezon City, docketed as Building Case No. R-10-91-006 entitled Giovanni C. Ong, et al. v. Manuel Chua (building case).^[11] Petitioners, who initiated the building case when Goldkey started putting up fences in some portions of the property, claimed that the parcel of land was a road lot.^[12]

On 10 September 1991, the HLURB issued a Development Permit to Goldkey allowing it to develop the land into residential townhouse units. The permit also mentioned that the project is classified as "Residential Townhouse Subdivision" and, as evaluated, the same is "in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Quezon City."^[13]

On 4 November 1991,^[14] petitioners filed a case for Annulment of Title and Damages^[15] with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Subsequently, the building official of Quezon City resolved the building case against petitioners and this decision became final and executory.^[16] The ruling held that the property is not a road lot but a residential lot.^[17]

On 5 June 1995, Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court) of Quezon City  issued an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.


The trial court dismissed petitioners' case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court pointed out that there was a decision rendered by the building official of Quezon City declaring the disputed property a residential lot and not a road lot; hence, the building official issued a building permit. The HLURB also issued a permit for the development of the land into a townhouse project. Petitioners did not appeal both rulings.  The trial court stated that petitioners' contention that the property is a road lot had been rendered moot by the finding of the building official which made the contrary declaration. If petitioners had any objection to the ruling, they should have appealed the same to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways as provided in Section 307 of Executive Order No. (EO) 1096. The findings of administrative agencies which have expertise are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.

The trial court also stated that the property had been approved by the HLURB for development into a townhouse project. The subject land was therefore removed from the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The HLURB's decision was also not appealed to the Office of the President as provided  in Section 4 of PD 1344 which gave the HLURB quasi-judicial powers.


On 17 September 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The appellate court stated that the original and amended complaints filed by petitioners were both premised on the claim that the subject parcels of land were subdivision road lots that were illegally converted into residential lots and thereafter disposed by del Rosario, the subdivision developer. Therefore, petitioners' complaints were filed for the purpose of enforcing a contractual and statutory obligation of del Rosario to preserve a subdivision road lot for street purposes. As such, the agency with jurisdiction is the HLURB, pursuant to the provisions of PD 957, 1216, and 1344, EO 648 dated 7 February 1981 and EO 90 dated 17 December 1986.

Further, the appellate court ruled that the error assigned by petitioners involves the issue on what law will apply to determine the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of the complaints. Petitioners' assigned error involves a pure question of law; hence, petitioners appealed to the wrong forum. Petitioners should have elevated their appeal to the Supreme Court and not to the Court of Appeals by way of a simple appeal.

Hence, this petition.


Petitioners raise three issues in this petition:

1. Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by dismissing petitioners' appeal on the ground that jurisdiction does not lie with the regular courts but with  the HLURB;
   
   
2. Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by dismissing petitioners' appeal on the ground that petitioners did not assign any error of fact; and
   
   
3. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper remedy for petitioners.
   

The petition lacks merit.

The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.^[18]  The extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends on the provisions of the statute creating such agency.^[19] Courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion.^[20]


PD 957,^[21] otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate business. The scope of the regulatory authority lodged in the NHA is indicated in the second whereas clause which states:

"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers," (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 22 of PD 957 provides:

Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans. - No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and  the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision. (Emphasis supplied)

PD 1344^[22] amended PD 957 by empowering the NHA to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions. Section 1 of PD 1344 states:

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

a.   Unsound real estate business practices;

b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)

Under EO 648,^[23] the NHA's functions were transferred to the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Section 8 of EO 648 provides:

Section 8.  Transfer of Functions. - The regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decrees No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission, together with such applicable personnel, appropriation, records, equipment and property necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among these regulatory functions are: (1) Regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) Registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) Approval of performance bond and the suspension of license to sell; (5) Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; (6) Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen; (7) Approval or mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the owner or developer; (8) Granting of permits for the alteration of plans and the extension of period for completion of subdivision or condominium projects; (9) Approval of the conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces found within the project which have been donated to the city or municipality concerned; (10) Regulation of the relationship between lessors and lessees; and (11) Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance. (Emphasis supplied)

EO 90^[24] renamed the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The HLURB retained the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the NHA.

Clearly, the scope and limitation of the HLURB's jurisdiction are well-defined. The HLURB's jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved, and the parties.^[25] In the present case, petitioners are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a subdivision road lot connecting their properties to the main road. Petitioners allege that the subdivision lot owners sold the road lot to a developer who is now constructing cement fences, thus blocking the passageway from their lots to the main road. In sum, petitioners are enforcing their statutory and contractual rights against the subdivision owners. This is a specific performance case which falls under the HLURB's exclusive jurisdiction.

In Osea v. Ambrosio,^[26] the Court held that the provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions relating to subdivisions. This intention was aimed to provide for an appropriate government agency, which is the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.

Petitioners claim that respondents violated the annotation at the back of TCT No. RT-20895 by selling an unsegregated portion of the lot without obtaining prior court approval.  The date of entry of this annotation is 18 August 1953. When PD 957, PD 1344, and EO 648 were enacted in 1976, 1978, and 1981, respectively, this annotation was impliedly modified such that the conversion of the road lot in the subdivision plan would fall under the HLURB's jurisdiction pursuant to these laws.

Petitioners argue that they can file a specific performance case to compel respondents to comply with their contractual and statutory obligation to maintain the road lot. However, petitioners can only be granted complete relief if the subject sales are declared void and the subsequent partition is declared illegal. Petitioners further contend that the HLURB, having only the jurisdiction to hear and decide specific performance cases, can only compel petitioners to file a case for annulment of title and prosecute the action. Petitioners insist that in the final analysis, a case for annulment of title would still have to be filed with the ordinary courts.^[27]

In Peña v. GSIS,^[28] the Court ruled that when an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:^[29]

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.

Finally, in Cristobal v. Court of Appeals,^[30] we held that "questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the NHA, now the HLURB, pursuant to Section 22 of PD 957 and not by the regular courts."


Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 2. Mode of appeal.-

(a) Ordinary Appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for Review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)

In Sevilleno v. Carilo,^[31] citing Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court summarized the rule on appeals:

(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;

(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied)

In First Bancorp, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,^[32] this Court also explained the two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:

(1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or

(2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioners raised only one issue in their Appellants' Brief - whether "the Honorable Trial Court a quo seriously erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when in fact it has already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter of the case."

The question on jurisdiction is undoubtedly one of law. We have held that "a question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted."^[33] Consequently, it is not disputed that the issue brought by petitioners to the Court of Appeals involves solely the  trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.

As petitioners' appeal solely involves a question of law, the appellate court did not err in dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners should have directly taken their appeal to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 nor a petition for certiorari with this Court under Rule 65.

As held in Balayan v. Acorda,^[34] "the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse." It lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the present case, petitioners chose the wrong mode of appeal. Hence, the instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss or lapse was an error in petitioners' choice of remedy. We have held in David v. Cordova^[35] that:

A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternate or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied)

There were instances when the Court has relaxed the rule on the special civil action for certiorari as a substitute for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 such as where the application of this rule would result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.^[36] Although the Court has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, there is nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the rules.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 17 September 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 28-44. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Romeo A. Brawner.

^[3] Id. at 25-26. Penned by Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia.

^[4] Id. at  7-8.

^[5] Id. at 8-9.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id. at 9.

^[8] Id. at 19.

^[9] Id. at 146.

^[10] Id. at 147.

^[11] Id. at 29.

^[12] Id. at 82 and 336.

^[13] Id. at 336-337.

^[14] Id. at 10.

^[15] Id. at 16.

^[16] Id. at 30.

^[17] Id. at 337.

^[18] Teotico v. Baer, G.R. No.  147464, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 279.

^[19] Osea v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 162774, 7 April 2006, 486 SCRA 599.

^[20] Id.

^[21] The law became effective on 12 July 1976.

^[22] The law became effective on 2 April 1978.

^[23] It is otherwise known as "Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission." The law became effective on 7 February 1981.

^[24] The law became effective on 17 December 1986.

^[25] Delos Santos v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 154877, 27 March 2007, 519 SCRA 62, 73.

^[26] G.R. No. 162774, 7 April 2006, 486 SCRA 599, 607.

^[27] Rollo, pp. 16-17.

^[28] G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 383, 402.

^[29] G.R. No. 80916, 9 November 1990, 191 SCRA 268, 272-273.

^[30] G.R. No. 125339, 22 June 1998, 291 SCRA 122, 132.

^[31] G.R. No. 146454, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 385, 388.

^[32] G.R. No. 151132, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 221, 235.

^[33] Bukidnon Doctors' Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 161882, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 233.

^[34] G.R. No. 153537, 5 May 2006, 489 SCRA 637, 641.

^[35] G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 394-395.

^[36] VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153144, 16 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 353.