SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 134712, August 13, 2004 ]MARIA CABOTAJE v. SPS. SOTERO PUDUNAN AND MARIA RIVERA +
MARIA CABOTAJE, AGUSTIN CABOTAJE, AMELIA TOMAS AND DANIEL PUGAYAN, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES SOTERO PUDUNAN AND MARIA RIVERA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
MARIA CABOTAJE v. SPS. SOTERO PUDUNAN AND MARIA RIVERA +
MARIA CABOTAJE, AGUSTIN CABOTAJE, AMELIA TOMAS AND DANIEL PUGAYAN, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES SOTERO PUDUNAN AND MARIA RIVERA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 42432 which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30,
in Civil Case No. 207 for recovery of ownership and possession, and damages.
The Antecedents
Bonifacia Lang-ew was the owner of two parcels of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-776-44 with an area of 9,951 square meters; and Lot 2 of Plan Psu-776-44 with an area of 6,382 square meters. The lots were located in Lamut, Indiana, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1657.[3] Lang-ew died intestate on November 23, 1965 and was survived by her grandchildren Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Amelia Tomas, the children of her daughter Josefina Bintican who died on November 21, 1952; and, her grandson Daniel Pugayan, the son of her daughter Emerenciana Bintican who also predeceased her.
Maria Cabotaje, Daniel Pugayan and their close relatives Remicio Marques and Amelia Tomas, were in dire need of money. On January 4, 1966, they borrowed P1,000 from the Spouses Sotero Pudunan and Maria Rivera. They signed a private document prepared by Juan Anungos, which stated inter alia that the payment of the said amount was secured by a mortgage over Lot 1 covered by TCT No. T-1657, and that the property was redeemable within one year, extendible for another year, until the full amount of the loan was paid.[4] The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-1657 was then delivered to the mortgagees by the mortgagors. The Spouses Pudunan took possession of the property, although under the document, the mortgagors had the right to remain in possession thereof.
On the same date, January 4, 1966, Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Daniel Pugayan, Amelia Tomas and her husband Pedro Tomas affixed their signatures over a deed entitled "Confirmatory Deed of Sale," in which they undertook to sell Lot 2 covered by TCT No. T-1657 to the Spouses Pudunan for the price of P2,000.00. Also in the document was a statement that part of the money was remitted to Bonifacia Lang-ew and was spent by her during her illness, and to her heirs which was used for burial expenses. The document was notarized by Judge Tomas P. Maddela, the Municipal Judge and Ex-Officio Notary Public of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and registered in his notarial register as Document No. 461, Page 96, Book V, Series of 1966.[5] The property sold under the said deed is described as follows:
After nineteen years or so, or on February 26, 1985, petitioners Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Amelia Tomas and Daniel Pugayan filed a complaint with the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya against the respondents, the Spouses Pudunan, for recovery of ownership and possession of Lots 1 and 2 covered by TCT No. T-1657. The petitioners alleged inter alia that in a private document they signed on January 4, 1966, it appears that they mortgaged Lot 1 to secure the payment of a P1,000-loan from the respondents. They averred, however, that they only received P660.00 and that the respondents thereafter took possession of the property. Being impoverished, they tolerated the respondents' possession of the property. The petitioners further narrated that they offered to pay their loan in 1972, but that the respondents refused to accept such payment as they (the respondents) were the rightful owners of the property. The petitioners further averred that after eighteen years, or in 1984, they sought the assistance of counsel on what course of action to take, and it was only then that they discovered that by virtue of a deed of sale issued in favor of the respondents, TCT No. T-20808 covering Lots 1 and 2 had been issued in the names of the latter. The petitioners alleged, however, that no copy of the said deed could be found in the Register of Deeds, and that they never executed any deed of sale covering the said lots, much less any deed settling the estate of the deceased Bonifacia Lang-ew.
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
The petitioners prayed that they be granted the following reliefs:
Respondent Maria Rivera testified that after the death of Lang-ew in 1965, the petitioners offered to sell Lot 1 for P2,500.00 to them and that the latter agreed. The amount of P1,000.00 was then given to the petitioners, while the remaining P1,500.00 was spent for the burial of Lang-ew. The respondents' remittances were further evidenced by receipts.[16] Respondent Rivera narrated that the parties to the sale arrived in the Office of Judge Maddela and requested the latter to revise the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale so as to include Lot 1 thereon. Since Judge Maddela was in a hurry, he instructed his Clerk of Court Mariano Gonzales to include Lot 1 in the deed, and the latter did as he was told. The petitioners and respondents then proceeded to the Office of the Register of Deeds where the said deed was filed. According to respondent Rivera, she was not aware if Judge Maddela's notarial copies of the deed were altered as to include Lot 1 therein, since the judge was in such a hurry.[17]
The petitioners presented Maria Cabotaje on rebuttal, who testified that the petitioners never sold Lot 1 to the respondents and that they learned of the insertions and intercalations in the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale only when Tubal testified.[18]
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, the decretal portion of which reads:
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioners did not bother to file their brief. The CA, thereafter, rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial court, holding that the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale was voidable under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code and not void ab initio; hence, the action to annul the said deed prescribed four years from the time of the petitioners' actual or presumptive knowledge thereof. The appellate court held that the cause of action of the petitioners to nullify the deed accrued on July 18, 1966 when the Confirmatory Deed of Sale was filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds, as the petitioners henceforth had presumptive knowledge of the existence of the altered Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[20] Hence, the petitioners should have filed their complaint within four years from July 18, 1966 or, on or before July 19, 1970. Since the appellees filed their complaint only on February 26, 1995, their action had long prescribed and should have been dismissed by the trial court. The appellate court further ruled that there is no law requiring the heirs to execute the conveyance in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioners, they alleged that the respondents altered the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale after the said deed was executed by the parties; as such, the deed was null and void, not merely voidable. However, the CA denied the said motion.
In their petition at bar, the petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
The petitioners assert that they did not sell Lot 1 to the respondents, much less receive from them the P2,000.00 purchase price which appears in the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale. Absent their consent to the sale and the price or consideration for their property, such deed is null and void; hence, they contend that their action is imprescriptible as provided for in Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. The petitioners further contend that Article 1391 of the New Civil Code applies only in a case where fraud is committed prior to or simultaneous with the execution of a deed.[22] The petitioners argue that the deed is null and void since the respondents altered the original copy of the deed after the execution and notarization thereof.
For their part, the respondents contend that the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale is valid. They aver that the alterations and intercalations contained in the original copy of the deed were reflective of the fact that Lot 1 was sold by the petitioners after the execution of the said deed, and that such alterations were known and agreed to by the petitioners before the same was filed with the Register of Deeds. They aver that the petitioners even turned over to them not only the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-1657 so that title over the two lots could be issued in their names, but also the possession of the property after Lang-ew's death on November 23, 1965. They also insist that they have been in possession of the property since then. The respondents further contend that even if the altered original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale is fraudulent, the same is merely voidable; hence, the action to nullify the same is prescriptible. The respondents aver that since the petitioners filed their complaint only on February 26, 1985, their action had long prescribed, considering that their cause of action accrued on July 18, 1966.
We rule for the petitioners.
The general rule is that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. However, the rule is not without exceptions, which the Court enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals[23] as follows: (a) when the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; (b) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals is manifestly mistaken or absurd; (c) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on its misapprehension of the facts; and, (d) when the Court of Appeals failed to resolve relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a modification or reversal of the decision of the appellate court.[24] The present case falls within the foregoing exceptions.
Rule 132, Section 31 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, provides:
First. Respondent Maria Rivera admitted in court that the alteration occurred after the execution of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[25]
Second. The petitioners did not authenticate the alterations in the assailed deed by affixing their initials or signatures thereon.
Third. Neither did Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge Tomas Maddela authenticate the said alterations when he notarized the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[26]
Fourth. Under the Confirmatory Deed of Sale, the petitioners sold Lot 2 for P2,000.00. In the assailed deed, the petitioners purportedly also sold Lot 1 to the respondents, but the purchase price thereof remained unchanged. Thus, under the assailed deed, the respondents paid P2,000.00 for the two lots. The respondents failed to give a satisfactory explanation why the price of the property remained at P2,000.00 Evidently, there was no price or consideration for the sale of Lot 1, as it is incredible that the petitioners would sell the property to the respondents without any price or consideration therefor.
Fifth. The respondents claim that they told Judge Maddela that they were also buying Lot 1 from the petitioners, but since the judge was in a hurry to leave, he merely instructed his clerk of court to make the necessary alterations in his copies of the deed of sale. The respondents also claim that the parties to the deed left without seeing to it that the clerk of court had made the alterations in the copies of Judge Maddela:
While it is true that a notarized deed of sale is a public document and has in its favor the presumption of regularity and that to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear and convincing; the evidence on record in this case is, however, so clear and convincing in support of the finding that the assailed copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale has been altered and is, in fact, null and void.
All told then, we find and so hold that the petitioners did not consent to the sale of Lot 1 to the respondents. One of the essential requirements of a valid contract, including a contract of sale, is the consent of the owner of the property.[31] Absent such consent, the contract is null and void ab initio.[32] A void contract is absolutely wanting in civil effects; it is equivalent to nothing.[33] It produces no effects whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; hence, it does not create, modify, or extinguish the judicial relation to which it refers.[34] In fine, the petitioners, not the respondents, are the rightful owners of Lot 1.
Under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code, the action for the declaration of the non-existence of a contract does not prescribe. Thus, the action of the petitioners for the declaration of the non-existence of the assailed deed is imprescriptible.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 207 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez (retired) with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (later promoted as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, now retired) and Bennie A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (retired), concurring.
[2] Penned by Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay.
[3] Exhibit "B."
[4] Exhibit "A."
[5] Exhibit "E."
[6] Exhibit "E-1."
[7] Exhibit "C."
[8] Records, p. 5.
[9] Id. at 20.
[10] Exhibit "C."
[11] Exhibit "C-1."
[12] Records, p. 170.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Id. at 171-172.
[15] Exhibit "A-4."
[16] Exhibits "4" and "4-D."
[17] TSN, 20 November 1990, pp. 10-12; TSN, 22 November 1990, pp. 7-11.
[18] TSN, 20 June 1991, pp. 4-5.
[19] Records, pp. 357-358.
[20] Exhibit "C."
[21] Rollo, p. 17.
[22] Id. at 19.
[23] 268 SCRA 703 (1992).
[24] Cited in Cordial v. Miranda, 348 SCRA 158 (2000).
[25] TSN, 20 November 1990, p. 11.
[26] Exhibit "E."
[27] TSN, 22 November 1990, pp. 7-10.
[28] TSN, 7 March 1988, pp. 12-13.
[29] Id. at 14-15.
[30] Exhibit "E."
[31] Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 359 (1981).
[32] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume IV, 1991 ed., p. 629.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Id. at 621.
Bonifacia Lang-ew was the owner of two parcels of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-776-44 with an area of 9,951 square meters; and Lot 2 of Plan Psu-776-44 with an area of 6,382 square meters. The lots were located in Lamut, Indiana, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1657.[3] Lang-ew died intestate on November 23, 1965 and was survived by her grandchildren Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Amelia Tomas, the children of her daughter Josefina Bintican who died on November 21, 1952; and, her grandson Daniel Pugayan, the son of her daughter Emerenciana Bintican who also predeceased her.
Maria Cabotaje, Daniel Pugayan and their close relatives Remicio Marques and Amelia Tomas, were in dire need of money. On January 4, 1966, they borrowed P1,000 from the Spouses Sotero Pudunan and Maria Rivera. They signed a private document prepared by Juan Anungos, which stated inter alia that the payment of the said amount was secured by a mortgage over Lot 1 covered by TCT No. T-1657, and that the property was redeemable within one year, extendible for another year, until the full amount of the loan was paid.[4] The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-1657 was then delivered to the mortgagees by the mortgagors. The Spouses Pudunan took possession of the property, although under the document, the mortgagors had the right to remain in possession thereof.
On the same date, January 4, 1966, Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Daniel Pugayan, Amelia Tomas and her husband Pedro Tomas affixed their signatures over a deed entitled "Confirmatory Deed of Sale," in which they undertook to sell Lot 2 covered by TCT No. T-1657 to the Spouses Pudunan for the price of P2,000.00. Also in the document was a statement that part of the money was remitted to Bonifacia Lang-ew and was spent by her during her illness, and to her heirs which was used for burial expenses. The document was notarized by Judge Tomas P. Maddela, the Municipal Judge and Ex-Officio Notary Public of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and registered in his notarial register as Document No. 461, Page 96, Book V, Series of 1966.[5] The property sold under the said deed is described as follows:
A parcel of land Lot No. 2, Plan Psu. 77644, situated in the Barrio of Lamut, Municipality of Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya; bounded on the S. by prop. of Arcadio Biag; on the W. by Aritao-Bambang Prov. Road; on the N by prop. of Crisanto Caro; on the SE. by the Acdao Brook; and on the NW. by prop. of Francisco Concepcion. Containing an area of 6,382 sq. meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1657 of the land records of Nueva Vizcaya.[6]Judge Tomas Maddela retained two copies of the deed for his notarial file. However, the deed was not filed with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. Subsequently, it was made to appear in the original copy of the said deed that both Lots 1 and 2, consisting of 6,382 square meters and 9,951 square meters, respectively, were sold to the Spouses Pudunan. The alterations are underscored, thus:
Two parcels of land Lot No. 1 and 2, Plan Psu. 77644, situated in the Barrio of Lamut, Municipality of Bambang, Province of Nueva Vizcaya; bounded on the S. by prop. of Arcadio Biag; on the W. by Aritao-Bambang Prov. Road; on the N by prop. of Crisanto Caro; on the SE. by the Acdao Brook; and on the NW. by prop. of Francisco Concepcion. Containing an area of 15,333 sq. meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1657 of the land records of Nueva Vizcaya.[7]Such altered original copy was filed on July 18, 1966 with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. On the same day, TCT No. T-20808 was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of the Spouses Pudunan.
After nineteen years or so, or on February 26, 1985, petitioners Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Amelia Tomas and Daniel Pugayan filed a complaint with the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya against the respondents, the Spouses Pudunan, for recovery of ownership and possession of Lots 1 and 2 covered by TCT No. T-1657. The petitioners alleged inter alia that in a private document they signed on January 4, 1966, it appears that they mortgaged Lot 1 to secure the payment of a P1,000-loan from the respondents. They averred, however, that they only received P660.00 and that the respondents thereafter took possession of the property. Being impoverished, they tolerated the respondents' possession of the property. The petitioners further narrated that they offered to pay their loan in 1972, but that the respondents refused to accept such payment as they (the respondents) were the rightful owners of the property. The petitioners further averred that after eighteen years, or in 1984, they sought the assistance of counsel on what course of action to take, and it was only then that they discovered that by virtue of a deed of sale issued in favor of the respondents, TCT No. T-20808 covering Lots 1 and 2 had been issued in the names of the latter. The petitioners alleged, however, that no copy of the said deed could be found in the Register of Deeds, and that they never executed any deed of sale covering the said lots, much less any deed settling the estate of the deceased Bonifacia Lang-ew.
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that, after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows, thus:In their answer to the complaint, the respondents interposed the defense of prescription of action, to wit:
a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20808 and the deed of sale which caused the issuance thereof;PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other reliefs consistent with law and equity and available in the premises.[8]
b) Declaring plaintiffs as the lawful owners of the above-described landholding, and directing the Register of Deeds to issue another title in the names of said plaintiffs;
c) Ordering defendants to pay actual damages to the plaintiffs equivalent to the monetary value of 2,440 cavanes (sic) of palay at 46 kilos per cavan;
d) Granting the claim for damages: moral damages of P10,000.00 each for all the plaintiffs or a total of P40,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00; and
e) Reimbursing attorney's fees of P7,000.00.
That similarly the plaintiffs' alleged cause of action to annul and cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20808 covering the parcels of land in question which had long legally belong to the defendants and which certificate of title lawfully, validly and regularly issued to the herein defendants on July 18, 1966 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya, in the absence of any plaintiffs' allegation of fraud, mistake, intimidation, violence or undue influence as alleged reasons for its nullification and cancellation, the same is very true likewise to said plaintiffs' seeking the nullification of the sale in favor of defendants, has also long prescribed and barred by the statute of limitations;[9]In the course of the presentation of the petitioners' evidence, Cornelio Tubal from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya testified on July 15, 1986 that TCT No. T-20808 was issued on the basis of a "Confirmatory Deed of Sale"[10] covering Lots 1 and 2[11] which deed, on its face, contained intercalations and alterations. Subsequently, the petitioners, with prior leave of court, filed an amended complaint in which they alleged inter alia that they never received any amount by virtue of the altered "Confirmatory Deed of Sale;" that they turned over the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-1657 to the respondents as a sign of good faith on account of their P1,000-loan of which only P673.60 was received by them; that they discovered the existence of the altered "Confirmatory Deed of Sale" covering Lots 1 and 2 only on July 15, 1986;[12] and, that they never executed any deed of sale covering Lot 1,[13] nor received the amount of P2,000.00 as stated on the said deed of sale. The petitioners concluded that as such, the altered deed was null and void.
The petitioners prayed that they be granted the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that, after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows, thus:The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds of acquisitive prescription under Article 1117, in relation to Article 1134 of the New Civil Code, and prescription of action. The trial court granted the motion but reinstated the case on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. At the trial, petitioner Maria Cabotaje testified that of the P1,000-loan, they received only P468.00, of which the amount of P326.60 was used for "title expenses;" P6.00 was received by "Belong," while the balance of P199.60 was divided among the petitioners.[15] The petitioners also presented Tubal who appeared for the Office of the Register of Deeds and testified that TCT No. T-1657 was cancelled on the basis of the altered copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.
a) Declaring as null and void partially both Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20808 as far as Lot No. 1 covering an area of 9,951 square meters and the deed of sale which caused the issuance thereof;PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other reliefs consistent with law and equity and available in the premises.[14]
b) Declaring plaintiffs as the lawful owners of the above-described landholding, directing the Register of Deeds to issue a title in the names of said plaintiffs covering said parcel of land and ordering the defendants to deliver the physical possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
c) Ordering defendants to pay actual damages to the plaintiffs equivalent to the monetary value of 2,870 cavans of palay at 46 kilos per cavan;
d) Granting the claim for damages: moral damages of P10,000.00 each for all the plaintiffs or a total of P40,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00; and
e) Reimbursing attorney's fees of P7,000.00.
Respondent Maria Rivera testified that after the death of Lang-ew in 1965, the petitioners offered to sell Lot 1 for P2,500.00 to them and that the latter agreed. The amount of P1,000.00 was then given to the petitioners, while the remaining P1,500.00 was spent for the burial of Lang-ew. The respondents' remittances were further evidenced by receipts.[16] Respondent Rivera narrated that the parties to the sale arrived in the Office of Judge Maddela and requested the latter to revise the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale so as to include Lot 1 thereon. Since Judge Maddela was in a hurry, he instructed his Clerk of Court Mariano Gonzales to include Lot 1 in the deed, and the latter did as he was told. The petitioners and respondents then proceeded to the Office of the Register of Deeds where the said deed was filed. According to respondent Rivera, she was not aware if Judge Maddela's notarial copies of the deed were altered as to include Lot 1 therein, since the judge was in such a hurry.[17]
The petitioners presented Maria Cabotaje on rebuttal, who testified that the petitioners never sold Lot 1 to the respondents and that they learned of the insertions and intercalations in the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale only when Tubal testified.[18]
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, justice and equity demand that Judgment be hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:The trial court ruled that the petitioners merely mortgaged Lot 1 to the respondents and that the conveyance thereof to the latter after the death of Lang-ew was null and void because it was not made in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. According to the trial court, the action to declare the non-existence of the said deed is imprescriptible. It also ruled that the action for the cancellation of the conveyance on the ground of fraud commenced to run only when Cornelio Tubal testified, and not on July 18, 1966 upon the filing of the original copy of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and the cancellation of TCT No. T-1657 in favor of TCT No. T-20808 over Lots 1 and 2 which was issued under the names of the respondents. The trial court also ruled that the respondents had not acquired ownership of Lot 1 by acquisitive prescription because the possession of the said lot by the respondents was merely upon the tolerance of the petitioners.
- Declaring null and void ab initio TCT No. T-20808 as far as Lot No. 1 is concerned with an area of 9,951 sq. meters, and the Confirmatory Deed of Sale (Exh. "C") which caused the issuance of said title;
- Declaring plaintiffs as the lawful owners of said Lot No. 1 and directing the Register of Deeds to issue corresponding Title to plaintiffs and Ordering the defendants to deliver the physical possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
- Ordering defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs 2,870 cavans of palay at 46 kilos per cavan or pay its monetary equivalent computed at the then prevailing rate or cost as actual damages;
- Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs as damages:
a) moral Damages P2,000.00 for each plaintiff or a total of P8,000.00;SO ORDERED.[19]
b) exemplary Damages P2,000.00;
c) attorney's Fees P5,000.00; and,
d) The costs of suit.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioners did not bother to file their brief. The CA, thereafter, rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial court, holding that the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale was voidable under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code and not void ab initio; hence, the action to annul the said deed prescribed four years from the time of the petitioners' actual or presumptive knowledge thereof. The appellate court held that the cause of action of the petitioners to nullify the deed accrued on July 18, 1966 when the Confirmatory Deed of Sale was filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds, as the petitioners henceforth had presumptive knowledge of the existence of the altered Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[20] Hence, the petitioners should have filed their complaint within four years from July 18, 1966 or, on or before July 19, 1970. Since the appellees filed their complaint only on February 26, 1995, their action had long prescribed and should have been dismissed by the trial court. The appellate court further ruled that there is no law requiring the heirs to execute the conveyance in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioners, they alleged that the respondents altered the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale after the said deed was executed by the parties; as such, the deed was null and void, not merely voidable. However, the CA denied the said motion.
In their petition at bar, the petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT IN RESOLVING THE APPEAL BEFORE IT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, HAS DONE SO IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE HIGHEST TRIBUNAL.The core issue for resolution is whether the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale wherein it appears that the petitioners also sold Lot 1 of their property to the respondents is null and void.
SPECIFICALLY: HAS PRESCRIPTION SET IN THE INSTANT CIVIL CASE AS TO DENY THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO PURSUE THEIR CAUSE/COMPLAINT TO RECOVER THEIR OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY?[21]
The petitioners assert that they did not sell Lot 1 to the respondents, much less receive from them the P2,000.00 purchase price which appears in the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale. Absent their consent to the sale and the price or consideration for their property, such deed is null and void; hence, they contend that their action is imprescriptible as provided for in Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. The petitioners further contend that Article 1391 of the New Civil Code applies only in a case where fraud is committed prior to or simultaneous with the execution of a deed.[22] The petitioners argue that the deed is null and void since the respondents altered the original copy of the deed after the execution and notarization thereof.
For their part, the respondents contend that the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale is valid. They aver that the alterations and intercalations contained in the original copy of the deed were reflective of the fact that Lot 1 was sold by the petitioners after the execution of the said deed, and that such alterations were known and agreed to by the petitioners before the same was filed with the Register of Deeds. They aver that the petitioners even turned over to them not only the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-1657 so that title over the two lots could be issued in their names, but also the possession of the property after Lang-ew's death on November 23, 1965. They also insist that they have been in possession of the property since then. The respondents further contend that even if the altered original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale is fraudulent, the same is merely voidable; hence, the action to nullify the same is prescriptible. The respondents aver that since the petitioners filed their complaint only on February 26, 1985, their action had long prescribed, considering that their cause of action accrued on July 18, 1966.
We rule for the petitioners.
The general rule is that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. However, the rule is not without exceptions, which the Court enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals[23] as follows: (a) when the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; (b) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals is manifestly mistaken or absurd; (c) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on its misapprehension of the facts; and, (d) when the Court of Appeals failed to resolve relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a modification or reversal of the decision of the appellate court.[24] The present case falls within the foregoing exceptions.
Rule 132, Section 31 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, provides:
Alterations in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.There is no doubt that the alterations in the assailed deed of sale are substantial and material. We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the respondents, either by themselves or at their behest and without the knowledge of the petitioners, caused the alterations in the assailed copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale by making it appear therein that the petitioners sold Lot 1 as well as Lot 2 with a total area of 15,333 square meters for only P2,000.00.
First. Respondent Maria Rivera admitted in court that the alteration occurred after the execution of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[25]
Second. The petitioners did not authenticate the alterations in the assailed deed by affixing their initials or signatures thereon.
Third. Neither did Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge Tomas Maddela authenticate the said alterations when he notarized the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.[26]
Fourth. Under the Confirmatory Deed of Sale, the petitioners sold Lot 2 for P2,000.00. In the assailed deed, the petitioners purportedly also sold Lot 1 to the respondents, but the purchase price thereof remained unchanged. Thus, under the assailed deed, the respondents paid P2,000.00 for the two lots. The respondents failed to give a satisfactory explanation why the price of the property remained at P2,000.00 Evidently, there was no price or consideration for the sale of Lot 1, as it is incredible that the petitioners would sell the property to the respondents without any price or consideration therefor.
Fifth. The respondents claim that they told Judge Maddela that they were also buying Lot 1 from the petitioners, but since the judge was in a hurry to leave, he merely instructed his clerk of court to make the necessary alterations in his copies of the deed of sale. The respondents also claim that the parties to the deed left without seeing to it that the clerk of court had made the alterations in the copies of Judge Maddela:
The claim of the respondents is incredible because Saturnino Galapon, the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, who testified for the petitioners, declared that he was appointed to the position during the incumbency of Judge Florante Tupasi:
The Clerk of Court during the incumbency of Judge Tomas Maddela was Mariano Gonzales, who was already deceased at the time Galapon testified:
Furthermore, Judge Maddela knew or should have known the legal implications of the alterations on the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale without making the appropriate alterations in his own copies of the deed, and could not have agreed to merely ordering the clerk of court to make the alterations himself. Aside from the fact that the copies of the deed[30] retained by Judge Maddela do not contain any alterations, the respondents failed to present Judge Tomas Maddela to corroborate the testimony of respondent Maria Rivera.
While it is true that a notarized deed of sale is a public document and has in its favor the presumption of regularity and that to contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear and convincing; the evidence on record in this case is, however, so clear and convincing in support of the finding that the assailed copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale has been altered and is, in fact, null and void.
All told then, we find and so hold that the petitioners did not consent to the sale of Lot 1 to the respondents. One of the essential requirements of a valid contract, including a contract of sale, is the consent of the owner of the property.[31] Absent such consent, the contract is null and void ab initio.[32] A void contract is absolutely wanting in civil effects; it is equivalent to nothing.[33] It produces no effects whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; hence, it does not create, modify, or extinguish the judicial relation to which it refers.[34] In fine, the petitioners, not the respondents, are the rightful owners of Lot 1.
Under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code, the action for the declaration of the non-existence of a contract does not prescribe. Thus, the action of the petitioners for the declaration of the non-existence of the assailed deed is imprescriptible.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 207 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo P. Galvez (retired) with Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena (later promoted as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, now retired) and Bennie A. Adefuin-De la Cruz (retired), concurring.
[2] Penned by Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay.
[3] Exhibit "B."
[4] Exhibit "A."
[5] Exhibit "E."
[6] Exhibit "E-1."
[7] Exhibit "C."
[8] Records, p. 5.
[9] Id. at 20.
[10] Exhibit "C."
[11] Exhibit "C-1."
[12] Records, p. 170.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Id. at 171-172.
[15] Exhibit "A-4."
[16] Exhibits "4" and "4-D."
[17] TSN, 20 November 1990, pp. 10-12; TSN, 22 November 1990, pp. 7-11.
[18] TSN, 20 June 1991, pp. 4-5.
[19] Records, pp. 357-358.
[20] Exhibit "C."
[21] Rollo, p. 17.
[22] Id. at 19.
[23] 268 SCRA 703 (1992).
[24] Cited in Cordial v. Miranda, 348 SCRA 158 (2000).
[25] TSN, 20 November 1990, p. 11.
[26] Exhibit "E."
[27] TSN, 22 November 1990, pp. 7-10.
[28] TSN, 7 March 1988, pp. 12-13.
[29] Id. at 14-15.
[30] Exhibit "E."
[31] Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 359 (1981).
[32] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume IV, 1991 ed., p. 629.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Id. at 621.