This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan, against Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.

On or about 30 January 2005, the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).^[1]

On 30 and 31 January 2005, a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG, DENR, and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City, Cebu. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees:

Container Van No.	Shipper	Consignee
NCLU - 2000492-22GI	Polaris Chua	Polaris Chua
IEAU - 2521845-2210	Polaris Chua	Polaris Chua
NOLU - 2000682-22GI	Rowena Balangot	Rowena Balangot
INBU - 3125757-BB2210	Rowena Balangot	Rowena Balangot
NCLU - 20001591-22GI	Jovan Gomez	Jovan Gomez
GSTU - 339074-US2210	Jovan Gomez	Jovan Gomez
CRXU - 2167567	Raffy Enriquez	Raffy Enriquez
NCLU - 2001570-22GI	Raffy Enriquez	Raffy Enriquez

The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products, as required by DENR Administrative Order No. 07-94. Gen. Dagudag alleged that, since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time, the DENR considered them as abandoned and, on 31 January 2005, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Richard N. Abella, issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines, Inc.^[2]

On 1 February 2005, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines, Inc. asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products.^[3] In an affidavit^[4] dated 9 February 2005, NMC Container Lines, Inc.'s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines, Inc. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans.

On 2, 9, and 15 February 2005, DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. Canete, Jr. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines, Inc. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. Nobody appeared during the adjudication.^[5] In a resolution^[6] dated 10 March 2005, Rivac, acting as adjudication officer, recommended to DENR Regional Executive Director Clarence L. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government.

In a complaint^[7] dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga, a certain Roger C. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. On 29 March 2005, Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin^[8] ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Salceda to take possession of the forest products.

In a motion to quash the writ of replevin,^[9] the defendants DENR, CENRO, and Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma's bond was insufficient; (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains; (3) Edma was not a party-in-interest; (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document; (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time; (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned; (7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; (8) replevin was not proper; (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR; (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. In a motion to dismiss ad cautelam^[10] dated 12 April 2005, the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines; (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent; and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products.

In an order^[11] dated 14 April 2005, Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit.

Gen. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavit-complaint^[12] dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. Gen. Dagudag stated that:

During the x x x hearing, [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x Edma. DENR's counsel was lambasted, cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT'S BALONEY."

x x x x

Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

x x x x

[Judge Paderanga's] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit, issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law.

In its 1^st Indorsement^[13] dated 1 August 2005, the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In his comment^[14] dated 6 September 2005, Judge Paderanga stated that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending before him.

In its Report^[15] dated 10 July 2006, the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; and (3) used inappropriate language in court. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary;^[16] and that he be fined P30,000.

In its Resolution^[17] dated 16 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed.^[18] Since Gen. Dagudag did not file any manifestation, the Court considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution.^[19]

The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.

The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's natural resources.

Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.

In the instant case, the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. Consequently, the DENR seized the forest products.

Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,^[20] the Court held that:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. (Emphasis ours)

In Dy v. Court of Appeals,^[21] the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals,^[22] the Court held that:

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours)

In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. In Dy,^[23] the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency -- not the courts. In Paat,^[24] the Court held that:

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

x x x x

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. (Emphasis ours)

Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may have been commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan^[25] -- a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case -- the Court held that:

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours)

In Paat,^[26] the Court held that:

[T]he enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Emphasis ours)

Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. In Calub v. Court of Appeals,^[27] the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin:

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis ours)

Judge Paderanga's acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. In Tabao,^[28] the Court held that:

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special competence. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.

x x x x

Respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Emphasis ours)

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.^[29]

The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright. In Español v. Toledo-Mupas,^[30] the Court held that:

Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.

When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find respondent's intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for."^[31]

Indeed, the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and undignified in court:

Atty. Luego:	Your Honor, we want to have this motion because that is...
Judge Paderanga:	I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?]
x x x x
Atty. Luego:	I apologize, Your Honor. We are ready to...
Judge Paderanga:	Ready to what? Proceed.
Atty. Luego:	Yes, Your Honor. We filed this motion to quash replevin, Your Honor, on the grounds, first and foremost, it is our contention, Your Honor, with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court, that the writ of replevin dated March 29, 2005 was improper, Your Honor, for the reasons that the lumber, subject matter of this case, were apprehended in accordance with...
Judge Paderanga:	Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego:	Under the rules...
Judge Paderanga:	Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules. What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. You point out the rules. You take out your rules and then you point out. Do you have the rules?
x x x x
Atty. Luego:	Your Honor, there was no seizure receipt, but during the apprehension, Your Honor, there was no claimant.
Judge Paderanga:	Answer me. Is there a seizure receipt?
Atty. Luego:	But during the apprehension, Your Honor, no owner has [sic] appeared.
x x x x
Atty. Luego:	According to [the] rules, Your Honor, if there is no...
Judge Paderanga:	Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from?
Atty. Luego:	From the shipping company, Your Honor.
x x x x
Atty. Luego:	Your Honor please, the shipping company denied the ownership of that lumber.
x x x x
Atty. Luego:	But the shipping company, Your Honor,...
Judge Paderanga:	Shut up. That's baloney. You are seizing it from nobody. Then how can you seize it from the shipping company. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company?
Atty. Luego:	But the... May I continue, Your Honor?
x x x x
Judge Paderanga:	Stop talking about the shipping company. Still you did not issue a seizure receipt here. Well, I'm telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company.
x x x x
Judge Paderanga:	You are a lawyer. You should know how to write pleadings. You write the pleadings the way it should be, not the way you think it should be.
Atty. Luego:	I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga:	You are an officer of the court. You should be careful with your language. You say that I am wrong. It's you who are [sic] wrong because you do not read the law.
x x x x
Judge Paderanga:	Then you read the law. How dare you say that the Court is wrong.
x x x x
Judge Paderanga:	Are you not representing [the DENR]?
Atty. Luego:	Yes, in this case, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga:	Then you are representing them. They are your clients. What kind of a lawyer are you?[32]
x x x x
Atty. Tiamson:	Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere, Your Honor.
Judge Paderanga:	No.
x x x x
Judge Paderanga:	The problem with you people is you do not use your heads.
Atty. Tiamson:	We use our heads, your Honor.
x x x x
Atty. Tiamson:	Your Honor, we would like to put on record that we use our heads, your Honor.[33] (Emphasis ours)

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers. Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language.^[34] They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court.^[35] In Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas,^[36] the Court held that:

A judge who is inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people's faith in the judiciary. He also violates Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

x x x x

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.

Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary.

Judge Paderanga's refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin, repeated interruption of the lawyers, and utterance of "shut up," "that's baloney," "how dare you say that the court is wrong," "what kind of a lawyer are you?," and "the problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,^[37] the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up," being arrogant, and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court. He has not changed.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.^[38] Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.^[39]

The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga's third offense. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga,^[40] the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." In Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga,^[41] the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits. In both cases, the Court sternly warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga's arrogance, incorrigibility, and unfitness to become a judge.

Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him one^[42] for gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of authority, and the other^[43] for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.^[44]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, and Brion, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, and Nachura, JJ., on official leave.

---

^[1] Rollo, p. 1.

^[2] Id. at 2.

^[3] Id.

^[4] Id. at 44-46.

^[5] Id. at 2-3.

^[6] Id. at 20-22.

^[7] Id. at 13-19.

^[8] Id. at 23-24.

^[9] Id. at 25-35.

^[10] Id. at 48-61.

^[11] Id. at 47.

^[12] Id. at 1-12.

^[13] Id. at 103.

^[14] Id. at 104-106.

^[15] Id. at 107-112.

^[16] Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides:


^[17] Rollo, p. 113.

^[18] Id. at 114-115.

^[19] Resolution, 23 April 2007, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017.

^[20] 378 Phil. 282, 292 (1999).

^[21] 363 Phil. 676, 682 (1999).

^[22] G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167, 175.

^[23] Supra note 21 at 683.

^[24] Supra note 22 at 184-185.

^[25] 416 Phil. 710, 719-720 (2001).

^[26] Supra note 22 at 177-178.

^[27] 387 Phil. 67, 79 (2000).

^[28] Supra note 25 at 720-721.

^[29] Atty. Macalintal v. Judge Teh, 345 Phil. 871, 878 (1997).

^[30] A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ, 19 April 2007, 521 SCRA 403, 415-416.

^[31] Rollo, p. 111.

^[32] Id. at 64-80.

^[33] Id. at 99-101.

^[34] Guanzon v. Rufon, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 38.

^[35] Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legaspi City) v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 218, 227-228.

^[36] Id. at 228-229.

^[37] A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 21, 36.

^[38] Sec. 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

^[39] Sec. 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

^[40] Supra note 37 at 36.

^[41] 455 Phil. 227, 236 (2003).

^[42] Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, RTJ-06-2025.

^[43] Summit World CDO, Inc. v. Judge Paderanga, OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2381-RTJ.

^[44] Escobar Vda. de Lopez v. Luna, A.M. No. P-04-1786, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 265, 277-278.