The antecedents are as follows:

Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr.^[3] who is the registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, containing an area of more than four (4) hectares, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte, and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5747.^[4] One (1) hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more than ten (10) years, with an agreed lease rental of twelve and one half (12½) cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Mainit, Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondents.

Consequently, respondents were charged in an Information^[5] dated February 28, 2002 which reads:

That in about and during the period from 1997 to 2001 in Brgy. Roxas, Mainit, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said spouses Samuel and Loreta Vanzuela, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, having leased and occupied the farmland of Veneranda S. Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr., and having harvested and accounted for a total of 400 sacks of palay for the past 10 harvest seasons of which 25% thereof were hold (sic) in trust by them or a total value of P80,000.00, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert said sum of P80,000.00 to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Veneranda Paler and other heirs of the late Dionesio Paler, Sr. in the aforementioned sum of P80,000.00.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that the respondents had been the agricultural tenants of Veneranda for more than ten (10) years; and that the palay was harvested twice a year on the subject property. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence,^[6] praying that the criminal case be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to establish the culpability of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition^[7] arguing that the respondents, as agricultural tenants, were required by law to hold the lease rentals in trust for the landowner and thereafter turn over the same to the latter.

In an Order^[8] dated May 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed the criminal case ratiocinating, thus:

From the averments of the information, the admissions of the parties and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is easily discernable (sic) that the instant case pertains to the non-payment of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural land by the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case at bench involves an agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, x x x.

Citing our ruling in David v. Rivera^[9] and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,^[10] the RTC opined that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the controversy had the character of an "agrarian dispute." The trial court did not find it necessary to rule on the respondents' Demurrer to Evidence and, in fact, no mention of it was made in the assailed Order of May 18, 2007. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 30, SURIGAO CITY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE FOR ESTAFA EVEN IF IT INVOLVES AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT; [AND]
   
   
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEEMING "EXEMPTION" FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL TENANTS FOR ESTAFA WOULD CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, SPECIFICALLY THE "EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE."^[11]
   

Petitioner, on one hand, contends that, under Section 57 of Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law" (CARL), Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) were vested with limited criminal jurisdiction, i.e., with respect only to the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the said Act; that the only penal provision in RA 6657 is Section 73 thereof in relation to Section 74, which does not cover estafa; that no agrarian reform law confers criminal jurisdiction upon the DARAB, as only civil and administrative aspects in the implementation of the agrarian reform law have been vested in the DAR; that necessarily, a criminal case for estafa instituted against an agricultural tenant is within the jurisdiction and competence of regular courts of justice as the same is provided for by law; that the cases relied upon by the RTC do not find application in this case since the same were concerned only with the civil and administrative aspects of agrarian reform implementation; that there is no law which provides that agricultural tenants cannot be prosecuted for estafa after they have misappropriated the lease rentals due the landowners; and that to insulate agricultural tenants from criminal prosecution for estafa would, in effect, make them a class by themselves, which cannot be validly done because there is no law allowing such classification. Petitioner submits that there is no substantial distinction between an agricultural tenant who incurs criminal liability for estafa for misappropriating the lease rentals due his landowner, and a non-agricultural tenant who likewise incurs criminal liability for misappropriation.^[12]

Finally, petitioner posits that, at this point, it is premature to discuss the merits of the case because the RTC has yet to receive in full the evidence of both parties before it can render a decision on the merits. Petitioner also claims that it is pointless to delve into the merits of the case at this stage, since the sole basis of the assailed RTC Order is simply lack of jurisdiction.^[13]

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that share tenancy is now automatically converted into leasehold tenancy wherein one of the obligations of an agricultural tenant is merely to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowner's share; thus, petitioner's allegation that respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest is not tenable because share tenancy has already been abolished by law for being contrary to public policy. Accordingly, respondents contend that the agricultural tenant's failure to pay his lease rentals does not give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Respondents stand by the ruling of the RTC that pursuant to Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes; and that respondents did not commit estafa for their alleged failure to pay their lease rentals. Respondents submit that a simple case for ejectment and collection of unpaid lease rentals, instead of a criminal case, should have been filed with the DARAB. Respondents also submit that, assuming arguendo that they failed to pay their lease rentals, they cannot be held liable for Estafa, as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, because the liability of an agricultural tenant is a mere monetary civil obligation; and that an agricultural tenant who fails to pay the landowner becomes merely a debtor, and, thus, cannot be held criminally liable for estafa.^[14]

Ostensibly, the main issue we must resolve is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of estafa, because the assailed order is premised on the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, should our resolution be in the affirmative, the more crucial issue is whether an agricultural tenant, who fails to pay the rentals on the land tilled, can be successfully prosecuted for estafa.

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we find it appropriate to reiterate the doctrines laid down by this Court relative to the respective jurisdictions of the RTC and the DARAB.

The three important requisites in order that a court may acquire criminal jurisdiction are (1) the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed; and (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.^[15]

First. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. It is determined by the material allegations of the complaint or information and the law at the time the action was commenced. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action, cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. Thus, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.^[16]

In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. In Arnado v. Buban,^[17] we held that:

Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided x x x shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one (1) year for its additional P10,000.00 x x x." Prision mayor in its minimum period, ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Under the law, the jurisdiction of municipal trial courts is confined to offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of the fine.

Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the [respondents] pertains to the regional trial court. x x x

The allegations in the Information are clear Criminal Case No. 6087 involves alleged misappropriation of the amount of P80,000.00.

Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction.

Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.^[18]

Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute. The cases relied upon by the RTC, namely, David v. Rivera^[19] and Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,^[20] are of different factual settings. They hinged on the subject matter of Ejectment and Annulment of Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), respectively. It is true that in Machete v. Court of Appeals^[21] this Court held that RTCs have no jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals filed against agricultural tenants by their landowners. In that case, however, what the landowner filed before the RTC was a collection suit against his alleged tenants. These three cases show that trial courts were declared to have no jurisdiction over civil cases which were initially filed with them but were later on characterized as agrarian disputes and thus, within DARAB's jurisdiction. No such declaration has been made by this Court with respect to criminal cases.

Instead, we have Monsanto v. Zerna,^[22] where we upheld the RTC's jurisdiction to try the private respondents, who claimed to be tenants, for the crime of qualified theft. However, we stressed therein that the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence. Accordingly, the RTC had to confine itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of the crime. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction and, correlatively, within DARAB's exclusive domain.

In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena,^[23] we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit:

For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.

Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.

x x x x x x x x x

Subsequently, in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, Executive Order No. 129-A^[24] was issued; it created the DARAB to assume the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR. Pertinent provisions of Rule II of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure read:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following cases:

1.1.	The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian laws;
	x x x x x x x x x
1.4.	Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders;
	x x x x x x x x x.

Section 3(d) of RA 6657, or the CARL, defines an "agrarian dispute" over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as:

(d) . . . refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements

including

any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.^[25]

Clearly, the law and the DARAB Rules are deafeningly silent on the conferment of any criminal jurisdiction in favor of the DARAB. It is worth stressing that even the jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offenses in violation of RA 6657 per se is lodged with the SACs and not with the DARAB.^[26] While indeed, the parties admit that there is an agricultural tenancy relationship in this case, and that under the circumstances, Veneranda as landowner could have simply filed a case before the DARAB for collection of lease rentals and/or dispossession of respondents as tenants due to their failure to pay said lease rentals, there is no law which prohibits landowners from instituting a criminal case for estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, against their tenants. Succinctly put, though the matter before us apparently presents an agrarian dispute, the RTC cannot shirk from its duty to adjudicate on the merits a criminal case initially filed before it, based on the law and evidence presented, in order to determine whether an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

However, we must reiterate our ruling in Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,^[27] that while we do not begrudge a party's prerogative to initiate a case against those who, in his opinion, may have wronged him, we now remind landowners that such prerogative of instituting a criminal case against their tenants, on matters related to an agrarian dispute, must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice.

Thus, even as we uphold the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the instant criminal case, we still deny the petition.

Herein respondents were charged with the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to fraud committed

By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

We viewed the cases invoked by the petitioner, namely, People v. Carulasdulasan and Becarel^[28]and Embuscado v. People^[29] where this Court affirmed the conviction for estafa of the accused therein who were also agricultural tenants. In People v. Carulasdulasan and Becarel,^[30] this Court held that -

From the facts alleged, it is clear that the accused received from the sale of the abaca harvested by them a sum of money which did not all belong to them because one-half of it corresponds to the landlord's share of the abaca under the tenancy agreement. This half the accused were under obligation to deliver to the landlord. They therefore held it in trust for him. But instead of turning it over to him, they appropriated it to their own use and refused to give it to him notwithstanding repeated demands. In other words, the accused are charged with having committed fraud by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money received by them in trust or under circumstances which made it their duty to deliver it to its owner. Obviously, this is a form of fraud specially covered by the penal provision above cited.

In Embuscado v. People,^[31] the accused appealed to this Court his conviction for the crime of theft by the Court of First Instance even as the information charged him with Estafa and of which he was convicted by the City Court. This Court ruled that the accused was denied due process when the Court of First Instance convicted him of a crime not charged in the information, and then reinstated with modification the ruling of the City Court convicting him of estafa.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, these cited cases are inapplicable. People v. Carulasdulasan and Becare^[32] involved a relationship of agricultural share tenancy between the landowner and the accused. In such relationship, it was incumbent upon the tenant to hold in trust and, eventually, account for the share in the harvest appertaining to the landowner, failing which the tenant could be held liable for misappropriation. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, share tenancy has been outlawed for being contrary to public policy as early as 1963, with the passage of R.A. 3844.^[33] What prevails today, under R.A. 6657, is agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship, and all instances of share tenancy have been automatically converted into leasehold tenancy. In such a relationship, the tenant's obligation is simply to pay rentals, not to deliver the landowner's share. Given this dispensation, the petitioner's allegation that the respondents misappropriated the landowner's share of the harvest - as contained in the information - is untenable. Accordingly, the respondents cannot be held liable under Article 315, paragraph 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

It is also worth mentioning that in Embuscado v. People,^[34] this Court merely dwelt on the issue of whether the accused charged with estafa could be convicted of the crime of theft. Issues of tenancy vis-a-vis issues of criminal liability of tenants were not addressed. Thus, the dissenting opinion of then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in the said case is worth mentioning when he opined that:

It is also my opinion that the petitioner cannot be found guilty of estafa because the mangoes allegedly misappropriated by him were not given to him in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, as provided for in Art. 315, par. 4, No. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What was entrusted to him for cultivation was a landholding planted with coconut and mango trees and the mangoes, allegedly misappropriated by him, were the fruits of the trees planted on the land. Consequently, the action, if any, should have been for accounting and delivery of the landlord's share in the mangoes sold by the petitioner.^[35]

In fine, we hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, we find no necessity to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, as it would only further delay the resolution of this case. We have opted to rule on the merits of the parties' contentions, and hereby declare that respondents cannot be held liable for estafa for their failure to pay the rental on the agricultural land subject of the leasehold.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

---

^* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 508 dated June 25, 2008.

^[1] Dated June 5, 2007; rollo, pp. 3-11.

^[2] Particularly docketed as Criminal Case No. 6087; id. at 13-16.

^[3] Also referred to as Dionesio Paler, Sr. in other documents and pleadings.

^[4] Rollo, p. 37.

^[5] Id. at 33-34.

^[6] Dated December 4, 2006; id. at 17-29.

^[7] Dated January 20, 2007; id. at 30-32.

^[8] Supra note 2, id at 14.

^[9] 464 Phil. 1006 (2004).

^[10] G.R. No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 336.

^[11] Rollo pp. 4-5.

^[12] Id. at 5-8.

^[13] Petitioner's Reply dated January 14, 2008; id. at 45-51.

^[14] Respondents' Comment dated September 17, 2007; id. at 43-47.

^[15] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 641, 654 (2002), citing Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 1992 Edition, p. 3.

^[16] Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 168.

^[17] A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543, May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 382, 387, citing Republic Act No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980."

^[18] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.

^[19] Supra note 9.

^[20] Supra note 10.

^[21] 320 Phil. 227, 235 (1995).

^[22] 423 Phil. 150, 164 (2001).

^[23] G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 259, 262-263. (Citations omitted).

^[24] "Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes." Approved on July 26, 1987.

^[25] As cited in Sindico v. Diaz, G.R. No. 147444, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 50, 53-54.

^[26] Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. §56 of RA 6657 confers jurisdiction on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are RTCs designated by this Court to act as such at least one branch within each province. Under §57, these special agrarian courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.

^[27] A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC, January 31, 2008.

^[28] 95 Phil. 8 (1954).

^[29] G.R. No. 38984, November 24, 1989, 179 SCRA 589.

^[30] Supra note 28 at 9-10 (Emphasis supplied).

^[31] Supra note 29.

^[32] Supra note 28.

^[33] Also known as "The Agricultural Land Reform Code," approved on August 8, 1963.

^[34] Supra note 29.

^[35] Id. at 592.