This petition for review assails the Decision^[1] dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution^[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua's petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration.  Padua's petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004^[3] and July 28, 2004^[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,^[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,^[6] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous drugs.^[7]  The Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.^[8]

When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.^[9]

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua's counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under   Section   70^[10]   of Rep.   Act  No. 9165.  The prosecutor interposed no objection.^[11]  Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order^[12] stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.  Hence, in a Decision^[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.^[14]

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation^[15] dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968^[16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165.  He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said laws.

The RTC in an Order^[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order.  The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.^[18]

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24^[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.  The court ruled thus:

Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:

"Sec. 24.  Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. - Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended."  (underlining supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.^[20]

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition.  The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.^[21]

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied.  Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONER'S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED['S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.^[22]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment^[23] as its Memorandum.  In its Comment, the OSG countered that

I.

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.

II.

SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW" HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.^[24]

Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua's petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua's right under Rep. Act No. 9344,^[25] the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 32^[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have application in this case?

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua's petition for certiorari.

For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur:  (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[27]

"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.  There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.  "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.^[28]

A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua's petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Padua's petition for probation.

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs.  It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24.  Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. - Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.  (Emphasis supplied.)

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.  Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.  The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.^[29]  If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.  This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.^[30]  Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.^[31]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11^[32] and 15^[33] of the Act.  The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators.  Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.^[34]  The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.^[35]

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users.  To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated.  Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case. Section 68^[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38^[37]  of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner's benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40^[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child^[39] for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 18-24.  Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurring.

^[2] Id. at 26.

^[3] Id. at 37-38.

^[4] CA rollo, p. 34.

^[5] SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

^[6] AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on June 7, 2002.

^[7] Rollo, p. 19.

^[8] Id. at 27.

^[9] Id. at 29.

^[10] SEC. 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. - Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration.  Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order.

The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act.  The completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court.  Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community service.  The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service or order a final discharge.

In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act.

If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.

^[11] Rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[12] Id. at 30.

^[13] Id. at 31-32.  Penned by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.

^[14] Id. at 32.

^[15] Id. at 33.

^[16] ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, done on July 24, 1976.

^[17] Rollo, p. 34.

^[18] CA rollo, pp. 22-26.

^[19] SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

^[20] Rollo, pp. 37-38.

^[21] Id. at 23-24.

^[22] Id. at 97.

^[23] Id. at 48-71.

^[24] Id. at 55, 64.

^[25] AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on April 28, 2006.

^[26] Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. - The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law.  The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem.  It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:

1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;
   
2. Community service orders;
   
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
   
4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
   
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the DSWD.
   

The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter.  The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of  promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.

^[27] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 133.

^[28] Id.

^[29] Baranda v. Gustilo, No. L-81163, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 757, 770.

^[30] R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 124 (5^th ed., 2003).

^[31] Id.

^[32] SEC. 11 Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the decree or purity thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

^[33] SEC. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for  the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.

^[34] Rollo, pp. 22-23.

^[35] Id. at 23.

^[36] SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

^[37] SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

^[38] SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

^[39] SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be   defined as follows:

x x x x

(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.