Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the November 25, 2003 Decision^[1] and March 22, 2004 Resolution^[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70589.

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On October 23, 2000, petitioner Marlene L. Rodrin filed a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended, relative to the death of her husband SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin before the GSIS. To bolster her claim, she submitted the following documents:

1) the Line of Duty Status of the late SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin wherein it was declared that: SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin, member of Silang Municipal Police Station, Silang, Cavite and assigned as Intel Operatives was killed on or about 142130 July 2000 at Las Villas Subdivision, Biñan, Laguna while performing his assigned task; that the death of SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin, member [sic] this station is in line of duty on the following grounds: that subject PNCO is presently assigned at Silang Municipal Police Station, Silang, Cavite and was performing Intel operation during his death; and that the subject PNP [Philippine National Police] member was on actual performance of his assigned duty when he was killed. (rollo p. 49);

2) the Sinumpaang Salaysay of both Jhoanne Rodrin, daughter of the deceased and petitioner wherein they stated that the deceased informed them that he was going to Biñan to arrest a certain "wanted" person;

3) the Investigation Report dated July 17, 2000. The pertinent portion of the findings of which reads as follows:

"Brothers Anolito Loyola y Maulanin, 45 years old, and Cesar Loyola y Maulanin, 36 years old executed their respective corroborative sworn statements to this case. Accordingly, OOA 142100H July 2000 they were driving their respective cars with SPO1 Felixberto Rodrin, their brother-in-law, riding in Cesar Loyola's car. From Carmona, Cavite intending to go to Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna they decided to pass through Las Villas de Manila, Brgy San Francisco, Biñan, Laguna. At gate II, they were allegedly permitted to enter by the duty security guards identified as ERIC MENDOZA Y CARDENAS, 26 years old and ROGELIO TAGANAP Y DAMASO, 26 years old, upon a favor given to SPO1 Felixberto Rodrin.However, they were stopped on their exit at gate 1 by the security guards whose service shot guns were pointed toward their two cars, as follows: VENUSTO DIWA YDEDIL, 50 years old, RODOLFO CREDO Y DAMASO, 21 years old, and one alias ALLAN VISTO. The Situation prompted SPO1 Felixberto Rodrin to alight from the car and approached Rodolfo Credo. They were then asked by the security guards why they persisted to enter gate II, despite the refusal of the guard. At this juncture, while they were engaged in a heated altercation, Rodolfo Credo shot SPO1 Felixberto Rodrin with a shot gun, hitting the latter on the left part of the body thereby causing his instantaneous death.

Instinctively, Cesar Loyola attempted to alight in his driven car to help SPO1 Rodrin but he was prevented by alias Allan Visto from doing so by uttering the following words, "PUTANG INA MO! KAPAG BUMABA KA PA NG KOTSE AY PAPATAYIN KA RIN NAMIN!" Following thereto, Allan Visto squeezed the trigger of his shotgun but it failed to fire. On the other hand, right after SPO1 Rodin was shot, Anolito Loyola was able to grab the shot gun of Venusto Diwa." (rollo p. 54)

4) Certification by Police Supt. Danilo B. Castro attesting that the late SPO1 Rodrin was assigned as Intel Operatives.

In a letter dated December 20, 2000, the Government Service Insurance System denied petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended, on the ground that the death of SPO1 Felixberto M. Rodrin did not arise out nor was it in the course of his employment.

Upon appeal to the ECC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS. The pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

"It is respectfully submitted that the death of the deceased was not the result of employment accident. To say that death among policemen is always compensable as long as they are on active duty, even if the cause of death is not in any way connected to their official functions, would be unfair and in danger of being abused. In the absence, therefore, of any proof that would link the death of the deceased with his employment, the claim for death benefits cannot be given due course." (rollo p. 19)^[3]

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review^[4] with the CA assailing the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC).

On November 25, 2003, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision which dismissed the Petition for Review.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration^[5] but the CA denied it in its Resolution^[6] of March 22, 2004.

Hence, the instant petition raising the basic issue of whether the death of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Rodrin is compensable under the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626^[7] as amended.

Petitioner's basic contention is that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) erred in denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of her husband, considering that she was able to submit various documents evidencing that SPO1 Rodrin died in the line of duty or that his death arose from or happened during the course of his employment.

Petitioner avers that this Court has ruled that P.D. No. 626 should be liberally interpreted in favor of the employee because it is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in society.

GSIS, on the other hand, argues that the issue raised by petitioner entails a factual determination of the circumstances surrounding the death of SPO1 Rodrin. It contends that there is a unanimous finding on the part of GSIS, ECC and the CA that SPO1 Rodrin was not in the performance of his official duty when he got killed.

GSIS also asserts that the present petition is pro forma, as it does not present anything new but merely reiterates the previous allegations and arguments which were already passed upon and rejected by the CA.

GSIS avers that while it commiserates with petitioner for the loss of her husband and the father of their children, the fact remains that the circumstances surrounding SPO1 Rodrin's death does not entitle petitioner to benefits under P.D. No. 626 and under current jurisprudence which calls for the protection of the financially strapped State Insurance Fund against non-deserving claims.

On its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that petitioner failed to prove that her husband died while performing official functions and that he was executing an order from his employer.

The OSG avers that the report dated August 9, 2000 of the Board of Officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Silang Cavite stating that SPO1 Rodrin died in the line of duty cannot be considered competent evidence to establish that the said policeman indeed died while performing an official duty. The OSG claims that the report was merely based on the sworn statements of petitioner and of their daughter wherein the allegations therein are mere hearsay and inadmissible in evidence considering that SPO1 Rodrin allegedly informed them that he was going to Biñan to arrest a person wanted by law.

The OSG also questions the veracity of the mission order dated July 10, 2000 issued by the Chief of Police of Silang, Cavite which supposedly required SPO1 Rodrin to go to Carmona, Cavite and Biñan, Laguna to conduct surveillance and monitoring activities and, if possible, arrest the persons named in said order. The OSG claims that there was no evidence to show that the Chief of Police of Silang notified or coordinated with the highest PNP or military commander in the area where the mission was to be accomplished in accordance with the policy of the PNP as contained in Circular No. 2000-016 dated December 11, 2000. The OSG concludes that the mission order was issued as an afterthought simply to support petitioner's claim for her husband's death.

The OSG further contends that the failure of the Biñan Police to state in their Report dated July 17, 2001 that SPO1 Rodrin was on official mission when he was killed puts in serious doubt petitioner's claim that her husband was killed in the line of duty. Moreover, the OSG avers that there is also nothing in the statements of the brothers-in-law of SPO1 Rodrin, who were his companions at the time that he was gunned down, that he was then on official mission. In fact, the said brothers-in-law simply asserted that they were going to Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna.

Furthermore, the OSG avers that the private character of the business of SPO1 Rodrin at the time of his death is also proven by the fact that his companions were not members of any law enforcement agency.

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

For the compensability of an injury to an employee which results in his disability or death, Section 1(a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation imposes the following conditions:

1. The employee must have been injured at the place where his work required him to be;
   
   
2. The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
   
   
3. If the injury was sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order of the employer.
   

The first condition has been met by petitioner. The GSIS and the ECC as well as the CA accepted the claim that SPO1 Rodrin may have been in the line of duty or on a surveillance mission at the time and place of his shooting.^[8] The ECC conceded that there was no question that SPO1 Rodrin was a member of the PNP at the time of his death; and that being so, he was considered to be at his place of work regardless of whether or not he was "on or off-duty."^[9] Both assertions are correctly based on this Court's ruling in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals^[10] that members of the national police, unless they are on official leave, are, by the nature of their functions, technically on duty 24 hours a day, because policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.

Anent the second and third conditions, the GSIS, ECC and the CA found that SPO1 Rodrin, at the time of his death, was not in the performance of his official duties pursuant to an official order from his superior.

The settled rule is that jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, not of fact. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.^[11] The Court finds that the present case falls under the first, second and eighth exceptions.

The GSIS and the ECC concluded that the death of SPO1 Rodrin is not compensable under the provisions of P.D. No. 626 as his death did not arise from, nor was it in the course of, his employment. However, both the GSIS and the ECC did not elaborate on how they arrived at such a conclusion. On the other hand, the CA itself found that petitioner sufficiently established that her husband was on a mission and was conducting surveillance when he was killed; but, nonetheless, the CA concluded that SPO1 Rodrin was not performing his official functions nor was he executing an order for his employer at the time of his death, thus:

The doctrine enunciated in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura cannot be made applicable in the case at bar. While it is true that petitioner sufficiently established that he was on mission and conducting intel surveillance of accused Gary Panopio and Elpedio Panopio, the other requirements for death to be compensable are wanting. SPO1 Rodrin was not performing his official functions nor was he executing an order for the employer at the time of his death. Upon examination of the records, what was only clearly established was that SPO1 Rodrin died as a result of their attempt to pass through the Las Villas Subdivision in Biñan, Laguna and that there was a heated altercation between petitioner's husband and the security guard of the said subdivision. As correctly averred by the Office of the Solicitor General, there was no proof directly linking the death of SPO1 Rodrin to the performance of his official duty.^[12]

It is clear from the Letter-Orders^[13] dated July 10, 2000, issued by SPO1 Rodrin's superior, Police Superintendent Danilo B. Castro, the Chief of Police of Silang, that SPO1 Rodrin was directed to proceed to Carmona, Cavite and Biñan, Laguna between July 10, 2000 and July 20, 2000 for the purpose of conducting monitoring, surveillance and, if possible, arrest of the persons named therein. Being specifically assigned to conduct intelligence work in Carmona and Biñan, SPO1 Rodrin is presumed to have been performing his official duty when he was shot to death by a security guard while trying to pass though the Las Villas de Manila subdivision in Brgy. San Francisco, Biñan, Laguna.^[14]

Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The said Rule treats this presumption as satisfactory unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence.

The Court is not persuaded by the contention of the OSG and the GSIS that SPO1 Rodrin's reason or reasons for intending to go to San Pedro, Laguna involved a purely private matter, as this is pure speculation. There is nothing in the Kusang Loob na Salaysay^[15] of his brothers-in-law to indicate that their business in going to San Pedro was not related to SPO1 Rodrin's work as an intelligence officer. It should be noted that, at the time of his death, he came from Carmona, Cavite which is a place specified in the subject Letter-Orders. Moreover, he was killed in Biñan, which is also a place specified in the said Letter-Orders. Furthermore, he was killed on July 14, 2000 which is within the period authorized by the subject Letter-Orders for him to conduct surveillance, monitoring and arrest. Other than the fact the SPO1 Rodrin had intended to go to San Pedro, Laguna, a place which is not covered by his Letter-Orders, there is no basis to conclude that SPO1 Rodrin's business in going to San Pedro was private in nature and was not related to his job as an intelligence officer of the PNP. Intelligence work covers a broad spectrum of activities that, more often than not, would necessarily involve secret plans or unexpected courses of action to attain its objectives.

Moreover, simply because SPO1 Rodrin was in the company of his brothers-in-law who are not members of any law enforcement agency does not establish that the business of SPO1 Rodrin at the time of his death was purely private in character. It should be noted that the GSIS itself, in its letter to petitioner dated December 20, 2000,^[16] found that SPO1 Rodrin sought the assistance of his brother-in-law Cesar Loyola in meeting a potential "asset" who could give information on a drug syndicate operating in the area.

With respect to the contention that San Pedro, Laguna was a place which was not covered by the subject Letter-Orders, the Court takes cognizance of the fact that the nature of work of a police officer who is an intelligence operative^[17] does not confine him to specific places and hours, more so with respect to a police officer involved in intelligence work. His actions may not be compartmentalized, as they depend to a large extent on the exigencies of the assignment given him. In the present case, the fact that the Letter-Orders indicated the possible location of the criminal suspects he was tasked to apprehend does not limit the conduct of his operation within the boundaries of these places. He was not prevented from immediately going to other locations if he had gathered information that these criminal elements were in said places. Hence, to conclude that SPO1 Rodrin was not in the performance of his official duty simply because, at the time of his death, he was then on his way to a place which was not specified in the subject Letter-Orders is absolutely erroneous. In the absence of sufficient evidence to prove otherwise, the presumption that SPO1 Rodrin was in the regular performance of his official duty when he was killed remains.

In addition, respondents, including the CA, dwelt on speculations and

surmises when they concluded that SPO1 Rodrin was not performing his official functions when he was shot. The fact that the Biñan Police failed to state in their Investigation Report^[18] dated July 17, 2000 that SPO1 Rodrin was on official mission when he was killed does not militate against the claim of herein petitioner. The Investigation Report of the Biñan Police focused only on the shooting incident and the circumstances surrounding the death of SPO1 Rodrin. The absence of any statement or indication which shows that SPO1 Rodrin was then on official mission does not mean that he, in fact, was not in the course of performing his duties as outlined in the subject Letter-Orders.

Respondents cite Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,^[19] in arguing that SPO1 Rodrin's death is not compensable. However, the factual circumstances of the said case are not the same as the present one before the Court. In GSIS, the police officer was shot to death while he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers for a fee. The Court, in denying the grant of death compensation benefits to the widow of the slain policeman, ruled that the latter did not meet the requirements set forth in the ECC guidelines, as it was obvious that the matter he was attending to when he was killed, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature. In other words, in said case, evidence clearly shows that at the time of his death the police officer was performing acts which could not in any way be considered as police service in character. The same may not be said in the present case. There is no evidence to prove the claims of respondents that the matter SPO1 Rodrin was attending to when he was shot to death was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature. The fact remains that he died at a place and within the time specified in his Letter-Orders. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, PO1 Rodrin is presumed to be in the performance of his official duties at the time of his death.

The argument that the cause of SPO1 Rodrin's death was not in any way related to his mission as outlined in the subject Letter-Orders is not plausible.

In Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,^[20] a police officer who was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station and assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview, because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the policeman was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. The claim for death compensation benefits by the widow of the slain police officer was denied by the GSIS and the ECC on the ground, among others, that he was plainly acting as a father to his son. However, the CA reversed the denial. In sustaining the CA reversal, this Court declared that in bringing his son to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as a father but as a peace officer. In the present case, evidence shows that, at the time that SPO1 Rodrin was gunned down, he was performing his duty as a police officer. The Investigation Report of the Biñan PNP as well as the Kusang Loob na Salaysay of both the brothers-in-law of SPO1 Rodrin show that when the latter was shot to death he was in the course of inquiring why the security guards of the subdivision they were passing through were aiming their guns at them. At that point, it cannot be denied that he was caught in a situation where he could not avoid exercising his authority and duty as policeman to maintain peace and security of the community. While his main mission was to apprehend certain criminal elements named in the subject Letter-Orders, he was not excused from performing his basic function as a peace officer. His act of trying to find out the reason why the security guards were acting hostile cannot be said to be foreign and unrelated to his job as a member of the police force.

Finally it is well to echo the Court's ruling in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,^[21] wherein it was held that:

x x x in case of doubt, the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. For this reason, this Court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and orphans of police officers. If we must demand - as we ought to - strict accountability from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night, we must also to the same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left without any means of supporting themselves.^[22]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2003, its Resolution of March 22, 2004 and the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated February 28, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new Decision is hereby entered declaring petitioner entitled to compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Respondent GSIS is hereby ORDERED to accordingly AWARD the petitioner the benefits under the said law.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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* The Court of Appeals, having been included as a co-respondent, is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

^[1] Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), rollo, p. 19.

^[2] CA rollo, p. 235.

^[3] CA rollo, pp. 192-194.

^[4] Id. at 8-14.

^[5] Id. at 202.

^[6] Id. at 235.

^[7] Entitled, "Further Amending Certain Articles of Presidential Decree No. 442 Entitled 'Labor Code of the Philippines.'"

^[8] Memorandum (for respondent GSIS), rollo, p. 209.

^[9] Comment, id. at 152.

^[10] G.R. No. 128524, April 20, 1999, 306 SCRA 41, 45.

^[11] Rubio v. Munar, Jr. G.R. No. 155952, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 597, 602-603.

^[12] CA rollo, p. 195.

^[13] Rollo, p. 62.

^[14] Id. at 91.

^[15] Annexes "B" and "C" to Comment of the OSG, rollo, pp. 177-178.

^[16] Annex "D" to Petition, rollo, p. 27.

^[17] Certification of Police Supt. Danilo B. Castro, id. at 102.

^[18] Annex "M" to Petition, rollo, p. 99.

^[19] G.R. No. 128524, April 20, 1999, 306 SCRA 41.

^[20] G.R. No. 115858, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 717.

^[21] Id.

^[22] Id. at 726, citing Vicente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. , January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190.