EN BANC
[ A.M. No. P-04-1898 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1887-P), July 28, 2008 ]ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA v. VS.RAMON P. VILLANUEVA +
ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA, COMPLAINANT, VS.RAMON P. VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 96, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA v. VS.RAMON P. VILLANUEVA +
ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA, COMPLAINANT, VS.RAMON P. VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 96, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is a letter-complaint[1] dated December 2, 2003, filed by Atty. Stanley G. Zamora, charging respondent Ramon P. Villanueva, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, with Gross Misconduct.
The antecedents are as follows:
Atty. Zamora, herein complainant, is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-01-43767, entitled "Sps. Mario and Carmelita Cruel v. Sps. Ernesto Pe Lim and Lulu Yu Pe Lim." Complainant narrates that on June 28, 2002, the RTC granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, he informed respondent sheriff that the defendant has real property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to prepare the required Notice of Levy on the property. Respondent in turn demanded from complainant P10,000, allegedly to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings. Complainant agreed and initially gave him P5,000[2] as advance payment; the balance was to be paid upon the transfer of the property in the name of his client.[3]
Respondent and one of complainant's paralegal staff members proceeded to Nasugbu, Batangas for the purpose of annotating the notice of levy on the property's title.[4] After the notice had been annotated on the title, respondent refused to proceed with the execution sale unless and until he was paid the balance of P5,000.[5]
On September 8, 2003, complainant acceded to respondent's demand and gave him P5,000[6] after respondent assured him that he would proceed with the execution sale.[7] However, before the date of the execution sale, respondent demanded an additional five percent of the bid price before proceeding with the sale. Complainant, however, refused to heed his demand.[8] Hence, respondent refused to proceed with the sale on the scheduled date; and further refused to accept the bid of complainant's client.[9]
In a letter[10] dated October 29, 2003, complainant reminded the respondent of the irregularity of his acts. He further warned respondent that his continued refusal to proceed with the sale would render him administratively and criminally liable.[11]
This letter notwithstanding, respondent failed to perform his duty. Hence, this administrative complaint.
In his Comment[12] dated April 7, 2004, respondent admitted having received the P10,000 but contended that the amount was used in serving the writ of execution. He asserted that he, along with another court personnel, Maveric Marasigan, and two police officers, tried to attach the personal properties of defendant Ernesto Pe Lim. However, Deputy Sheriff Joseph Visnar of the RTC, Branch 216, Quezon City was already implementing another writ of execution against the same defendant. In his attempt to attach defendant's properties, respondent incurred transportation, representation and other expenses.[13] Thereafter, he and Marasigan went to Nasugbu, Batangas to register the notice of levy, where he incurred further expenses.[14] Lastly, he adds that he tried to serve the notice on the defendant twice and had to post it twice in three conspicuous public places and once in Nasugbu, Batangas.[15]
As regards the questioned auction sale, respondent contended that he was ready to proceed with the public auction, with complainant's client as the only bidder. He then requested complainant to pay the corresponding Office Commission to the Clerk of Court pursuant to the Rules of Court. However, complainant refused to pay, claiming that the title should first be consolidated.[16] Respondent prayed that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of basis.
The parties thereafter filed their respective letters[17] to refute each other's accusations and defenses.
In its Report[18] dated September 9, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and be meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay.[19]
From the parties' pleadings and letters, the issues for resolution are simplified as follows: (1) whether or not respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to the expenses of the execution sale; and (2) whether or not respondent prematurely adjourned the execution sale contrary to Sec. 22, Rule 39, Rules of Court.
It is undisputed that respondent demanded and received P10,000 from complainant. He, however, reasoned that the amount was to defray the expenses he incurred in implementing the writ of execution and annotating the notice of levy on defendant's property in Nasugbu, Batangas. Nevertheless, his justifications for demanding and receiving the amount from complainant are futile attempts to exculpate himself from liability under the law.
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the court's prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the writ. Specifically, the Rules provide:
In the present case, there was no evidence showing that respondent submitted to the court, for its approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded P10,000 from complainant. Neither was it shown that he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
As regards respondent's refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due to the parties' refusal to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred that payment of any such commission is a pre-requisite to an execution sale. Respondent's refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and illegal.
As to the validity of the adjournment of the execution sale, Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[22] clearly shows that a sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon written consent of the judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time agreed upon. The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement but only if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Consequently, respondent's act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.
As employees of the court who play an important role in the administration of justice, high standards are expected of sheriffs. This Court expounded in Vda. de Abellera v. Dalisay:[23]
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[27] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.[28] In the present case, it has been sufficiently proven that respondent willfully violated established rules. Respondent's improper conduct of demanding P10,000 from the complainant; his refusal to proceed with the execution sale; and his act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale were against the clear mandate of the rules and tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. For this, the Court finds respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies grave misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first (1st) offense. Moreover, Section 9 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Civil Service Commission and attached to his personnel file in the judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-4.
[2] Id. at 5.
[3] Id. at 2.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 6.
[7] Supra, note 3.
[8] Id. at 3.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 7.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 13-15.
[13] Id. at 13.
[14] Id. at 14.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 15.
[17] Id. at 19-22; id. at 36-37; id. at 28-29; id. at 23-24; id. at 40-41.
[18] Id. at 44-50.
[19] Id. at 50.
[20] Balanag, Jr. v. Osita, A.M. No. P-01-1454, September 12, 2002, 388 SCRA 630, 634.
[21] Bercasio v. Benito, A.M. No. P-95-1158, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 405, citing Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
[22] Sec. 22. Adjournment of sale. -- By written consent of the judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, the officer may adjourn the sale to any date and time agreed upon by them. Without such agreement, he may adjourn the sale from day to day if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned.
[23] A.M. No. P-87-100, February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 64, 67.
[24] Tan v. Dael, A.M. No. P-00-1392, July 13, 200, 335 SCRA 513, 521.
[25] Oliveros v. San Jose, A.M. No. P-02-1582, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 121, 123.
[26] Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 174, 199.
[27] Mendoza v. Navarro, A.M. NO. P-05-2034, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 354, 363.
[28] Geronca v. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2398, February 13, 2008.
The antecedents are as follows:
Atty. Zamora, herein complainant, is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-01-43767, entitled "Sps. Mario and Carmelita Cruel v. Sps. Ernesto Pe Lim and Lulu Yu Pe Lim." Complainant narrates that on June 28, 2002, the RTC granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, he informed respondent sheriff that the defendant has real property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to prepare the required Notice of Levy on the property. Respondent in turn demanded from complainant P10,000, allegedly to defray the expenses for the execution proceedings. Complainant agreed and initially gave him P5,000[2] as advance payment; the balance was to be paid upon the transfer of the property in the name of his client.[3]
Respondent and one of complainant's paralegal staff members proceeded to Nasugbu, Batangas for the purpose of annotating the notice of levy on the property's title.[4] After the notice had been annotated on the title, respondent refused to proceed with the execution sale unless and until he was paid the balance of P5,000.[5]
On September 8, 2003, complainant acceded to respondent's demand and gave him P5,000[6] after respondent assured him that he would proceed with the execution sale.[7] However, before the date of the execution sale, respondent demanded an additional five percent of the bid price before proceeding with the sale. Complainant, however, refused to heed his demand.[8] Hence, respondent refused to proceed with the sale on the scheduled date; and further refused to accept the bid of complainant's client.[9]
In a letter[10] dated October 29, 2003, complainant reminded the respondent of the irregularity of his acts. He further warned respondent that his continued refusal to proceed with the sale would render him administratively and criminally liable.[11]
This letter notwithstanding, respondent failed to perform his duty. Hence, this administrative complaint.
In his Comment[12] dated April 7, 2004, respondent admitted having received the P10,000 but contended that the amount was used in serving the writ of execution. He asserted that he, along with another court personnel, Maveric Marasigan, and two police officers, tried to attach the personal properties of defendant Ernesto Pe Lim. However, Deputy Sheriff Joseph Visnar of the RTC, Branch 216, Quezon City was already implementing another writ of execution against the same defendant. In his attempt to attach defendant's properties, respondent incurred transportation, representation and other expenses.[13] Thereafter, he and Marasigan went to Nasugbu, Batangas to register the notice of levy, where he incurred further expenses.[14] Lastly, he adds that he tried to serve the notice on the defendant twice and had to post it twice in three conspicuous public places and once in Nasugbu, Batangas.[15]
As regards the questioned auction sale, respondent contended that he was ready to proceed with the public auction, with complainant's client as the only bidder. He then requested complainant to pay the corresponding Office Commission to the Clerk of Court pursuant to the Rules of Court. However, complainant refused to pay, claiming that the title should first be consolidated.[16] Respondent prayed that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of basis.
The parties thereafter filed their respective letters[17] to refute each other's accusations and defenses.
In its Report[18] dated September 9, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and be meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay.[19]
From the parties' pleadings and letters, the issues for resolution are simplified as follows: (1) whether or not respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to the expenses of the execution sale; and (2) whether or not respondent prematurely adjourned the execution sale contrary to Sec. 22, Rule 39, Rules of Court.
It is undisputed that respondent demanded and received P10,000 from complainant. He, however, reasoned that the amount was to defray the expenses he incurred in implementing the writ of execution and annotating the notice of levy on defendant's property in Nasugbu, Batangas. Nevertheless, his justifications for demanding and receiving the amount from complainant are futile attempts to exculpate himself from liability under the law.
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the court's prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the writ. Specifically, the Rules provide:
SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving processes. -- x x xThus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the court's approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.[20] The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.[21]
(l) For money collected by him by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial, the following sums, to wit;
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriff's expenses in serving or executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guard's fees, warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff's expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor. (emphasis supplied)
- On the first four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, four (4%) per centum.
- On all sums in excess of four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos, two (2%) per centum.
In the present case, there was no evidence showing that respondent submitted to the court, for its approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded P10,000 from complainant. Neither was it shown that he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
As regards respondent's refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due to the parties' refusal to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be inferred that payment of any such commission is a pre-requisite to an execution sale. Respondent's refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless and illegal.
As to the validity of the adjournment of the execution sale, Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[22] clearly shows that a sheriff has no blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon written consent of the judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time agreed upon. The sheriff may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement but only if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Consequently, respondent's act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and contrary to the Rules.
As employees of the court who play an important role in the administration of justice, high standards are expected of sheriffs. This Court expounded in Vda. de Abellera v. Dalisay:[23]
At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice.By the nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and decorum, to be above suspicion.[24] Sheriffs are court officers and, like everyone else in the judiciary, are called upon to discharge their sworn duties with great care and diligence.[25] They cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.[26]
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.[27] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.[28] In the present case, it has been sufficiently proven that respondent willfully violated established rules. Respondent's improper conduct of demanding P10,000 from the complainant; his refusal to proceed with the execution sale; and his act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale were against the clear mandate of the rules and tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. For this, the Court finds respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies grave misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first (1st) offense. Moreover, Section 9 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
Sec. 9. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and the disqualification for re-employment in the government service. Further, it may be imposed without prejudice to criminal liability.WHEREFORE, Sheriff Ramon P. Villanueva is found Guilty of grave misconduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and financial institutions. Respondent is furthered ordered to return the amount of P10,000 to complainant Atty. Stanley G. Zamora.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Civil Service Commission and attached to his personnel file in the judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-4.
[2] Id. at 5.
[3] Id. at 2.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 6.
[7] Supra, note 3.
[8] Id. at 3.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 7.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 13-15.
[13] Id. at 13.
[14] Id. at 14.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 15.
[17] Id. at 19-22; id. at 36-37; id. at 28-29; id. at 23-24; id. at 40-41.
[18] Id. at 44-50.
[19] Id. at 50.
[20] Balanag, Jr. v. Osita, A.M. No. P-01-1454, September 12, 2002, 388 SCRA 630, 634.
[21] Bercasio v. Benito, A.M. No. P-95-1158, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 405, citing Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
[22] Sec. 22. Adjournment of sale. -- By written consent of the judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, the officer may adjourn the sale to any date and time agreed upon by them. Without such agreement, he may adjourn the sale from day to day if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned.
[23] A.M. No. P-87-100, February 12, 1997, 268 SCRA 64, 67.
[24] Tan v. Dael, A.M. No. P-00-1392, July 13, 200, 335 SCRA 513, 521.
[25] Oliveros v. San Jose, A.M. No. P-02-1582, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 121, 123.
[26] Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 174, 199.
[27] Mendoza v. Navarro, A.M. NO. P-05-2034, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 354, 363.
[28] Geronca v. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2398, February 13, 2008.