SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004 ]JUSTINO LARESMA v. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA +
JUSTINO LARESMA, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
JUSTINO LARESMA v. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA +
JUSTINO LARESMA, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On May 24, 1994, respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo, Cebu, Branch 29, against petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E of subdivision plan psd. 271428, a parcel of
agricultural land located in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47171. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the petitioner had been a lessee of a certain Socorro
Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that sometime in 1985, the petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took possession of his property and deprived him of its possession.[1] The respondent prayed that, after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the petitioner to vacate the property and pay him actual damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.[2] Appended to the complaint was a contract of lease[3] executed by the
petitioner's wife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma, on March 1, 1977, over a parcel of land owned by Socorro Chiong covered by Tax Declaration No. 05561.
To support his complaint, the respondent presented his father, Teotimo Abellana, as witness. Teotimo testified that the petitioner married his maid, Praxedes Seguisabal, after which the couple resided in the property of Socorro Chiong,[4] which abutted the property of the petitioner and a portion of the property of the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras. The petitioner thus became a tenant of Socorro Chiong. Teotimo further narrated that sometime in 1989 and 1990, the petitioner transferred his house to the property of his son, the respondent, in the process destroying coconut trees planted on the property to pave the way for the construction of the barangay hall. According to the witness, he reported the incident to the office of the chief of police and the barangay captain. However, the matter was not acted upon.[5]
Teotimo also testified that his son, the respondent, purchased the property from his uncle, Mariano Paras, who, in turn, bought the same from his parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras.[6] Based on the said sale, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 47171 over the property under the name of the respondent on April 2, 1980.[7] The respondent had since then declared the property for taxation purposes,[8] and paid the realty taxes therefor.[9] Teotimo declared that he requested Geodetic Engineer Lordeck Abella to relocate the property, and the engineer prepared a sketch plan showing that the said lot abutted the property of Socorro Chiong on the northeast and that of Agnes Abellana on the north.[10] He admitted that he and the respondent were informed that the property had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT), and that they refused to acknowledge the information.[11]
The respondent's aunt, Socorro Chiong, testified that on October 14, 1972, she and Felicidad Paras Montecillo purchased from her parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras, a 19-hectare land in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu, Lot 4-C of Psd. 271428 Lot 4-E, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009088.[12] Chiong's parents died in 1977. In an Order dated November 8, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) affirmed the July 11, 1988 Ruling of the DAR Regional Director that the deed of sale over the property executed by her parents in her favor was valid; that the tenants therein, including Justino Laresma and his wife, were bound by the said sale; and that the tenanted portion of the property, including that portion leased to Praxedes Laresma, was outside the scope of the OLT.[13] She confirmed that the property of the respondent abutted her property on the north.[14]
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the dispute between him and the respondent was agrarian in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession covered by Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled in the name of the respondent consisted of a portion of that property owned by the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 780 which was placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No. 27. Being a beneficiary of the agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the property, Lot No. 00013, with an area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and his wife became owners of the property and, as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.
The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an ocular inspection of the property to determine whether Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 was, indeed, a part of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. On January 13, 1995, the trial court issued an Order allowing the said inspection with Socorro Chiong in attendance.[15] The parties were advised to make a report on the same. The court designated its process server, Felix Navarro, as its representative during the inspection.[16] The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, for its part, designated Municipal Agrarian Reform Technologist Alberto Epan as its representative.
On February 16, 1995, Epan inspected the property in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner pointed to Epan eight of the ten OLT muniments. Epan also noticed that there were coconuts scattered on the property, that corn was planted in the plan area, and that the house of the respondent was in the property titled to the petitioner. On February 17, 1995, the parties' respective counsels, including Navarro and Epan, inspected the property. Epan, thereafter, submitted his Report dated February 22, 1995,[17] with a sketch at the dorsal portion showing the respective locations of the property cultivated by the respondent, his house and the OLT muniments.[18] Navarro submitted a separate report on March 7, 1995,[19] where it was indicated that the parties had agreed that the house of the petitioner was located at the respondent's property.
The petitioner denied being the tenant of the respondent. He testified and adduced evidence that he and his wife were married on September 23, 1953,[20] and, thereafter, resided in the property of the Spouses Paras[21] where he was a tenant.[22] He delivered one-half of the produce from the land to Susana Paras and kept the rest as his share. Shortly thereafter, the Spouses Paras sold a portion of the property to the respondent. Sometime in 1976 or 1977, the subject property was placed under the OLT.[23] The respondent and Roque Paras protested the inclusion of the property, which was, however, rejected.[24] The petitioner also testified that after the death of the Spouses Paras, he gave the share of the produce to the spouses' daughter, Socorro Chiong.[25]
The petitioner further testified that on July 13, 1982, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 over Lot No. 00013, the property he was cultivating. The lot had an area of 0.1700 hectares and was located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. Because of lack of funds, his wife was able to make only partial payments of her amortizations for the property to the Land Bank of the Philippines for which she was issued receipts.[26] After CLT No. 0-031817 was issued to his wife, he kept all the produce from the land.
The petitioner also presented Felix Navarro and Alberto Epan who affirmed their respective reports on the conduct of the inspection on the property.
On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner. The fallo of the decision reads:
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner points out that the property subject of the complaint is covered by a CLT issued by the DAR in the name of his wife. The petitioner avers that although the complaint of the respondent appeared to be one for the recovery of possession of the said property (accion publiciana), by claiming that the petitioner was the tenant of Socorro Chiong, the respondent indirectly attacked the said CLT. Hence, the action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) under Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioner asserts that, by declaring that the landholding was not legally possessed by him and that he was not a de jure tenant, the trial court thereby declared him as having forfeited his rights under the CLT. He was, thus, prevented from paying his monthly amortizations over the property to the Land Bank of the Philippines as required by law.
The petitioner further asserts that he was the agricultural tenant of the Spouses Paras, the original owners of the property. His right as a farmer subsisted, notwithstanding the transfer of the property of the deceased prior to October 21, 1972, which transfer was registered with the Register of Deeds only on December 21, 1977. He contends that since the landholding was already placed under the scope of OLT, the respondent merely stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Paras. Moreover, having become owners of the property on October 21, 1972, the petitioner and his wife were not obliged to pay damages to the respondent; as such, there was no factual basis for the award of actual damages in the amount of P70,000 in favor of the latter.
In his comment on the petition, the respondent avers that the threshold issue in this case is factual; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals by a writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. He contends that he did not, in his complaint, attack the CLT issued to Praxedes Laresma because the property covered by it is a portion of the property of Socorro Chiong, and not that of his property covered by TCT No. 47171. He also posits that the said title is valid and insists that the petitioner had actual knowledge of the sale of the property to him. The petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Antonio v. Estrella[28] to bolster his claim.
As gleaned from the petition, the comment thereon, and the memoranda of the parties, the issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the action of the respondent in the trial court is in reality an indirect attack on the validity of CLT No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the guise of an action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of the property covered by TCT No. 47171; (b) whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the respondent; and (c) whether the petitioner is liable for damages in favor of the respondent.
On the first two issues, the petitioner avers that he and his wife Praxedes became owners of Lot No. 00013 by virtue of CLT No. 0-031817 which was awarded in the latter's favor. As such, they are entitled to the possession of the lot. The petitioner contends that unless and until CLT No. 0-031817 is nullified in a direct action for the said purpose before the DARAB, they cannot be evicted from the said property. He posits that the action of the respondent against him in the RTC for recovery of possession of real property is, in reality, an indirect attack on the CLT issued to his wife which is proscribed by the ruling of this Court in Miranda v. Court of Appeals.[29] He asserts that the decision of the trial court declaring him in illegal possession of the property and not a de jure tenant of the respondent operates as an illegal forfeiture or cancellation of the CLT.
For his part, the respondent asserts that his complaint against the petitioner did not indirectly assail the CLT issued to the latter's wife. He contends that his action was one for the recovery of his possession of a portion of his property Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and not that of Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 which is a portion of Lot 4-C owned by his aunt Socorro Chiong. He notes that the petitioner himself admits that he has never been his agricultural tenant over his property. Consequently, the respondent concludes, the trial court correctly ruled that the dispute between him and the petitioner is civil in nature and within its exclusive jurisdiction.
We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the petitioner. The bone of contention of the parties and the decisive issue in the trial court was whether or not Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of the respondent. This is the reason why the parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent. After a calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and Navarro, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent:
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments of his complaint, the action of the respondent against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.[32] In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation,[33] we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[34] Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[35] that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.[36] But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.[37] If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[38]
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action.[39] Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.[40] If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material allegations of the respondent's complaint and even on the admission of the petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the respondent. In fact, the respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the respondent, as plaintiff, and the petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jure possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not an agrarian dispute. Decisive of the issue is our ruling in Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals:[41]
In light of the foregoing disquisitions of the court, there is no longer a need to still resolve the third issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo, Cebu City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-466 is NULLIFIED for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action of the respondent against the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
Tinga, J., on leave.
[1] Records, pp. 1-5.
[2] Id. at 2-3.
[3] Annex "A," Id. at 10.
[4] TSN, 10 June 1996, p. 13; Id. at 500.
[5] Id. at 5-6.
[6] Id. at 11.
[7] Exhibit "D."
[8] Exhibits "E" and "F."
[9] Exhibits "G" to "G-19."
[10] TSN, 10 June 1995, p. 7.
[11] Id. at 12.
[12] Exhibit "C."
[13] Exhibit "A."
[14] TSN, 22 March 1996, p. 6.
[15] Records, p. 130.
[16] Id. at 142.
[17] Exhibit "6."
[18] Exhibit "6-D."
[19] Exhibit "5."
[20] Exhibit "7."
[21] TSN, 15 November 1996, p. 3.
[22] Id. at 4.
[23] Exhibits "3" and "4."
[24] TSN, 15 November 1996, pp. 10-11.
[25] Id. at 22.
[26] Exhibits "2" to "2-C."
[27] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[28] 156 SCRA 68 (1987).
[29] 141 SCRA 302 (1986).
[30] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[31] Id. at 38.
[32] Cruz v. Torres, 316 SCRA 193 (1999).
[33] Boleyley v. Villanueva, 314 SCRA 364 (1999).
[34] Ibid.
[35] 280 SCRA 20 (1997).
[36] Onquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354 (1998).
[37] Ibid.
[38] Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).
[39] Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, 344 SCRA 680 (2000).
[40] Duero v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 11 (2002).
[41] 327 SCRA 293 (2000).
[42] Id. at 297-299.
[43] Records, pp. 1-2.
[44] Exhibit "G-16."
[45] Aliabo v. Carampatan, 354 SCRA 548 (2001); Ouano v. PGTT Int'l. Investment Corporation, 384 SCRA 589 (2002).
To support his complaint, the respondent presented his father, Teotimo Abellana, as witness. Teotimo testified that the petitioner married his maid, Praxedes Seguisabal, after which the couple resided in the property of Socorro Chiong,[4] which abutted the property of the petitioner and a portion of the property of the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras. The petitioner thus became a tenant of Socorro Chiong. Teotimo further narrated that sometime in 1989 and 1990, the petitioner transferred his house to the property of his son, the respondent, in the process destroying coconut trees planted on the property to pave the way for the construction of the barangay hall. According to the witness, he reported the incident to the office of the chief of police and the barangay captain. However, the matter was not acted upon.[5]
Teotimo also testified that his son, the respondent, purchased the property from his uncle, Mariano Paras, who, in turn, bought the same from his parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras.[6] Based on the said sale, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 47171 over the property under the name of the respondent on April 2, 1980.[7] The respondent had since then declared the property for taxation purposes,[8] and paid the realty taxes therefor.[9] Teotimo declared that he requested Geodetic Engineer Lordeck Abella to relocate the property, and the engineer prepared a sketch plan showing that the said lot abutted the property of Socorro Chiong on the northeast and that of Agnes Abellana on the north.[10] He admitted that he and the respondent were informed that the property had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT), and that they refused to acknowledge the information.[11]
The respondent's aunt, Socorro Chiong, testified that on October 14, 1972, she and Felicidad Paras Montecillo purchased from her parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras, a 19-hectare land in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu, Lot 4-C of Psd. 271428 Lot 4-E, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009088.[12] Chiong's parents died in 1977. In an Order dated November 8, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) affirmed the July 11, 1988 Ruling of the DAR Regional Director that the deed of sale over the property executed by her parents in her favor was valid; that the tenants therein, including Justino Laresma and his wife, were bound by the said sale; and that the tenanted portion of the property, including that portion leased to Praxedes Laresma, was outside the scope of the OLT.[13] She confirmed that the property of the respondent abutted her property on the north.[14]
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the dispute between him and the respondent was agrarian in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession covered by Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled in the name of the respondent consisted of a portion of that property owned by the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 780 which was placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No. 27. Being a beneficiary of the agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the property, Lot No. 00013, with an area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and his wife became owners of the property and, as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.
The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an ocular inspection of the property to determine whether Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 was, indeed, a part of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. On January 13, 1995, the trial court issued an Order allowing the said inspection with Socorro Chiong in attendance.[15] The parties were advised to make a report on the same. The court designated its process server, Felix Navarro, as its representative during the inspection.[16] The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, for its part, designated Municipal Agrarian Reform Technologist Alberto Epan as its representative.
On February 16, 1995, Epan inspected the property in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner pointed to Epan eight of the ten OLT muniments. Epan also noticed that there were coconuts scattered on the property, that corn was planted in the plan area, and that the house of the respondent was in the property titled to the petitioner. On February 17, 1995, the parties' respective counsels, including Navarro and Epan, inspected the property. Epan, thereafter, submitted his Report dated February 22, 1995,[17] with a sketch at the dorsal portion showing the respective locations of the property cultivated by the respondent, his house and the OLT muniments.[18] Navarro submitted a separate report on March 7, 1995,[19] where it was indicated that the parties had agreed that the house of the petitioner was located at the respondent's property.
The petitioner denied being the tenant of the respondent. He testified and adduced evidence that he and his wife were married on September 23, 1953,[20] and, thereafter, resided in the property of the Spouses Paras[21] where he was a tenant.[22] He delivered one-half of the produce from the land to Susana Paras and kept the rest as his share. Shortly thereafter, the Spouses Paras sold a portion of the property to the respondent. Sometime in 1976 or 1977, the subject property was placed under the OLT.[23] The respondent and Roque Paras protested the inclusion of the property, which was, however, rejected.[24] The petitioner also testified that after the death of the Spouses Paras, he gave the share of the produce to the spouses' daughter, Socorro Chiong.[25]
The petitioner further testified that on July 13, 1982, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 over Lot No. 00013, the property he was cultivating. The lot had an area of 0.1700 hectares and was located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. Because of lack of funds, his wife was able to make only partial payments of her amortizations for the property to the Land Bank of the Philippines for which she was issued receipts.[26] After CLT No. 0-031817 was issued to his wife, he kept all the produce from the land.
The petitioner also presented Felix Navarro and Alberto Epan who affirmed their respective reports on the conduct of the inspection on the property.
On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant declaring:The court ruled that, as evidenced by the contract of lease executed by Praxedes Laresma and Socorro Chiong, the petitioner was the tenant of Chiong and not of the respondent. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the case. The court rejected the reports of Epan and Navarro, and considered the same as barren of probative weight, considering that the said reports failed to take into account the technical descriptions of Lot 4-C owned by Chiong, Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and Lot 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner points out that the property subject of the complaint is covered by a CLT issued by the DAR in the name of his wife. The petitioner avers that although the complaint of the respondent appeared to be one for the recovery of possession of the said property (accion publiciana), by claiming that the petitioner was the tenant of Socorro Chiong, the respondent indirectly attacked the said CLT. Hence, the action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) under Republic Act No. 6657. The petitioner asserts that, by declaring that the landholding was not legally possessed by him and that he was not a de jure tenant, the trial court thereby declared him as having forfeited his rights under the CLT. He was, thus, prevented from paying his monthly amortizations over the property to the Land Bank of the Philippines as required by law.
The petitioner further asserts that he was the agricultural tenant of the Spouses Paras, the original owners of the property. His right as a farmer subsisted, notwithstanding the transfer of the property of the deceased prior to October 21, 1972, which transfer was registered with the Register of Deeds only on December 21, 1977. He contends that since the landholding was already placed under the scope of OLT, the respondent merely stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Paras. Moreover, having become owners of the property on October 21, 1972, the petitioner and his wife were not obliged to pay damages to the respondent; as such, there was no factual basis for the award of actual damages in the amount of P70,000 in favor of the latter.
In his comment on the petition, the respondent avers that the threshold issue in this case is factual; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals by a writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. He contends that he did not, in his complaint, attack the CLT issued to Praxedes Laresma because the property covered by it is a portion of the property of Socorro Chiong, and not that of his property covered by TCT No. 47171. He also posits that the said title is valid and insists that the petitioner had actual knowledge of the sale of the property to him. The petitioner cites the ruling of this Court in Antonio v. Estrella[28] to bolster his claim.
As gleaned from the petition, the comment thereon, and the memoranda of the parties, the issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether the action of the respondent in the trial court is in reality an indirect attack on the validity of CLT No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the guise of an action for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of the property covered by TCT No. 47171; (b) whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the respondent; and (c) whether the petitioner is liable for damages in favor of the respondent.
On the first two issues, the petitioner avers that he and his wife Praxedes became owners of Lot No. 00013 by virtue of CLT No. 0-031817 which was awarded in the latter's favor. As such, they are entitled to the possession of the lot. The petitioner contends that unless and until CLT No. 0-031817 is nullified in a direct action for the said purpose before the DARAB, they cannot be evicted from the said property. He posits that the action of the respondent against him in the RTC for recovery of possession of real property is, in reality, an indirect attack on the CLT issued to his wife which is proscribed by the ruling of this Court in Miranda v. Court of Appeals.[29] He asserts that the decision of the trial court declaring him in illegal possession of the property and not a de jure tenant of the respondent operates as an illegal forfeiture or cancellation of the CLT.
For his part, the respondent asserts that his complaint against the petitioner did not indirectly assail the CLT issued to the latter's wife. He contends that his action was one for the recovery of his possession of a portion of his property Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171, and not that of Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 which is a portion of Lot 4-C owned by his aunt Socorro Chiong. He notes that the petitioner himself admits that he has never been his agricultural tenant over his property. Consequently, the respondent concludes, the trial court correctly ruled that the dispute between him and the petitioner is civil in nature and within its exclusive jurisdiction.
We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the petitioner. The bone of contention of the parties and the decisive issue in the trial court was whether or not Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of the respondent. This is the reason why the parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent. After a calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and Navarro, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the respondent:
Plaintiff unabashedly claims that defendant has never been his tenant over the former's property, Lot No. 4-E, but defendant claims otherwise. The evidence of plaintiff tends to establish that defendant is not his or has never been his tenant over his agricultural land, Lot 4-E, but defendant Justino Laresma is rather the tenant of Socorro Chiong over her property, Lot 4-C. In support of this contention that defendant is not plaintiff's own tenant but that of Socorro Chiong, plaintiff offered and adduced the contract of lease duly entered by and between Socorro Chiong and defendant [Exhibit "B"] in 1977 wherein it was clearly stipulated [that] Socorro Chiong as the agricultural lessor leased a portion of her land to defendant, in the latter's capacity as agricultural lessee of Lot 4-C with the obligation to pay Socorro Chiong rentals during the stipulated crop years.The petitioner has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial court in the petition at bar; hence, he is bound by the said findings.
This particular contract of lease [Exhibit "B"] does not show that plaintiff is a privy (sic) to it. It is (sic) goes to show that plaintiff is [not] bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
In the order of DAR under DARRO Adm. Case No. VII-98-88 dated November 8, 1994 [Exhibit "A"] which is actually a decision arising from the tenancy relationship between Socorro Chiong and defendant Justino Laresma, the DAR had expressly ruled that defendant is the tenant of Socorro Chiong of her property but limited to an actual area of 3.7316 hectares and excluding the area of 4.4905 [page 3, Decision] from the scope of the operation of Operation Land Transfer. It was further ruled therein that the landholding of Socorro Chiong was a part of the total landholding owned by her parents, Vicente N. Paras and Susana Paras, both deceased, which was, subsequently, sold by her parents to her as evidenced by a deed of sale dated October 14, 1972 [Exhibit "C"]. This deed of conveyance was affirmed by the DAR as validly executed between Socorro Chiong and defendant Justino Laresma because the latter had actual knowledge and recognition of the said transaction between Socorro and her deceased parents. This actual transfer of ownership of said parcel of land from Socorro Chiong['s] deceased parents to her was evidenced by the execution of the contract of lease between her and defendant on March 10, 1977 (sic) [Exhibit "B"].
But in the said ruling of the DFAR (sic), defendant has been expressly declared by DAR as a bona fide tenant of Socorro Chiong but his farmholding inside her property is limited to an actual area of 3.7316 hectares and excluding the area of 4.4905 [page 3, Decision] from the scope of the operation of Operation Land Transfer.
If defendant were (sic) truly a tenant of plaintiff, he would have also asked plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest to execute that necessary contract of lease like the instrument, which Socorro Chiong executed in favor of defendant as her tenant. In the absence of said instrument to establish his tenancy over plaintiff's landholding, this Court cannot just presume the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between plaintiff and defendant.[30]
…
However, this Court cannot accept these ocular reports and the accompanying sketches thereof so as to correctly reflect the identity of defendant's farmholding and to establish its exact location within the land of plaintiff in view of the absence of pertinent technical description of said farmholding in relation to the metes and bounds of plaintiff's land whose technical description is clearly mentioned in plaintiff's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47171 [Exhibit "D"]. The said technical description of the defendant's farmholding is required to clearly pinpoint its identity with its area and boundaries in relation to the titled property of plaintiff. Without said technical description, it is very difficult to identify defendant's landholdings to be within plaintiff's real property.
In view of the absence of the above-mentioned indispensable requisites or any one of them in order to establish the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between plaintiff and defendant, as earlier mentioned, does not make defendant a de jure tenant under the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws. [Caballes v. DAR, ibid.].[31]
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments of his complaint, the action of the respondent against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.[32] In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation,[33] we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[34] Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[35] that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.
It must be stressed that the regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.[36] But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy.[37] If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[38]
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action.[39] Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.[40] If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material allegations of the respondent's complaint and even on the admission of the petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the respondent. In fact, the respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the respondent, as plaintiff, and the petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jure possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not an agrarian dispute. Decisive of the issue is our ruling in Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals:[41]
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. In this case, the respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner on May 24, 1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court over the nature of this action is governed by Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3 thereof amended Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, and reads:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Italics supplied)"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, stewardship or, otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the case of Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure-related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place.[42]
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:On the other hand, Section 1 of the Rule amending Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads:
…
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdictions:The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. In this case, the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana) reads:
… (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) ….
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00.[44] Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.[45] Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null and void.
- That plaintiff is the owner and possessor of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. T-47171 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu;
- That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P. Chiong, which adjoins the parcel of land owned by the plaintiff as shown by a leasehold contract hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
- That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, and stealth, the herein defendant took possession of the parcel of land owned by herein plaintiff, thus effectively depriving plaintiff of the possession thereof;
- That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of herein plaintiff, cut trees, and harvested the fruits of said land causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P50,000.00;
- That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate said land and return the possession thereof to herein plaintiff, thus compelling the plaintiff to file the present action;
- In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the services of counsel for P10,000.00 and expects to incur expenses of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00.[43]
In light of the foregoing disquisitions of the court, there is no longer a need to still resolve the third issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo, Cebu City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-466 is NULLIFIED for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action of the respondent against the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), on official leave.
Tinga, J., on leave.
[1] Records, pp. 1-5.
[2] Id. at 2-3.
[3] Annex "A," Id. at 10.
[4] TSN, 10 June 1996, p. 13; Id. at 500.
[5] Id. at 5-6.
[6] Id. at 11.
[7] Exhibit "D."
[8] Exhibits "E" and "F."
[9] Exhibits "G" to "G-19."
[10] TSN, 10 June 1995, p. 7.
[11] Id. at 12.
[12] Exhibit "C."
[13] Exhibit "A."
[14] TSN, 22 March 1996, p. 6.
[15] Records, p. 130.
[16] Id. at 142.
[17] Exhibit "6."
[18] Exhibit "6-D."
[19] Exhibit "5."
[20] Exhibit "7."
[21] TSN, 15 November 1996, p. 3.
[22] Id. at 4.
[23] Exhibits "3" and "4."
[24] TSN, 15 November 1996, pp. 10-11.
[25] Id. at 22.
[26] Exhibits "2" to "2-C."
[27] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[28] 156 SCRA 68 (1987).
[29] 141 SCRA 302 (1986).
[30] Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[31] Id. at 38.
[32] Cruz v. Torres, 316 SCRA 193 (1999).
[33] Boleyley v. Villanueva, 314 SCRA 364 (1999).
[34] Ibid.
[35] 280 SCRA 20 (1997).
[36] Onquit v. Binamira-Parcia, 297 SCRA 354 (1998).
[37] Ibid.
[38] Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).
[39] Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, 344 SCRA 680 (2000).
[40] Duero v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 11 (2002).
[41] 327 SCRA 293 (2000).
[42] Id. at 297-299.
[43] Records, pp. 1-2.
[44] Exhibit "G-16."
[45] Aliabo v. Carampatan, 354 SCRA 548 (2001); Ouano v. PGTT Int'l. Investment Corporation, 384 SCRA 589 (2002).