EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 18, 2008 ]SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV v. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE +
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO
MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., AND MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROSA R. MANOTOK, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, REPRESENTED BY TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV v. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE +
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO
MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., AND MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROSA R. MANOTOK, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, REPRESENTED BY TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles have helped stabilize land ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is security with facility in dealing with land.[1] Its fundamental purpose
is to quiet title to land, to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title,[2] hence, the titles issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in that it remains susceptible to fraud, either in the original
registration proceedings or in subsequent transactions.[3]
These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts at registration of the subject property. Necessarily, they call for the correct application of entrenched principles in land registration. At the same time, they afford this Court the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system against unscrupulous elements who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end.
These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division which had initially ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12 December 2005.[4] They were accepted by the Court en banc in a Resolution dated 26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various contentions before the Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of their respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court en banc, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General was required,[5] and a set of new parties was allowed leave to intervene.[6]
The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized herein for convenience.
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on specific property registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a number of cases since then.[7] These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the most contentious of those cases thus far.
Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition[8] with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner's duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.
Learning of the Barques' petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et. al. They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques' and the Manotoks' titles advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The Barque title actually involves two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns only one parcel of land, but with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied[9] the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in the Manotoks' title. It observed that:
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review[13] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review[14] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks argued in their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok title was spurious and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene.[15] She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject property.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16] in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques' petition and affirming the LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] Subsequently, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision[18] dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:
On the other hand, as to the Manotoks' petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[21] on 29 October 2003 which affirmed the resolution of the LRA.[22] The appellate court held that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barques' petition for reconstitution, since there was as yet no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration of this ruling.[23] As had occurred with the Barques' petition, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Barques' motion for reconsideration and on 24 February 2004, promulgated its Amended Decision[24] wherein it held that:
On 12 December 2005, the Court's First Division rendered its Decision[26] affirming the two decisions of the Court of Appeals.[27] The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court's First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19 April 2006.[28] Thereafter, the Manotoks' filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The Court denied the same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further ordered that entry of judgment be made.[29] Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[30]
The Barques filed multiple motions with the Court's First Division concerning the execution of the judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution.[31] In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred these cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases.[32]
On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention.[33] Movants alleged that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.[34] The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the LMB that:
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en bancs move on the Special First Division's referral for reevaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with the reevaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and the Special First Division warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had sanctioned the recall entries of judgment.[36] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.[37] The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as well as the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in the Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelledexcept in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."[38] Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court.[39] Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction[40] over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the government and its agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a certificate of title. It invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein x x x." That the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of "exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC," there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can perhaps assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as follows:
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost due to "flood, fire and other force majeure." The petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments:
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela,[45] which we held that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners."[46] That such doctrine was established for cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.
III
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,[47] where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal infirmities" of Molina's cause of action, the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques' petition.
The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because in that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for reconstitution of Molina's titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial court's decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these alternative results the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court itself by directly annulling Molina's titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA's ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlier explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title.
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have ruled definitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to title. After all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900.[48] The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc.[49] This detracts from the Barques' claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing,[50] nor did the LMB have a record of the plan.[51] However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region (DENR-NCR).[52] The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office.[53]
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector.[54] The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it was a forged document.[55] To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its office.[56] In a letter to the administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that "it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration."[57]
There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR.[58] The DENR-confirmed technical description reads:
Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out that the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon City." This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the boundaries of Quezon City.[62] A similar finding was made by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate.[63]
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques' claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.
V
In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye on the evidence and points raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the Manotoks' claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000.[64]
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.[65] The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is not visually discernible what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the purported predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo Villanueva certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be."[68]
According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.
Also on record[69] is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in 1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
VI
The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in the Manotok title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancy rule on such question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants more deliberation.
The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the Manotok title until the proper case for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However, it is already apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidence unrefuted thus far indicating that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,[71] the subject property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the administrative reconstitution of the title to the property, leading Alonso to file a complaint for nullification of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonso's complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the validity of Cebu Country Club's administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision declared "that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines."
The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso,[72] extensively discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not participated or intervened in that case before the lower courts.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks' claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before - in Republic v. Court of Appeals[74] and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals.[75] Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this Resolution.
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of the Solicitor General is directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from the Land Management Bureau and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., join dissenting opinion of J. Ynares-Santiago.
Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., concur with J. Carpio's separate opinion.
Corona, J., see separate opinion.
Nachura, J., related to one of the counsel. no part.
[1] F. PONCE, THE PHILIPPINE TORRENS SYSTEM: A TEXBOOK ON LAND TITLES, DEEDS, LIENS, DESCENT AND MORTGAGE at 120.
[2] Id. at 121.
[3] Id. at 125.
[4] G.R. No. 162605, rollo, pp. 666-732. See also 477 SCRA 339.
[5] Id. at
[6] Id. at 969-A.
[7] See, e.g., Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107595, 2 February 1994, 229 SCRA 601; Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455; In Re: Azucena Garcia, 393 Phil. 718 (2000); University of the Philippines v. Rosario, 407 Phil. 924 (2001); Republic v. Holazo, G.R. No. 146846, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 345; Cañerov. University of the Philippines, G.R. No.156380, 8 September 2004, 437 SCRA 630; Encinas v. National Bookstore, G.R. No. 162704, 28 July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572; Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 128122, 128184 & 128229, 18 March 2005, 485 SCRA 234; Subido v. Republic, G.R. No. 152149, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 178: Heirs of Nicolas v. Development Bank, G.R. No. 137548, 3 September 2007, 532 SCRA 38.
[8] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 74.
[9] Id. at 86.
[10] Id at 87.
[11] Id at 95.
[12] Id at 96.
[13] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 2-23.
[14] CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 rollo, p.7-45.
[15] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, pp. 172-201.
[16] Id. at 244-248.
[17] Id. at 256-275.
[18] Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr, Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. dissented.
[19] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 432.
[20] Justice Enriquez maintained his dissent.
[21] Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[22] CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, rollo, p. 144-149.
[23] Id. at 151-171.
[24] Id. at 218.
[25] G.R. No.162605. Rollo, p. 386.
[26] Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by the Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr and by Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Adolfo S. Azcuna. Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
[27] Id. at 667-684.
[28] Id. at 830.
[29] Id. at 881. Entry of judgment was recorded on 2 May 2006.
[30] Id. at 884.
[31] Id. at 908-918.
[32] Id. at. 947-A.
[33] G.R. No. 162335, rollo, p. 891.
[34] Id at 1320.
[35] Id at 1075.
[36] Citing Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 675; Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, 434 Phil. 753 (2002).
[37] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1988, 292 SCRA 38.
[38] See Sec. 48, Pres. Decree No. 1529.
[39] Sec. 9(1) & (2), B.P. 129, as amended.
[40] See Sec. 9(3), B.P. 129, as amended.
[41] See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 5, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732.
[42] See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 19, as amended.
[43] See Rep. Act No. 6732, Secs. 11 & 12, Rep. Act No. 6732.
[44] See e.g., Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34080 & 34693, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
[45] 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
[46] Id. See also Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44.
[47] G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
[48] Rollo, p. 127.
[49] Id. at 1200-1201.
[50] Rollo, p. 157.
[51] Id. at 132.
[52] Id. at 134.
[53] Rollo, p. 136.
[54] Id. at 137.
[55] Id. at 142.
[56] Id. at 144.
[57] Id. at 143.
[58] See "Annex A," Memorandum of Intervenor. "Extracted from Technical Descriptions appearing on Deed of Conveyance No. 200022 with Sales Cert. No. 511 issued by the OIC Director of Land Management Bureau on Oct. 30, 2000 and was further checked and verified against the Land use Map of Q.C., C.M. 14-40 N. 121-05'E., Sec. 4-A, Brgy. of Matandang Balara on file at the Projection Unit of LSVS-DENR-NCR and plan Sp-00-000779 on file at TSS-DENR-NCR."
[59] Id.
[60] Annex "G," Respondents' Memorandum.
[61] Rollo, p. 210.
[62] Id. at 949.
[63] See id. at 1107.
[64] Id. at 1075
[65] Id. at 1077.
[66] Id.
[67] Id.
[68] Id. at 1320.
[69] See id. at 1321-1322.
[70] Id.
[71] 426 Phil. 61 (2002).
[72] See 462 Phil. 546 (2003) .
[73] Id. at 563-566.
[74] 359 Phil. 530 (1998).
[75] G.R. Nos. 123346 & 134385, 14 December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
[76] Id. at 351-352.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996,[1] addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty. Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR).[2]
In his reply dated 7 November 1996,[3] Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28 November 1996,[4] Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D conflicted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2 December 1996[5] to Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter dated 5 December 1996,[6] Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engineer Dalire wrote:
The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer
In an Order dated 30 June 1997,[12] Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
The Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998,[15] the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13,[16] only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engineer Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official communication from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined that the Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:
The Manotoks filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying for the modification of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA. The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA-G.R. No. 66642
CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001[20] for failure to show that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Manotoks, the petition was reinstated in the Resolution of 27 November 2001.[21]
In its Decision of 29 October 2003,[22] the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration of the Barques, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004,[23] the dispositive portion of which reads:
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002,[25] the Court of Appeals dismissed the Barques' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Barques moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003,[26] the Court of Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
The Manotoks filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2 August 2004.
In a Decision dated 12 December 2005,[29] the First Division of this Court denied the petitions and affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution,[30] the Special First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration. No proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court assailing the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques' simple petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not only reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others, granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court referred the cases to the Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the Court en banc accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007, the Court en banc considered the following issues:
The Ruling of This Court
We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court.
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon.[31] Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because of the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct proceeding assailing its validity is filed before the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques submitted patently forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts." First, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution of title resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person without a direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to reconstitute administratively a Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the issue of ownership of land is decided with finality in a petition for administrative reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying for a simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected and undeserved windfall the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the same property.
LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines firmly established in numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them landmark rulings. To name a few of these decisions starting in the year 1915: Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,[32] Magay, etc. v. Estiandan,[33] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[34] Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.,[35] MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al.,[36] Liwag v. Court of Appeals,[37] Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[38] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals,[39] Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,[40] Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[41] and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[42]
The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division has overturned are:
DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE
The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division has already become final and executory, and thus has become immutable and unalterable. The dissenting opinion states that there is no compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions.
On the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions necessarily applies only to final and executory decisions. If the decision never became final and executory, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions has no application. Before finality of a decision, a court has "plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the decision becomes final."[47]
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division. The Court en banc has ruled in Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar[48] that a decision of a division is void if it overturns a doctrine established by the en banc or another division. There, the Court held:
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.[51]
In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree[52] states that a "certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack." The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack[53] on a Torrens title. The Manotoks' prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.[54]
THE MANOTOKS' PRIOR TITLE NULLIFIES
RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS OF BARQUES
In fact, the existence of a prior Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings and renders the reconstituted title void.[55] Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,[56] penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, is instructive and summarizes the law on this matter:
A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN A DIRECT
ACTION ASSAILING ITS VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
The LRA has also no jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks because the exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title belongs to the Regional Trial Court. The LRA, moreover, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership dispute over a parcel of land[60] between the Barques and the Manotoks because jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of disputed real properties belongs to courts of justice.
Two specific provisions of law confer exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts to cancel a Torrens title. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
That the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain any action to cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of the Property Registration Decree. Section 108 states that "no erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title x x x, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)."
LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to decisions that are capable of becoming final and executory. Decisions of the LRA on administrative reconstitutions of title never become final and executory. An administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or replacement of a lost or destroyed title in its original form at the time of the loss or destruction.[62] The issuance of a reconstituted title vests no new rights and determines no ownership issues.[63] At any time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or destroyed title is subsequently found.[64] The issuance by the LRA of a reconstituted title is an executive function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata. This Court stated in A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[65] "[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination."[66]
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques much more than what the Barques prayed for in their petition for administrative reconstitution of title. In their petition before the LRA, the Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of their allegedly destroyed title. The Decision of the First Division grants the reconstitution, declares the reconstituted title valid, awards ownership over the disputed property to the Barques, and cancels the Torrens title of the Manotoks. This violates the "cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than what is prayed for"[67] in the petition.
A SURFEIT OF FORGERIES AND BADGES OF FRAUD
Equally disturbing, there are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and other dubious circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed aside in its Decision. These forgeries alone are more than sufficient grounds to deny the reconstitution of the Barques' title. These forgeries provide compelling reasons for this Court to require compliance with Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree in determining the validity of the Manotoks' title. Section 48 requires a proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Torrens title before such title can be cancelled.
First: Forged Plan Fls-3168-D
The Barques submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer patently forged documents in support of their petition. On 31 January 1997, Engineer Dalire wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D submitted to the LRA "bears forged initials of my section officer and myself,"[68] and that the Lands Management Bureau National Office "does not have copy of Fls-3168-D."[69] Engineer Dalire urged the LRA that plan Fls-3168-D and the accompanying authentication letter "be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources."[70]
Plan Fls-3168-D is vital in establishing the authenticity of the Barques' Torrens title, which contains two lots as subdivided by plan Fls-3168-D from the original Lot 823. The Manotoks' title covers only one lot, Lot 823, without subdivision. Both the Manotoks and the Barques claim the same original Lot 823. If there is no record in the Lands Management Bureau National Office of plan Fls-3168-D showing the subdivision of Lot 823 into two lots, then the Barques' title is spurious.
During the oral argument of these cases, counsel for the Barques was asked if the Barques have ever secured a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. Counsel for the Barques showed the Court a copy of what purported to be plan Fls-3168-D but on closer examination the copy was certified not by the Lands Management Bureau National Office but by the NCR Regional Office. What counsel for the Barques showed was the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, had rejected as a forgery in his 31 January 1997 and 19 February 1997 letters to Atty. Bustos. In his letters, Engineer Dalire stated that there is no plan Fls-3168-D in the files of the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
Second: Forged 2 January 1997 Letter
On 13 February 1997, Engineer Privadi J. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly coming from Engineer Dalire, "definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document."[71]
In his 19 February 1997 letter, Engineer Dalire also informed the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2 January 1997 letter purportedly coming from him was the "handiwork of forgers."[72] In the questioned 2 January 1997 letter[73] addressed to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire allegedly stated that the Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics of the National Capital Region-Lands Management Bureau (NCR Regional Office) had forwarded a copy of Fls-3168-D to Engineer Dalire's office. Engineer Dalire has repeatedly denounced this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery, not only because he never signed this letter, but also because his office never received a copy of Fls-3168-D from the NCR Regional Office.
Third: Plan Fls-3168-D Is Void Unless Validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques then undertook to present to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, counsel for the Barques explained why they could not present a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office:
The Barques also submitted a Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena,OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, stating:
Thus, no secondary copies of plans, like the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, can have any evidentiary value unless validated by the Geodetics Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. More importantly, copies of plans, like the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, which have not been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division, are deemed "expunged from the Records of the Records Division." The inescapable conclusion is that the form letter (Annex "J") issued by the Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, and the Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, both of which refer to the existence of the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, are absolutely worthless and are mere scraps of paper.
The Barques' explanation is further belied by the 19 February 1997 letter of Engineer Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, that:
The Geodetic Surveys Division validates the survey plans based on the "back-up file in the Central Records Office." Despite the decentralization of the records of survey plans, the Lands Management Bureau National Office retained "back-up files" of the decentralized records. Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 states:
This Court has already recognized that copies of survey plans are void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991. In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[76] the Court held:
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D, certified by the NCR Regional Office, to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques had earlier submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
Second, Annex "H" is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as required by Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
Third, Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly originated from the office of Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau. Annex "H" is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the Barques showed to the Court during the oral argument. Engineer Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy of Fls-3168-D as "spurious" in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
Again, in his 31 January 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire reiterated that plan Fls-3168-D, which purportedly was certified by him, did not come from his office. Engineer Dalire stated in his 31 January 1997 letter:
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the Barques had written the LRA Administrator complaining against the LRA reconstituting officer's alleged "pattern of effort to delay the administrative reconstitution."[81] The Barques attached to their 7 February 1997 letter an alleged order of reconstitution signed by Atty. Bustos approving the reconstitution of the Barques' TCT No. 210177. In his 14 February 1997 reply to the LRA Administrator, Atty. Bustos exposed the alleged order of reconstitution submitted by the Barques as a "tampered document."
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there was a "recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said reconstitution." However, in his 13 February 1997 letter[82] to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire, the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, disowned this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the LRA reconstituting officer wrote the LRA Administrator that:[83]
The tampering refers to the insertion of (1) the name of "Homer L. Barque," and (2) the title number "210177" in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). The Barques justified the authenticity of the copy they presented by claiming that their copy was "initialed in each and every page."[84] However, the Barques' copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) differed from the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that the LRA reconstituting officer himself signed on 27 January 1997. To repeat, the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) was an order issued and signed by the LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos. Indeed, the Barques' copy[85] of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) shows that it was signed by the same LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, handling the Barques' then pending petition for administrative reconstitution.
The Barques also failed to explain why they still pursued their petition for administrative reconstitution of their title if indeed they had already obtained an approved reconstitution on 27 January 1997 under their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96). On 13 August 1998, the LRA reconstituting officer filed before the LRA Administrator the following Comment:
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques explained the circumstances of the order of reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in this manner:
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing) the title and name of the Barques from the resolution." The Barques are now accusing Atty. Bustos of falsification by deleting the Barques' name and title in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) included the Barques' name and title, which is the copy that the Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to include the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27 January 1997, he was still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery found in the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31 January 1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos even wrote the LRA Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us (LRA) into favorable action by submitting forged documents." Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have included the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame excuse that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now "completely irrelevant" because what was raised on appeal to the LRA was the order of Atty. Bustos denying the Barques' petition for reconstitution. If their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic and untampered, the Barques should insist that their petition for administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by the reconstituting officer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not claim or even mention this now, instead they agree that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their claim that Atty. Bustos granted their petition by including the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered or forged documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render the Barques' reconstituted title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6732 (RA 6732),[87] the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles, provides:
Fifth: The Barques' Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
The Barques filed their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22 October 1996, eight years after the original of their Torrens title was allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds. In contrast, the Manotoks administratively reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February 1991, three years after the fire and just one year after the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732 allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles under certain circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in the tax declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer: "Memo: This property appear (sic) to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under TD No. B-067-02136 with area of 343,945 sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202."[88] In their Petition For Review dated 30 March 2004, the Manotoks submitted certified true copies of the Barques' Tax Declarations 06892[89] and 06895[90] containing this notation. In their Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted copies of the Barques' tax declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of the notation on the Barques' tax declarations. However, counsel for the Barques admitted that he has not seen the original tax declarations on file with the Assessor's Office, thus:
Seventh: The Barques Paid Realty Tax only for 1987 to 1996
The Barques first paid real estate tax on the property only in 1996,[92] for realty taxes for the years 1987 to 1996, because the Barques were required to pay the current and preceding years' realty taxes before they could file their petition for administrative reconstitution. The Barques have not paid any realty tax after 1996, or before 1987.[93] In contrast, the LRA reconstituting officer found that the Manotoks have been paying realty taxes on the property since 1965. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks claim that they paid their realty taxes on the property from 1933 until the present, attaching to their Memorandum representative copies of their realty tax payments.
Eighth: The Barques Have Never Set Foot on the Property
The Barques have never set foot on the property since the time Homer L. Barque, Sr. allegedly purchased the property in 1975. Counsel for the Barques admitted this when he stated during the oral argument that the Barques merely "went around" the walled property. On the other hand, the Manotoks assert that the property is publicly known in their neighborhood as the Manotok Compound. The Manotoks further claim:
Ninth: LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In calling the Manotoks' title "sham and spurious," the LRA Administrator cited the non-existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The LRA Administrator stated: "The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong."[95] This is a finding of fact that is based not only on self-serving and suspect evidence, but also on a patently erroneous claim.
The LRA Administrator relied on Annex "N" of "Petitioners," that is, the map of the Barques who were the petitioners before the LRA Administrator assailing the LRA reconstituting officer's denial of their reconstitution on the ground of pre-existence of the Manotoks' title and the submission of a spurious document by the Barques. Obviously, this Court should not rely on the LRA Administrator's findings which were admittedly based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been judicially acknowledged almost three decades ago in the Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya,[96] involving the same property under dispute in these cases. In Spouses Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection of Barrio Payong in Quezon City, thus:
In Spouses Tiongson, there were 28 petitioners.[98] Of these 28 petitioners, at least sixteen are petitioners composing part of the Manotoks in these cases. Of these sixteen petitioners, eight Miguel A.B. Sison, Ma. Cristina E. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Philipp Manotok, Maria Theresa Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Jose Maria Manotok were then minors at the time of Spouses Tiongson and were thus represented by judicial guardians. These eight are now of age in these cases.
Tenth: The Barques Bought the Property Knowing the Manotoks Had Constructed Buildings and Perimeter Wall on the Property
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen a picture of the 34-hectare Manotok compound completely surrounded by a high concrete perimeter wall. When counsel for the Barques was asked if his clients made an ocular inspection of the property at the time his clients purchased it in 1975, Barques' counsel answered as follows:
Clearly, the Barques have never set foot on the property from 1975 up to the present. The Barques merely "went around" the fully fenced property. The Barques never sent a demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property. The Barques never filed an ejectment or any action to recover possession of the property.
Eleventh: The Barques' Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace their Torrens title to the purchase by their predecessors-in-interest of the property from the Government in 1919. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks state:
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey Shows Barques' Property Located 5.6 Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have submitted a relocation survey made by the Lands Management Bureau NCR Regional Office of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D showing that the Barques' property is located "some 5.6 kilometers away from Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, outside of Quezon City."[101] The relocation survey plan is signed by Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the Technical Services Division, and Engineer III Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex "M" a copy of the Lands Management Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D.
This Court ruled in Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.[102] that courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of title involving a property already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person. The dissenting opinion claims that the Barques' title was already existing at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title in 1991. This is an egregious error. When the Manotoks' title was reconstituted in 1991, the Barques' title had not been reconstituted, and even up to now the reconstitution of the Barques' title is still pending resolution in the instant case. In contrast, when the Barques filed their reconstitution in 1996, the Manotoks' title had already been finally reconstituted and existing. Clearly, it is the Barques' still pending reconstitution that can no longer proceed because of the existing title of the Manotoks.
In Alabang, the Court held that a "duly issued existing Torrens title x x x cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles." The phrase "duly issued existing Torrens title" simply means a title verifiably issued by the proper Register of Deeds. The validity or invalidity of the title is not material at that point. What is material is whether the Register of Deeds actually issued the title as part of his regular functions.
Clearly, at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title, the Barques had no "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only "duly issued existing Torrens title" over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Manotoks' title could be verified against the reconstituted original title on file with the Register of Deeds. In fact, the LRA Administrator has admitted that the Manotoks' title "is existing as a reconstituted title at the Office of the Register of Deeds."[103]
The Barques could not produce even up to now a "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Barques' owner's duplicate certificate of title could not be verified with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because the Barques' title has no corresponding original title, whether reconstituted or not, on file with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the reconstitution of the Barques' title, which is still pending in this case, can no longer proceed.
Once the reconstituting court or officer establishes that the Register of Deeds has in fact issued an existing title in the name of another person, the proper step is to file an action before the Regional Trial Court to annul such title. It is in such proceeding before the regional trial court that the validity or invalidity of the title is determined. In such proceeding, any party may introduce in evidence the LRA Administrator or the NBI's findings. In the meantime, no reconstitution proceeding can prosper until after the cancellation by final judgment of such existing title.
The Alabang ruling necessarily involves a situation where there is an existing title issued by the Register of Deeds at the time of filing of a petition to reconstitute another title over the same property in the name of another person. The Alabang ruling states that in such a situation the reconstituting authority has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reconstitution until a final judgment cancels the other title. This is clear from the Court's ruling in Alabang:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property.[105] Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest,[106] the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands v. Gan Tan:[107]
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) can issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory findings on whether a Torrens title is spurious or authentic. These findings are mere evidences that must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court, which alone has the power to adjudicate whether the title is void. Findings by the LRA or the NBI that a title is spurious are merely administrative opinions, not a judicial determination that settles rights and obligations between parties over a disputed property. These findings are merely evidences, not the judgment itself of validity or invalidity which can only come from the Regional Trial Court. These findings do not become res judicata, while the judgment of the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an adjudication of the title's validity. The Barques received an undeserved windfall when the First Division declared their reconstituted title valid when the only relief they sought in the administrative reconstitution was the restoration of their title in its condition at the time of the alleged loss or destruction. This Court has ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.:[109]
The dissenting opinion further argues that the Manotoks are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LRA Administrator or the LRA reconstituting officer. The dissenting opinion asserts that the Manotoks failed to question in the proceedings before these LRA officials their jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques' title. This invocation of equity jurisdiction in favor of the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer for the benefit of the Barques - is grossly erroneous.
First, the settled doctrine is "he who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands."[111] The Barques have submitted patently forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer. In the development of equity jurisdiction through the ages, the constant principle from which there was no deviation was that equity could never be used to reward those who commit fraud. This Court should not depart from the noble intention that motivated the development and use of equity jurisdiction. As this Court aptly stated in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[112]
Third, the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer refused to assume jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques' title. The LRA Administrator denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of the Manotoks' title, which in the words of the LRA Administrator must first be cancelled by "a court of competent jurisdiction" before the Barques' petition may be given due course. The LRA reconstituting officer also denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of the Manotoks' title which the LRA had already reconstituted. In short, these LRA officials admitted that they had no jurisdiction over the Barques' petition. Since these LRA officials refused to assume jurisdiction, there was no assumption of equity jurisdiction that the Manotoks could have questioned. For the same reason, there is no assumption of jurisdiction that this Court can now recognize and validate through equity principles.
Fourth, the principle of equity jurisdiction arising from estoppel or any other reason applies only to courts of justice. The jurisdiction of courts of justice arises from either statute or equity, or both. In legal systems which recognize equity jurisdiction, equity is an inherent power of courts by virtue of their duty to dispense justice to the full extent possible. Equity jurisdiction is a judicial power. Administrative agencies or officers exercising administrative, executive, or ministerial functions cannot assume equity jurisdiction because they do not exercise judicial functions. Thus, it is gross error to invest on the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer equity jurisdiction because these LRA officers perform administrative or executive functions in petitions for administrative reconstitution of titles.
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrator's jurisdiction in relation to the LRA Administrator's opinion that the Manotoks' title was "sham and spurious." In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 August 1998 before the LRA Administrator,[116] the Manotoks stated:
The LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Only the Barques insist that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title of a third party in an administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by another party, a contention that is patently baseless.
Seventh, and most important of all, equity jurisdiction can never be used to violate the law. Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to render judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its statutory jurisdiction.[120] However, equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law.[121] Where the law prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.[122] Thus, this Court has ruled:
This rule has special application to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, enacted specifically to foreclose any possible collateral attack on a Torrens title, as well as any possible cancellation or modification of a Torrens title without a proceeding in the Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the title. Strict compliance with Section 48 is what gives Torrens titles enduring stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land ownership. To extend equity jurisdiction to LRA officers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks on a Torrens title is a gross and blatant violation of the clear and express command of a positive law. Any extension of equity jurisdiction that operates to negate Section 48 will destroy the most basic safeguard in the Property Registration Decree. Certainly, equity jurisdiction cannot be used for this purpose.
In cancelling the Manotoks' Torrens title without any trial before any court, the First Division of this Court completely disregarded Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a Torrens title "cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
That law is Section 19 of the Judiciary Act which states that the "Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to x x x real property." These two provisions mandate that no Torrens title can be cancelled unless there is a proceeding in the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it ordered the cancellation of the Torrens title of the Manotoks without a prior proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Manotoks' title. Likewise, the First Division of this Court committed the same violation totally disregarding Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act, and in the process overturning well-entrenched doctrines of this Court.
The validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be assailed only in a direct proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court in accordance with Section 48. In Ladignon v. Court of Appeals,[124] the Court declared:
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[129] as authority that the Court of Appeals and this Court "have jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title" under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. The ponente has obviously misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon Realty was a petition filed with the Court of Appeals for annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost owner's duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David. Rexlon Realty proved that the titles were not lost but were in its possession as the first buyer of the properties from Alex David who had later sold again the properties to Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon Realty also proved that Alex David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the sale.
Rexlon Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same property, which is the situation in the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the opposing parties agreed that there was only one set of titles covering the same properties. The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were lost, and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of the titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which covered properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David. Rexlon Realty's obvious interest was to maintain the validity of the titles to the properties it had purchased, the titles to which were in Rexlon Realty's possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, the law requiring a direct proceeding in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the validity of a Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and distinct issue from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in issuing replacement titles to the properties in the name of Alex David who claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial court's judgment, Rexlon Realty invoked, as stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides "the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court x x x [based on] fraud and lack of jurisdiction." Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree is the cornerstone of our land registration system providing stability to land titles. Without Section 48, our land registration system will crumble. Section 48 guarantees every landowner with a Torrens title that his title can never be cancelled unless the validity of his title is first directly assailed in court where he can adduce evidence in his favor. The Decision of the First Division erases this guarantee. In one stroke, the Decision of the First Division has overturned over a century of jurisprudence fortifying a guarantee essential to the stability of our land registration system.
In 1915, after the introduction in 1903[131] of the Torrens system in this country, this Court waxed poetic in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby[132] in describing the cornerstone of the then new system of land registration. Declared the Court:
The Decision of the First Division denies to the Manotoks a basic guarantee under the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.[136] The Decision deprives the Manotoks of their P1.7 billion property without any trial in any court contrary to the clear and express mandate of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. This Court should never allow such blatant, gross and shocking violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
This Court has often warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles, which have resulted in innocent landowners losing their titled lands to crime syndicates specializing in forged titles and documents. The patently forged documents presented in these cases remind us of what this Court stated in Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay:[137]
[1] Rollo, (G.R. No. 162335), p. 131. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, supposedly registered in the name of Homer L. Barque Sr., please furnish us with a certified copy of subdivision plan Fls-3168-D, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[2] Id. at 133. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the above-entitled petition, please furnish us with a certification as to the existence and authenticity of plan Fls-3168-D, supposedly covered by TCT No. 210177, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[3] Id. at 132. The letter states:
In reply to your letter dated October 29, 1996 requesting for certified copy of plan Fls- 3168-D for reference in connection with administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177. Relative to the plan Fls-3168-D, please be informed that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168- D.
[4] Id. at 134. The letter states:
In reply to your undated letter, please be informed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS- 3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of this Office.
[5] Id. at 135. The letter states:
Relative to the above-entitled petition, we would like to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of Plan Fls-3168-D, while your Office does not have a record of the same.
Attached for your reference are the following:
[6] Id. at 136.
[7] Id. at 137. Emphasis supplied.
[8] Id. at 138. Emphasis supplied.
[9] Id. at 139-140. Emphasis supplied.
[10] Id. at 142. Emphasis supplied.
[11] Id. at 144-145. Emphasis supplied.
[12] Id. at 146.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 147.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 88-95. Penned by Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit.
[16] Re: Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Lost or Destroyed Certificates of Title Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6732.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 93-94.
[18] Id. at 95.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 96-97. Penned by Administrator Senecio O. Ortile.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 78-79.
[21] Id. at 90-91.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 106-111. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[23] Id. at 113-118.
[24] Id. at 117.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 244-248. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 56-69. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine, concurring and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissenting.
[27] Id. at 65.
[28] Id. at 71-73.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 667-683.
[30] Id. at 830-832.
[31] 450 Phil. 615 (2003).
[32] 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
[33] 161 Phil. 586 (1976).
[34] 183 Phil. 426 (1979).
[35] 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
[36] 209 Phil. 325 (1983).
[37] G.R. No. 86074, 20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 420.
[38] G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743.
[39] G.R. No. 34080, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
[40] G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
[41] 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[42] Resolution, 462 Phil. 546 (2003).
[43] Section 48, PD 1529; Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra note 32; Magay, etc. v. Estiandan, supra note 33; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 38; Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, supra note 41.
[44] Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc. et al., supra note 35; MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., supra note 36; Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 40.
[45] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[46] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Liwag v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., supra note 42.
[47] Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 388.
[48] 438 Phil. 252 (2002); Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 210 Phil. 482 (1983).
[49] Id. at 278-279.
[50] Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 203.
[51] Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
[52] Presidential Decree No. 1529.
[53] A direct attack on a Torrens title is an action whose principal purpose is to alter or annul the title. Such direct attack can be filed only before the proper regional trial court. An indirect or collateral attack is an action whose principal purpose is other than to alter or annul a title but its indirect consequence is at the very least to put doubt on the validity of the title. A petition for reconstitution of title over property that is already covered by a pre-existing Torrens title is an indirect attack on such Torrens title. See Leyson v. Bontuyan, et al., G.R. No. 156357, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 94.
[54] Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 140752, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 543.
[55] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 597-598 (1999). In Alipoon, the Court ruled:
[57] Id. at 161-162.
[58] Supra note 34.
[59] Id. at 432-433.
[60] See note 46.
[61] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
[62] Zafra v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875 (1953); Bunagan v. Branch VI CFI of Cebu, 186 Phil. 31 (1980).
[63] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[64] Section 18 of RA No. 26 allows the Register of Deeds to cancel the reconstituted title if the lost title is subsequently found and both titles are still in the name of the same registered owner. Section 18 states:
[66] Emphasis supplied.
[67] Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958).
[68] Supra note 9.
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Supra note 10.
[72] Supra note 11.
[73] Supra note 7.
[74] Supra, note 11.
[75] Supra, note 9.
[76] G.R. No. 120958, 16 December 1996, 265 SCRA 614.
[77] Id. at 642-643.
[78] Supra, note 11.
[79] Id.
[80] Supra, note 9.
[81] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 141. The Barques' 7 February 1997 letter states in full:
[83] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 143. The 14 February 1997 letter of the LRA reconstituting officer states in full:
[85] Id. at 357-360.
[86] Id. at 253. The LRA reconstituting officer's Comment reads in full:
[88] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 438.
[89] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 213. Annex "BB," Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[90] Id. at 214. Annex "BB-1," Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[91] TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 353-355.
[92] Supra note 86.
[93] Annex "M-21," Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[94] LRA Records, p. 412, Opposition dated 8 April 1997.
[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 99.
[96] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[97] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 174-175.
[98] SPOUSES CAYETANO and PATRICIA TIONGSON, SPOUSES EDWARD and PACITA GO, SPOUSES ROBERTO and MYRNA LAPERAL III, ELISA R. MANOTOK, SPOUSES IGNACIO and PACITA MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., SPOUSES FAUSTO and MILAGROS MANOTOK, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Minors MIGUEL A. B. SISON and MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, represented by their judicial guardian FILOMENA M. SISON, SPOUSES MAMERTO and PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, represented by his judicial guardian MAMERTO BOCANEGRA, SPOUSES FRANCISCO and FILOMENA SISON, JOSE CLEMENTE MANOTOK, SPOUSES JESUS and THELMA MANOTOK, Minors PHILIP MANOTOK, MARIA TERESA MANOTOK and RAMON SEVERINO MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., Minors JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian JESUS MANOTOK, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO S. MACAYA, respondents. Supra note 96.
[99] TSN, Oral Argument of 24 July 2007, pp. 445-447.
[100] Annual Report of the Director of Lands For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 1927, p. 106, Annex "M-22," Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[101] Intervenors' Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, p. 22. In its 12 September 2006 Resolution, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
[102] Supra note 35.
[103] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 94. LRA Resolution dated 24 June 1998.
[104] Supra note 35 at 744.
[105] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[106] Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680 (1987).
[107] 89 Phil. 184 (1951).
[108] Id. at 186-187.
[109] Supra note 42.
[110] Id. at 565.
[111] Catingub v. Court of Appeals, et al., 206 Phil. 83 (1983); Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 175 Phil. 476 (1978).
[112] 216 Phil. 533 (1984).
[113] Id. at 535.
[114] The dissenting opinion cited Tijam v. Sibonghanay, et al., 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
[115] Supra, note 94.
[116] LRA Records, pp. 254-277.
[117] Id. at 273.
[118] 111 Phil. 73 (1961).
[119] Id. at 93-94.
[120] Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
[121] Arsenal v. IAC, 227 Phil. 36 (1986).
[122] Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 252.
[123] Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 178, 184 citing Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
[124] 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).
[125] Id. at 1174.
[126] See note 15.
[127] Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, 3 August 1990, 788 SCRA 321; Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 18 (1999).
[128] Supra.
[129] 429 Phil. 31 (2002).
[130] Id. at 44-46.
[131] Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, was approved by the Philippine Commission on 6 November 1902 and took effect on 1 February 1903. See Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
[132] Supra note 32.
[133] Id. at 593-594.
[134] Supra note 41.
[135] Id. at 252-253.
[136] Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[137] G.R. No. 56694, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 12.
[138] Id. at 20.
These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts at registration of the subject property. Necessarily, they call for the correct application of entrenched principles in land registration. At the same time, they afford this Court the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system against unscrupulous elements who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end.
These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division which had initially ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12 December 2005.[4] They were accepted by the Court en banc in a Resolution dated 26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various contentions before the Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of their respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court en banc, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General was required,[5] and a set of new parties was allowed leave to intervene.[6]
The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized herein for convenience.
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were destroyed as a consequence. The resulting effects of that blaze on specific property registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a number of cases since then.[7] These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the most contentious of those cases thus far.
Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition[8] with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner's duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.
Learning of the Barques' petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino Manotok, et. al. They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques' and the Manotoks' titles advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated in the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. The Barque title actually involves two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns only one parcel of land, but with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied[9] the petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:
The Barques' motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order[10] dated 10 February 1998; hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.x x x
- Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
- The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.
x x x
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition and should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further found anomalies in the Manotoks' title. It observed that:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the Manotok title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled,[11] that:
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory....
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos ... confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. ...
....
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ....
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. ...
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the Barques with a prayer that the reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied[12] the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration and the Barques' prayer for immediate reconstitution.
SO ORDERED.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Barques' petition for review[13] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks' petition for review[14] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks argued in their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok title was spurious and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene.[15] She sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed ownership over the subject property.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16] in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques' petition and affirming the LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] Subsequently, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision[18] dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners' valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.[19]The Manotoks filed a motion for the reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, but this was denied.[20]
On the other hand, as to the Manotoks' petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[21] on 29 October 2003 which affirmed the resolution of the LRA.[22] The appellate court held that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barques' petition for reconstitution, since there was as yet no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title. The Barques filed a motion for reconsideration of this ruling.[23] As had occurred with the Barques' petition, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Barques' motion for reconsideration and on 24 February 2004, promulgated its Amended Decision[24] wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title, the Manotoks filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. On 2 August 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335.[25]
On 12 December 2005, the Court's First Division rendered its Decision[26] affirming the two decisions of the Court of Appeals.[27] The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court's First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19 April 2006.[28] Thereafter, the Manotoks' filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The Court denied the same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further ordered that entry of judgment be made.[29] Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[30]
The Barques filed multiple motions with the Court's First Division concerning the execution of the judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution.[31] In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred these cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution accepting the cases.[32]
On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention.[33] Movants alleged that the property subject of the petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.[34] The Director of the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the LMB that:
...steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481(372302) and all its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted to the State.[35]Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in these cases, directing the OSG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments were eventually held on 24 July 2007.
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the Solicitor General to submit their respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are attended by a few procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en bancs move on the Special First Division's referral for reevaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with the reevaluation of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner in these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and the Special First Division warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the administrators and courts which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had sanctioned the recall entries of judgment.[36] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.[37] The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved to accept these petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court's First Division, as well as the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution is the result of that review. As earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRA's position, but ultimately, upon motion for reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in the Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation of the Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the Barque title. The obvious question is whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelledexcept in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."[38] Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial court.[39] Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques' and the Manotoks' petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction[40] over the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the government and its agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a certificate of title. It invokes the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC over "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein x x x." That the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of "exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC," there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can perhaps assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as follows:
SEC. 6. General FunctionsNowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost due to "flood, fire and other force majeure." The petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments:
(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still pending accomplishment;Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, further provides:
(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form without any apparent intentional alterations or erasures;
(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed;
(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the Assessor's Office; and
(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing of the petition for reconstitution.[41]
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been on the latter, after the issuance thereof.[42]Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner.[44]
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.[43]
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela,[45] which we held that "[t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners."[46] That such doctrine was established for cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already covered by a Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is obviously fraudulent or attended by flaws and as such cannot be countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the courts, and not with the LRA.
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.
III
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,[47] where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal infirmities" of Molina's cause of action, the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the Barques' petition.
The unusual "shortcut" that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because in that case the trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor General from the order for reconstitution of Molina's titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the Court of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial court's decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct resolution which was the annulment of Molina's titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these alternative results the more prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case records to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court itself by directly annulling Molina's titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA's ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive authority.
IV
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence following our earlier explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA from inquiring into the validity of that title.
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have ruled definitively on the validity of the Barques' claim to title. After all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim was valid would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before the Court is comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900.[48] The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been registered under the name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name of Manotok Realty, Inc.[49] This detracts from the Barques' claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks. The Barques have failed to explain the anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing,[50] nor did the LMB have a record of the plan.[51] However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region (DENR-NCR).[52] The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office.[53]
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector.[54] The LMB, however, denied issuing such letter and stated that it was a forged document.[55] To amplify the forged nature of the document, the LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its office.[56] In a letter to the administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that "it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case [be] referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration."[57]
There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the Barques, and the technical description provided by the DENR.[58] The DENR-confirmed technical description reads:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate.[59]However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with respect to the boundaries named therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the subdivision plan would read:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco; on the SE., by Diez Francisco; along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1 by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate."[60]The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the subdivision plan it relies on and the DENR record. They also do not contradict the finding of the National Archives that there is no copy in its files of the deed of sale allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque.[61]
Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August 2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out that the land as described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon City." This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is within the boundaries of Quezon City.[62] A similar finding was made by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the Barque title locates it at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate.[63]
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques' claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.
V
In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye on the evidence and points raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the Manotoks' claim are considerable and disturbing enough. The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the integrity of the land registration system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective as they are of a scourge this Court is dedicated to eliminate.
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these cases. The Manahans had filed a petition with the OSG seeking that it initiate cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That petition was referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April 2000.[64]
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S. dela Peña a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR Undersecretary, in answering that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate.[65] The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No. 22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is not visually discernible what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000 stating thus:
After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that the documents leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the files of this Office.[66]These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR, according to Undersecretary Dela Peña.[67]
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates and assignment of sales certificates in the names of the purported predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias, and Felicisimo Villanueva certificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No. C-99-152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that the said documents "could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be."[68]
According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan as grantee, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of Conveyance was referred to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.
Also on record[69] is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989, authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated therein that Lot No. 823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in 1908. In 1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued Sales Certificate No. 511. The Investigation Report stated:
Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman Manahan as (Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23, 1974. Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Central Office, it appears that original claimant of lot 823 was Valentin Manahan.[70]All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks' claim dissuade us from being simply content in reflexively dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution filed by the Barques. Indeed, we have to take further action.
VI
The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in the Manotok title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title. If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without hesitancy rule on such question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants more deliberation.
The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the Manotok title until the proper case for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial court. Within that context, it would also be a plausible recourse for us is to direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However, it is already apparent, following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidence unrefuted thus far indicating that the Manotoks' claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,[71] the subject property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club had undertaken the administrative reconstitution of the title to the property, leading Alonso to file a complaint for nullification of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonso's complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with this Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the validity of Cebu Country Club's administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision declared "that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines."
The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso,[72] extensively discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, had not participated or intervened in that case before the lower courts.
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all.
x x x
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.
x x x
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property, the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless therein expressly provided, is founded on "the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided."
x x x
Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it had become private property.[73]
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks' claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before - in Republic v. Court of Appeals[74] and more recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals.[75] Our following explanation in Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving and evaluating evidence should be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this Court may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted, similar to the annulment of the Cebu Country Club title in Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims to title by other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may submit on their behalf, may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus be prudent, in assuring the accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG, to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. If the final evidence on record definitively reveals the proper claimant to the subject property, the Court would take such fact into consideration as it adjudicates final relief.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or `areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.[76]
For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from notice of this Resolution.
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of the Solicitor General is directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from the Land Management Bureau and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of the Court's First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and the Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these remanded cases immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
Puno, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., join dissenting opinion of J. Ynares-Santiago.
Carpio, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio-Morales, J., concur with J. Carpio's separate opinion.
Corona, J., see separate opinion.
Nachura, J., related to one of the counsel. no part.
[1] F. PONCE, THE PHILIPPINE TORRENS SYSTEM: A TEXBOOK ON LAND TITLES, DEEDS, LIENS, DESCENT AND MORTGAGE at 120.
[2] Id. at 121.
[3] Id. at 125.
[4] G.R. No. 162605, rollo, pp. 666-732. See also 477 SCRA 339.
[5] Id. at
[6] Id. at 969-A.
[7] See, e.g., Medina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107595, 2 February 1994, 229 SCRA 601; Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455; In Re: Azucena Garcia, 393 Phil. 718 (2000); University of the Philippines v. Rosario, 407 Phil. 924 (2001); Republic v. Holazo, G.R. No. 146846, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 345; Cañerov. University of the Philippines, G.R. No.156380, 8 September 2004, 437 SCRA 630; Encinas v. National Bookstore, G.R. No. 162704, 28 July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572; Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 128122, 128184 & 128229, 18 March 2005, 485 SCRA 234; Subido v. Republic, G.R. No. 152149, 25 April 2006, 488 SCRA 178: Heirs of Nicolas v. Development Bank, G.R. No. 137548, 3 September 2007, 532 SCRA 38.
[8] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 74.
[9] Id. at 86.
[10] Id at 87.
[11] Id at 95.
[12] Id at 96.
[13] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 2-23.
[14] CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 rollo, p.7-45.
[15] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, pp. 172-201.
[16] Id. at 244-248.
[17] Id. at 256-275.
[18] Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr, Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. dissented.
[19] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, rollo, p. 432.
[20] Justice Enriquez maintained his dissent.
[21] Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[22] CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, rollo, p. 144-149.
[23] Id. at 151-171.
[24] Id. at 218.
[25] G.R. No.162605. Rollo, p. 386.
[26] Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by the Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr and by Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Adolfo S. Azcuna. Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
[27] Id. at 667-684.
[28] Id. at 830.
[29] Id. at 881. Entry of judgment was recorded on 2 May 2006.
[30] Id. at 884.
[31] Id. at 908-918.
[32] Id. at. 947-A.
[33] G.R. No. 162335, rollo, p. 891.
[34] Id at 1320.
[35] Id at 1075.
[36] Citing Barnes v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 675; Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, 434 Phil. 753 (2002).
[37] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1988, 292 SCRA 38.
[38] See Sec. 48, Pres. Decree No. 1529.
[39] Sec. 9(1) & (2), B.P. 129, as amended.
[40] See Sec. 9(3), B.P. 129, as amended.
[41] See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 5, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732.
[42] See Rep. Act No. 26, Sec. 19, as amended.
[43] See Rep. Act No. 6732, Secs. 11 & 12, Rep. Act No. 6732.
[44] See e.g., Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34080 & 34693, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
[45] 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
[46] Id. See also Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44.
[47] G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
[48] Rollo, p. 127.
[49] Id. at 1200-1201.
[50] Rollo, p. 157.
[51] Id. at 132.
[52] Id. at 134.
[53] Rollo, p. 136.
[54] Id. at 137.
[55] Id. at 142.
[56] Id. at 144.
[57] Id. at 143.
[58] See "Annex A," Memorandum of Intervenor. "Extracted from Technical Descriptions appearing on Deed of Conveyance No. 200022 with Sales Cert. No. 511 issued by the OIC Director of Land Management Bureau on Oct. 30, 2000 and was further checked and verified against the Land use Map of Q.C., C.M. 14-40 N. 121-05'E., Sec. 4-A, Brgy. of Matandang Balara on file at the Projection Unit of LSVS-DENR-NCR and plan Sp-00-000779 on file at TSS-DENR-NCR."
[59] Id.
[60] Annex "G," Respondents' Memorandum.
[61] Rollo, p. 210.
[62] Id. at 949.
[63] See id. at 1107.
[64] Id. at 1075
[65] Id. at 1077.
[66] Id.
[67] Id.
[68] Id. at 1320.
[69] See id. at 1321-1322.
[70] Id.
[71] 426 Phil. 61 (2002).
[72] See 462 Phil. 546 (2003) .
[73] Id. at 563-566.
[74] 359 Phil. 530 (1998).
[75] G.R. Nos. 123346 & 134385, 14 December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
[76] Id. at 351-352.
CARPIO, J.:
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996,[1] addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty. Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to furnish him with a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D (Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Lands Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR).[2]
In his reply dated 7 November 1996,[3] Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Lands Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28 November 1996,[4] Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D conflicted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2 December 1996[5] to Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter dated 5 December 1996,[6] Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engineer Dalire wrote:
In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan FLS-3168-D (microfilm) issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the Chief of Technical Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he issued to LRA for our evaluation.A letter dated 2 January 1997,[7] purportedly from Engineer Dalire, addressed to the LRA Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records Section on 7 January 1997. The letter states:
In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the copy of that office issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate from this Office. The stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not the same stamp we are using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment.
SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D
Caloocan, M.M.
02 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of the subject plan was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was found out that they are identical and bore the same stamps and initials used in this office.
In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then for our last result, hence, this case be given due course for Administrative reconstitution (sic).
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau(SGD.)
PRIVADI J. G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
Interestingly, Engineer Dalire wrote another letter dated 5 January 1997[8] addressed to the Regional Technical Director, LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:PRIVADI J. G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that Office in connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to the certified reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that office (signed by Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records and Statistics Section) on September 23, 1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have no records of Fls-3168-D.Engineer Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997[9] to the LRA Administrator. The letter states:
The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with machine copy of Fls-3168-D reproduced from the copy issued by that Office and we found out that the copy of Fls-3168-D file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this Office. We reiterate that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.
May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on file in your office for our evaluation and comment.
31 January 1997In a letter dated 13 February 1997[10] to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire explained that the 2 January 1997 letter was forged. Thus:
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution of the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr., Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested us to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does not have a record of the same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.
- Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
- Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
- Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29, 1996
Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in the file. We requested for the copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication as required by DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or portion thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
13 February 1997Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997,[11] Engineer Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious, thus:
The Administrator
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be informed that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions, that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your letter, this letter definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996 and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached).
With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
19 February 1997
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Bustos:
In reply to your query whether or not
are authentic and really coming from this office.
The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating that copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is identical to the microfilm and that the case be given due course for administrative reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this letter was never prepared and issued by this Office. Our record books and file attest to this. We do not use letterheads for letters involving this topic.
Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did not reach you.
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents.
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
In an Order dated 30 June 1997,[12] Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10 February 1998,[14] Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.
- Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472, respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
- The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.[13] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998,[15] the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13,[16] only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the owner's duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engineer Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official communication from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined that the Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:
It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by oppositors particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79", "84" and "85" of Opposition] which is grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position Paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong. It must likewise be noted that there is a Barrio Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio Matandang Balara and they do not adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June 1988 would show that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara [Annexes "91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to "114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax receipts also reflect the tax declaration of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular that the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations which appear to have been canceled would again be revived.However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a court of competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of the LRA Resolution reads:
The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same is being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of the tax map over the property in question issued by the Quezon City Assessor's Office [annex "H" of Petitioners Position Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot 822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time of the original survey, there were no such Psd's yet.
Examination of the technical decription and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners' Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners' Position Paper]. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate.[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June 2001,[19] the LRA denied the motion.
SO ORDERED.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
The Manotoks filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying for the modification of 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA. The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of competent jurisdiction.
CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001[20] for failure to show that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Manotoks, the petition was reinstated in the Resolution of 27 November 2001.[21]
In its Decision of 29 October 2003,[22] the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration of the Barques, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004,[23] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177.The Manotoks came to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 162335.
SO ORDERED.[24]
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002,[25] the Court of Appeals dismissed the Barques' petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Barques moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003,[26] the Court of Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners' valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its Resolution of 12 March 2004,[28] the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The Manotoks filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2 August 2004.
In a Decision dated 12 December 2005,[29] the First Division of this Court denied the petitions and affirmed the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution,[30] the Special First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks' motion for reconsideration. No proceeding of any kind took place before any trial court assailing the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques' simple petition for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this Court cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not only reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others, granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court referred the cases to the Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the Court en banc accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007, the Court en banc considered the following issues:
- Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners' title?
- Does the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
- Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?
- Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court.
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon.[31] Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques' title because of the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct proceeding assailing its validity is filed before the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth, the Barques submitted patently forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their title, and even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division made four "firsts." First, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution of title resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person without a direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to reconstitute administratively a Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the issue of ownership of land is decided with finality in a petition for administrative reconstitution of title. And fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying for a simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected and undeserved windfall the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the cancellation of a previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the same property.
The Decision of the First Division overturns three doctrines firmly established in numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them landmark rulings. To name a few of these decisions starting in the year 1915: Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,[32] Magay, etc. v. Estiandan,[33] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[34] Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.,[35] MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al.,[36] Liwag v. Court of Appeals,[37] Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[38] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals,[39] Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,[40] Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[41] and Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[42]
The three well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division has overturned are:
- A Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly attacking the title's validity before the proper regional trial court.[43] This is the bedrock principle that provides enduring stability to Torrens titles.
- A reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or administrative, cannot proceed once it is shown that another Torrens title has already been issued to another person over the same property. The reconstituting body or court has no jurisdiction to issue another Torrens title over the same property to the petitioner.[44] The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings.[45] The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other person.
- The reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership over the property or the validity of the title.[46] The purpose of reconstitution is solely to replace a certificate of title that was lost or destroyed in the same legal status it existed at the time of the loss or destruction. The validity of a Torrens title, reconstituted or not, is a separate issue from the reconstitution of title.
The dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division has already become final and executory, and thus has become immutable and unalterable. The dissenting opinion states that there is no compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions.
On the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions necessarily applies only to final and executory decisions. If the decision never became final and executory, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions has no application. Before finality of a decision, a court has "plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the decision becomes final."[47]
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division. The Court en banc has ruled in Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar[48] that a decision of a division is void if it overturns a doctrine established by the en banc or another division. There, the Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:A void decision vests no right, creates no obligation, grants no title, and settles no issue. A void decision protects no one and is subject to attack, directly or collaterally,[50] at any time. A void decision has no existence in law. Therefore, a void decision cannot become final and executory against, or in favor of, any one.
"x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of the above constitutional provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.[51]
In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree[52] states that a "certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack." The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack[53] on a Torrens title. The Manotoks' prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.[54]
RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS OF BARQUES
In fact, the existence of a prior Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings and renders the reconstituted title void.[55] Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,[56] penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, is instructive and summarizes the law on this matter:
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.[57] (Emphasis supplied)Even before Demetriou, this Court had already ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals[58] that the existence of a prior Torrens title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings, thus:
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombasi cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.These rulings of the Court are so essential in providing stability to land titles that overturning them now would be catastrophic to our Torrens system of land registration.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration.[59] (Emphasis supplied)
ACTION ASSAILING ITS VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
The LRA has also no jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks because the exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title belongs to the Regional Trial Court. The LRA, moreover, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership dispute over a parcel of land[60] between the Barques and the Manotoks because jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of disputed real properties belongs to courts of justice.
Two specific provisions of law confer exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts to cancel a Torrens title. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)Section 19 of the Judiciary Act[61] provides that the "Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to x x x real property."
That the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain any action to cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of the Property Registration Decree. Section 108 states that "no erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title x x x, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)."
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to decisions that are capable of becoming final and executory. Decisions of the LRA on administrative reconstitutions of title never become final and executory. An administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or replacement of a lost or destroyed title in its original form at the time of the loss or destruction.[62] The issuance of a reconstituted title vests no new rights and determines no ownership issues.[63] At any time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or destroyed title is subsequently found.[64] The issuance by the LRA of a reconstituted title is an executive function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata. This Court stated in A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[65] "[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination."[66]
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques much more than what the Barques prayed for in their petition for administrative reconstitution of title. In their petition before the LRA, the Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of their allegedly destroyed title. The Decision of the First Division grants the reconstitution, declares the reconstituted title valid, awards ownership over the disputed property to the Barques, and cancels the Torrens title of the Manotoks. This violates the "cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than what is prayed for"[67] in the petition.
Equally disturbing, there are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and other dubious circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed aside in its Decision. These forgeries alone are more than sufficient grounds to deny the reconstitution of the Barques' title. These forgeries provide compelling reasons for this Court to require compliance with Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree in determining the validity of the Manotoks' title. Section 48 requires a proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Torrens title before such title can be cancelled.
First: Forged Plan Fls-3168-D
The Barques submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer patently forged documents in support of their petition. On 31 January 1997, Engineer Dalire wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D submitted to the LRA "bears forged initials of my section officer and myself,"[68] and that the Lands Management Bureau National Office "does not have copy of Fls-3168-D."[69] Engineer Dalire urged the LRA that plan Fls-3168-D and the accompanying authentication letter "be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources."[70]
Plan Fls-3168-D is vital in establishing the authenticity of the Barques' Torrens title, which contains two lots as subdivided by plan Fls-3168-D from the original Lot 823. The Manotoks' title covers only one lot, Lot 823, without subdivision. Both the Manotoks and the Barques claim the same original Lot 823. If there is no record in the Lands Management Bureau National Office of plan Fls-3168-D showing the subdivision of Lot 823 into two lots, then the Barques' title is spurious.
During the oral argument of these cases, counsel for the Barques was asked if the Barques have ever secured a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. Counsel for the Barques showed the Court a copy of what purported to be plan Fls-3168-D but on closer examination the copy was certified not by the Lands Management Bureau National Office but by the NCR Regional Office. What counsel for the Barques showed was the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, had rejected as a forgery in his 31 January 1997 and 19 February 1997 letters to Atty. Bustos. In his letters, Engineer Dalire stated that there is no plan Fls-3168-D in the files of the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
Second: Forged 2 January 1997 Letter
On 13 February 1997, Engineer Privadi J. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly coming from Engineer Dalire, "definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document."[71]
In his 19 February 1997 letter, Engineer Dalire also informed the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2 January 1997 letter purportedly coming from him was the "handiwork of forgers."[72] In the questioned 2 January 1997 letter[73] addressed to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire allegedly stated that the Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics of the National Capital Region-Lands Management Bureau (NCR Regional Office) had forwarded a copy of Fls-3168-D to Engineer Dalire's office. Engineer Dalire has repeatedly denounced this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery, not only because he never signed this letter, but also because his office never received a copy of Fls-3168-D from the NCR Regional Office.
Third: Plan Fls-3168-D Is Void Unless Validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques then undertook to present to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, counsel for the Barques explained why they could not present a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office:
Following the order of the Honorable Justice Carpio for respondents to secure a certified true copy of Fls-3168-D from the Land Management Bureau, National Office, they went to said National Office to secure said certified true copy of Fls-33168-D but were instead given a copy of a form letter (Annex "J") issued in reply to a prior request for transmittal of Plan FLS-3168-D with the information that records of said plan had already been turned over to the National Capital Region.The form letter (Annex "J") from the Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, that the Barques attached to their Memorandum, states -
x x x plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of and situated in Caloocan Rizal was among those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR-199, for their reference/file purposes.The form letter bears the printed name of Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office although someone whose signature is not legible signed for Rainier D. Balbuena.
The Barques also submitted a Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena,OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, stating:
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDP's Listing has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, Xerox copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (Now Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.In sharp contrast, the Manotoks attached to their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007 a certification signed by three persons from the Lands Management Bureau National Office, namely, Bienvenido F. Cruz, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division; Rodel Collantes, Chief, Technical Services & Survey Records Documentation Section; and Teodoro A. de Castro, researcher. This certification, dated 2 August 2007, states:
August 2, 2007The certification of the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division prevails over the certification of the OIC, Records Management Division. Under paragraph 2.4 of Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, "no copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division." The same paragraph 2.4 further states that unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Divisions, copies of such plans "should be temporarily expunged from the records of the Records Division until they are validated and returned for official file."
LUISA T. PADORA
2830 Juan Luna St. Tondo
Manila
S i r /M a d a m:
This is in connection with your request on the verification of survey plan. As per our inventory we found out the following:
Survey No.
LocationAccession No. Fls-3168-D Not listed in EDP listing.
Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section
Researched by:
(Sgd) TEODORO A. DE CASTRO
OR#: 3041650
Date: 08/02/07
Amt. Php 40.00
Thus, no secondary copies of plans, like the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, can have any evidentiary value unless validated by the Geodetics Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. More importantly, copies of plans, like the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, which have not been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division, are deemed "expunged from the Records of the Records Division." The inescapable conclusion is that the form letter (Annex "J") issued by the Records Management Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, and the Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "E-I") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office, both of which refer to the existence of the Barques' Fls-3168-D plan, are absolutely worthless and are mere scraps of paper.
The Barques' explanation is further belied by the 19 February 1997 letter of Engineer Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, that:
x x x Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.As pointed out by Engineer Dalire, under DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, the copy of plan Fls-3168-D must be forwarded by the NCR Regional Office for validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. No copy of the survey plan can be issued by the NCR Regional Office without the validation of the Geodetic Surveys Division. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49 states:
x x x
x x x How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). x x x.[74] (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4. Preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans. The following considerations on the preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans shall be observed:The requirement of validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated and amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, thus:
2.4 No copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division (see paragraph 4.3, DENR A.O. 49, s-1991). The Survey Records Section shall turn over all print (white, blue, xerox) copies and photographic copies in its file to the Geodetic Surveys Division for examination, investigation and/or validation. These copies should temporarily be expunged from the records of the Records Division until they are validated and returned for official file. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)Unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, secondary copies of survey plans, such as the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D, have no evidentiary value because they are "temporarily x x x expunged from the records of the Records Division."
The Geodetic Surveys Division validates the survey plans based on the "back-up file in the Central Records Office." Despite the decentralization of the records of survey plans, the Lands Management Bureau National Office retained "back-up files" of the decentralized records. Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 states:
The NCR Regional Office failed to submit to the Geodetics Survey Division a copy of plan Fls-3168-D despite repeated requests from Engineer Dalire. In his 31 January 1997 letter to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire stated:
x x x please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA (sic) did not emanate from our office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.[75] (Emphasis supplied)This repeated and manifest failure by the NCR Regional Office is echoed by the glaring failure of the Barques to submit, as they had promised to the Court during the oral argument, a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
This Court has already recognized that copies of survey plans are void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991. In Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[76] the Court held:
Finally, private respondents' cause of action against petitioner is defeated by the findings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands, contained in his letters to the Regional Technical Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15 December 1992, respectively:Clearly, in the present cases the copy of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D issued by the NCR Regional Office is likewise void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, as amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92. Up to this time, the Barques have failed to submit a copy of their plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Geodetic Surveys Division. The inescapable conclusion is that the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D is void ab initio.
12 November 1992
x x x
MEMORANDUM:
15 December 1992
FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands
The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard
Manila
FROM: L M B
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certified by Engineer Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared from a tracing cloth plan on file in the NCR" for validation. We returned the white print plan prepared by Engineer Pangyarihan because we should examine the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the tracing cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies sent by the Central Records Division to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated 27 November 1992, Engineer Pangyarihan explained that he prepared the copy which he certified from a white print plan on file in the region as the applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth. While the explanation may be considered, yet the preparation of the plan is not yet in accordance with Sections 1.3 and 4.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49, s-1991 which requires that the white prints or photographic print of the plan other than the original plan which have been decentralized must first be authenticated by this Bureau before a certified true copy is issued by the region. It is evident therefore that the issuance of a certified true copy of Psu-201 from a white print is premature, and considered void ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print copy is subjected to field ocular inspection of the land and on the basis of the findings, the region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as usual. Certified copies may now be issued based on the reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201 should therefore be subjected to ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila. That plan was heavily damaged and its reconstruction was not finalized. This should be included in the investigation.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division.[77] (Emphasis supplied)
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D, certified by the NCR Regional Office, to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques had earlier submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (microfilm) duly certified by Carmelito A. Soriano for the Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR, Annex "H" hereof. This microfilm copy is exactly the same as the Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.First, there does not appear in Annex "H" a signature over the printed name Carmelito A. Soriano, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National Office.
Second, Annex "H" is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as required by Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
Third, Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly originated from the office of Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau. Annex "H" is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the Barques showed to the Court during the oral argument. Engineer Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy of Fls-3168-D as "spurious" in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:Engineer Dalire ended his letter by advising Atty. Bustos to "disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents."[79]
- We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?
- The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is not our practice;
- The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for th certification and another for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
- The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the spurious copy of plan;
- The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY" is smaller than our rubber stamp;
- The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________ "This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have shown you our rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your possession is a spurious plan.[78] (Emphasis supplied)
Again, in his 31 January 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire reiterated that plan Fls-3168-D, which purportedly was certified by him, did not come from his office. Engineer Dalire stated in his 31 January 1997 letter:
x x x We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:The Barques have the temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan Fls-3168-D which has been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by Engineer Dalire, the very person whom the Barques claim certified their copy of Fls-3168-D. Engineer Dalire is the best person to determine the authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because he allegedly signed it as claimed by the Barques, but also because he is the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, the office that has the "inventory of approved plans x x x (and) Microfilm Computer list of plans available for decentralization."
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
- Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
- The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the Barques had written the LRA Administrator complaining against the LRA reconstituting officer's alleged "pattern of effort to delay the administrative reconstitution."[81] The Barques attached to their 7 February 1997 letter an alleged order of reconstitution signed by Atty. Bustos approving the reconstitution of the Barques' TCT No. 210177. In his 14 February 1997 reply to the LRA Administrator, Atty. Bustos exposed the alleged order of reconstitution submitted by the Barques as a "tampered document."
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there was a "recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said reconstitution." However, in his 13 February 1997 letter[82] to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire, the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, disowned this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the LRA reconstituting officer wrote the LRA Administrator that:[83]
In his 14 February 1997 letter, the LRA reconstituting officer complained to the LRA Administrator that "there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents."
- There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the submitted documents;
- The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document. For your comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
- The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached for your reference is a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received by the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, marked as annex "B";
- Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m., respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823, Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached as annex "C." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The tampering refers to the insertion of (1) the name of "Homer L. Barque," and (2) the title number "210177" in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). The Barques justified the authenticity of the copy they presented by claiming that their copy was "initialed in each and every page."[84] However, the Barques' copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) differed from the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that the LRA reconstituting officer himself signed on 27 January 1997. To repeat, the original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) was an order issued and signed by the LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos. Indeed, the Barques' copy[85] of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) shows that it was signed by the same LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, handling the Barques' then pending petition for administrative reconstitution.
The Barques also failed to explain why they still pursued their petition for administrative reconstitution of their title if indeed they had already obtained an approved reconstitution on 27 January 1997 under their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96). On 13 August 1998, the LRA reconstituting officer filed before the LRA Administrator the following Comment:
2. That we maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the grounds stated in our Order dated June 30, 1997, and on the following additional grounds, to wit:The LRA reconstituting officer ended his Comment by urging the LRA Administrator that "this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission for investigation."
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased the subject property in the year 1975, why did he not take possession of it upon purchase, and up to now his descendants, the Petitioners, are not in possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of Barque, only in the year 1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors have been paying realty taxes on the property since the year 1965;
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)?[86] (Emphasis supplied)
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques explained the circumstances of the order of reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in this manner:
The said resolution was issued on January 27, 1997 when there was, as yet, no opposition from anyone to the Barques' petition for reconstitution and after the Barque had already submitted their Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 210177 which entitled them, like the several other petitioners listed in Mr. Bustos' aforesaid Resolution, to a reconstitution thereof under R.A. 6732.In short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. as one of the titles approved for reconstitution by Atty. Bustos, is authentic, genuine and untampered. This is contrary to the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos that the copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) submitted by the Barques is a "tampered document," and that the original Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself signed, which original is on file in his office in the LRA, does not include TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
In his letter, Atty. Turgano surmised that:
"The animosity and bias of Mr. Bustos against petitioners may be explained by the fact that he was responsible in giving due course and approving with dispatch the administrative reconstitution of the Manotok title which is TCT No. RT-22481 (372302).Mr. Bustos' bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of the Barques' Petition for Reconstitution which prompted them to file their opposition to the Barques' petition on April 14, 1997. He, therefore, apparently had the motive to delete the title and name of the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the LRA proceedings since it is his Order denying Barques' petition for reconstitution that was raised on appeal before the LRA Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing) the title and name of the Barques from the resolution." The Barques are now accusing Atty. Bustos of falsification by deleting the Barques' name and title in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) included the Barques' name and title, which is the copy that the Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to include the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27 January 1997, he was still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery found in the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31 January 1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos even wrote the LRA Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us (LRA) into favorable action by submitting forged documents." Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have included the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame excuse that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now "completely irrelevant" because what was raised on appeal to the LRA was the order of Atty. Bustos denying the Barques' petition for reconstitution. If their copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic and untampered, the Barques should insist that their petition for administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by the reconstituting officer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not claim or even mention this now, instead they agree that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their claim that Atty. Bustos granted their petition by including the Barques' title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered or forged documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render the Barques' reconstituted title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6732 (RA 6732),[87] the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles, provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)This Court would never countenance these blatant and glaring forgeries. The present cases involve 34 hectares of prime land located beside the Ayala Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Its value is estimated conservatively at P1.7 billion.
Fifth: The Barques' Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
The Barques filed their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22 October 1996, eight years after the original of their Torrens title was allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds. In contrast, the Manotoks administratively reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February 1991, three years after the fire and just one year after the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732 allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles under certain circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in the tax declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer: "Memo: This property appear (sic) to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under TD No. B-067-02136 with area of 343,945 sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202."[88] In their Petition For Review dated 30 March 2004, the Manotoks submitted certified true copies of the Barques' Tax Declarations 06892[89] and 06895[90] containing this notation. In their Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted copies of the Barques' tax declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of the notation on the Barques' tax declarations. However, counsel for the Barques admitted that he has not seen the original tax declarations on file with the Assessor's Office, thus:
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques ignored completely the Manotoks' claim that the Barques erased the notation.
Seventh: The Barques Paid Realty Tax only for 1987 to 1996
The Barques first paid real estate tax on the property only in 1996,[92] for realty taxes for the years 1987 to 1996, because the Barques were required to pay the current and preceding years' realty taxes before they could file their petition for administrative reconstitution. The Barques have not paid any realty tax after 1996, or before 1987.[93] In contrast, the LRA reconstituting officer found that the Manotoks have been paying realty taxes on the property since 1965. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks claim that they paid their realty taxes on the property from 1933 until the present, attaching to their Memorandum representative copies of their realty tax payments.
Eighth: The Barques Have Never Set Foot on the Property
The Barques have never set foot on the property since the time Homer L. Barque, Sr. allegedly purchased the property in 1975. Counsel for the Barques admitted this when he stated during the oral argument that the Barques merely "went around" the walled property. On the other hand, the Manotoks assert that the property is publicly known in their neighborhood as the Manotok Compound. The Manotoks further claim:
[A]s owners of said Lot 823, oppositors (Manotoks) had introduced substantial improvements, amounting to several millions, thereon consisting of, among others, high wall hollow block fence; their respective houses, apartments; offices and employees quarters, as early as in 1960, photographs of which are hereto attached as Annexes "115" to "134";[94] (Emphasis supplied)During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen the pictures of the various houses, buildings and concrete perimeter fence that the Manotoks constructed on the property since 1960.
Ninth: LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In calling the Manotoks' title "sham and spurious," the LRA Administrator cited the non-existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The LRA Administrator stated: "The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong."[95] This is a finding of fact that is based not only on self-serving and suspect evidence, but also on a patently erroneous claim.
The LRA Administrator relied on Annex "N" of "Petitioners," that is, the map of the Barques who were the petitioners before the LRA Administrator assailing the LRA reconstituting officer's denial of their reconstitution on the ground of pre-existence of the Manotoks' title and the submission of a spurious document by the Barques. Obviously, this Court should not rely on the LRA Administrator's findings which were admittedly based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been judicially acknowledged almost three decades ago in the Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya,[96] involving the same property under dispute in these cases. In Spouses Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection of Barrio Payong in Quezon City, thus:
On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question, which is as follows:The recognition of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Barrio Payong exists in Quezon City is based on the ocular inspection conducted on 23 June 1978 by the Clerk of Court of the Court of Agrarian Relations. In contrast, the statement of the LRA Administrator that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City is based merely on the map that the Barques submitted in their petition for administrative reconstitution, which was filed only on 22 October 1996.
"Conformably with `Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection' filed with this Court on even date and as stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, which as agreed upon between them is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock A.M. (sic), wherein the parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to determine:On June 27, 197[8], the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT", which is as follows:
(a) Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the plaintiff and/or his children;
(b) Portions of the property where the rice paddies are located;
(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and vegetables;
(d) Portions of the property where the houses of the plaintiff and/or his children are built and located;
(e) Portion of the property which, according to the defendants, had been, before the filing of the complaint in this case, worked on by Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the defendants, through Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f) Portions burned by the plaintiff."
Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit his report as well as his sketch plan for further disposition of the Court.
"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated June 20, 1978, undersigned together with Mr. Victor Flores of this Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23, 1978, to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding involved in this case. x x x"[97] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In Spouses Tiongson, there were 28 petitioners.[98] Of these 28 petitioners, at least sixteen are petitioners composing part of the Manotoks in these cases. Of these sixteen petitioners, eight Miguel A.B. Sison, Ma. Cristina E. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Philipp Manotok, Maria Theresa Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Jose Maria Manotok were then minors at the time of Spouses Tiongson and were thus represented by judicial guardians. These eight are now of age in these cases.
Tenth: The Barques Bought the Property Knowing the Manotoks Had Constructed Buildings and Perimeter Wall on the Property
During the oral argument, the Manotoks showed on the projector screen a picture of the 34-hectare Manotok compound completely surrounded by a high concrete perimeter wall. When counsel for the Barques was asked if his clients made an ocular inspection of the property at the time his clients purchased it in 1975, Barques' counsel answered as follows:
| Justice Velasco: | ||
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Did your client prior to buying the lot from Mr. Setosta go to the land to investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
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The one who bought the property was the father of Barques now.
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| Justice Velasco: | ||
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Would you know if the father of respondent visit and inspect and investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
|
I was told that he visited the property because the father of the Barques used to work for Mr. Antonio Florendo. I think he was the manager of one of the businesses of Mr. Florendo in Davao City having to do with accessory parts of cars and trucks and he was
at one time also the operator of a public transportation company.
|
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| Justice Velasco: | ||
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Okay. Did the father of Mr. Barque find any building or structures on the land now subject of this dispute?
|
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
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We would not know because Mr. Barque died already, Your Honor.[99]
|
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| x x x x |
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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Now, when did they take possession of the property since Mr. Homer L. Barque purchased it in 1975, when did he take possession of the property?
|
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
|
The reason why they could not take really possession of the property because they were trying to get some papers from an Aunt of Mr. Barque to whom the property was mortgaged before he died. I understand that the property was mortgaged for something like One
Million to Two Million Pesos.
|
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of the property?
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
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There were attempts to take possession, Your Honor.
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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What kind of attempts, did they file ejectment suit?
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
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In fact Your Honor I understand that some of the Barque girls even went around the property.
|
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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Went around the property (interrupted)
|
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
|
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after that they left for the United States and for one reason or another they have not been able to take the proper steps (interrupted)
|
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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So, they never filed any suit to recover possession of the property, is that right?
|
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
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None that I know, Your Honor.
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| Justice Carpio: | ||
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Did they send any demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property since they were the owners?
|
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| Atty. Flaminiano: | ||
|
None that I know, Your Honor.
|
Clearly, the Barques have never set foot on the property from 1975 up to the present. The Barques merely "went around" the fully fenced property. The Barques never sent a demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property. The Barques never filed an ejectment or any action to recover possession of the property.
Eleventh: The Barques' Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace their Torrens title to the purchase by their predecessors-in-interest of the property from the Government in 1919. In their Memorandum dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks state:
9.5 The Manotok chain of titles began with the purchase by Zacarias Modesto, Regina Geronimo and Feliciano Villanueva of Lot 823 from the Philippine government on March 10, 1919. Attached hereto as Annex E is a Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copy of Sale Certificate No. 1054 issued by the Friar Lands Division, Bureau of Lands, to Modesto, Geronimo and Villanueva. Ownership over Lot 823 was later consolidated in Modesto, who in 1920 assigned his interests thereon to M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok. Attached hereto as Annexes F and G are Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copies of Assignments of Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 and June 7, 1920.On the other hand, the Barques can trace their chain of title only up to 1975 when Homer Barque, Sr. purchased the property from Emiliano Setosta, who the Barques claim bought the property directly from the Government in the 1940s. The Barques have not presented the deed of conveyance by the Government to Setosta. The claim of the Barques that Setosta purchased the property directly from the Government in the 1940s is belied by the 1927 Annual Report of the Director of Lands, stating that:
9.6 In 1923, M. Teodoro assigned his share and interests over Lot 823 to Severino Manotok, making him the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 823. A certified xerox copy of Assignment of Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 is attached hereto as Annex H.
9.7 Through a series of transfers within the Manotok family and the Manotok Realty, Inc., a company owned by petitioners, Lot 823 was titled under TCT No. 372302 on October 16, 1987 in the names of all of the Manotoks. The Manotok's chain of titles to the property, with deeds of conveyances, are attached hereto as Annex I, with sub-annexes.
9.8 Fire gutted the Quezon City ROD on June 11, 1988, and shortly thereafter (i.e., on August 31, 1988) the Manotoks filed reconstitution proceedings before the LRA, and were issued a reconstituted certificate of title, TCT No. RT-22841 (372302), by the ROD of Quezon city in 1991. A xerox copy of the petition for reconstitution filed by the Manotoks with the ROD, with attachments, is attached hereto as Annex J, while a certified true copy of TCT No. 372302 (the title sought to be reconstituted in this petition) is attached hereto as Annex J-1.
With the exception of the estates of Calamba, Imus, Isabela, Lolomboy, Naic, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Santa Maria de Pandi, and Talisay-Minglanilla, where there are still some vacant lands, all the others of the 23 Friar land estates had already been entirely disposed of. x x x.[100] (Emphasis supplied)At the end of 1927, the Government had already sold all of the Piedad Estate, a Friar land. Thus, the Government could not have sold directly to Setosta the disputed property in the 1940s.
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey Shows Barques' Property Located 5.6 Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have submitted a relocation survey made by the Lands Management Bureau NCR Regional Office of the Barques' plan Fls-3168-D showing that the Barques' property is located "some 5.6 kilometers away from Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, outside of Quezon City."[101] The relocation survey plan is signed by Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the Technical Services Division, and Engineer III Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex "M" a copy of the Lands Management Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D.
A DULY ISSUED TORRENS TITLE IS ONE ISSUED
BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS IN THE REGULAR
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES
BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS IN THE REGULAR
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES
This Court ruled in Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.[102] that courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of title involving a property already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person. The dissenting opinion claims that the Barques' title was already existing at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title in 1991. This is an egregious error. When the Manotoks' title was reconstituted in 1991, the Barques' title had not been reconstituted, and even up to now the reconstitution of the Barques' title is still pending resolution in the instant case. In contrast, when the Barques filed their reconstitution in 1996, the Manotoks' title had already been finally reconstituted and existing. Clearly, it is the Barques' still pending reconstitution that can no longer proceed because of the existing title of the Manotoks.
In Alabang, the Court held that a "duly issued existing Torrens title x x x cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles." The phrase "duly issued existing Torrens title" simply means a title verifiably issued by the proper Register of Deeds. The validity or invalidity of the title is not material at that point. What is material is whether the Register of Deeds actually issued the title as part of his regular functions.
Clearly, at the time of the reconstitution of the Manotoks' title, the Barques had no "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only "duly issued existing Torrens title" over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Manotoks' title could be verified against the reconstituted original title on file with the Register of Deeds. In fact, the LRA Administrator has admitted that the Manotoks' title "is existing as a reconstituted title at the Office of the Register of Deeds."[103]
The Barques could not produce even up to now a "duly issued existing Torrens title" from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Barques' owner's duplicate certificate of title could not be verified with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because the Barques' title has no corresponding original title, whether reconstituted or not, on file with the Register of Deeds. Thus, the reconstitution of the Barques' title, which is still pending in this case, can no longer proceed.
Once the reconstituting court or officer establishes that the Register of Deeds has in fact issued an existing title in the name of another person, the proper step is to file an action before the Regional Trial Court to annul such title. It is in such proceeding before the regional trial court that the validity or invalidity of the title is determined. In such proceeding, any party may introduce in evidence the LRA Administrator or the NBI's findings. In the meantime, no reconstitution proceeding can prosper until after the cancellation by final judgment of such existing title.
The Alabang ruling necessarily involves a situation where there is an existing title issued by the Register of Deeds at the time of filing of a petition to reconstitute another title over the same property in the name of another person. The Alabang ruling states that in such a situation the reconstituting authority has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reconstitution until a final judgment cancels the other title. This is clear from the Court's ruling in Alabang:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor.[104] (Emphasis supplied)The Decision of the First Division misapplies the Alabang ruling by holding that the LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title by a finding that the title was not "duly issued." Even the Register of Deeds, who physically issues a Torrens title as part of his regular functions, cannot adjudicate on the validity of a title. The Decision states that the "function of the (LRA) is adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution." This is grave error.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property.[105] Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest,[106] the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands v. Gan Tan:[107]
But the lower court claims that petitioner, even if he complied with all the requirements of the law, is not entitled to have his title reconstituted for the reason that, being an alien, he is not qualified to acquire the land covered by said title under our Constitution. However, we find this claim untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The rule on this matter is that this issue can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). Moreover, it is a well known doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Kane, 61 Phil., 504), and our duty is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding.The fallacy in the dissenting opinion's argument is that it assumes that the LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title. The original jurisdiction to adjudicate or to decide the validity of a Torrens title is vested by law exclusively in the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in the Regional Trial Court the "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide factual and legal issues "which involve the title to x x x real property." This means the Regional Trial Court first decides the validity of the Torrens title, and this power to first decide is to the exclusion of all other organs of the State. Not even the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court can usurp this exclusive original power of the Regional Trial Court. Any judgment resulting from such usurpation is void.
To our mind, the only issue here is whether there is a title to be reconstituted. That is the only purpose of the law (Rep. Act No. 26). If there is, then it is the duty of the court to comply with its mandate. Whether the petitioner has the right to acquire the land or not, is beyond the province of this proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. The two proceedings are distinct and should not be confused.[108] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) can issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory findings on whether a Torrens title is spurious or authentic. These findings are mere evidences that must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court, which alone has the power to adjudicate whether the title is void. Findings by the LRA or the NBI that a title is spurious are merely administrative opinions, not a judicial determination that settles rights and obligations between parties over a disputed property. These findings are merely evidences, not the judgment itself of validity or invalidity which can only come from the Regional Trial Court. These findings do not become res judicata, while the judgment of the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an adjudication of the title's validity. The Barques received an undeserved windfall when the First Division declared their reconstituted title valid when the only relief they sought in the administrative reconstitution was the restoration of their title in its condition at the time of the alleged loss or destruction. This Court has ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.:[109]
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.[110] (Emphasis in original)Thus, the LRA has no jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two claimants over the same property is the lawful owner. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in courts of justice the "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide factual and legal issues involving "the title to x x x real property."
EQUITY JURISDICTION DOES NOT APPLY
The dissenting opinion further argues that the Manotoks are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LRA Administrator or the LRA reconstituting officer. The dissenting opinion asserts that the Manotoks failed to question in the proceedings before these LRA officials their jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques' title. This invocation of equity jurisdiction in favor of the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer for the benefit of the Barques - is grossly erroneous.
First, the settled doctrine is "he who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands."[111] The Barques have submitted patently forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer. In the development of equity jurisdiction through the ages, the constant principle from which there was no deviation was that equity could never be used to reward those who commit fraud. This Court should not depart from the noble intention that motivated the development and use of equity jurisdiction. As this Court aptly stated in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[112]
Pagasa cannot rely on equity because he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks relief[113] (30 C.J.S. 1009). (Emphasis supplied)Second, the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel applies only to those who have sought affirmative relief in the wrong court, lost there, and then assail the adverse decision of that court. This estoppel applies against a party "who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an adverse decision."[114] However, it was the Barques, not the Manotoks, who sought the affirmative relief of a reconstituted title. In their Opposition[115] before the LRA reconstituting officer, the Manotoks sought a defensive, negative relief - that the Barques' petition "be dismissed for lack of merit." It was also the Barques, not the Manotoks, who invoked the jurisdiction of the LRA, which had no jurisdiction over the Barques' petition because of the pre-existing title of the Manotoks. Moreover, it was the Barques, not the Manotoks, who lost before the LRA reconstituting officer and who assailed the adverse decision before the LRA Administrator. The Barques even lost before the LRA Administrator who refused to reconstitute the Barques' title without the intervention of a "court of competent jurisdiction." Clearly, jurisdiction by estoppel cannot apply to the Manotoks.
Third, the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer refused to assume jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques' title. The LRA Administrator denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of the Manotoks' title, which in the words of the LRA Administrator must first be cancelled by "a court of competent jurisdiction" before the Barques' petition may be given due course. The LRA reconstituting officer also denied the Barques' petition because of the existence of the Manotoks' title which the LRA had already reconstituted. In short, these LRA officials admitted that they had no jurisdiction over the Barques' petition. Since these LRA officials refused to assume jurisdiction, there was no assumption of equity jurisdiction that the Manotoks could have questioned. For the same reason, there is no assumption of jurisdiction that this Court can now recognize and validate through equity principles.
Fourth, the principle of equity jurisdiction arising from estoppel or any other reason applies only to courts of justice. The jurisdiction of courts of justice arises from either statute or equity, or both. In legal systems which recognize equity jurisdiction, equity is an inherent power of courts by virtue of their duty to dispense justice to the full extent possible. Equity jurisdiction is a judicial power. Administrative agencies or officers exercising administrative, executive, or ministerial functions cannot assume equity jurisdiction because they do not exercise judicial functions. Thus, it is gross error to invest on the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer equity jurisdiction because these LRA officers perform administrative or executive functions in petitions for administrative reconstitution of titles.
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrator's jurisdiction in relation to the LRA Administrator's opinion that the Manotoks' title was "sham and spurious." In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 August 1998 before the LRA Administrator,[116] the Manotoks stated:
Moreover, it is not disputed that herein oppositors are the holder of an existing valid and effective TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covering the same land embraced by TCT No. 210177 in question found which, as stated, is non-existing and spurious. Given said fact, no administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 should proceed. As held by the Supreme Court, to wit:Sixth, the principle of estoppel applies only if the LRA had in fact jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks, so as to bar the Manotoks, who previously claimed that the LRA had no jurisdiction, from later taking a contrary position. Thus, the Court declared in People v. Casiano:[118]
So too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles." (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234 SCRA 458 [1994])[117] (Emphasis supplied)
4.The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. x x x[119] (Emphasis supplied)The LRA never had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Jurisdiction, as ruled in People v. Casiano, "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel." It is axiomatic that only the law can confer jurisdiction. No amount of estoppel can vest jurisdiction on an officer or court that the law has not conferred jurisdiction.
The LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper Regional Trial Court has the jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Only the Barques insist that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title of a third party in an administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by another party, a contention that is patently baseless.
Seventh, and most important of all, equity jurisdiction can never be used to violate the law. Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to render judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its statutory jurisdiction.[120] However, equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law.[121] Where the law prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.[122] Thus, this Court has ruled:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as `a justice outside legality,' this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.[123] (Emphasis supplied)Hence, no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles.
This rule has special application to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, enacted specifically to foreclose any possible collateral attack on a Torrens title, as well as any possible cancellation or modification of a Torrens title without a proceeding in the Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the title. Strict compliance with Section 48 is what gives Torrens titles enduring stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land ownership. To extend equity jurisdiction to LRA officers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks on a Torrens title is a gross and blatant violation of the clear and express command of a positive law. Any extension of equity jurisdiction that operates to negate Section 48 will destroy the most basic safeguard in the Property Registration Decree. Certainly, equity jurisdiction cannot be used for this purpose.
WHETHER ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR
NOT, A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE
NOT, A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE
In cancelling the Manotoks' Torrens title without any trial before any court, the First Division of this Court completely disregarded Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a Torrens title "cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
That law is Section 19 of the Judiciary Act which states that the "Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to x x x real property." These two provisions mandate that no Torrens title can be cancelled unless there is a proceeding in the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it ordered the cancellation of the Torrens title of the Manotoks without a prior proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Manotoks' title. Likewise, the First Division of this Court committed the same violation totally disregarding Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act, and in the process overturning well-entrenched doctrines of this Court.
The validity of a Torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, can be assailed only in a direct proceeding before the proper Regional Trial Court in accordance with Section 48. In Ladignon v. Court of Appeals,[124] the Court declared:
What is worse, in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383675, respondent Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction. After all, it is hornbook law that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law. x x x.[125] (Emphasis supplied)The LRA Administrator has admitted that the Torrens title of the Manotoks "is thus presumed valid."[126] The law recognizes that the Manotoks' Torrens title is "evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein."[127] Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prior title of the Manotoks is spurious, still under Ladignon v. Court of Appeals,[128] such title can only cancelled by the proper Regional Trial Court in a direct proceeding assailing its validity.
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[129] as authority that the Court of Appeals and this Court "have jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title" under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. The ponente has obviously misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon Realty was a petition filed with the Court of Appeals for annulment of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost owner's duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David. Rexlon Realty proved that the titles were not lost but were in its possession as the first buyer of the properties from Alex David who had later sold again the properties to Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon Realty also proved that Alex David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the sale.
Rexlon Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same property, which is the situation in the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the opposing parties agreed that there was only one set of titles covering the same properties. The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were lost, and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of the titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which covered properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David. Rexlon Realty's obvious interest was to maintain the validity of the titles to the properties it had purchased, the titles to which were in Rexlon Realty's possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, the law requiring a direct proceeding in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the validity of a Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and distinct issue from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in issuing replacement titles to the properties in the name of Alex David who claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial court's judgment, Rexlon Realty invoked, as stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides "the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court x x x [based on] fraud and lack of jurisdiction." Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
x x x In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if an owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the owner's duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owner's duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.Indeed, Rexlon Realty supports the Manotoks' contention that once it is shown that there is a pre-existing title duly issued by the Register of Deeds over the same property which is the subject of reconstitution proceedings, the reconstitution cannot proceed for either of two reasons. First, the reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to reconstitute a title that has never been lost or destroyed. Second, the reconstituting officer or court has no authority to decide which of two conflicting titles is valid. Thus, Rexlon Realty categorically ruled that in reconstitution proceedings, whether administrative or judicial, the reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction "to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land" covered by the lost title because the "certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership."
x x x
In this case at bar, we simply annulled the decision of the RTC, acting as a land registration court in L.R.C. Record No. 8843, to issue new owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538, for lack of jurisdiction. The dispute between petitioner Rexlon and respondent David regarding ownership over the parcels of land will have to be threshed out or determined in a more appropriate proceeding. In a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title. Possession of a lost owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property. [130] (Emphasis supplied)
GUARANTY OF STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree is the cornerstone of our land registration system providing stability to land titles. Without Section 48, our land registration system will crumble. Section 48 guarantees every landowner with a Torrens title that his title can never be cancelled unless the validity of his title is first directly assailed in court where he can adduce evidence in his favor. The Decision of the First Division erases this guarantee. In one stroke, the Decision of the First Division has overturned over a century of jurisprudence fortifying a guarantee essential to the stability of our land registration system.
In 1915, after the introduction in 1903[131] of the Torrens system in this country, this Court waxed poetic in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby[132] in describing the cornerstone of the then new system of land registration. Declared the Court:
x x x The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x xThis Court has reiterated the doctrine in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, now embodied in Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, in innumerable decisions. In the 2003 case of Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[134] a decision penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, this Court declared:
x x x The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. x x x[133] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[135] (Emphasis supplied)The Decision of the First Division cancels a Torrens title without any proceeding in a trial court directly attacking the title as required by law. What this Court warned against in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby is now before us a situation where "all security in registered titles [is] lost." Every landowner holding a Torrens title will now have to camp in the corridors of the courts, or constantly watch in the balcony of his house, just to avoid losing his titled land. The Decision of the First Division, by destroying the stability of land titles, will usher in an era of land disputes, which before the advent of the Torrens system were often violent and bloody.
The Decision of the First Division denies to the Manotoks a basic guarantee under the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.[136] The Decision deprives the Manotoks of their P1.7 billion property without any trial in any court contrary to the clear and express mandate of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree. This Court should never allow such blatant, gross and shocking violation of a fundamental constitutional right.
A FINAL WORD ON RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
This Court has often warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles, which have resulted in innocent landowners losing their titled lands to crime syndicates specializing in forged titles and documents. The patently forged documents presented in these cases remind us of what this Court stated in Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay:[137]
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding has many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted title in someone else's name.[138] (Emphasis supplied)Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT petitioners' letter motion for reconsideration dated 19 July 2006, (2) REVERSE the Court's First Division Decision dated 12 December 2005 and Resolution dated 19 April 2006, (3) RECALL the Entry of Judgment dated 2 May 2006, and (4) DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 filed by respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
[1] Rollo, (G.R. No. 162335), p. 131. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, supposedly registered in the name of Homer L. Barque Sr., please furnish us with a certified copy of subdivision plan Fls-3168-D, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[2] Id. at 133. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the above-entitled petition, please furnish us with a certification as to the existence and authenticity of plan Fls-3168-D, supposedly covered by TCT No. 210177, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[3] Id. at 132. The letter states:
In reply to your letter dated October 29, 1996 requesting for certified copy of plan Fls- 3168-D for reference in connection with administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177. Relative to the plan Fls-3168-D, please be informed that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168- D.
[4] Id. at 134. The letter states:
In reply to your undated letter, please be informed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS- 3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of this Office.
[5] Id. at 135. The letter states:
Relative to the above-entitled petition, we would like to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of Plan Fls-3168-D, while your Office does not have a record of the same.
Attached for your reference are the following:
- Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
- Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
- Your reply letter dated November 7, 1996.
[6] Id. at 136.
[7] Id. at 137. Emphasis supplied.
[8] Id. at 138. Emphasis supplied.
[9] Id. at 139-140. Emphasis supplied.
[10] Id. at 142. Emphasis supplied.
[11] Id. at 144-145. Emphasis supplied.
[12] Id. at 146.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 147.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 88-95. Penned by Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit.
[16] Re: Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Lost or Destroyed Certificates of Title Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6732.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 93-94.
[18] Id. at 95.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 96-97. Penned by Administrator Senecio O. Ortile.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 78-79.
[21] Id. at 90-91.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 106-111. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[23] Id. at 113-118.
[24] Id. at 117.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 244-248. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 56-69. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine, concurring and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissenting.
[27] Id. at 65.
[28] Id. at 71-73.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 667-683.
[30] Id. at 830-832.
[31] 450 Phil. 615 (2003).
[32] 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
[33] 161 Phil. 586 (1976).
[34] 183 Phil. 426 (1979).
[35] 201 Phil. 727 (1982).
[36] 209 Phil. 325 (1983).
[37] G.R. No. 86074, 20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 420.
[38] G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743.
[39] G.R. No. 34080, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
[40] G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
[41] 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[42] Resolution, 462 Phil. 546 (2003).
[43] Section 48, PD 1529; Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra note 32; Magay, etc. v. Estiandan, supra note 33; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 38; Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, supra note 41.
[44] Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc. et al., supra note 35; MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., supra note 36; Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 40.
[45] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[46] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Liwag v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., supra note 42.
[47] Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 388.
[48] 438 Phil. 252 (2002); Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 210 Phil. 482 (1983).
[49] Id. at 278-279.
[50] Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 203.
[51] Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
[52] Presidential Decree No. 1529.
[53] A direct attack on a Torrens title is an action whose principal purpose is to alter or annul the title. Such direct attack can be filed only before the proper regional trial court. An indirect or collateral attack is an action whose principal purpose is other than to alter or annul a title but its indirect consequence is at the very least to put doubt on the validity of the title. A petition for reconstitution of title over property that is already covered by a pre-existing Torrens title is an indirect attack on such Torrens title. See Leyson v. Bontuyan, et al., G.R. No. 156357, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 94.
[54] Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 140752, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 543.
[55] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 597-598 (1999). In Alipoon, the Court ruled:
We are convinced that based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the genuineness of TCT No. T-17224 issued by the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on March 16, 1933 covering Lot No. 663 in the name of Marcelina P. Alvarez, predecessor of private respondents herein. Inasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void. (Emphasis supplied)[56] G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158.
[57] Id. at 161-162.
[58] Supra note 34.
[59] Id. at 432-433.
[60] See note 46.
[61] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
[62] Zafra v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875 (1953); Bunagan v. Branch VI CFI of Cebu, 186 Phil. 31 (1980).
[63] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[64] Section 18 of RA No. 26 allows the Register of Deeds to cancel the reconstituted title if the lost title is subsequently found and both titles are still in the name of the same registered owner. Section 18 states:
SECTION 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if both titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its reconstitution, except the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of title. Thereupon, the register of deeds shall cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and spread upon the owner's duplicate, as well as on the co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate, if any has been issued, such annotations of subsisting liens or encumbrances as may appear on the recovered certificate of title, cancelling at the same time the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven hereof: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the recovered certificate of title shall be likewise cancelled, but all subsisting liens or encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be transferred to the new certificate of title and to its owner's duplicate, as well as to any co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate that may have been issued, the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, if any, being thereby ipso facto cancelled. (Emphasis supplied)[65] 346 Phil. 136 (1997).
[66] Emphasis supplied.
[67] Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958).
[68] Supra note 9.
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Supra note 10.
[72] Supra note 11.
[73] Supra note 7.
[74] Supra, note 11.
[75] Supra, note 9.
[76] G.R. No. 120958, 16 December 1996, 265 SCRA 614.
[77] Id. at 642-643.
[78] Supra, note 11.
[79] Id.
[80] Supra, note 9.
[81] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 141. The Barques' 7 February 1997 letter states in full:
[82] Supra note 10.February 7, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
Land Registration Authority
Sir:
Re: Administrative Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
We write in behalf of our clients, the Heirs of the late Homer L. Barque, Sr., the registered owner of the properties covered by TCT No. 210177.
We are constrained to bring to your immediate attention a pattern of effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the above title in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732 and LRA Circular No. 13 dated July 26, 1989 SR [sic] notwithstanding the recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said reconstitution.
We respectfully request that this matter be looked into in order to expedite the long overdue reconstitution of the title to the said properties.
With our highest esteem.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN D. TURGANO
Counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Lot 9, Blk 11, Don Jose Avenue
Don Jose Heights, Fairview, Quezon City
[83] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 143. The 14 February 1997 letter of the LRA reconstituting officer states in full:
[84] LRA Records, p. 204.February 14, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
In connection with the letter dated February 7, 1997, of Benjamin D. Turgano, counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque, petitioners in the Administrative Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, please be informed of the following:
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case be referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration.
- There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the submitted documents;
- The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document. For your comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
- The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached for your reference is a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received by the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, marked as annex "B";
- Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m., respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823, Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached as annex "C".
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
[85] Id. at 357-360.
[86] Id. at 253. The LRA reconstituting officer's Comment reads in full:
[87] An Act Allowing the Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and other Force Majeure, Amending for the Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine and Section Five of Republic Act Numbered Twenty-Six.Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
QUEZON CITY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRAÂTIVE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 210177 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
Petitioner.
ADMIN. RECONS. NO. Q-547(97)
COMMENT ON OPPOSITOR'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated July 27, 1998
COMES NOW, the undersigned Reconstituting Officer, by way of comment to the Oppositor's Motion for Reconsideration, respectfully states:
1. That we support the Oppositor's prayer that the challenged Resolution dated June 24, 1998, be reconsidered, reversed, and set aside for lack of factual and legal basis;
2. That we maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the grounds stated in our Order dated June 30, 1997, and on the following additional grounds, to wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased the subject property in the year 1975, why did he not take possession of it upon purchase, and up to now his descendants, the Petitioners, are not in possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Oppositor's Motion for Reconsideration be given due course; the challenged Resolution be set aside; and the Order dated June 30, 1997 be upheld.
2.2 Why was the property declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of Barque, only in the year 1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors have been paying realty taxes on the property since the year 1965;
2.3 Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)? (Emphasis supplied)
It is further prayed that this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commision for investigation.
Quezon City, Philippines, August 13, 1998.
(SGD.) BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer & Chief, Reconstitution Division
Enclosure:
Xerox Copy of tampered Adm. Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
[88] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 438.
[89] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 213. Annex "BB," Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[90] Id. at 214. Annex "BB-1," Manotoks' Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[91] TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 353-355.
[92] Supra note 86.
[93] Annex "M-21," Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[94] LRA Records, p. 412, Opposition dated 8 April 1997.
[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 99.
[96] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[97] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 174-175.
[98] SPOUSES CAYETANO and PATRICIA TIONGSON, SPOUSES EDWARD and PACITA GO, SPOUSES ROBERTO and MYRNA LAPERAL III, ELISA R. MANOTOK, SPOUSES IGNACIO and PACITA MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., SPOUSES FAUSTO and MILAGROS MANOTOK, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Minors MIGUEL A. B. SISON and MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, represented by their judicial guardian FILOMENA M. SISON, SPOUSES MAMERTO and PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, represented by his judicial guardian MAMERTO BOCANEGRA, SPOUSES FRANCISCO and FILOMENA SISON, JOSE CLEMENTE MANOTOK, SPOUSES JESUS and THELMA MANOTOK, Minors PHILIP MANOTOK, MARIA TERESA MANOTOK and RAMON SEVERINO MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., Minors JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian JESUS MANOTOK, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO S. MACAYA, respondents. Supra note 96.
[99] TSN, Oral Argument of 24 July 2007, pp. 445-447.
[100] Annual Report of the Director of Lands For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 1927, p. 106, Annex "M-22," Petitioners' Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[101] Intervenors' Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, p. 22. In its 12 September 2006 Resolution, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
[102] Supra note 35.
[103] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 94. LRA Resolution dated 24 June 1998.
[104] Supra note 35 at 744.
[105] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[106] Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680 (1987).
[107] 89 Phil. 184 (1951).
[108] Id. at 186-187.
[109] Supra note 42.
[110] Id. at 565.
[111] Catingub v. Court of Appeals, et al., 206 Phil. 83 (1983); Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 175 Phil. 476 (1978).
[112] 216 Phil. 533 (1984).
[113] Id. at 535.
[114] The dissenting opinion cited Tijam v. Sibonghanay, et al., 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
[115] Supra, note 94.
[116] LRA Records, pp. 254-277.
[117] Id. at 273.
[118] 111 Phil. 73 (1961).
[119] Id. at 93-94.
[120] Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
[121] Arsenal v. IAC, 227 Phil. 36 (1986).
[122] Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 252.
[123] Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 178, 184 citing Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
[124] 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).
[125] Id. at 1174.
[126] See note 15.
[127] Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, 3 August 1990, 788 SCRA 321; Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 18 (1999).
[128] Supra.
[129] 429 Phil. 31 (2002).
[130] Id. at 44-46.
[131] Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, was approved by the Philippine Commission on 6 November 1902 and took effect on 1 February 1903. See Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
[132] Supra note 32.
[133] Id. at 593-594.
[134] Supra note 41.
[135] Id. at 252-253.
[136] Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[137] G.R. No. 56694, 2 July 1990, 187 SCRA 12.
[138] Id. at 20.
SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The integrity of the Torrens system of land registration should be zealously guarded. Otherwise, transactions involving registered lands will be utterly confusing and public faith in the Torrens system and the value of certificates of titles may be seriously impaired.[1] It is therefore the duty of courts, specially this Court, to tread carefully and cautiously in cases where its adjudication will allow or tend to allow doubts on the integrity of the Torrens system to linger. With this in mind, I respectfully submit the following opinion.
THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY, IN PROPER
INSTANCES, ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF A
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN AN APPEAL OF THE
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY'S DECISION IN
AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION
PROCEEDING
In resolving controversies, this Court's duty is to apply or interpret the law. It cannot make or amend the law without treading the perilous waters of judicial legislation. It is not within the Court's power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law.[2] It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.[3]
I submit that the First Division, in its December 12, 2005 decision, enlarged the scope of the authority of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in administrative reconstitution proceedings when it recognized the authority of the LRA to rule that petitioners' certificate of title was a sham, spurious and not duly issued.
Section 6 of PD[4] 1529[5] limits the LRA's functions to the following:
SEC. 6. General Functions.Thus, under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity and validity of a certificate of title. While Section 9[6] of RA[7] 6732 vested the LRA with the quasi-judicial[8] power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or Register of Deeds" on appeal in administrative reconstitution proceedings, the LRA nonetheless did not acquire any authority to declare a certificate of title void. Such power properly and exclusively pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).[9]
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Register of Deeds of the corresponding certificate of title;
(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Register of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;
(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Register of Deeds;
(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the [RTCs] throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefore;
(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by PD No. 957.
(2) The [LRA] shall have the following functions:
(a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of the government;
(b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings; and
(c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands.
Indeed, the separate opinions on the December 12, 2005 decision recognized that these cases should have been tried by the RTC.[10] However, the said opinions stated that to remand these cases for trial at this stage would only be "a time-consuming and pointless exercise." With due respect, justice should not be sacrificed for expediency. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court be right.[11]
Nonetheless, while the LRA cannot rule on the authenticity and validity of a certificate of title, the Court of Appeals possesses such power when presented with an appeal of the decision of the LRA in a case such as this where the validity and authenticity of a certificate of title covering a particular property is challenged in the course of and in connection with the administrative reconstitution of another certificate of title purportedly covering the same property.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that while Section 48[12] of PD 1529 provides that a certificate of title "cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law," it is silent as to the specific court where the petition for cancellation of a certificate of title should be instituted. In contrast, Section 108[13] of PD 1529 expressly states that petitions for amendment or alteration of a certificate of title covering a particular property after original registration of that property should be filed in the then Court of First Instance, now the RTC. This difference in the treatment between cancellation of a certificate of title and the alteration or amendment/modification thereof shows the legislative intent to distinguish between these actions. Thus, courts other than the RTC, such as the Court of Appeals, have the authority and jurisdiction to order the cancellation of a certificate of title which may be found to be false or fraudulent when this is necessary in the adjudication of a controversy brought before them.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals is vested under Section 9(3) of BP 129 (in connection with RA 5434) with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the LRA in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. This is reflected in Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, while its jurisdiction to review the judgment, decision, resolution or award of the LRA is designated under BP 129 as "appellate," the Court of Appeals actually exercises original jurisdiction (in its traditional sense) as it is the first time that the said case becomes the subject of a judicial action.[14] This is the proper character of the authority exercised by the Court of Appeals in an appeal of the judgment, decision, resolution, order or award of the LRA in an administrative reconstitution proceeding. This also supports the view that the Court of Appeals has the power to pass upon the authenticity and validity of a certificate of title covering a particular property (and to order its cancellation) when the same is put in issue in connection with the reconstitution of another certificate of title covering the same property.
This neither runs counter to nor encroaches on the power of the RTC under Section 19(2) of BP 129, as amended, to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein." In so canceling a certificate of title, the Court of Appeals does not resolve a civil action involving title to real property. "Title" to real property is not the same as the "certificate of title"; the certificate of title is distinct from the title itself. The certificate of title may get lost, burned or destroyed and later on reconstituted but the title subsists all the while and remains unaffected unless transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.
Title is the "union of all the elements (as ownership, possession and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property."[15] It is the "legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself."[16]
Though employed in various ways, title is generally used to describe either the manner in which a right to real property is acquired, or the right itself. In the first sense, it refers to the conditions necessary to acquire a valid claim to land; in the second, it refers to the legal consequences of such conditions. These two senses are not only interrelated, but inseparable: given the requisite conditions, the legal consequences or rights follow as of course; given the rights, conditions necessary for the creation of those rights must have been satisfied. Thus, when the word `title' is used in one sense, the other sense is necessarily implied.[17]On the other hand, a Torrens certificate of title is the certificate of ownership issued under the Torrens system of registration by the government thru the Register of Deeds naming and declaring the owner in fee simple of the real property described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law.[18] Legally defined, a certificate of title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the Registrar of Deeds in the registry.[19]
Whereas title is the claim, right or interest in land, a certificate of title is the document evidencing that right. The issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has. He secures his certificate of title by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title.[20] To reiterate, the loss or destruction and subsequent reconstitution of a certificate of title does not affect the subsistence of the title unless it (the title) is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.
THESE CASES SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR CONSIDERATION OF
CONTENTIOUS FACTUAL ISSUES
Having affirmed the authority of the Court of Appeals to order the cancellation of a certificate of title in this instance, does it follow that this Court should uphold the December 12, 2005 decision of the First Division? I do not believe so.
Considering the serious and grave imputations against the respective certificates of titles of the contending parties, it would be precipitate as well as imprudent for the Court to simply adopt the findings of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700. A "surfeit of forgeries, badges of fraud and other dubious circumstances"[21] is alleged to have attended respondents' administrative petition for reconstitution of their TCT No. T-210177. Similarly, significant irregularities and fatal defects[22] have been cast on petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481. Indeed, the parties trade serious accusations of fraud and deceit. Similarly, both parties invoke Section 11 of RA 6732 in support of their respective positions:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.Any decision in favor of one party at this moment will be a declaration (express or implied) that there is prima facie evidence that the other party obtained or sought to obtain his certificate of title by means of fraud, deceit or other machination. Such statement will give this Court no legal option but to order the criminal prosecution of the losing party pursuant to Section 12 of RA 6732:
SEC. 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination obtains or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but not exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.Since any declaration of fraud or deceit on the part of one party will expose that party to criminal prosecution, this Court should refrain from making any such declaration until and unless the complicated and contentious maze of factual matters is clearly resolved. While these matters have been brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700, the Court of Appeals at that time was not able to exhaustively evaluate and analyze them.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
The controversial factual matters were, however, brought to light extensively and in great detail during the oral arguments of these cases as well as in the respective memoranda submitted by the parties and by Office of the Solicitor General after the oral arguments.
To reiterate, what is crucial and critical in these cases is the complete determination of contentious factual issues.
However, the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this Court as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance.[23] On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to perform that task. Indeed, we stated in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation:[24]
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.There are indeed many factual questions looming over the respective certificates of title of the contending parties. These can only be threshed out in a remand to the Court of Appeals. Hence, I respectfully submit that the proper and prudent course now is for the Court to constitute a special division of the Court of Appeals to be composed of three associate justices to be designated by us for the purpose of hearing these cases on remand. The special division will hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three months from finality of the Court's resolution in this case.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence.
Accordingly, I vote that these cases be REMANDED to a special division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
[1] Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Renato C. Corona in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 123346, 134385 and 148767, 14 December 2007, 540 SCRA 304.
[2] Municipality of Kananga v. Madrona, G.R. No. 141375, 30 April 2005, 402 SCRA 330.
[3] Republic v. Estipular, 391 Phil. 211 (2000).
[4] Presidential Decree.
[5] Property Registration Decree.
[6] SEC. 9. The Land Registration Authority Administrator may review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or Register of Deeds. Any appeal shall be filed within fifteen days from the receipt of the judgment or order by the aggrieved party.
[7] Republic Act.
[8] Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official actions and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Midland Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71905, 13 August 1986, 143 SCRA 458.) A quasi-judicial adjudication would mean the determination of rights, privileges, and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation. (Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, 29 April 1988, 160 SCRA 180)
Under Section 9 of RA 6732, the power of the LRA Administrator to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm any decision of the reconstituting officer or Register of Deeds is quasi-judicial in nature. He is given the authority to exercise discretion of a judicial nature to investigate facts and draw conclusions from them as a basis for his official action. His adjudication is quasi-judicial as it is a determination of the right of the applicant or petitioner to have his certificate of title reconstituted as well as of the correlative duty of the Registrar of Deeds to reconstitute the said certificate of title.
[9] Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended, it is the RTC which has sole jurisdiction to nullify or declare as void a Torrens certificate of title.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:[10] In his separate opinion, Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing stated:
x x x x x x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein x x x (emphasis supplied)
While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial Court would have been in order, remand of this case for trial at this late stage would only be a time-consuming and pointless exercise. Prompt resolution of this controversy is in order to avoid further delay. (emphasis supplied)On the other hand, Justice Azcuna noted the following in his separate opinion:
x x x It is, therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go through the exercise of proving this matter again in the regular courts, as would ordinarily be required, since the point is indubitable.[11] Urbano v. Chavez, G.R. No. 87977, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 347.
I thus find applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Veloso, as it would be unjust to require respondents to undergo a time-consuming and pointless exercise to cancel an evidently sham and spurious title. (emphasis supplied)
[12] SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
[13] SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. - No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.
[14] See Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 154993, 25 October 2005, 474 SCRA 258.
[15] Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, p. 1522.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. citing Kent MacNeill, Common Law Aboriginal Title.
[18] Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71753, 26 August 1989, 176 SCRA 736.
[19] Philippine National Bank v. Tan Ong Zse, 51 Phil. 317 (1927).
[20] Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
[21] These include the (a) letter dated January 2, 1997 of Engr. Privaldi J. Dalire, chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, (b) plan Fls-3186-D, (c) copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) submitted by respondents, (d) the length of time it took respondents from the occurrence of the Quezon City Hall fire to file their petition for administrative reconstitution, (e) erasures of the notation on the tax declarations of respondents, (f) realty taxes paid by respondents were only for 1987 to 1996, (g) respondents have never set foot on the disputed property, (h) the existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City, (i) respondents' knowledge that petitioners had constructed buildings and perimeter wall on the disputed property, (j) respondents chain of title stops in 1975, (k) location of respondents' property as showed by the relocation surveys of the Lands Management Bureau and (l) the deed of sale between Emiliano Setosta and respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Homer Barque, Sr.
[22] These include the (a) identity and description of the property in petitioners' certificate of title, particularly the location, boundaries and technical description of the property indicated in the said certificate of title and (b) the existence of respondents' title when petitioners' caused the reconstitution of TCT No. RT-22481.
[23] Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, supra.
[24] Id.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I maintain that the December 12, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court's First Division in G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 became final and executory. The same had been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments in a Resolution dated May 2, 2006.
Despite the Entry of Judgment, the Court en banc took cognizance of the cases when counsel for petitioners, Ret. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano wrote the Court and prayed for the suspension of the effects of the Entry of Judgment. Thereafter, the cases were set for Oral Argument.
From the presentations made by the parties and the questions propounded by the members of the Court during the oral argument held on July 24, 2007, two main factual issues emerged, to wit: 1) Whether or not Plan Fls-3168-D which is reflected in the technical description of respondents' TCT No. 210177 duly exists in the official records of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB); and 2) Whether or not Barrio Payong, which is indicated in petitioners' various documentary exhibits as location of the property allegedly covered by their TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) exists as a barrio in Quezon City or Caloocan City.
Re Plan Fls-3168-D:
During the Oral Argument, the following discussion took place on the issue of whether Plan Fls-3168-D duly exists, to wit:
Thereafter, the Court required counsel for respondents to submit a certified copy of plan Fls-3168-D from the LMB, National Office. This is in addition to the certified photocopy of the Tracing Cloth plan[3] and certified photocopy (microfilm) of Plan Fls-3168-D[4] which respondents obtained from the LMB, Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) and already submitted before the Court.
JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, thank you.[2]
In compliance with the directive, respondents submitted a copy of a letter[5] furnished them by the LMB, National Office, explaining why it could not issue a certified copy of Fls-3168-D, thus:
In reply to your letter dated April 24, 2006, please be informed that according to the verification made by the Survey Records Section, Records Management Division from their Lists of Transmittal of Survey Records, plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal was among those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR-199, for their reference/file purposes.Thus, as expressly mentioned in the above-quoted letter, "plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal was among those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region."
It is therefore suggested that you address your letter-request to the Chief, Surveys Division, DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), L & S Bldg., 1515 Roxas Boulevard, Ermita, Manila, relative to the said plan.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192[6] dated June 10, 1987, DENR was reorganized and regional offices of the Bureau of Lands were established in each of the country's 13 administrative regions.[7] The functions of a unit in the national office were transferred to the newly established regional office, which likewise include the transfer of records to said regional office. Hence, the reason why respondents could not be furnished by the LMB Head Office with a certified copy of Plan Fls-3168-D.
However, they were able to obtain a Certification dated June 19, 2007 from the Records Management Division of DENR Head Office that its Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Listing includes plan Fls-3168-D, Lot 823 in the name of Emiliano Setosta.[8] The Certification reads, thus:
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDP's Listing has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, xerox copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (now Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.The certification by the Records Management Division of the DENR-Head Office also confirmed the authenticity of the other computer print-outs submitted by respondents showing Fls-3168-D as among those listed, namely:
x x x x
The computer print-outs show that Plan Fls-3168-D is the second plan in said list, followed by Fls-3169-D of Chua, then Fls-3170-D of Loyola. Said official list is a credible piece of evidence proving the existence of Setosta's Plan Fls-3168-D.
- A certified true photocopy of a computer print out earlier issued by the Land Management Bureau, Head Office, showing that Plan Fls-3168-D is listed in its EDP listing of approved plans and Official Receipt #8994774 issued in payment for the Certification.[9]
- The same computer print out, as that attached as Annex F, which shows Fls-3168-D of E. Setosta as one of those listed therein duly certified by Melchor Magsanoc, Asst. Regional Exec. Director for Operation, LMB, DENR-NCR.[10]
Respondents also furnished the Court photo copies of Plan Fls-3168-D issued by the Land Management Bureau-National Capital Region (LMB-NCR) and certified by different officials:
Notwithstanding the above certifications which clearly show the existence of Plan Fls-3168-D, the Majority Opinion chose to lend credence to petitioners' claim that Fls-3168-D does not exist in the government files based solely on Engr. Dalire's allegations in his February 19, 1997 letter. This is unfortunate considering that Dalire's credibility was completely repudiated by the LRA. Dalire's claim that the documents presented by the respondents were forgeries was disregarded as frivolous and baseless, thus:
- A photo copy of Plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued on September 23, 1996 and duly certified by Carmelito A. Soriano for Ernesto S. Erive, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR.[11]
- A photocopy of a File Copy of the Tracing Cloth Plan of Fls-3168-D, duly certified on July 9, 1999 by Teofilo R. Laguardia, Chief, Technical Records and Statistics Section, LMB, Regional Office, NCR.
Based on the documents presented, petitioners (Barques) have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....In his letter dated January 31, 1997, Dalire alleged that plan Fls-3168-D was not included in the inventory of approved plans enrolled in their file. However, this allegation was belied upon presentation of a photocopy of the tracing cloth plan of Fls-3168-D duly certified by Teofilo R. Laguardia, Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics Section of the LMB-NCR.
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.
....
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos ... confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. ...
....
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ....
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. ...[12]
Dalire next claimed that plan Fls-3168-D was not included in their computer list of plans available for decentralization. However, this claim was categorically debunked by the LRA, thus:
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by a certified copy of the computer print-out issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered in the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 x x x.In light of the evidence on record, I completely agree with the conclusion reached by the LRA that the "evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his February 19, 1997 letter."
Therefore, on the issue of due existence of Fls-3168-D, I find no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR. Accordingly, I find respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, in order.
Moreover, the LRA correctly found that petitioners' reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) is spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary to the LRA findings. The long-settled rule is that factual findings of an administrative agency which are not shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence can be validly sustained and, in fact, are oftentimes binding on the court,[13] especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,[14] as in this case.
Re Location of the Property:
Petitioners' documentary exhibits simultaneously and/or alternately referred to Barrio Payong and Barrio Culiat as the location of the property covered by their title. However, as noted by the LRA, after the fire that burned the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988, the receipts for realty taxes of the property covered by petitioners' title already indicated the location of the property as Barrio Matandang Balara. However, no basis or explanation, whether in the form of official documents or otherwise, was shown or presented by the petitioners before the LRA, the Court of Appeals and this Court, why the location of the property supposedly covered by their title was transferred from Barrio Payong and Barrio Culiat to Barrio Matandang Balara. Significantly, petitioners' reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) does not state the barrio where the property described therein is located.
Petitioners' counsel failed to give any explanation for this seemingly anomalous situation. However, he readily agreed with the possible rationalization provided during the Oral Argument:
This is pure speculation which deserves no credence at all, especially in the light of evidence in the form of official certifications from relevant government offices in Quezon City[17] and Caloocan City[18] that Payong had not existed as a barrio in Quezon City or in Caloocan City before the property became a part of Quezon City.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
The map of Quezon City,[19] as prepared by NAMRIA, the official mapping agency of the government, also shows that both Barangay Culiat and Barangay Matandang Balara are existing Barangays of Quezon City but are clearly far away from each other. Payong does not exist in the map.
Moreover, Barangays Culiat and Matandang Balara were almost simultaneously created as barangays. Culiat was created on March 26, 1962 while Matandang Balara was created as a barangay on May 10, 1962. The simultaneous creation of Culiat and Matandang Balara as barangays thus showed the fallacy of petitioners' claim during the Oral Argument that the disputed property was originally located in Payong, but was later converted into Barangay Culiat and finally as Barangay Matandang Balara.
Significantly, it also appears from Intervenors Manahans' Memorandum that the property covered by their alleged Deed of Conveyance dated October 30, 2000 is likewise located in Barangay Culiat, Quezon City. The relevant portion of the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate in Manahans' Memorandum[20] which shows Barrio Culiat as the location of the property is quoted below:
A parcel of land (Lot 823, Piedad Estate, LRC Record No. 5975), situated in the Barrio of Culiat, Municipality of Caloocan, Metro Manila.[21]Intervenors Manahan also alleged that petitioners Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 is fake and spurious for not being based on authentic documents.[22]
I do not agree with the claim that Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals[23] which mentioned the Agrarian Court's order to its clerk of court to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, constitutes credible evidence as to the location of the property. There was no mention at all as to how the said court made the determination of the location of the property. Moreover, there was nothing in the Agrarian Court's Order stating exactly where, in Quezon City, Barrio Payong was located, which indicates that petitioners themselves may have brought the inspecting parties to the property they were occupying.
Similarly, the Court in the case of People v. Siguin,[24] did not make a finding as to the existence and location of Sitio Payong but merely referred to the Information filed which alleged that the crime was committed in Sitio Payong, Matandang Balara.
In any event, petitioners are bound by their own documentary evidence and verbal admission during the Oral Argument that the property is located in Payong, Culiat or simply Barrio Payong or Barrio Culiat. Since petitioners presented the said documentary evidence to prove their ownership of the property and the source of their title, they have thereby judicially admitted that the location of the property covered by their title, as shown in said exhibits, is Payong, Culiat, or Barrio Payong, or simply Barrio Culiat, Quezon City. They are, therefore, bound by said admissions,[25] especially since they have neither alleged nor proven that said admissions were made through palpable mistake.[26]
It is also important to note that, except for Tax Declarations and realty tax payments that were issued after the fire that gutted the records of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, petitioners did not present any credible evidence showing that the property they are occupying and covered by their reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) is located in Barrio Matandang Balara.
Consequently, since the property covered by petitioners' reconstituted title is not the property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such property. The Court's ruling in Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[27] is pertinent. Thus:
Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands. Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of evidence are broken. While the titles presented by petitioners show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in the titles presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and adjoining owners of the land claimed by MWSS for registration. x x xThe Deed of Sale between Emiliano
Setosta and Homer Barque, Sr.:
Petitioners alleged that the deed of sale between Emiliano Setosta and Homer Barque, Sr. was not a public document because the document does not appear to be recorded in the Notarial Register Records of Atty. Eliseo Razon.
Granting that the Notarial Register of Atty. Eliseo Razon does not reflect the said Deed of Sale executed by Emiliano Setosta in favor of Homer Barque, Sr., nonetheless, applying the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, I find that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized as otherwise the instrument would not have been registrable and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City would not have issued TCT No. 210177 to Homer Barque, Sr. on the basis of said Deed of Sale.
Such presumption cannot be overcome by the mere failure, even if true, of Atty. Razon to record the deed in his Notarial Register since said failure does not make the notarization less genuine. Neither could the respondents be faulted for said failure. In any event, respondents submitted a Certification under oath of Mr. Gregorio B. Faraon[28] attesting to the existence of said Deed of Sale in the records of the Clerk of Court of the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-
22481.
The Decisions of the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals both affirmed the LRA findings that petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 was spurious and a sham and that respondents' TCT No. 210177 sought to be reconstituted is genuine, valid and existing.
The Court of Appeals, being the tribunal to which the appeal was elevated pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides that final Orders or Resolutions of the LRA may be appealed to the Court of Appeals, has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda, filed by the parties,[29] and to apply the law applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732.[30]
Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that "the findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals." Since petitioners were not able to show that the LRA findings of fact were unsupported by evidence,[31] the Court of Appeals committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings.
Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab intio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof.Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners' reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also affirmed the LRA finding that respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative reconstitution process.
It must be noted that Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (or The Property Registration Decree) does not expressly provide for the specific court that can order the cancellation of a certificate of title. On the other hand, Section 108 thereof clearly provides that only the Court of First Instance (now RTC) can order an erasure, alteration or amendment in a certificate of title.
The variance is a clear indication of the intent to distinguish between these two actions. Thus, under Section 48, courts other than the Regional Trial Court, such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are possessed with authority and jurisdiction to order the cancellation of a Torrens title which they confirmed to be spurious, as in this case, when this is necessary in the disposition of a case elevated before them on appeal.
Moreover, there has been a change in the traditional concept of "original jurisdiction" on account of Rule 43, Rules of Court, where the Court of Appeals has the power to take judicial cognizance of a case for the first time through its review powers. Thus, this Court said in Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation[32] that:
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for review.Consequently, when an administrative reconstitution proceeding is appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the Court of Appeals would be acting as a court of original jurisdiction with regard to said appealed cases, hence, BP 129 would not apply.
x x x x
The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly using the phrase "appellate jurisdiction." x x x
In view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly acted within its jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) of petitioners after it confirmed the LRA finding that said title is fake and spurious.
Significantly, the Court has ruled in Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[33] that it has jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title. We held that the Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the title issued in the name of Paramount in the light of the facts of this case, and that:
[I]n order for a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case, we must decide on the effect of void duplicate copies of a certificate of title that served as a basis for the sale of the property it represents and the eventual issuance of title in the name of respondent Paramount. To require another proceeding only for the purpose of annulling the said new titles when the same could be decided in this very petition would promote judicial bureaucracy, a practice abhorred by our legal system. As we have ruled in Gayos v. Gayos, it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[34]More pertinently, the Court ruled in Rexlon, thus:
On whether this Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the titles issued in the name of respondent Paramount in the light of the facts of this case, we rule in the affirmative.Jurisdiction of the Land
x x x x
Secondly, respondent Paramount has duly consented to put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this appeal the reasons espoused by the appellate court and respondent David for the dismissal of the petition to annul the decision of the trial court. In its Memorandum and respondent David's comment that it adopted, respondent Paramount has not made any jurisdictional objection as regards its inclusion in the appeal to the petition for annulment of judgment, and even participated in the discussion of the merits of the case. Based on the principle of estoppel, respondent Paramount is barred from raising any objection over the power of this Court to nullify its titles.[35]
Registration Authority (LRA) to
administratively reconstitute the
allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in
the name of respondents despite the
previously reconstituted TCT No.
RT-22481 of the petitioners over the
same property.
To resolve this issue, it is relevant to first consider whether petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, in fact, covers the same property identified and described in respondents' TCT No. 210177.
Respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, indicates Barrio Matandang Balara as location of the property. On the other hand, the reconstituted title of petitioners, TCT No. RT-22481, does not indicate the barrio where the property described therein is located. As shown by petitioners' documentary evidence, the property which they claim to be covered by their TCT No. RT-22481 is located in Barrio Payong, or Barrio Culiat, Quezon City.
More importantly, the technical description in respondents' title, TCT No. 210177, indicates boundaries totally different from those stated in petitioners' title, TCT No. RT-22481. Furthermore, the technical description of respondents' title shows that it covers two lots while petitioners' title covers only one lot.
The claim that the LRA has no authority to pass upon the genuineness of a certificate of title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding is an absurdity. Will the LRA just accept any title and order its reconstitution although it is facially void? Such an absurd interpretation would necessarily result in the reconstitution of a patently fake and spurious title and the consequent proliferation of fake titles, a situation that the legislature could not have contemplated when it enacted R.A. No. 6732 authorizing the administrative reconstitution of titles.
It is, therefore, misleading and baseless for petitioners to assert that their previously reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covers the same property as that identified and described in respondents' TCT No. 210177 so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution.
However, even assuming that both petitioners' and respondents' titles cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution.
As petitioners themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, respondents' TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Its existence was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24, 1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988.
Respondents' TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time petitioners filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court ruled that:
[I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void.It, therefore, follows that petitioners' reconstituted title, even assuming the same to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere existence of respondents' title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of petitioners' title.[37] Pertinently, the Court held in Alabang Development Corp. v. Hon. Valenzuela[38] that:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. x x xMoreover, since petitioners recognized the jurisdiction of the LRA when they filed their opposition to respondents' petition for reconstitution and submitting evidence therein, they cannot thereafter turn around and impugn such jurisdiction after the LRA ruled against their prayer for the denial of the petition for reconstitution. We ruled in Salva v. Court of Appeals:[39]
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings in the tribunal which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. x x xIn the instant cases, it is undisputed that petitioners actively participated in the proceedings and submitted evidence in support of their claim. Estoppel does not apply only as against plaintiffs who sought affirmative reliefs. It equally applies to defendants who actively participate in the proceedings, thus:
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of elementary principles of right dealing and good faith. This applies not only to parties who are plaintiffs, complainants or others who initiated the case by actually filing the action, but also to parties who are defendants or respondents, if the latter fail to timely raise the jurisdictional issue and instead actively participate in the proceedings.[40]There is, therefore, no further need to require another proceeding for the cancellation of petitioners' reconstituted title before the LRA can proceed to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177.
Jurisdiction of the LRA to adjudicate
on the validity of petitioners'
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the administrative
reconstitution case filed by
respondents.
In its comment dated March 30, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General categorically declared that:
While it is true that the Register of Deeds and the Administrator of the LRA, in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers over petitions for administrative reconstitution, have the authority to receive evidence, it is limited for the purpose of determining whether or not the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted are valid, authentic, genuine and in force at the time they were lost or destroyed, and to the end of either granting or denying the prayer of the petition. Also, their jurisdiction to hear administrative petitions for reconstitution does not encompass any other title except that which is the subject matter of the petition. Otherwise, they exceed their jurisdiction.[41]Furthermore, the technical expertise of the LRA with regard to reconstitution of titles is such that the Court has long directed the lower courts to strictly observe the LRA circulars on reconstitution and land registration cases. It said:
In recognition of these developments that have placed under a cloud the integrity of the once unassailable Torrens Title, spawned the proliferation of fake land titles and encouraged the mushrooming of land grabbers and squatters on legitimately-titled lands, Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa issued on July 15, this year, Administrative Circular No. 7-96 addressed to all judges of all court levels and their Clerks of Court enjoining the strict observance of Land Registration Authority (LRA) circulars on reconstitution and land registration cases.[42]Since the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for reconstitution as well as petitioners' opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the petitioners. Thus:
[W]hen an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored.[43]Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are correct in claiming that the LRA had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of validity of title in a petition for reconstitution, nonetheless, since petitioners opposed respondents' petition for reconstitution and, in fact, ventilated before the LRA the issue of validity or genuineness of their title and submitted evidence in support thereof, instead of going to the courts to enjoin the LRA proceedings on account of their possession of a purported reconstituted title over the same property covered by respondents' TCT No. 210177, petitioners are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. We ruled in Laxina, Sr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,[44] that:
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting evidence. x x x Thus, it has been held that participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.[45]Again, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court should have had a first chance at resolving the issue of validity of the title, nonetheless, under the circumstances, this Court, upon elevation of the issue before it, had the unquestionable jurisdiction to declare petitioners' reconstituted title void and order its cancellation, under the same rationale relied upon by this Court in Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa:[46]
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court x x x.The ruling in Islamic Directorate of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[47] is likewise applicable, to wit:
The resolution of the question as to whether or not the SEC had jurisdiction to declare the subject sale null and void is rendered moot and academic by the inherent nullity of the highly dubious sale due to lack of consent of the IDP, owner of the subject property. No end of substantial justice will be served if we reverse the SEC's conclusion on the matter, and remand the case to the regular courts for further litigation over an issue which is already determinable based on what we have in the records.Beyond all that, however, is the unalterable fact that this Court's First Division had already resolved in its Decision of December 12, 2005, the jurisdictional issues raised by petitioners.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
or the LRA to decide the ownership
of the disputed property in the
administrative reconstitution of title
filed by respondents.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership before the LRA when they presented evidence in the form of a Deed of Sale, five (5) Unilateral Deeds of Conveyance, tax declarations, and realty tax receipts to prove their ownership of the property allegedly covered by their reconstituted TCT RT No. 22481. Petitioners supported their claim of genuineness of their reconstituted title with documentary evidence showing their supposed acquisition of ownership of the land.
However, the LRA gave no credence to the evidence of ownership submitted by the petitioners, mainly because the property described therein appears to be located in a barrio different and far from the barrio where the property in dispute is actually located.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners again adverted to the same documentary evidence they presented before the LRA in support of their claim of ownership of the property covered by their TCT No. RT 22481 and to buttress their contention that their title is genuine and authentic.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Resolution of the LRA which found their reconstituted title a sham and spurious and respondents' title, genuine, authentic and existing. In addition, the Court of Appeals also ordered the cancellation of petitioners' TCT No. RT22481 and the reconstitution of respondents' TCT No. 210177.
In short, since petitioners themselves laid before the LRA and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.
In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian,[48] the Court ruled, thus:
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, that they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding. It being a valid judgment, res judicata applies.Indeed, petitioners are barred from thereafter impugning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule on these issues. In the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[49] it was stressed that:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction x x x.In the light of all the foregoing, I find no compelling reason or overriding consideration to further require the referral of these cases to the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Court's First Division in its final and executory Decision dated December 12, 2005.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the power of the court. x x x [I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
x x x [W]e frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse x x x.
More importantly, the doctrine of immutability of final and executory decisions which became part of our legal system almost a century ago and reiterated time and again by this Court precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action.
As held in Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz,[50] every consideration of expediency and justice is opposed to the uncontrolled exercise of discretion by the courts in opening up cases after judgments entered therein have become final.[51] The interest of the individual, as well as of the community, demands there should be a definite end to every litigation; and nothing could be more impolitic than to leave it to the discretion of every court to revise and review and reconsider its judgments without limit.[52]
Furthermore, the question of whether the Court can reopen a final and executory judgment has constitutional implications since a reopening of the final and executory December 12, 2005 Decision would violate the prevailing parties' right to due process. As the Court said in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong:[53]
A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution. x x x.Thereafter, in Fortich v. Corona,[54] the Court ruled against a reopening of a final and executory judgment since this is not a mere question of technicality but that of substance and merit, thus:
It should be stressed that when the March 2, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners x x x. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and merit. x x xConsidering all the foregoing and the fact that these cases do not involve an issue of transcendental importance, such as life, liberty or the security of the state, no compelling reason exists to depart from this well-settled doctrine, nor to ignore the fundamental public policy behind it.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that these cases be referred back to the Court's Special First Division for final disposition in accordance with its Decision of December 12, 2005.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Adolfo S. Azcuna; Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
[2] TSN, July 24, 2007, pp. 68-71; Emphasis supplied.
[3] Annex G, Respondents' Memorandum.
[4] Annex H, Respondents' Memorandum.
[5] Annex J, Respondents' Memorandum.
[6] EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 192. PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES; RENAMING IT AS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[7] See Sec. 24 (c).
[8] Annex I-1, Respondents' Memorandum.
[9] Annexes F and F-1, respectively, Respondents' Memorandum.
[10] Annex I, Respondents' Memorandum.
[11] Annex H, Respondents' Memorandum.
[12] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 12, 2005, 477 SCRA 339, 346-348.
[13] Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., No. L-75501, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 49, 57-58.
[14] Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 596, 604.
[15] Should be names.
[16] TSN, July 24, 2007, pp. 146-148.
[17] Annex D, Respondents' Memorandum.
[18] Annex E, Respondents' Memorandum.
[19] Annex B of Respondents' Memorandum.
[20] Page 4.
[21] Annex B, Intervenor Manahans' Memorandum.
[22] Intervenors Manahans' Memorandum, p. 9.
[23] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[24] G.R. No. 126517, November 24, 1998, 299 SCRA 124.
[25] RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 4.
[26] Id.
[27] G.R. No. 109111, June 28, 2000, 334 SCRA 454, 462.
[28] Annex N, Respondents' Memorandum.
[29] See Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120138, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 793, 809.
[30] AN ACT ALLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL COPIES OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLES LOST OR DESTROYED DUE TO FIRE, FLOOD AND OTHER FORCE MAJEURE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION ONE HUNDRED TEN OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED FIFTEEN TWENTY-NINE AND SECTION FIVE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED TWENTY-SIX.
[31] Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 17.
[32] G.R. No. 154993, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 258, 268.
[33] G.R. No. 128412, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 306.
[34] Id. at 320.
[35] Id. at 319, 320.
[36] 364 Phil. 591 (1999).
[37] See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865.
[38] 201 Phil. 727, 744 (1982).
[39] G.R. No. 132250, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 632, 652-653.
[40] Id. at 654.
[41] Comment, Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 21-22; Temporary rollo, no. 3.
[42] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283, 287.
[43] Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation, G.R. No. 79622, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 164, 168.
[44] G.R. No. 153155, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 542.
[45] Id. at 554-555.
[46] G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 875-876.
[47] G.R. No. 117897, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 454, 472-473.
[48] No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589, 607.
[49] No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36.
[50] 38 Phil. 29 (1918).
[51] Id. at 37.
[52] Id.
[53] No. L-52415, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 663, 681.
[54] G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998, 298 SCRA 679, 693.
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is to express my dissent in the majority opinion which set aside the final and executory Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court, recalled the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 in the present cases, and remanded the same to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence.
I emphatically call attention to the fact that the Decision, dated 12 December 2005, the fallo of which reads
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED[,]had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY. The two Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners were both denied in Resolutions dated 19 April 2006 and 19 June 2006. The Entry of Judgment was already made on 2 May 2006.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.[1]
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.[2]
Apparent from the foregoing are the two-fold purposes for the doctrine of the immutability and inalterability of a final judgment: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Obviously, the first purpose is in line with the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a judicious decision. The end should always be the meting out of justice. As to the second purpose, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. It must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice and to place everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility that errors may be committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be discounted.[3]
The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is void.[4] Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion.[5] Petitioners assert, and the majority opinion effectively sustains, that the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court, affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the LRA rendered without jurisdiction, may be set aside for belonging to the first group of void judgments. I cannot subscribe to such a view.
It is argued that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the respondents' title because such reconstitution supposedly constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the petitioners' pre-existing Torrens title over the same property.
It is worthy to note that the LRA itself, despite finding clear and convincing evidence that respondents' title was valid, genuine, authentic, and effective, while concluding that petitioners' title was fraudulently reconstituted, held back from actually canceling the petitioners' title. According to the dispositive portion of the LRA Decision
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of [herein respondents' predecessor] Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of [herein petitioners] Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.From the said LRA Decision, the parties filed separate appeals with the Court of Appeals.
Respondents' petition for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, which the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2003, resolved as follows
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of [herein petitioners] and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith [herein respondents'] valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.Petitioners' petition for review, on the other hand, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, disposed by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision, dated 24 February 2004, in the following manner
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel [herein petitioners'] TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith [herein respondents'] TCT No. T-210177.It was not the LRA which ordered the cancellation of petitioners' title but the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals which separately decided CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. Petitioners contend, however, that even the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of their title. They maintain that their title can only be attacked in a direct action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court already addressed the said arguments, thus
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners' title is forged. x x xWhile the Court, when it finds that a lower court or quasi-judicial body is in error, may simply and conveniently nullify the challenged decision, resolution or order and remand the case thereto for further appropriate action, it is well within the conscientious exercise of its broad review powers to refrain from doing so and instead choose to render judgment on the merits when all material facts have been duly laid before it as would buttress its ultimate conclusion, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case.[6]
x x x x
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof.
Such a course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court."[7] Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case. A marked characteristic of the judicial set-up in this country is that where the dictates of justice so demand, the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.[8]
The decisions of the LRA, the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the First Division of the Court, consistently finding that it is respondents' title to the land which is authentic and genuine, and that of the petitioners is false and fraudulent, are sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. Petitioners' evidence to prove their title to the land was already considered and weighed by the LRA and the courts as against the respondents' evidence. There is no showing that petitioners had any other significant evidence that they can only present before the RTC in another proceeding directly attacking their title. Thus, although the proceedings canceling petitioners' title to the land did not follow the ordinary course, which should have been initiated with the RTC, the Court of Appeals and the First Division of the Court had all the material facts before them and evidence on record to already render judgment on the merits in the instant cases.
Moreover, when petitioners opposed respondents' petition for reconstitution of title, on the basis of their prior existing title to the same piece of land, petitioners submitted their title to the scrutiny of the LRA. The LRA could not dismiss respondents' petition for reconstitution of title on the mere presentation by petitioners of their supposed title. It was still incumbent upon the LRA to determine the existence, genuineness and authenticity of petitioners' title, so as to preclude the reconstitution of respondents' title over the same piece of land. To make such a determination, the LRA had to examine and weigh the evidence of both the respondents and the petitioners in support of their own respective titles; and as a result thereof, the LRA came to the conclusion that petitioners' title was fraudulently reconstituted.
Given the foregoing, it cannot be simply said that the issuance by the LRA of reconstituted titles is a purely executive function. Before the LRA can issue a decision, either granting or denying petitions for reconstitution of title, it must consider and weigh the arguments and evidence presented by those seeking and those opposing the reconstitution; irrefragably, a quasi-judicial function. An act by an executive agency or officer becomes quasi-judicial in nature when the parties involved are given the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence, and such evidence is weighed before a decision is rendered thereon.[9] The fact that the LRA is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial function becomes incontestable especially considering that its decisions are among those explicitly identified in the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 as appealable to the Court of Appeals.[10]
Again, it must be stressed that, despite its finding that petitioners' title was fraudulent, the LRA left the cancellation of their title to a court of competent jurisdiction. While under ordinary circumstances, such a court of competent jurisdiction would have been the RTC, the First Division of the Court properly found, in accordance with public policy and the dictates of justice, that the instant cases need no longer be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, in promulgating their respective Amended Decisions, already had all the material facts and evidence before it to render judgment on the validity of petitioners' title. Hence, the Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court, declining to remand the instant cases to the RTC and affirming the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals therein, is a valid decision which could and had, in fact, attained finality.
It is time that the Court finally put an end to the controversies between petitioners and respondents in these cases, and thwart further attempts by any party to still prolong the same. Unfortunately, the Resolution of the majority opinion has the contrary effect. It not only protracts the litigation, but also complicates the same by giving undue consideration to the evidence and points raised by Felicitas and Resendo Manahan (Manahans) in their much delayed petition-in-intervention.
When the Court en banc reopened the present cases, it expressly delineated the four issues to be resolved and upon which the parties were to be heard in the oral arguments. These issues were:
Even just a cursory reading of the foregoing issues would readily reveal that these are mainly legal and jurisdictional issues. The parties, namely, the petitioners and the respondents, have the right to rely on the adherence by the Court en banc to the said issues in its determination of whether or not to still subject the said parties to more litigation proceedings. For the Court en banc to consider and rule upon issues which are outside of the four afore-stated and on which the parties were heard during the oral arguments is a denial of due process.
- Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 without a trial before the proper Regional Trial Court in the proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners' title?
- Does the Land Registration Authority [LRA] have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
- Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?
- Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
The matter of whether or not the factual issues in the instant cases should again be relitigated cannot be anchored on the factual allegations of the parties, moreso, when such allegations were made by the Manahans. The Manahans were not even allowed to intervene in the oral arguments nor submit issues for the oral arguments. Thus, the majority opinion palpably erred in remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals for further reception of evidence on the basis of the assertions of the Manahans, which contradict the claims of both the petitioners and the respondents, the original parties in the cases at bar. The courts are bound to look no further than the record and cannot even consider contrary evidence to determine where the preponderance thereof lies.[11] These cases must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the LRA, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.[12] Further proceedings before the Court of Appeals following the remand of the instant cases thereto, would undoubtedly be tantamount to a new trial and investigation.
Wherefore, I vote to DENY all motions and prayers of the petitioners for the setting aside of the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court and the remand of the present cases to the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, in my firm belief that the said Decision must stand and be honored for already being final and executory. I also vote to GRANT the motions for execution and possession filed by the respondents pursuant to the same Decision.
[1] Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 377, 386.
[2] Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22, 28 (2000).
[3] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 55 (1998).
[4] Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, supra note 1 at 386.
[5] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 910 (1997).
[6] CAPANELA v. National Labor Relations Commission, 311 Phil. 744, 765 (1995).
[7] Board of Commissioners v. Hon. dela Rosa, 274 Phil. 1156, 1194 (1991).
[8] Tejones v. Gironella, G.R. No. L-35506, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 100, 106.
[9] See Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 450.
[10] Relevant provisions of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Order No. 1-95 read
1. Scope. These rules shall apply from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
[11] Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil. 794, 801 (1975).
[12] Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1410 (1963).