EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009 ]ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES +
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ANTONIO M. SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES +
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to country. They have provided the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to understand not only how much international migration impacts development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect.For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[2] to wit:
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon Global Forum on Migration and Development Brussels, July 10, 2007[1]
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the December 8, 2004 Decision[3] and April 1, 2005 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.[6]
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.[7] Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.[8]
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint[9] against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant's salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month."[14]
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00),[12] representing the complainant's claim for a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant's (petitioner's) claim for attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to the aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents appealed[15] to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed[16] to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[17] that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.[18]
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay."[20]
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.[21] The NLRC denied the motion.[22]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[23] with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.[24] After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.[25]
His Motion for Reconsideration[26] having been denied by the CA,[27] petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his medical treatment and medication.[29] Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the constitutional question be resolved.[30]I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner's award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.[28]
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.[31]
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package.[32] It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups;[33] and that it defeats Section 18,[34] Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.[35]
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected OFWs.[36]
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. [37] (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more than three (3) months.[38]Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.[39]
The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.[40]
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)[41] points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.[42]
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission[43] and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[44] OFWs are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.[45]
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions."[46]
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.[51]
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[52] Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor tribunal,[53] and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA.[54] Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function - its function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself;[55] thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject clause.[56] Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive[57] is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation,[58] and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;[59] however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.[60] Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.[61] Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.[62]
Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.[65]
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.[66]
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;[67] b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;[68] and c) strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[70] or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.[72]
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications[73] based on race[74] or gender[75] but not when the classification is drawn along income categories.[76]
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[77] the constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy, to wit:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.
x x x x
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
x x x x
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
x x x x
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
As pointed out by petitioner,[78] it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[79] (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.[80] (Emphasis supplied)In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division, October 1998),[81] which involved an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months' salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division, December 1998),[83] which involved an OFW (therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's employment contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[82]
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
of the Monetary Award3 months
2 months
9 months
9 days
24 days
23 days
Paramio, et al.[94]
4 days
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995,[97] illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
of the Monetary Award
23 days
23 days
et al.[103]
18 days
18 days
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Among OFWs With Employment
Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time.[105] Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman,[106] but the length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the contract, but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis-à-vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.[107]
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of the Code of Commerce (1888),[108] to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed period, none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the termination of the period agreed upon.In Reyes v. The Compañia Maritima,[109] the Court applied the foregoing provision to determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers prior to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the shipping company liable for the salaries of its managers for the remainder of their fixed-term employment.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained in the following articles.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie,[110] in which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,[111] Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis supplied.)Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan[112] read the disjunctive "or" in Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France Company.[113] And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay[114] held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for the purpose of reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be entitled to had he continued in such employment until the termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.)[115] (Emphasis supplied)On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.[116] Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,[117] the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in effect.[118]
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as in First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople,[119] involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[120] an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-period employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same ruling in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission,[121] which involved a foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court awarded him salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[122] a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was awarded his salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[123] an OFW whose 12-month contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries for the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.[124] It is akin to the paramount interest of the state[125] for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards,[126] or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.[127]
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay."[128]
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions.[129] (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law originated;[130] but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of money claims.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims under this Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims exclusive of damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided, That any installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or voluntary settlement shall not be more than two (2) months. Any compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null and void.
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this Section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral Conference Committee (Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3,[131] Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,,[132] there are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,[133] particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[134] has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.[135] (Emphasis added)
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.[136]
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1,[137] Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,[138]
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., join J. Carpio's opinion.
Carpio, and Brion, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
[1] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11084.doc.htm.
[2] Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, effective July 15, 1995.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo; rollo, p. 231.
[4] Id. at 248.
[5] Rollo, p. 57.
[6] Id. at 58.
[7] Id. at 59.
[8] Id. at 48.
[9] Id. at 55.
[10] According to petitioner, this amount represents the pro-rated difference between the salary of US$2,590.00 per month which he was supposed to receive as Chief Officer from March 19, 1998 to April 30, 1998 and the salary of US$1,850.00 per month which he was actually paid as Second Officer for the same period. See LA Decision, rollo, pp. 107 and 112.
[11] Position Paper, id. at 53-54.
[12] The LA awarded petitioner US$45.00 out of the US$1,480.00 salary differential to which petitioner is entitled in view of his having received from respondents US$1,435.00 as evidenced by receipts marked as Annexes "F", "G" and "H", id. at 319-321.
[13] Id. at 114.
[14] Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[15] Id. at 124.
[16] Id. at 115.
[17] G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998, 299 SCRA 608.
[18] Appeal Memorandum, rollo, p. 121.
[19] Id. at 134.
[20] NLRC Decision, rollo, p. 140.
[21] Id. at 146-150.
[22] Id. at 153.
[23] Id. at 155.
[24] Id. at 166-177.
[25] CA Decision, id. at 239-241.
[26] Id. at 242.
[27] Id. at 248.
[28] Petition, rollo, p. 28.
[29] Id. at 787.
[30] Id. at 799.
[31] Rollo, p. 282
[32] Memorandum for Petitioner, id. at 741-742.
[33] Id. at 746-753.
[34] Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
[35] Rollo, pp. 763-766.
[36] Petition, id. at 735.
[37] Memorandum of the Solicitor General, rollo, p. 680.
[38] Memorandum for Petitioner, id. at 755.
[39] Id. at 761-763.
[40] Rollo, pp. 645-646 and 512-513.
[41] Alfredo L. Benipayo was Solicitor General at the time the Comment was filed. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) was Solicitor General when the Memorandum was filed.
[42] Memorandum of the Solicitor General, id. at 662-665.
[43] G.R. No. 113658, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 190.
[44] G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002, 385 SCRA 306.
[45] Memorandum of the Solicitor General, rollo, pp. 668-678.
[46] Id. at 682.
[47] The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008.
[48] Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1.
[49] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
[50] Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136.
[51] Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 149719, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 198; Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409.
[52] Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49.
[53] Rollo, p. 145.
[54] Id. at 166.
[55] Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 678.
[56] Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
[57] Memorandum for Petitioner, rollo, pp. 741-742.
[58] Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 748.
[59] Picop Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 163509, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 400.
[60] Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. 314 (1873); Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941); Intrata-Assurance Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156571, July 9, 2008; Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 155491, September 16, 2008.
[61] Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81, citing JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319.
[62] Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
[63] Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
[64] Section 3, The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
[65] See City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308; Pimentel III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008, 548 SCRA 169.
[66] League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008; Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 139147,November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168.
[67] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
[68] Los Angeles v. Almeda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Craig v. Boren, 429 US 190 (1976).
[69] There is also the "heightened scrutiny" standard of review which is less demanding than "strict scrutiny" but more demanding than the standard rational relation test. Heightened scrutiny has generally been applied to cases that involve discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy, such as in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, where a heightened scrutiny standard was used to invalidate a State's denial to the children of illegal aliens of the free public education that it made available to other residents.
[70] America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. (2007); http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-908.pdf.
[71] Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 US 230 (1995).
[72] Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 US 216 (1984).
[73] The concept of suspect classification first emerged in the famous footnote in the opinion of Justice Harlan Stone in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the full text of which footnote is reproduced below:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n 2, and cases cited.
[74] Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
[75] Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
[76] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[77] G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
[78] Rollo, pp. 727 and 735.
[79] 371 Phil. 827 (1999).
[80] Id. at 840-841.
[81] G.R. No. 131656, October 20, 1998, 297 SCRA 727.
[82] Id.
[83] Supra note 17.
[84] G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639.
[85] G.R. No. 162195, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 600.
[86] G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008.
[87] G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 279.
[88] G.R. No. 157534, June 18, 2003 (Resolution).
[89] G.R. No. 153750, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 100.
[90] G.R. No. 148418, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 314.
[91] G.R. No. 148407, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 720.
[92] G.R. No. 156381, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 120.
[93] G.R. No. 157373, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 342.
[94] G.R. No. 144786, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 732.
[95] G.R. No. 177948, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 712.
[96] G.R. No. 151303, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 313.
[97] Asian Center v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 81.
[98] G.R. No. 143949, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 571.
[99] G.R. No. 123354, November 19, 1996, 264 SCRA 418.
[100] G.R. No. 109390, March 7, 1996, 254 SCRA 457.
[101] G.R. No. 112096, January 30, 1996, 252 SCRA 588.
[102] G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 409.
[103] G.R. No. 123901, September 22, 1999, 315 SCRA 23.
[104] G.R. No. 157975, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 586.
[105] www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary visited on November 22, 2008 at 3:09.
[106] See also Flourish, supra note 95; and Athena, supra note 96.
[107] It is noted that both petitioner and the OSG drew comparisons between OFWs in general and local workers in general. However, the Court finds that the more relevant comparison is between OFWs whose employment is necessarily subject to a fixed term and local workers whose employment is also subject to a fixed term.
[108] Promulgated on August 6, 1888 by Queen Maria Cristina of Spain and extended to the Philippines by Royal Decree of August 8, 1888. It took effect on December 1, 1888.
[109] No. 1133, March 29, 1904, 3 SCRA 519.
[110] No. L-8431, October 30, 1958, 104 SCRA 748.
[111] See also Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor, No. L-50734-37, February 20, 1981, 102 scra 835, where Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie is cited.
[112] No. L-10422, January 11, 1916, 33 SCRA 162.
[113] No. L-15878, January 11, 1922, 42 SCRA 660.
[114] 7 Phil. 268 (1907).
[115] See also Knust v. Morse, 41 Phil 184 (1920).
[116] Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, No. L-48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 702.
[117] No. L-22608, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 699.
[118] The Labor Code itself does not contain a specific provision for local workers with fixed-term employment contracts. As the Court observed in Brent School, Inc., the concept of fixed-term employment has slowly faded away from our labor laws, such that reference to our labor laws is of limited use in determining the monetary benefits to be awarded to fixed-term workers who are illegally dismissed.
[119] No. L-65545, July 9, 1986., 142 SCRA 542.
[120] G.R. No. 100399, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 132.
[121] G.R. No. 111212, January 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 116.
[122] G.R. No. 113363, August 24, 1999, 313 SCRA 1.
[123] G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998, 284 SCRA 656.
[124] See Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1.
[125] Id.
[126] Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971); see also Carey v. Population Service International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
[127] Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318, 174177, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 704.
[128] Comment, rollo, p. 555.
[129] Memorandum of the Solicitor General, id. at 682-683
[130] Id. at p. 693.
[131] Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
[132] Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408.
[133] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
[134] G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
[135] Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 134, at 686.
[136] Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. v. Dumlao, G. R. No. 136762, November 21, 2002, 392 SCRA 269.
[137] Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[138] G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008. See also PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission. G.R. No. 153031, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 44.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur that the provision "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 10, paragraph 5,[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042[2] is unconstitutional, but on a different ground. The provision violates the prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law. It is an invalid exercise of police power.
Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Protected property includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[3] the Court held that:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. (Emphasis supplied)The right to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the right to bargain for better terms in an employment contract and the right to enforce those terms. If protected property does not include these rights, then the right to work and the right to earn a living would become empty civil liberties -- the State can deprive persons of their right to work and their right to earn a living by depriving them of the right to negotiate for better terms and the right to enforce those terms.
The assailed provision prevents the OFWs from bargaining for payment of more than three months' salary in case the employer wrongfully terminates the employment. The law may set a minimum amount that the employee can recover, but it cannot set a ceiling because this unreasonably curtails the employee's right to bargain for better terms of employment. The right to bargain for better terms of employment is a constitutional right that cannot be unreasonably curtailed by the State. Here, no compelling State interest has been advanced why the employee's right to bargain should be curtailed. The claim that that the three-month salary cap provides an incentive to service contractors and manning agencies is specious because such incentive is at the expense of a protected and disadvantaged class -- the OFWs.
The right to property is not absolute -- the prohibition against deprivation of property is qualified by the phrase "without due process of law." Thus, the State may deprive persons of property through the exercise of police power.[4] However, the deprivation must be done with due process. Substantive due process requires that the means employed in depriving persons of property must not be unduly oppressive. In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,[5] the Court held that:
[T]he State x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphasis supplied)Moreover, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution.[6] In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[7] the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)The assailed provision is unduly oppressive, unreasonable, and repugnant to the Constitution. It undermines the mandate of the Constitution to protect the rights of overseas workers and to promote their welfare. Section 3, Article XIII, of the Constitution states that the State shall (1) afford full protection to overseas labor, (2) promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, and (3) guarantee the rights of all workers to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Section 18, Article II, of the Constitution states that, "The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
The assailed provision also undermines the declared policies of RA No. 8042. Section 2 of RA No. 8042 states that (1) the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of Filipino migrant workers; (2) the State shall afford full protection to overseas labor and promote full employment opportunities for all; (3) the existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of Filipinos shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated; and (4) it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interest of distressed Filipino migrant workers are adequately protected and safeguarded.
The assailed provision is the reverse of the constitutional mandate and the declared policies of RA No. 8042: (1) instead of protecting the rights and promoting the welfare of OFWs, it unreasonably curtails their freedom to enter into employment contracts; (2) instead of empowering OFWs, it prevents them from bargaining for better terms; (3) instead of setting the minimum amount that OFWs are entitled to in case they are terminated without just, valid or authorized cause, it provides a ceiling; (4) instead of allowing OFWs who have been terminated without just, valid or authorized cause to recover what is rightfully due, it arbitrarily sets the recoverable amount to their three-month salary.
OFWs belong to a disadvantaged class, are oppressed, and need protection. In Olarte v. Nayona,[8] the Court held that:
Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them in our laws. (Emphasis supplied)In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.,[9] the Court held that:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that x x x employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. (Emphasis supplied)With the inclusion of the assailed provision in RA No. 8042, the OFWs, whom the Constitution and the law particularly seek to protect, end up even more oppressed.
In her ponencia, Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez held that the assailed provision violated the equal protection clause. The application of the equal protection clause is improper because local workers and OFWs are differently situated. Local workers who perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer are deemed regular after six months of service. This is true even if the workers are for a fixed term. In Glory Philippines, Inc. v. Vergara,[10] the Court held that:
[W]e cannot give credence to petitioner's claim that respondents were fixed term employees. x x x In the instant case, respondents' original employment contracts were renewed four times. x x xOn the other hand, OFWs are never deemed regular. In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,[11] the Court held that:
In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, we held that such a continuing need for respondents' services is sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of their services to petitioner's business. Consequently, we find that respondents were regular employees defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner. (Emphasis supplied)
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied)Accordingly, I vote to declare the provision "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 10, paragraph 5, of Republic Act No. 8042 as unconstitutional for violation of the due process clause.
[1] Section 10, paragraph 5, of RA No. 8042 provides:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
[2] Otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."
[3] G.R. No. 120095, 5 August 1996, 260 SCRA 319, 330.
[4] Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, No. L-81958, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 386, 390.
[5] G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 138.
[6] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341, 362.
[7] Supra note 4 at 391.
[8] 461 Phil. 429, 431 (2003).
[9] Supra note 4 at 397.
[10] G.R. No. 176627, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 253, 262.
[11] G.R. No. 48494, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 702, 714.
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (R.A. No. 8042), is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.My conclusion, however, proceeds from a different reason and constitutional basis. I believe that this provision should be struck down for violations of the constitutional provisions in favor of labor[1] and of the substantive aspect of the due process clause.[2] Given these bases, I see no necessity in invoking the equal protection clause. Underlying this restraint in invoking the equal protection clause is my hesitation to join the ponencia in declaring a classification as "suspect" and in using the strict scrutiny standard without clearly defined parameters on when this approach applies.
I begin by reading the assailed provision - Section 10, R.A. No. 8042 - in its constitutional context. Section 18, Article II of the Constitution declares it a state policy to affirm labor as a primary social economic force and to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. This policy is emphatically given more life and vitality under Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.On June 7, 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8042 "to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and of overseas Filipinos in distress."[3] The express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show that its purposes are reiterations of the very same policies enshrined in the Constitution. R.A. No. 8042, among others, recites that:
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
(b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.[4]These declared purposes patently characterize R.A. No. 8042 as a direct implementation of the constitutional objectives on Filipino overseas work so that it must be read and understood in terms of these policy objectives. Under this interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the interest of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any place in the law.
x x x
(e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the rights and interests of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded.
Further examination of the law shows that while it acknowledges that the State shall "promote full employment," it states at the same time that "the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development. The existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of Filipino citizens shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated." In blunter terms, the overseas employment program exists only for OFW protection.
Having said all these, the law concludes its Declaration of Policies with a statement the lawmakers may have perceived as an exception to the law's previously declared policies, by stating - "[n]onetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives may be extended to them." Thus, in express terms, the law recognizes that there can be "incentives" to service contractors and manning agencies in the spirit of encouraging greater deployment efforts. No mention at all, however, was made of incentives to the contractors' and agencies' principals, i.e., the foreign employers in whose behalf the contractors and agencies recruit OFWs.
The matter of money claims - the immediate subject of the present case - is governed by Section 10 of the law. This section grants the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) jurisdiction over OFW money claims. On liability for money claims, the sections states:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. -- Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.Under these terms, the law protects the OFW as against the employer and the recruitment agency in case of illegal termination of service, but limits this liability to the reimbursement of the placement fee and interest, and the payment of "his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." After earlier declaring the principal/employer and the contractor/recruitment agency jointly and solidarily liable, the limitation of liability appears to be a step backward that can only be justified, under the terms of the law, if it is an "appropriate incentive." To be "appropriate," the incentive must necessarily relate to the law's purpose with reasonable expectation that it would serve this purpose; it must also accrue to its intended beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies), and not to parties to whom the reason for the grant does not apply.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
These considerations bring us to the question - can the disputed portion of Section 10 stand constitutional scrutiny?
I submit that it cannot as it violates the constitutional provisions in favor of labor, as well as the requirements of substantive due process.
The best indicator of the effect of the disputed portion of Section 10 on OFWs can be seen from the results of the pre-R.A. No. 8042 rulings of this Court that the ponencia painstakingly arranged in tabular form. The ponencia's table shows that by our own past rulings, before R.A. No. 8042, all illegal dismissals merited the payment of the salaries that the OFWs would have received for the unexpired portion of their contracts.[5] After R.A. No. 8042, our rulings vary on the computation of what should be paid to illegally dismissed OFWs, but in all cases the principal's/agency's adjudged liability was for less than the unexpired portion of the OFW's contract.[6]
Anyway viewed, the situation of illegally dismissed OFWs changed for the worse after R.A. No. 8042. In this sense, the disputed portion of Section 10 is one that goes against the interests of labor, based on R.A. No. 8042's own declared purposes and, more importantly, on constitutional standards. Section 10 diminished rather than enhanced the protection the Constitution envisions for OFWs.
The more significant violation, however, that the disputed portion of Section 10 spawns relates to its character as a police power measure, and its failure to meet the substantive due process requirements of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
By the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) own representations, the disputed Section 10 is a police power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies. It "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions."[7] To constitutionally test the validity of this measure, substantive due process requires that there be: (1) a lawful purpose; and (2) lawful means or method to achieve the lawful purpose.[8]
I see nothing inherently unconstitutional in providing incentives to local service contractors and manning agencies; they are significant stakeholders in the overseas employment program and providing them with encouragement - as R.A. No. 8042 apparently envisions in its Declaration of Policies - will ultimately redound to the benefit of the OFWs they recruit and deploy for overseas work. The Constitution itself also expressly recognizes "the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth."[9] As entities acting for the principals/employers in the overseas employment program, the recruitment/manning agencies deserve no less. Viewed from this perspective, the purpose of encouraging greater efforts at securing work for OFWs cannot but be constitutionally valid. Thus, the issue before us in considering substantive due process is reduced to whether the means taken to achieve the purpose of encouraging recruitment efforts (i.e., the incentive granted limiting the liability of recruitment/manning agencies for illegal dismissals) is reasonable.
The first significant consideration in examining this issue is the question of liability - who is liable when a foreign principal/employer illegally terminates the services of an OFW? Under Philippine law, the employer, as the contracting party who violated the terms of the contract, is primarily liable.[10] In the overseas employment situation, the protective measures adopted under the law and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rules to protect the OFW in his or her overseas contract best tell us how we regard liability under this contract.
First, POEA Rules require, as a condition precedent to an OFW deployment, the execution of a master contract signed by a foreign principal/employer before it can be accredited by the POEA as an entity who can source its manpower needs from the Philippines under its overseas employment program.[11] The master contract contains the terms and conditions the foreign principal/employer binds itself to in its employment relationship with the OFWs it will employ. Second, signed individual contracts of employment between the foreign principal/employer or its agent and the OFW, drawn in accordance with the master contract, are required as well.[12] Third, the foreign aspects or incidents of these contracts are submitted to the Philippine labor attachés for verification at site.[13] This is a protective measure to ensure the existence and financial capability of the foreign principal/employer. Labor attaches verify as well the individual employment contracts signed by foreign principals/employers overseas. Fourth, the POEA Rules require the issuance by the foreign principal-employer of a special power of attorney authorizing the recruitment/manning agency to sign for and its behalf, and allowing itself to sue or be sued on the employment contracts in the Philippines through its authorized recruitment/manning agency.[14] Fifth, R.A. No. 8042 itself and its predecessor laws have always provided that the liability between the principal and its agent (the recruitment/manning agency) is joint and solidary,[15] thus ensuring that either the principal or the agent can be held liable for obligations due to OFWs. Finally, OFWs themselves can sue at the host countries with the assistance of Philippine embassies and labor offices.[16]
These measures collectively protect OFWs by ensuring the integrity of their contracts; by establishing the responsible parties; and by providing the mechanisms for their enforcement. In all these, the primary recourse is with the foreign principal employer who has direct and primary responsibility under the employment contract.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer's liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs' recovery in wrongful dismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer - the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 - read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies - oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of liability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the law's intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. Ironically, the OSG unabashedly confirmed this view in its Comment when it represented that "[b]y limiting the liability to three months, Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employees."[17]
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs - the benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are taken from the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination of employment decisions. This reality, unfortunately, is one that we cannot simply wish away with the disputed Section 10 in place. Thus, this inherently oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision should be struck down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of the constitutional due process guarantee. Specifically, the phrase "for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired terms, whichever is less" in the fifth and final paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 should be declared unconstitutional.
With these conclusions, I see no need to further test the validity of the assailed clause under the equal protection guarantee. My restraint in this regard rests on two reasons.
First, I believe that the ponencia's use of the strict scrutiny standard of review - on the premise that the assailed clause established a suspect classification - is misplaced. Second, I do not see the present case as an occasion to further expand the use of the strict scrutiny standard which the Court first expanded in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[18]
A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.[19] With a suspect classification, the scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest level: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and government carries the burden of proving that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; if this is proven, the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended result.[20]
In the present case, I do not see the slightest indication that Congress actually intended to classify OFWs - between and among themselves, and in relation with local workers - when it adopted the disputed portion of Section 10. The congressional intent was to merely grant recruitment and manning agencies an incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works for the foreign principals' benefit at the expense of the OFWs.
Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the classification should not immediately be characterized as a suspect classification that would invite the application of the strict scrutiny standard. The disputed portion of Section 10 does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and human rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed portion limits the monetary award for wrongful termination of employment - a tort situation affecting an OFW's economic interest. This characterization and the unintended classification that unwittingly results from the incentive scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict scrutiny disproportionate to the circumstances to which it is applied.
I believe, too, that we should tread lightly in further expanding the concept of suspect classification after we have done so in Central Bank,[21] where we held that classifications that result in prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution[22] requires a stricter judicial scrutiny. The use of a suspect classification label cannot depend solely on whether the Constitution has accorded special protection to a specified sector. While the Constitution specially mentions labor as a sector that needs special protection, the involvement of or relationship to labor, by itself, cannot automatically trigger a suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny; much should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on the sector involved, on the needed protection, and on the impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future situations. In other words, we should carefully calibrate our moves when faced with an equal protection situation so that we do not misappreciate the essence of what a suspect classification is, and thereby lessen its jurisprudential impact and value. Reserving this approach to the worst cases of unacceptable classification and discrimination highlights the importance of striking at these types of unequal treatment and is a lesson that will not be lost on all concerned, particularly the larger public. There is the added reason, too, that the reverse onus that a strict scrutiny brings directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, at the regularity of the performance of functions of a co-equal branch of government; inter-government harmony and courtesy demand that we reserve this type of treatment to the worst violations of the Constitution.
Incidentally, I believe that we can arrive at the same conclusion and similarly strike down the disputed Section 10 by using the lowest level of scrutiny, thereby rendering the use of the strict scrutiny unnecessary. Given the OSG's positions, the resulting differential treatment the law fosters between Philippine-based workers and OFWs in illegal dismissal situations does not rest on substantial distinctions that are germane to the purpose of the law. No reasonable basis for classification exists since the distinctions the OSG pointed out do not justify the different treatment of OFWs and Philippine-based workers, specifically, why one class should be excepted from the consequences of illegal termination under the Labor Code, while the other is not.
To be sure, the difference in work locations and working conditions that the OSG pointed out are not valid grounds for distinctions that should matter in the enforcement of employment contracts. Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, the integrity of contracts - be they labor, commercial or political - is a zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should not demean by allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to undertake. This is true whatever may be the duration or character of employment; employment contracts, whatever their term and conditions may be subject only to their consistency with the law, must be respected during the whole contracted term and under the conditions agreed upon.
Significantly, the OSG could not even point to any reason other than the protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of the Philippine overseas program as justification for the limitation of liability that has effectively distinguished OFWs from locally-based workers. These reasons, unfortunately, are not on the same plane as protection to labor in our constitutional hierarchy of values. Even RA 8042 repeats that "the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and national development." Under RA 8042's own terms, the overseas employment program exists only for OFW protection. Thus viewed, the expansion of the Philippine overseas deployment program and the need for incentives to achieve results are simply not valid reasons to justify a classification, particularly when the incentive is in the form of oppressive and confiscatory limitation of liability detrimental to labor. No valid basis for classification thus exists to justify the differential treatment that resulted from the disputed Section 10.
In light of all these, I vote to strike down the disputed portion of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
[1] CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3; see p. 2 of this Concurring opinion.
[2] Id.; Article III, Section 1 contains both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, as follows: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[3] Long title of R.A. No. 8042. Its short title is "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The law came soon after the Gancayco Commission rendered its report on the situation of overseas Filipino workers. The Commission was convened following the execution of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipino domestic helper executed in Singapore on March 17, 1995.
[4] See and compare with Section 3, Article XIII of the Constituion
[5] See: Ponencia, p. 23.
[6] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[7] OSG Memorandum, rollo, pp. 668-678; cited in the ponencia, p. 11.
[8] See: City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308; Planters Committee v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 79310 and 79744, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1998, 163 SCRA 182.
[9] CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3.
[10] LABOR CODE, Article 279; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998; Tierra International Construction, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101825, April 2, 1996.
[11] POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Workers (POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers), Part III, Rule 1, Sections 1 to 4; Rule 2, Section 2.
[12] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part V, Rile I, Sections 1 to 4; POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers (POEA Rules for Seafarers), Part IV, Rule I, Sections 1 and 2.
[13] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Section 1; POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 1 to 4
[14] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2 (a) to 3, and Rule 2, Section 2 (a); POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2 (b) and 4, and Rule 2, Section 2(a).
[15] POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (f) (3); POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (e) (8); Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, G.R. No. 156029, November 14, 2008; See: Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (1976), Book I, Rule V, Section 10; See also: Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 691, and Royal Crown International v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78085, October 16, 1989, 178 SCRA 569.
[16] Assistance is provided by Labor Attaches who report to the DOLE functionally and to the Philippine Ambassador at the foreign post. Assisting him are welfare officers of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) and the POEA representatives, all of them functionally reporting to the DOLE.
[17] OSG Comment; rollo, p. 555.
[18] G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
[19] City of Cleburn, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 413 U.S. 432 (1985); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
[20] Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
[21] Supra note 18.
[22] In the Central Bank case, the classification was based on salary grade or officer-employee status. In the words of the decision, "It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades."