Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,^[1] for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.^[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.^[3] Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.^[4]

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes.^[5] This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other's acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.^[6] Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.^[7]


The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas^[8] assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,^[9] each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

By Decision^[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.^[11] By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution" dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents' "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents' "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents' "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached `Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008' Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon."

Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution."^[12]

Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:

(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;

(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motion--which mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional-- remains unresolved; and

(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated ground--that the "basic issues have already been passed"-- suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?

The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.

It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)

Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total."^[13] In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value."^[14]

As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the `majority' was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration."^[15]

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. - Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC - x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.

But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution--a 6-6 deadlock.

On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate^[16] entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.^[17] In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.^[18] Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.^[19]

While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan^[20] is most apropos:

To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.

The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.

This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.

The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief
During the 11^th Congress,^[21] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives.^[22] Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.

Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157^[23] to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices."

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12^th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29^[24] which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12^th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.

Then came the 13^th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.^[25]

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.

As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.

As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.^[26]

Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene.

Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite results.

On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments.

The Issues

In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause.

In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.

After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.

Petitioners' threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress' valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.

By constitutional design^[27] and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.^[28] But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.^[29] The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.

Petitioners' posture does not persuade.

The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term "barrio" in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and the addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject provision, explains:

Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.^[30] Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature."^[31] Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities."^[32] Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.

Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to "criteria established in the local government code," thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."^[33] x x x (Emphasis added.)

It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.^[34] Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3^[35] of the Constitution.

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

Petitioners' theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.

As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis-à-vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners' constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.^[36]

Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years" as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x." RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

x x x x

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis^[37] or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.^[38] To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,^[39] resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.^[40]

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.^[41]

The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentel's sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz:

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.

Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus:

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.

We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?

SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.

THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.^[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.^[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.^[44] Torres v. Limjap could not have been more precise:

The intent of a Statute is the Law. - If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.^[45] (Emphasis supplied.)

As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.^[46] Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.^[47] Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.

It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were undertaken in the 11^th and/or the 12^th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13^th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body.

The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood bills--which were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009--were again being considered during the 13^th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.^[48] And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.

This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds.

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws."

Petitioners' challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.^[49] This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.^[50]

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP's claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.

As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,^[51] necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.^[52] The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.

As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing of the rules in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator Lim's sponsorship speech:

x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest - twenty-four (24) in all - failed to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures.

Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001 elections.

The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport - changing the rules in the middle of the game.

Undaunted, they came back during the [12^th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out from them.

For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13^th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x

I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x.

x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status.

Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.

The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.

In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.

Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x^[53] (Emphasis supplied.)

In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lim's speech, which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed "unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.^[54] By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11^th Congress, 33 of those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.

While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11^th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court.

Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991.

Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.

Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.

A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;

(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;

(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11^th and 12^th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13^th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.

(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs' Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents' `Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009' and `Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008' Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.


Corona, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Abad, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., no part. relationship to counsel.
Carpio,  J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales,  Brion, and Peralta, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Carpio.
Nachura and Del Castillo, JJ., no part.

---

^[1] Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912).

^[2] People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16 & L-46997, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, No. L-26521, December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 578.

^[3] Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259; Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra; U.S. v. Co Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).

^[4] Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 472; citing Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962).

^[5] Cocunut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47; citing Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925) and other cases.

^[6] Cawalig v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 146319 & 146342, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 453.

^[7] Cawalig v. COMELEC, id. Peralta v. COMELEC, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 & L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.

^[8] Mayor of Iloilo City.

^[9] The sixteen (16) cityhood laws are the following:

1. R.A. 9389, otherwise known as "An Act converting the Municipality of Baybay in the Province of Leyte into a component city to be known as City of Baybay." Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;

2. R.A. 9390 - as "An Act converting the municipality of Bogo in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of Bogo." Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;

3. R.A. 9391 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Catbalogan in the Province of Western Samar into a component city to be known as the City of Catbalogan." Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;

4. R.A. 9392 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Tandag in the Province of Surigao del Sur into a component city to be known as City of Tandag." Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;

5. R.A. 9394 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Borongan in the Province of Eastern Samar into a component city to be known as City of Borongan." Lapsed into law on March 16, 2007;

6. R.A. 9398 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Tayabas in the Province of Quezon into a component city to be known as City of Tayabas." Lapsed into law on March 18, 2007;

7. R.A. 9393 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Lamitan in the Province of Basilan into a component city to be known as City of Lamitan." Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;

8. R.A. 9404 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Tabuk in the Province of Kalinga into a component city to be known as City of Tabuk." Lapsed into law on March 23, 2007;

9. R.A. 9405 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Bayugan in the Province of Agusan del Sur into a component city to be known as City of Bayugan." Lapsed into law on March 23, 2007;

10. R.A. 9407 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Batac in the Province of Ilocos Norte into a component city to be known as City of Batac." Lapsed into law on March 24, 2007;

11. R.A. 9408 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Mati in the Province of Davao Oriental into a component city to be known as City of Mati." Lapsed into law on March 24, 2007;

12. R.A. 9409 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Guihulngan in the Province of Negros Oriental into a component city to be known as City of Guihulngan." Lapsed into law on March 24, 2007;

13. R.A. 9434 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Cabadbaran in the Province of Agusan del Norte into a component city to be known as City of Cabadbaran." Lapsed into law on April 12, 2007;

14. R.A. 9436 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Carcar in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of Carcar." Lapsed into law on April 15, 2007;

15. R.A. 9435 - "An Act converting the Municipality of El Salvador in the Province of Misamis Oriental into a component city to be known as City of El Salvador." Lapsed into law on April 12, 2007; and

16. R.A. 9491 - "An Act converting the Municipality of Naga in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of Naga." Lapsed into law on July 15, 2007.

^[10] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio.

^[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 178056), p. 2845. As alleged, the Court assumed that each of the cities existing when the cityhood bills were enacted had an income of PhP 100 million or more.

^[12] Per Justice Leonardo-De Castro's Reflections.

^[13] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1363.

^[14] G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.

^[15] Cited in the opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Lambino.

^[16] Sec. 10, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides that "If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments."

^[17] Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 1361000, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419.

^[18] Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 68.

^[19] Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24, 1990, 190 SCRA 31, 38.

^[20] G.R. Nos. 156383 & 160723, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 327.

^[21] July 1998 and June 2001.

^[22] Journal, Senate 13th Congress 59th Session 1238 (January 23, 2007).

^[23] Entitled "An Act Amending Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, Otherwise Known as The Local Government Code of 1991, by Increasing the Average Annual Income Requirement for a Municipality or Cluster of Barangays to be Converted into a Component City."

^[24] Entitled "Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress Before June 30, 2001 from the Coverage of [RA] 9009." Annex "A," Memorandum of Petitioners.

^[25] Journal, Senate 13^th Congress, 59^th Session, pp. 1238-40, cited in Justice Reyes' Dissent, p. 37.

^[26] Sec. 285 of the 1991 LGC provides: Allocation to Local Government Units. -- The share of [LGUs] in the [IRA] shall be allocated in the following manner:


Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:


^[27] Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions on the creation of LGUs and both specifically provides that the creation shall be in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.

^[28] Torralba v. Municipality of Sibagat, No. L-59180, January 29, 1987, 147 SCRA 390, 394; Sema v. COMELEC, infra.

^[29] G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 700.

^[30] 36 Phil. 547 (1917).

^[31] No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569, 576.

^[32] Id.

^[33] Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY 124 (1996).

^[34] Became effective on January 1, 1992.

^[35] Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization x x x allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

^[36] Discussed in some detail in retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes' dissent from the original Decision.

^[37] Whenever possible, the words in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning. See La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1; citing Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng Mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. Nos. 160261-63 & 160277, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44.

^[38] Solid Homes v Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 137; Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005, 465 SCRA 532.

^[39] Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501 (1956); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 (1931); Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916); U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915).

^[40] Id.

^[41] Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47.

^[42] See Justice Reyes' Dissent promulgated on November 18, 2008; citing II Record, Senate, 13^th Congress, pp. 167-168. This is confirmed by the Journal of the Senate on January 29, 2007, p. 1240, which contains the following entry:

"Expressing his support for the sentiment of Senator Lim, Senator Pimentel stated that the local government units applying for cityhood are requesting to be exempted from the income requirement because when this was raised by RA 9009, the bills on conversion to cityhood were already pending in the House x x x. He recalled that during the deliberation on said law, when Senate President Drilon asked him if there were pending bills on the creation of cities, he replied that there were three, only to find out later on that there were, in fact, a number of cityhood bills pending in the House x x x. He asked Senator Lim to be more patient and to allow Senators Roxas and Recto to interpellate on the bills the following day."

^[43] Coconut Oil Refiners Association, supra note 41.

^[44] National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 801.

^[45] Torres v. Limjap, supra note 39; citing Sutherland, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. II, pp. 693-695.

^[46] Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 US 312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993); Abbas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965, November 10, 1989, 179 SCRA 287; Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 734; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925).

^[47] Peralta v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 & L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; citing Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (3rd ed., 1942).

^[48] Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 28508, July 7, 1989, 175 SCRA 149; cited in Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, supra.

^[49] Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.

^[50] Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919).

^[51] Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY 124 (1996).

^[52] Id.

^[53] Journal, Senate 13^th Congress, 59^th Session, pp. 1238-1240 (January 23, 2007); cited in Justice Reyes' Dissenting Opinion, pp. 33-37.

^[54] Pangilinan v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 104216, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 511.

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DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

"A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC (dated 26 January 1999): In the Matter of Clarifying the Rule in Resolving Motions for Reconsideration

The Court Resolved as follows:

A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.

IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED." (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

[T]he reason for the rule (of immutability of final judgments) is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements.

- Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009

The ponencia states that "since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, [Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC] ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases `shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon."'

I dissent.

I.


Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court expressly governs tie-votes in the en banc, thus:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)

This provision contemplates three possible instances where the Supreme Court en banc may be equally divided in opinion or where the necessary majority^[1] in the votes cannot be had.

First, in actions instituted originally in the Supreme Court, if there is a tie-vote, the Court en banc shall deliberate again. After such re-deliberation and the Court remains equally divided, which means that no decision had been reached, the original action shall be dismissed. In such a case, the tie-vote results in the dismissal of the action without establishing any jurisprudential precedent.

Significantly, a deadlock vote on an original action is not novel to the Court. In fact, the Court had experienced such a deadlock in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,^[2] Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec,^[3] Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec,^[4] Agudo v. Comelec,^[5] and People v. Lopez.^[6]

1. Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the IPRA "on the ground that its provisions amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution." The Court, via a Per Curiam resolution, dismissed the petition because the Court was equally divided in opinion, to wit:

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.^[7] (Emphasis supplied)

On motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc, by virtue of Section 7, Rule 56, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration since the members of the Court en banc were equally divided on such motion. In a minute Resolution promulgated on 21 September 2001, the Court stated that "the members of the Court who took part in the original deliberations on the petition find no reason to modify or in any way alter their views on the questions raised by petitioners and reiterated in their motion for reconsideration and therefore maintain their votes as stated in the resolution of December 6, 2000." Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez took no part on the ground that she did not participate in the deliberations on the petition.

In short, the tie-vote on the main decision cannot invalidate the prior action of the Legislative and Executive branches in enacting RA 8371. Moreover, the tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration resulted in the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Thus, RA 8371 stands as valid.

2. Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec

In Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, petitioner Badoy, Jr. prayed that Section 12(F) of Republic Act No. 6132 or The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act be declared unconstitutional. The voting of the Supreme Court Justices standing at five (5) votes in favor of constitutionality and five (5) votes against, the constitutionality of the provision was deemed upheld in conformity with Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution then in force. The petitions were, therefore, denied.

3. Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec

In Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec, the Supreme Court Justices were evenly divided on the issue of whether the Comelec should have ordered, as it did, a recanvass and proclamation on the basis of the returns of certain precincts in Batanes. Five Justices believed that such a proclamation was a necessary precedent to a protest in the House Electoral Tribunal. Five other Justices dissented. The Court, pursuant to the Rules of Court, ordered a rehearing on the petition in G.R. No. L-31609 entitled Agudo v. Comelec.

4. Agudo v. Comelec

In Agudo v. Comelec, where the Court reheard G.R. No. L-31609, "the equal division (5 to 5) in the Justices' opinions had persisted, thus calling for the application of Section 11, Rule 56 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court."^[8] Accordingly, the Court ordered the dismissal of the petition.

5. People v. Lopez

In People v. Lopez, then Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Tañada, filed in the name of the People of the Philippines, a petition for prohibition to enjoin Associate Judge Eusebio M. Lopez from conducting further proceedings and from otherwise taking further cognizance of criminal cases for treason against Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527) and against Antonio de las Alas, and other treason cases of similar nature. After the case was firstly heard, the Justices taking part were equally divided and no decision could be rendered; so the Court ordered a rehearing in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 56 in relation with Section 1 of Rule 58. The case was submitted again for deliberation and decision. The votes remained tied at 4-4. Thus, the petition was denied.

The above-cited cases, involving actions originally commenced in the Supreme Court, clearly demonstrate that the Court has consistently applied the Rules on tie-vote. In accordance with such rules, the evenly divided Court directed the rehearing of those cases^[9] and when, after the rehearings, the tie-vote persisted, the Court ordered the dismissal or denial of the petitions.

Second, in cases appealed to the Supreme Court, Section 7 of Rule 56 explicitly provides that if the Court en banc is still equally divided after re-deliberation, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed. A tie-vote in cases arising under the Court's appellate jurisdiction translates into a summary affirmance of the lower court's ruling.^[10] In short, the tie-vote in the en banc cannot amend or reverse a prior majority action of a lower court, whose decision stands affirmed.

Third, on all incidental matters, which include motions for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 56 specifically states that if the Court en banc is evenly divided on such matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

To settle any doubt on how a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration should be interpreted, the Court en banc issued a clarificatory Resolution on 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, as follows:

A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.

IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court's prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed.^[11] This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc." In short, Section 4(2) requires a majority vote of the Court en banc not only in cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also in all other cases that are heard by the Court en banc.

The principle that a multi-member judicial body such as the Supreme Court cannot, based on a tie-vote, overrule a prior action is consistently applied in legislative bodies as well.^[12] In the book The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, the author Alice Sturgis writes:

A tie vote on a motion means that the same number of members has voted in the affirmative as in the negative. Since a majority vote, or more than half of the legal votes case, is required to adopt a motion, an equal or tie vote means that the motion is lost because it has failed to receive a majority vote. A tie vote on a motion is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion is lost.^[13] (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, if the Philippine Supreme Court en banc is evenly split in its opinion on a motion for reconsideration, it is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion for reconsideration is defeated. More importantly, the tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration does not and cannot, in any instance and for any reason, supersede the prior majority vote on the main decision.


The Tie-Vote on the Second Motion for Reconsideration

Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, the requirement of a majority vote of the Supreme Court en banc applies not only to the constitutionality of a law, but also to the constitutionality of treaties, executive agreements, ordinances, regulations, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court shall be heard by the Court en banc. To repeat, any case which is heard by the Court en banc shall be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc.

To insure equal protection of the law, all cases required to be heard by the Court en banc under Section 4(2), Article VII of the Constitution must be governed by the same rules on voting, whether on the main decision or on the motion for reconsideration. There can be no one rule for cases involving the constitutionality of a law and another rule for all other cases. The Constitution makes no such distinction in Section 4(2) of Article VIII. Undeniably, the Constitution does not require that motions for reconsideration in cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be treated differently from motions for reconsideration in other cases heard by the Court en banc. There is no basis for such a different treatment, and such a different treatment would violate the equal protection of the law. Where the Constitution does not distinguish, this Court must not create a forced and baseless distinction.

In the present cases, the voting on the main petitions was 6-5 to declare the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. Clearly, there was compliance with Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution since a majority of the members of the Court en banc, who actually took part in the deliberations, voted to declare unconstitutional the sixteen Cityhood Laws.

In the first motion for reconsideration, a majority of 7-5 voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. Again, there was a clear majority that denied the first motion for reconsideration. The majority of the Court en banc struck down the sixteen Cityhood Laws twice, first, during the deliberations on the main petitions, and second, during the deliberations on the first motion for reconsideration.

Thereafter, by deliberating on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, the Court in effect allowed the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is generally prohibited under the Rules of Court. The Court en banc, voting 6-6, denied the second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution of 28 April 2009.

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Certainly, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, and the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision. The Court en banc need not deliberate again because in case of a tie-vote on a second motion for reconsideration, which is an incidental matter, such motion is lost. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and the second motion for reconsideration must thus be denied. Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and Resolution of 31 March 2009 where majority of the Court en banc concurred in decreeing the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.^[14] These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

Applying Section 7, Rule 56 and the clarificatory Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC to the present cases does not in any manner contravene the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. To repeat, the Court en banc deliberated on the petitions and, by a majority vote of 6-5, granted the petitions and declared the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional in the Decision of 18 November 2008. Again, by a clear majority vote of 7-5, the Court en banc voted to deny the first motion for reconsideration. Therefore, contrary to the ponencia, the present cases were decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc when it declared the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc. Whether the case involves the constitutionality of a law, ordinance or regulation, or any civil, administrative or criminal case which under the Rules of Court must be heard en banc, the case must be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc as expressly required by Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Any tie-vote in the motion for reconsideration results in the denial of the motion for reconsideration pursuant to A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, which governs all cases heard by the Court en banc.

Further, to treat the second motion for reconsideration not as an incidental matter would certainly render inutile the distinction set forth in Section 7, Rule 56 among original actions commenced in this Court, appeals from the judgments of lower courts, and incidental matters, such as motions.

III.

In Santiago v. Comelec,^[15] involving the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 (RA 6735), entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor," the Court en banc, in an 8-5 vote, held that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." While the Court en banc did not expressly declare RA 6735 unconstitutional, the majority of the Court en banc ruled that RA 6735, the law governing the implementation of the initiative system, was insufficient to amend the Constitution. The majority of the Court en banc concluded that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."^[16] On motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc voted 6-6-1,^[17] inevitably resulting in the denial of the motion for reconsideration and affirmance of the prior majority action on the main petition. In other words, the Court en banc's ruling in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to amend the Constitution, obtained via an 8-5 vote, was deemed affirmed by a tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration. In fact, the Court's decision in Santiago spelled the sudden death of the so-called PIRMA initiative that triggered Santiago.

The case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources also applies to the present cases. Petitioners in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). There, the Court en banc was evenly divided not only on the main petition, but also on the motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution promulgated on 21 September 2001, the Court en banc, by virtue of Section 7, Rule 56, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration since the members of the Court en banc were equally divided on such motion. As a result, the Per Curiam Resolution dismissing the petition stood affirmed and the constitutionality of RA 8371 was deemed upheld.

Santiago and Cruz are squarely in point with the present cases because Santiago and Cruz, like the present cases, indisputably involve the constitutionality of a law and a tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration.

Applying Section 7, Rule 56, the Court en banc, instead of prolonging their disposition, outrightly denied the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz. No rehearings and no redeliberations were set and conducted to re-examine the motions for reconsideration. This is precisely because such proceedings are absolutely without any basis. For this reason alone, the second motion for reconsideration in these cases must suffer the same fate as the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz -- it must be summarily denied pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56.

Following the ponencia, the cases of Santiago and Cruz would be deemed unresolved. Worse, the resolutions in Santiago and Cruz denying reconsideration due to a tie-vote would be deemed a blatant disregard of the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

IV.

Respondents, in filing the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead that Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File, and To Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon (Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009), mistakenly believe that "with the 6-6 vote on the second motion for reconsideration, the issue of whether the Cityhood Laws were unconstitutional remained unresolved." In the first place, the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 is a prohibited pleading. A prohibited pleading is a scrap of paper, and can never be placed "on an equal, if not a higher, standing than a motion for reconsideration."

There is nothing left to be resolved precisely because the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration simply means that there was no majority vote to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision, and the second motion for reconsideration is lost. The tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the Court en banc to muster the necessary vote for their reconsideration.^[18] No further proceedings, much less re-deliberations by the Court en banc, are required.

Since the second motion for reconsideration was denied, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 56, there is absolutely nothing which would preclude the 18 November 2008 Decision from becoming final after fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the 28 April 2009 Resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration.

The Court had explicitly directed the parties, in the 28 April 2009 Resolution, to refrain from filing further pleadings as it would no longer entertain the same. Yet, respondents opted to ignore and persistently defy such directive. Aside from filing the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009, respondents filed three more pleadings, namely, (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 2 June 2009, (2) Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents, and (3) Appeal to Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura to Participate in the Resolution of Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. All these pleadings, which were filed in direct contravention of the Court's directive in the 28 April 2009 Resolution, are prohibited and are mere scraps of paper, unworthy of the Court's attention.

Furthermore, having in fact been filed without express leave - no such leave ever having been granted by the Court, these pleadings are mere surplusage that did not need to be acted on, and did not give rise to any pending matter which would effectively forestall the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision.

Clearly, these various pleadings reflect respondents' desperate attempts to further delay the execution of the final decision in these consolidated cases. As pointed out in petitioners' Comment Ad Cautelam,^[19] respondents, "by every possible guise and conceivable stratagem, have stubbornly and persistently sought to evade the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision." Notably, respondents craftily phrased and titled their motions based on the Court's last denial order or resolution, and deliberately avoided reference to the previous repeated denials by the Court." The Court cannot countenance such dilatory tactics.

While it is perfectly fine for respondents to defend their cause with all the vigor and resources at their command, respondents may not be allowed to persist in presenting to the Court arguments which have already been pronounced by final judgment to be without merit and their motions for reconsideration of that judgment which have been denied.^[20]

Litigations must end and terminate at some point. In the present cases, that point must be reckoned after the lapse of 15 days from the date of receipt by respondents' counsel of the 28 April 2009 Resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration or on 21 May 2009, as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office. Whether respondents understood, or simply refuse to understand, the meaning of this statement, there is no other meaning than to consider G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056 finally closed and terminated on 21 May 2009.

Well-entrenched is the rule that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,^[21] no longer subject to attack and cannot be modified directly or indirectly, and the court which rendered it, including this Court, had lost jurisdiction to modify it.^[22] The Court laid down this rule precisely "(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and; (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is why courts exist."^[23] As Justice Bersamin stated in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals:^[24]

[T]he reason for the rule is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, when the 18 November 2008 Decision became final on 21 May 2009, this Court can no longer entertain and consider further arguments or submissions from the parties respecting the correctness of the decision, and nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or done in these cases.^[25]

In fact, in recognition of the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8670, while the Department of Budget and Management issued Local Budget Memorandum No. 61.

COMELEC's Resolution No. 8670 ordained that the voters in the 16 respondent municipalities shall vote not as cities, but as municipalities in the 10 May 2010 elections.

On the other hand, the Department of Budget and Management's Local Budget Memorandum No. 61 set forth the Fiscal Year 2009 Final Internal Revenue Allotment Allocation of all the legally existing cities and municipalities in the whole country and the reversion of the 16 "newly-created cities" to municipalities.

Moreover, House Bill No. 6303, introduced by Representatives Carmen L. Cari, Eduardo R. Gullas, Rodolfo G. Plaza, Philip A. Pichay, Thelma Z. Almario, Wilfrido Mark M. Enverga, Manuel S. Agyao, Sharee Ann T. Tan, Edelmiro A. Amante, Mujiv S. Hataman, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Teodulo M. Coquilla and Yevgeny Vincente B. Emano, sought to amend Republic Act No. 9009 by inserting the following paragraph:

THE INCOME REQUIREMENT PRESCRIBED HEREIN SHALL NOT APPLY TO MUNICIPALITIES WHICH WERE SOUGHT TO BE CONVERTED INTO CITIES AS EMBODIED IN BILLS FILED BEFORE JUNE 30, 2001 AND WHOSE CHARTERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED BY THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

House Bill No. 6303, in proposing to amend Republic Act No. 9009 by exempting the 16 respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement under the Local Government Code, is undoubtedly an admission that the 18 November 2008 Decision had become final and the Cityhood Laws are indeed unconstitutional. House Bill No. 6303 is clearly but an "attempt to possibly rectify the conceded fatal defect in the Cityhood Laws."

To repeat, the Court, by a majority vote, ruled that the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional in its 18 November 2008 Decision. The Court, by another majority vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. Then, the Court, by a split-vote, denied the second motion for reconsideration. Contrary to respondents' perception, there is nothing left unresolved by the Court. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final on 21 May 2009. As a consequence, it has become immutable and unalterable, no longer subject to attack and cannot be modified directly or indirectly by this Court, which had lost jurisdiction to alter it.

V.

Any ruling of this Court that a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration reverses a prior majority vote on the main decision would wreak havoc on well-settled jurisprudence of this Court. Such an unprecedented ruling would resurrect contentious political issues long ago settled, such as the PIRMA initiative in Santiago and the people's initiative in Lambino. Countless other decisions of this Court would come back to haunt it, long after such decisions have become final and executory following the tie-votes on the motions for reconsideration which resulted in the denial of the motions. Such a ruling would destabilize not only this Court, but also the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. Business transactions made pursuant to final decisions of this Court would also unravel for another round of litigation, dragging along innocent third parties who had relied on such prior final decisions of this Court. This Court cannot afford to unleash such a catastrophe on the nation.

Accordingly, I vote to EXPUNGE from the records, for being prohibited pleadings, the (1) Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009; (3) Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents; and (4) Appeal to Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura to Participate in the Resolution of Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009.

---

^[1] "Majority" means the number greater than half or more than half of any total (Perez v. Dela Cruz, 137 Phil. 393, 410 [1969], citing Webster's International Dictionary, Unabridged).

^[2] 400 Phil. 904 (2000).

^[3] No. L-32546, 17 October 1970, 35 SCRA 285, 301.

^[4] 143 Phil. 241, 259-260 (1970).

^[5] 144 Phil. 462-463 (1970).

^[6] 78 Phil. 286, 318 (1947).

^[7] Id. at 930-931.

^[8] SEC. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. -- Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on re-hearing no decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

^[9] See also People v. Alcover, 82 Phil. 681, 692 (1949).

^[10] Michael Coenen, Original Jurisdiction Deadlocks, 118 YLJ 1003, March 2009.

^[11] In Fortich v. Corona, retired Justice Jose Melo, in his Separate Opinion on the motion for reconsideration, stated that "in our own Court En Banc, if the voting is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote, one (1) slot vacant, or with one (1) justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself, the motion (for reconsideration) shall, of course, not be carried because that is the end of the line." (Emphasis supplied)

^[12] See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WMMLR 643, December 2002.

^[13] Alice Sturgis, The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, Revised by the American Institute of Parliamentarians, 4^th Edition, pp. 136-137. (http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=clk1qO-dWp4C&dq=alice+sturgis+parliamentary+procedure&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=rFwU0kuABG&sig=MzvI6eH4M2HlNsWIu0zSdflfvSo&hl=tl&ei=lLKDSpuoNMnIkAXzqPS5Bw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3#v=onepage&q=&f=false)

^[14] In Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, the Court, by a vote of 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication, denied the motion for reconsideration. The case of Lambino v. Comelec cited Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC.

^[15] 336 Phil. 848 (1997).

^[16] The dispositive portion of the decision in Santiago provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered


The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

^[17]The minute Resolution of 10 June 1997 pertinently states: "Two members of the Court did not take part in the deliberations: Padilla, J., who is on sick leave and who, in any case, had from the outset inhibited himself from taking part in the cases at bar on account of his personal relationship with the attorney of one of the parties; and Torres, J., who inhibited himself from participation in the deliberation for the reasons set forth in his separate Opinion hereto attached. x x x The remaining Justices actually present thereafter voted on the issue of whether the motions for reconsideration should be granted or not, with the following results: Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., voted to DENY said motions for lack of merit; and Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., voted to GRANT the same. Vitug, J., maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication."

^[18] See Fortich v. Corona, 371 Phil. 672 (1999).

^[19] Filed in compliance with the Resolution of 29 September 2009.

^[20] Ortigas & Company Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, 4 March 1996, 254 SCRA 234.

^[21] Ortigas & Company Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, 4 March 1996, 254 SCRA 234; Long v. Basa, G.R. Nos. 134963-64, 27 September 2001, 366 SCRA 113; Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 624; Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 136221, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 139; Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613, 15 October 2002, 391 SCRA 67; Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez, 82 Phil. 776, 778 (1949); Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 131547, 15 December 2005, 478 SCRA 27; Arnedo v. Llorente, 18 Phil. 257, 262-263 (1911); Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, 11 March 2003; 399 SCRA 43; Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, 4 April 2007, 520 SCRA 310.

^[22] Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, 11 March 2003, 399 SCRA 43.

^[23] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, 24 September 1998, 296 SCRA 36; Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 642.

^[24] G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009.

^[25] Alcantara v. Ponce, G.R. No. 131547, 15 December 2005, 478 SCRA 27 citing Ortigas & Company Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, 4 March 1996, 254 SCRA 234.