SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 145013, March 31, 2005 ]SPS. BERTO VILLORENTE AND LERMA T. VILLORENTE v. APLAYA LAIYA CORPORATION +
SPOUSES BERTO VILLORENTE & LERMA T. VILLORENTE, AND SPOUSES CATALINO BAJETA & PASCUALA A. BAJETA, PETITIONERS, VS. APLAYA LAIYA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
SPS. BERTO VILLORENTE AND LERMA T. VILLORENTE v. APLAYA LAIYA CORPORATION +
SPOUSES BERTO VILLORENTE & LERMA T. VILLORENTE, AND SPOUSES CATALINO BAJETA & PASCUALA A. BAJETA, PETITIONERS, VS. APLAYA LAIYA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51531. The appellate court
dismissed the petition for review[2] which challenged the November 6, 1996 Conversion Order[3] issued by then Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, on the sole ground of untimeliness in the filing of
the said petition.
The Antecedents
The Aplaya Laiya Corporation (ALC) is the owner of 22 parcels of agricultural land with an area of 151.38 hectares located at Barangay Laiya, Aplaya, San Juan, Batangas.
Portions of the property were tenanted, and some tenants had constructed their respective houses thereon. The ALC decided to develop the property into a tourist spot under the project name Aplaya Laiya Tourism Development Project. It then filed its application with the Regional Development Council of Region IV for the conversion of the property from agricultural to non-agricultural. After due consideration of the application, the council endorsed the conversion of the property as part of the site for the Batangas Tourism Development Area (BTDA) in Region IV to the Regional Land Use Council which, in turn, favorably endorsed the approval of the application to the National Land Use Council (NLUC). Finding merit in the application and that the requisite documents and requirements to facilitate conversion procedures for the BTDA site had been duly complied with, the NLUC approved a Resolution dated September 18, 1996 recommending the approval/confirmation of the application to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
After a review of the matter, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao approved the application on November 6, 1996 and issued a Conversion Order. The DAR Secretary also declared that his Order was without prejudice to the payment of disturbance compensation to the farmers who would be displaced by reason of the conversion of the property into Regional Agri- Industrial Centers and Tourism Development Area.[4]
Accordingly, pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 12, Series of 1994,[5] the afore-quoted Order was conspicuously posted in the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of San Juan, Batangas, from November 23, 1996 to January 28, 1997. Moreover, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of San Juan, Batangas issued a Certification[6] of Publication dated January 29, 1997, stating that as required by Section XII of DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1994, the order had been published at the expense of the corporation, and attested to the fact of compliance with the requirement of posting. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of San Juan, Batangas, likewise certified that during the said period, it did not receive any objection pertaining to the approved land conversion.[7]
Negotiations commenced in earnest between the ALC and the tenants/occupants on the latter's claim for disturbance compensation. Included therein were the Spouses Villorente and Catalino Bajeta. However, disagreements ensued as to the amounts to be offered by the ALC. On January 26, 1998, Rodolfo Javier, representing the heirs of Juan Javier, together with the tenants/claimants who were also members of the Kooperatibang Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMPI), filed a motion for reconsideration[8] of the November 6, 1996 Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. Included therein were Melchor De Chavez, Catalino Bajeta (who had been a tenant on the property since 1941), Lerma Villorente (who had occupied a portion of the property with an area of 50 square meters more or less), and Artemio Mendoza. The tenants/claimants prayed that the questioned Conversion Order be set aside, and should not be enforced due to the non-observance of due process. They claimed that instead of being apprised of the application for conversion, the ALC gave notice thereof only after its confirmation and when the negotiations for the payment of disturbance compensation had already begun. Appended to the motion was a list of its members, which included Catalino Bajeta and Lerma Villorente.
Resolving that there was no compelling reason to rule otherwise, DAR Secretary Garilao issued the May 25, 1998 Order[9] denying the aforesaid motion for lack of merit. The DAR, thereafter, considered the case closed.
Unfazed by the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the Conversion Order, the KSMPI interposed an appeal to the appellate court and filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review thereof. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48041. On July 17, 1998, the CA issued an Order denying the motion.[10] Realizing that it was not a real party-in-interest, the KSMPI no longer appealed such denial of its motion. Hence, the appellate court's July 17, 1998 Order of dismissal became final and executory.
On December 18, 1998, the ALC instituted ejectment cases before the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas against the herein petitioners, the Spouses Villorente and Spouses Bajeta, entitled and docketed as Civil Case No. 733 ("ALC v. Spouses Berto and Lerma T. Villorente") and Civil Case No. 734 ("ALC v. Spouses Catalino and Pascuala Bajeta").[11]
The ALC alleged that as an aftermath of the Conversion Order, it offered to have the residential houses of the petitioners relocated to the ALC Village, with the allocated lots to be donated and titled in their favor and at no cost to them. However, the petitioners refused to vacate for no justifiable reason. Since they were not considered tenant-farmers in the properties covered by the Conversion Order, but squatters or occupants by mere tolerance, the ALC was impelled to file the ejectment cases against the petitioners. The ALC further alleged that the Spouses Bajeta occupied a portion of its property outside of his tenancy area.[12]
By way of riposte, the petitioners filed on March 31, 1999, a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA, assailing the November 6, 1996 Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. They claimed that they came to know of the Conversion Order only on March 1, 1999, upon their receipt of the summons and the complaints for ejectment against them.
The CA, however, rendered judgment on September 15, 2000 dismissing the petition, following its finding that the reglementary period for the filing of the petition had long expired. The CA ruled that the petitioners, who were also members of the KSMPI, had appealed the Conversion Order; the said appeal had been dismissed by it; and the KSMPI failed to appeal the dismissal. Being members of the KSMPI, the petitioners knew or should have known of the Conversion Order after its publication, as shown in the Certification of Publication dated January 29, 1997 issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of San Juan, Batangas, which publication was a notice to all concerned farmers-beneficiaries in the said municipality. The appellate court also declared that the petitioners even negotiated with the ALC for disturbance compensation after the issuance of the Conversion Order.
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision of the CA, citing as grounds the following errors:
Anent the publication of the Conversion Order, the petitioners call for the suspension of the rule on constructive notice. They aver that they are poor farmers who used to stay in the farms; there was no way for them to know the existence of such publication as they were more concerned with their day-to-day living, instead of wasting their time going to the municipal hall where the said publication was made.[14] Finally, albeit admitting the series of negotiations that transpired prior to the Conversion Order, the petitioners argue that their participation therein is not tantamount to an automatic knowledge of the impending conversion of the subject land.
In its comment on the petition, the respondent ALC averred that the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary dated November 6, 1996 had long become final and executory upon the petitioners' failure to appeal the same within fifteen days from notice thereof. The respondent further averred that the petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the Conversion Order because shortly after its issuance, the petitioners and the other occupants/tenants negotiated for disturbance compensation. The respondent further avers that the petitioners never questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 124 and Joint NCDA, DAR No. 1, Series of 1993 before the DAR and the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board, and, as such are now proscribed from doing so.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied due course.
Indubitably, the Conversion Order of the DAR was a final order, because it resolved the issue of whether the subject property may be converted to non-agricultural use. The finality of such Conversion Order is not dependent upon the subsequent determination, either by agreement of the parties or by the DAR, of the compensation due to the tenants/occupants of the property caused by its conversion to non-agricultural use. Once final and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be questioned. [15]
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that final orders of quasi-judicial bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, including the DAR under Republic Act No. 6657, may be appealed to the CA via a petition for review. Under Section 4 of the Rule, the petition should be filed within 15 days from notice of the said final order or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
In the present case, shortly after the issuance of the Conversion Order on November 6, 1996, and in the course of its publication, the petitioners and the other members of the KSMPI, through their counsel, started negotiating in earnest with the respondent for their respective claims of disturbance compensation. They opted not to appeal the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. The negotiations became protracted until, on January 26, 1998, or after the lapse of more than one year from November 6, 1996, when the KSMPI, in behalf of its members, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said Conversion Order. By then, the period for the petitioners to question the said order had long since expired. Moreover, the Order was published as required by DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1994. Indeed, as found by the CA
We are convinced that the petition for review filed by the petitioners with the CA was merely an afterthought, when negotiations with the respondent for their claims for disturbance compensation failed. Rather than seek the aid of the DAR in the ascertainment of the amounts due them, if any, the petitioners sought relief from the CA by assailing the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. It must be stressed that the petitioners agreed to negotiate with the respondent for the disturbance compensation which they claimed was due them, conformably with the said Conversion Order. Hence, they cannot now assail the said order without running afoul to the doctrine of estoppel. The petitioners cannot approbate and disapprobate at the same time.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired) and Hilarion L. Aquino (retired), concurring.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 14-34.
[3] Rollo, pp. 41-45.
[4] Rollo, 41-45.
[5] XII. Posting of DAR Conversion Order
[7] Id. at 82.
[8] CA Rollo, pp. 83-85.
[9] Id. at 93-94.
[10] Separate complaints from the ejected tenants were filed against the Spouses Melchor & Paz de Chavez and Spouses Artemio and Emelita Mendoza (Id. at 30).
[11] Id. at 62.
[12] Rollo, pp. 55, 62.
[13] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[14] Rollo, p. 29.
[15] National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389; Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No. 69260, 22 December 1989, 180 SCRA 576; Republic of the Philippines v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, 23 June 2000, 334 SCRA 320.
[16] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
The Aplaya Laiya Corporation (ALC) is the owner of 22 parcels of agricultural land with an area of 151.38 hectares located at Barangay Laiya, Aplaya, San Juan, Batangas.
Portions of the property were tenanted, and some tenants had constructed their respective houses thereon. The ALC decided to develop the property into a tourist spot under the project name Aplaya Laiya Tourism Development Project. It then filed its application with the Regional Development Council of Region IV for the conversion of the property from agricultural to non-agricultural. After due consideration of the application, the council endorsed the conversion of the property as part of the site for the Batangas Tourism Development Area (BTDA) in Region IV to the Regional Land Use Council which, in turn, favorably endorsed the approval of the application to the National Land Use Council (NLUC). Finding merit in the application and that the requisite documents and requirements to facilitate conversion procedures for the BTDA site had been duly complied with, the NLUC approved a Resolution dated September 18, 1996 recommending the approval/confirmation of the application to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
After a review of the matter, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao approved the application on November 6, 1996 and issued a Conversion Order. The DAR Secretary also declared that his Order was without prejudice to the payment of disturbance compensation to the farmers who would be displaced by reason of the conversion of the property into Regional Agri- Industrial Centers and Tourism Development Area.[4]
Accordingly, pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 12, Series of 1994,[5] the afore-quoted Order was conspicuously posted in the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of San Juan, Batangas, from November 23, 1996 to January 28, 1997. Moreover, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of San Juan, Batangas issued a Certification[6] of Publication dated January 29, 1997, stating that as required by Section XII of DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1994, the order had been published at the expense of the corporation, and attested to the fact of compliance with the requirement of posting. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of San Juan, Batangas, likewise certified that during the said period, it did not receive any objection pertaining to the approved land conversion.[7]
Negotiations commenced in earnest between the ALC and the tenants/occupants on the latter's claim for disturbance compensation. Included therein were the Spouses Villorente and Catalino Bajeta. However, disagreements ensued as to the amounts to be offered by the ALC. On January 26, 1998, Rodolfo Javier, representing the heirs of Juan Javier, together with the tenants/claimants who were also members of the Kooperatibang Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMPI), filed a motion for reconsideration[8] of the November 6, 1996 Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. Included therein were Melchor De Chavez, Catalino Bajeta (who had been a tenant on the property since 1941), Lerma Villorente (who had occupied a portion of the property with an area of 50 square meters more or less), and Artemio Mendoza. The tenants/claimants prayed that the questioned Conversion Order be set aside, and should not be enforced due to the non-observance of due process. They claimed that instead of being apprised of the application for conversion, the ALC gave notice thereof only after its confirmation and when the negotiations for the payment of disturbance compensation had already begun. Appended to the motion was a list of its members, which included Catalino Bajeta and Lerma Villorente.
Resolving that there was no compelling reason to rule otherwise, DAR Secretary Garilao issued the May 25, 1998 Order[9] denying the aforesaid motion for lack of merit. The DAR, thereafter, considered the case closed.
Unfazed by the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the Conversion Order, the KSMPI interposed an appeal to the appellate court and filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review thereof. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48041. On July 17, 1998, the CA issued an Order denying the motion.[10] Realizing that it was not a real party-in-interest, the KSMPI no longer appealed such denial of its motion. Hence, the appellate court's July 17, 1998 Order of dismissal became final and executory.
On December 18, 1998, the ALC instituted ejectment cases before the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas against the herein petitioners, the Spouses Villorente and Spouses Bajeta, entitled and docketed as Civil Case No. 733 ("ALC v. Spouses Berto and Lerma T. Villorente") and Civil Case No. 734 ("ALC v. Spouses Catalino and Pascuala Bajeta").[11]
The ALC alleged that as an aftermath of the Conversion Order, it offered to have the residential houses of the petitioners relocated to the ALC Village, with the allocated lots to be donated and titled in their favor and at no cost to them. However, the petitioners refused to vacate for no justifiable reason. Since they were not considered tenant-farmers in the properties covered by the Conversion Order, but squatters or occupants by mere tolerance, the ALC was impelled to file the ejectment cases against the petitioners. The ALC further alleged that the Spouses Bajeta occupied a portion of its property outside of his tenancy area.[12]
By way of riposte, the petitioners filed on March 31, 1999, a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA, assailing the November 6, 1996 Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. They claimed that they came to know of the Conversion Order only on March 1, 1999, upon their receipt of the summons and the complaints for ejectment against them.
The CA, however, rendered judgment on September 15, 2000 dismissing the petition, following its finding that the reglementary period for the filing of the petition had long expired. The CA ruled that the petitioners, who were also members of the KSMPI, had appealed the Conversion Order; the said appeal had been dismissed by it; and the KSMPI failed to appeal the dismissal. Being members of the KSMPI, the petitioners knew or should have known of the Conversion Order after its publication, as shown in the Certification of Publication dated January 29, 1997 issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of San Juan, Batangas, which publication was a notice to all concerned farmers-beneficiaries in the said municipality. The appellate court also declared that the petitioners even negotiated with the ALC for disturbance compensation after the issuance of the Conversion Order.
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision of the CA, citing as grounds the following errors:
- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVERSION ORDER OF NOVEMBER 6, 1996 IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THEREFORE, SAID PETITION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
- EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 124 IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2.7 OF JOINT NEDA-DAR M.C. NO. 1, SERIES OF 1993 IS NULL AND VOID AS IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF AGRARIAN REFORM UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE LEGAL MANDATE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
6657.
- ADJACENT TO AND PORTIONS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE ALREADY COVERED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP). CONSEQUENTLY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CARPABILITY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES SIMILAR
TO THOSE ALREADY COVERED BY CARP.
- THE CONVERSION ORDER IN QUESTION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1996 WAS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF HEREIN PETITIONERS AS THE OCCUPANTS AND FARMERS-BENEFICIARIES OF CARP UNDER R.A. 6657, AND
- IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT APLAYA LAIYA CORPORATION TO COMMENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN SPITE [OF] THE CLEARING OF THE OCCUPANTS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS THEREOF, IN VIOLATION OF DAR A.O. NO. 01, S-93 AND 07, S-97, THE
CONVERSION ORDER OF NOVEMBER 6, 1996 IS CANCELABLE AS IT WAS RESORTED TO IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT THE CARP COVERAGE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES UNDER R.A. 6657.
- IN SUM, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR REVIEW.[13]
Anent the publication of the Conversion Order, the petitioners call for the suspension of the rule on constructive notice. They aver that they are poor farmers who used to stay in the farms; there was no way for them to know the existence of such publication as they were more concerned with their day-to-day living, instead of wasting their time going to the municipal hall where the said publication was made.[14] Finally, albeit admitting the series of negotiations that transpired prior to the Conversion Order, the petitioners argue that their participation therein is not tantamount to an automatic knowledge of the impending conversion of the subject land.
In its comment on the petition, the respondent ALC averred that the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary dated November 6, 1996 had long become final and executory upon the petitioners' failure to appeal the same within fifteen days from notice thereof. The respondent further averred that the petitioners cannot feign ignorance of the Conversion Order because shortly after its issuance, the petitioners and the other occupants/tenants negotiated for disturbance compensation. The respondent further avers that the petitioners never questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 124 and Joint NCDA, DAR No. 1, Series of 1993 before the DAR and the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board, and, as such are now proscribed from doing so.
The petition is denied due course.
Indubitably, the Conversion Order of the DAR was a final order, because it resolved the issue of whether the subject property may be converted to non-agricultural use. The finality of such Conversion Order is not dependent upon the subsequent determination, either by agreement of the parties or by the DAR, of the compensation due to the tenants/occupants of the property caused by its conversion to non-agricultural use. Once final and executory, the Conversion Order can no longer be questioned. [15]
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that final orders of quasi-judicial bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, including the DAR under Republic Act No. 6657, may be appealed to the CA via a petition for review. Under Section 4 of the Rule, the petition should be filed within 15 days from notice of the said final order or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
In the present case, shortly after the issuance of the Conversion Order on November 6, 1996, and in the course of its publication, the petitioners and the other members of the KSMPI, through their counsel, started negotiating in earnest with the respondent for their respective claims of disturbance compensation. They opted not to appeal the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. The negotiations became protracted until, on January 26, 1998, or after the lapse of more than one year from November 6, 1996, when the KSMPI, in behalf of its members, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said Conversion Order. By then, the period for the petitioners to question the said order had long since expired. Moreover, the Order was published as required by DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1994. Indeed, as found by the CA
Furthermore, the subject DAR Conversion Order dated November 6, 1996, as required under Section XII of DAR Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994, has been published and complied with by the private respondent as shown in the Certification of Publication dated January 29, 1997 issued by Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of San Juan, Batangas, which publication was a notice to all concerned farmers-beneficiaries in the Municipality of San Juan, Batangas. This fact again belies the contention of herein petitioners that it was only on March 1, 1999 that they were aware of the existence of the Conversion Order dated November 6, 1996.Indubitably then, the petition filed by the petitioners before the CA seeking the review of the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary was barred. The said Order can no longer be modified or reversed. Moreover, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review the same.
Finally, in pursuant to the conditions imposed by the said Conversion Order dated November 6, 1996, private respondent Aplaya Laiya Corp. has to accelerate its negotiations with the tenants-farmers as beneficiaries, including the plain occupants of the properties like the petitioners who are not beneficiaries (tenants-farmers) but are residing inside the 151 hectares covered by the Conversion Order for the payment of their disturbance compensation. In fact, the negotiation with the tenants-farmers and occupants within the ALC properties started on the year 1996 continuously up to the present, so that it is impossible that it was only on March 1, 1999 when petitioners received copies of the Summons and Complaints in the ejectment case that they were accordingly informed of the existence of the Conversion Order dated November 6, 1996.[16]
We are convinced that the petition for review filed by the petitioners with the CA was merely an afterthought, when negotiations with the respondent for their claims for disturbance compensation failed. Rather than seek the aid of the DAR in the ascertainment of the amounts due them, if any, the petitioners sought relief from the CA by assailing the Conversion Order of the DAR Secretary. It must be stressed that the petitioners agreed to negotiate with the respondent for the disturbance compensation which they claimed was due them, conformably with the said Conversion Order. Hence, they cannot now assail the said order without running afoul to the doctrine of estoppel. The petitioners cannot approbate and disapprobate at the same time.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired) and Hilarion L. Aquino (retired), concurring.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 14-34.
[3] Rollo, pp. 41-45.
[4] Rollo, 41-45.
[5] XII. Posting of DAR Conversion Order
Immediately upon approval of a conversion order, the developer/applicant shall post in a conspicuous place of the project area, a public notice stating the following: "the conversion of this landholding has been approved by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (or Undersecretary for Policy and Planning or Regional Director depending on the authority provided in this A.O.) under Conversion Order No. ______ dated _____________." It will include the name of the project and area, name of the developer/landowner, and date when the development permit was granted. Failure to post such notice shall be a ground for the suspension of the development of the area and for possible cancellation of the conversion order, pursuant to section XIV hereof.[6] CA Rollo, p. 81.
[7] Id. at 82.
[8] CA Rollo, pp. 83-85.
[9] Id. at 93-94.
[10] Separate complaints from the ejected tenants were filed against the Spouses Melchor & Paz de Chavez and Spouses Artemio and Emelita Mendoza (Id. at 30).
[11] Id. at 62.
[12] Rollo, pp. 55, 62.
[13] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[14] Rollo, p. 29.
[15] National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA 389; Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No. 69260, 22 December 1989, 180 SCRA 576; Republic of the Philippines v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, 23 June 2000, 334 SCRA 320.
[16] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
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