In an affidavit-complaint dated July 1, 1999, Abraham L. Mendova charged Judge Crisanto B. Afable of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian Sulat, Eastern Samar, with ignorance of the law relative to Criminal Case No. 2198-98, "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Roberto Q. Palada, Accused," for slight physical injuries.

Complainant Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that on February 18, 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. Barangay Chairman Ronie D. Quintua, in his Certification dated April 19, 1999,¹ confirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia L. Cabago also certified in an undated "Minutes In Settling Disputes"² that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

On May 4, 1998, complainant filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian Sulat, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2198-98. On November 3, 1998, respondent judge rendered his Decision³ dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, thus: 

"Complaint in this case dated April 20, 1998 was filed with this Court on May 4, 1998. The affidavits of complainant as well as prosecution witness Melvin C. Quiloña were subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned also on May 4, 1998. 

"The alleged offense took place on February 15, 1998. From the date of the commission of the alleged offense, more than two months have elapsed. 

"This is for slight physical injuries and is therefore a light offense. 

"Under Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by presciption of the crime. 

"Article 90 of the same Code provides that light offenses prescribe in two months. This being a light offense, the same should be considered as already having prescribed because the case against the accused was filed after two months. 

"LET, THEREFORE, this case be DISMISSED, the crime having already prescribed. 

"SO ORDERED." (emphasis added)

On July 7, 1999, complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an administrative complaint against respondent judge. He alleged that in dismissing the case, respondent judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), which state: 

"Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.

x x x x x x x x x 

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay." (emphasis added)

Complainant further alleged that respondent's conduct caused him injury and grave injustice.

In his comment dated September 13, 1999, respondent admitted that his Decision being assailed by complainant "was wrong." According to him, "(w)hen I rendered the questioned decision, what entered my mind was the rule on prescription as provided under the Revised Penal Code. There was a mental lapse on my part caused by heavy workload," as he was likewise designated the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Llorente-Hernani, Eastern Samar.⁴ He begged for kindness and understanding, stating that he has been a trial judge for 10 years and that this is the "first kind of mistake" he has ever committed.

In its Evaluation and Recommendation,⁵  the Office of the Court Administrator, through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely, thus:

"EVALUATION: It cannot be denied that respondent has been remiss in the dispensation of his adjudicatory functions. The court has not been wanting in its warnings that judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice. Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority (Cuaresma vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73). Further, a judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that occupants of the bench can not justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles (Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48)."

In a Resolution dated February 13, 2002, this Court ordered that this case be docketed as an administrative matter and required the parties to manifest, within 20 days from notice, whether they are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed.

Both parties filed their respective manifestations that they are willing to have the case so decided. In his manifestation, respondent judge made the additional comment that the complainant did not allege bad faith or malice on his (respondent's) part in rendering the questioned decision.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether respondent judge is liable administratively for dismissing Criminal Case No. 2198-98 on the ground of prescription.

It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed, that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.⁶

What we said in Flores vs. Abesamis⁷ is illuminating: 

"As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. 

"Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. 

"Flores (complainant) resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges' orders had caused him 'undue injury.' This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that 'administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof' (See In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417-418 [1987]; In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995]. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a judge can be had only if 'there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and x x x also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order' or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code (see In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, at pp. 464-465). 

"x x x. In fine, Flores filed his administrative and criminal complaints prematurely, before ascertainment of the existence of foundation therefor; x x x." (emphasis added)

In the present case, we noticed from the records before us that the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judge's decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus, following our settled pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative complaint is premature.

According to complainant, Robert Palada committed the crime of slight physical injuries on February 15, 1998. On February 18, 1998, complainant filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion, San Julian, Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c) of The Local Government Code of 1991, quoted earlier, such filing interrupted the prescriptive period⁸ and started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. Here, records fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed on May 4, 1998 Criminal Case No. 2198-98 for slight physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case on November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action. Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.

While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be an error of judgment.

Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad faith or malice on the part of respondent judge when he dismissed the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint against Judge Crisanto B. Afable is DISMISSED. He is reminded, however, that henceforth, he should be more assiduous and circumspect in his judicial calling.

SO ORDERED. 

Panganiban, (Acting Chairman), Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.  
 

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¹ Annex "A" of Mendova's Affidavit-Complaint.

² Annex "B," id. 

³ Annex "C," id. 

⁴ A copy of the designation dated January 6, 1998 issued by Executive Judge Celso F. Lorenzo, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court, Borongan, Eastern Samar, is attached to respondent Judge Afable's Comment. 

⁵ Rollo, at 19-20. 

⁶ Santos vs. Orlino, 296 SCRA 101, 106-107 (1998); In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405, 407-408, 464-465 (1995); Rodrigo vs. Quijano, 79 SCRA 10, 12 (1977); Dizon vs. De Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52 (1971); Urbina vs. Maceren, 57 SCRA 403, 407 (1974). 

⁷ 275 SCRA 302, 316-317 (1997).

⁸ Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescibe in two months. Pursuant to Article 91 thereof, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended parties, etc.