THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010 ]PEOPLE v. BENANCIO MORTERA Y BELARMINO +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. BENANCIO MORTERA Y BELARMINO, APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PEOPLE v. BENANCIO MORTERA Y BELARMINO +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. BENANCIO MORTERA Y BELARMINO, APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Zamboanga City (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 19311, which found accused Benancio[3] Belarmino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas.
The accusatory portion of the Amended Information[4] charging the accused with murder reads:
Upon arraignment on February 6, 2004, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty."[5]
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramil Gregorio, an eyewitness; (2) Jovel Veñales, another eyewitness; (3) Dr. Jamella Marbella, examining physician; (4) Leticia Rojas, mother of Robelyn; and (5) PO1 Yaser Hakim.
The prosecution's version of the incident, as found by the trial court and adopted by the Office of the Solicitor General, appears in the Appellee's Brief[6] as follows:
Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned,[7] during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense.[8] By his account, after leaving his uncle's house at Gov. Camins, he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled to Ayala and later to Lintangan, Zamboanga del Norte.[9]
The defense witness, Roden Macasantos, claimed that he was drinking with the group of Alberto Rojas when he saw the accused having an argument with Jomer Diaz. After they had pacified the two, he saw Diaz run away. Later, he returned with Robelyn Rojas. Robelyn also argued with the accused, and they were likewise pacified by the others in the group. The dispute apparently settled, the group left Robelyn and the accused alone. After about five minutes, they heard women shouting. When they went to find out what it was all about, they saw Robelyn wounded. He, however, did not see the person who stabbed him.[10]
On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[11]
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liability of the accused. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." The claim of self-defense was rejected for failure to prove the element of unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence. With respect to his civil liability, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was awarded, in lieu of the actual damages awarded by the trial court, for failure of Leticia Rojas to substantiate her claim with official receipts. The amount of exemplary damages was likewise reduced to P25,000.00. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before this Court.[12] In seeking his acquittal, he has assigned three errors for the court's resolution, to wit: (i) there was a denial of his right to due process and of his right to have an impartial trial; (ii) there was no appreciation of the justifying circumstance of self defense; and (iii) assuming that not all the requirements of self-defense were present, there was no appreciation of the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
After an assiduous assessment of the records, the Court finds no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction or even appreciate the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. We, thus, affirm.
For a better grasp of the assertion of the defense that he was denied his right to due process of law and his right to an impartial trial, we quote at length the transcript of stenographic notes. Thus:
Citing the foregoing as basis, the accused argues that Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. displayed his hostility towards him and condemned him even before the defense could rest its presentation of evidence. By saying that he was "just making a story," the judge already concluded his guilt during trial.
The Court is not unaware of the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,[13] where it was written:
The situation in the case at bench is, however, different.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. They were not out of context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense.
The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have proceeded.[14] As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have been his.[15]
Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge "had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.
The invocation of Opida[16] fails to persuade us either. The facts therein are not at all fours with the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution.
In his second assigned error, the accused invokes self-defense. By asserting it, however, it became incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed had acted in defense of himself. The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[17]
The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is undoubtedly a question of fact, and it is well entrenched in jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court command great weight and respect unless patent inconsistencies are ignored or where the conclusions reached are clearly unsupported by evidence.[18] In the present case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the trial court, as modified by the CA. In debunking his claim, we quote with approval the ruling of the CA.
Finding the primordial requisite of unlawful aggression wanting, the Court cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
As regards damages, we affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals. Considering that only P14,653.50 of the P38,653.00 actual damages awarded by the trial court is supported by receipts, the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.[19] We, however, reinstate the amount of exemplary damages to P30,000.00 to be in accord with current jurisprudence.[20]
WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00518-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Rodrigo F. Lim Jr. and concurred in by Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Ruben C. Ayson, CA rollo, pp.126-146.
[2] Penned by Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.
[3] Appellant's Brief, CA rollo, p. 1, supra note 1.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] Id. at 19.
[6] CA rollo, pp. 55-57.
[7] Records, p. 20.
[8] TSN, February 17, 2005, p. 14.
[9] Id. at 4-9.
[10] TSN, November 25, 2004, pp. 2-10.
[11] Records, pp. 107-108.
[12] Both the accused and the OSG manifested that they were dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and submitting the case for decision based on the briefs they had filed with the CA.
[13] G.R. Nos. 103501-03, G.R. No. 103507, February 17, 1997, 268 SCRA 332.
[14] Rule 119, Section 11. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
x x x x
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
[15] People v. Unarce, G.R. No. 120549, April 4, 1997, 270 SCRA 756.
[16] G.R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986, 142 SCRA 295.
[17] Novicio v. People, G.R. No. 163331, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 680.
[18] People v. Barriga, G.R. No. 178545 September 29, 2008,567 SCRA 65.
[19] People v. Se, G.R. No. 152966, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 725.
[20] People v. Elmer Peralta y Hidalgo, G..R. No. 187531, October 16, 2009; and People v. Antonio Dalisay y Destresa, G.R. No. 188100, November 25, 2009.
The accusatory portion of the Amended Information[4] charging the accused with murder reads:
That on or about August 25, 2002, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with a knife, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and stab from behind with the use of said weapon that he was then armed with, at the person of ROBELYN ROJAS y MALLARI, employing means, manner and form which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without any danger to the person of the accused, and as a result of which attack, the said Robelyn Rojas y Mallari sustained stabbed wound on the fatal part of the latter's body which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on February 6, 2004, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty."[5]
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramil Gregorio, an eyewitness; (2) Jovel Veñales, another eyewitness; (3) Dr. Jamella Marbella, examining physician; (4) Leticia Rojas, mother of Robelyn; and (5) PO1 Yaser Hakim.
The prosecution's version of the incident, as found by the trial court and adopted by the Office of the Solicitor General, appears in the Appellee's Brief[6] as follows:
Robelyn Mallari Rojas, 23 years old, single, was stabbed and killed on August 25, 2002 at Cabato Lane, Gov. Camins, Zamboanga City. Post mortem examination conducted by Dr. Jamella Marbella, Medical Officer V of Zamboanga City Health Office showed that Robelyn Rojas sustained the following injuries:
1. Penetrating wound, clean edges, 2-5 cm width 1.5 cm. gaping located at 5 cm. from spine below the left sub-scapular region. 19 cm. deep upward towards axilla, and 11 cm. deep downward towards left flank region.
2. Linear abrasion 5.5 cm. in length at the left lateral aspect of left arm (Ex. "B").
The cause of his death was cardio pulmonary arrest probably secondary to hemorrhagic shock secondary to stab wound, penetrating left back (Exh. "A-1").
Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio y Toribio, 24 years old, single, testified that on August 25, 2002, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he together with Jovel Veñales, Archie Saavedra, John Carpio, Plong Siano and Alberto Rojas were drinking tuba at Cabato Lane, near Acapulco Drive, Governor Camins, Zamboanga City. Four of them were sitting on a chair leaning on a concrete wall while two of their companions sat on the ground. They have just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Gregorio were (sic) singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. He bought something from a store five meters away from the place where Gregorio and his companions were drinking. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the place where Ramil Gregorio and his companions were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each other. After their discussion, Mortera and Robelyn shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and walked three steps. Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back with a knife about 9 inches long. Robelyn was hit at the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up with the latter. Robelyn fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother Ricky but he was [pronounced] dead on arrival at the hospital (Exh. "A").
Jovel Veñales y Bandian, 23 years old, who was drinking together with Ramil Gregorio, Archie Saavedra, John Carpio, Plong Siano and Alberto Rojas, in the afternoon of August 25, 2002 corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony.
Mrs. Leticia Rojas y Mallari, 48 years old, married, is the mother of Robelyn Rojas y Mallari. She testified that Robelyn is one of her eight children. xxx She was at work at Zamboanga Puericulture Lying-in Maternity Hospital as laundry woman when her daughter Marilyn called her by telephone informing her that Robelyn was stabbed. She went to Western Mindanao Medical Center where she saw Robelyn already dead with stab wound at the back. At past 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Robelyn's body was brought to Remedios Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Rojas testified that she spent a total of Php38,653.00 in connection with her son's death (Exh. "J"; "J-1", "J-1-A" to "J-1-V").
Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned,[7] during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense.[8] By his account, after leaving his uncle's house at Gov. Camins, he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled to Ayala and later to Lintangan, Zamboanga del Norte.[9]
The defense witness, Roden Macasantos, claimed that he was drinking with the group of Alberto Rojas when he saw the accused having an argument with Jomer Diaz. After they had pacified the two, he saw Diaz run away. Later, he returned with Robelyn Rojas. Robelyn also argued with the accused, and they were likewise pacified by the others in the group. The dispute apparently settled, the group left Robelyn and the accused alone. After about five minutes, they heard women shouting. When they went to find out what it was all about, they saw Robelyn wounded. He, however, did not see the person who stabbed him.[10]
On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. The trial court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused BENANCIO MORTERA, JR. Y BELARMINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder, as principal, for the unjustified killing of Robelyn Rojas y Mallari and SENTENCES said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and its accessory penalties, to pay the heirs of the victim Php50, 000.00 as indemnity for his death; Php50,000.00 as moral damages; Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages; Php38,653.00 as actual damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[11]
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liability of the accused. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." The claim of self-defense was rejected for failure to prove the element of unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence. With respect to his civil liability, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 was awarded, in lieu of the actual damages awarded by the trial court, for failure of Leticia Rojas to substantiate her claim with official receipts. The amount of exemplary damages was likewise reduced to P25,000.00. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated January 16, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 19311 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Robelyn Rojas the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages; and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before this Court.[12] In seeking his acquittal, he has assigned three errors for the court's resolution, to wit: (i) there was a denial of his right to due process and of his right to have an impartial trial; (ii) there was no appreciation of the justifying circumstance of self defense; and (iii) assuming that not all the requirements of self-defense were present, there was no appreciation of the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
After an assiduous assessment of the records, the Court finds no reason to reverse the judgment of conviction or even appreciate the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. We, thus, affirm.
For a better grasp of the assertion of the defense that he was denied his right to due process of law and his right to an impartial trial, we quote at length the transcript of stenographic notes. Thus:
Citing the foregoing as basis, the accused argues that Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. displayed his hostility towards him and condemned him even before the defense could rest its presentation of evidence. By saying that he was "just making a story," the judge already concluded his guilt during trial.
The Court is not unaware of the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,[13] where it was written:
The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial... hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta.... The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate... A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from the common standard of fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added)
The situation in the case at bench is, however, different.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. They were not out of context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense.
The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have proceeded.[14] As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should have been his.[15]
Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge "had taken the cudgels for the prosecution.
The invocation of Opida[16] fails to persuade us either. The facts therein are not at all fours with the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution.
In his second assigned error, the accused invokes self-defense. By asserting it, however, it became incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed had acted in defense of himself. The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[17]
The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is undoubtedly a question of fact, and it is well entrenched in jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court command great weight and respect unless patent inconsistencies are ignored or where the conclusions reached are clearly unsupported by evidence.[18] In the present case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the trial court, as modified by the CA. In debunking his claim, we quote with approval the ruling of the CA.
In the instant case, accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part Robelyn Rojas when the latter allegedly hit him with a spray gun. However, except this self-serving statement, no other evidence was presented to prove that indeed he was hit by Robelyn. Accused-appellant failed to show where he was hit and what injuries he sustained, if any. Moreover, his own defense witness Roden Macasantos did not see him being hit by a spray gun. On the contrary, the prosecution has clearly shown that before Robelyn was stabbed, the two even discussed with each other and accused-appellant even shook hands with him. Moreover, if indeed it was true that Robelyn was carrying a spray gun and tried to hit him, accused-appellant, while he was in a supine position, could have easily just flaunted his knife to scare his alleged attackers away. On the other hand, even if we assume to be true that he was in a supine position when he thrust the knife at his attacker, it is however impossible that the back of Robelyn would be hit, unless the latter could also fell (sic) on his back, which is again far from reality. In a myriad of cases, it has been ruled that the location, number or seriousness of the stab or hack wounds inflicted on the victim are important indicia which may disprove accused's plea of self defense. In the instant case, it is clear that the victim was stabbed at the back negating any indication that accused-appellant acted in self defense.
Finding the primordial requisite of unlawful aggression wanting, the Court cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
As regards damages, we affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals. Considering that only P14,653.50 of the P38,653.00 actual damages awarded by the trial court is supported by receipts, the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.[19] We, however, reinstate the amount of exemplary damages to P30,000.00 to be in accord with current jurisprudence.[20]
WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00518-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Rodrigo F. Lim Jr. and concurred in by Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Ruben C. Ayson, CA rollo, pp.126-146.
[2] Penned by Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.
[3] Appellant's Brief, CA rollo, p. 1, supra note 1.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] Id. at 19.
[6] CA rollo, pp. 55-57.
[7] Records, p. 20.
[8] TSN, February 17, 2005, p. 14.
[9] Id. at 4-9.
[10] TSN, November 25, 2004, pp. 2-10.
[11] Records, pp. 107-108.
[12] Both the accused and the OSG manifested that they were dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and submitting the case for decision based on the briefs they had filed with the CA.
[13] G.R. Nos. 103501-03, G.R. No. 103507, February 17, 1997, 268 SCRA 332.
[14] Rule 119, Section 11. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
x x x x
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
[15] People v. Unarce, G.R. No. 120549, April 4, 1997, 270 SCRA 756.
[16] G.R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986, 142 SCRA 295.
[17] Novicio v. People, G.R. No. 163331, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 680.
[18] People v. Barriga, G.R. No. 178545 September 29, 2008,567 SCRA 65.
[19] People v. Se, G.R. No. 152966, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 725.
[20] People v. Elmer Peralta y Hidalgo, G..R. No. 187531, October 16, 2009; and People v. Antonio Dalisay y Destresa, G.R. No. 188100, November 25, 2009.