EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010 ]ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG +
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, AND RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN. RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ v. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG +
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, AND RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN. RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this administrative matter by filing an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 to charge Sandiganbayan Justices
Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the complaint, with (1) grave
misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law.[1]
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that this decision is limited to the determination of the administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and does not extend to the ascertainment of whatever might be the effects of any irregularity they committed as members of the Fourth Division on the trial proceedings. This clarification stresses that the proceedings, if procedurally infirm, resulted from the acts of the Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as individual Justices. The remedy against any procedural infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
Details of the Charges
A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006, the Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice in Davao City.
Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the complainant sent a memorandum to Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio) to invite his attention to the irregular arrangement being adopted by the Fourth Division in conducting its provincial hearings.[3] The memorandum reads as follows:
The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the other Prosecutors to object to the arrangement and to place their objections on record.
During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial body. Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio's instructions, the complainant objected to the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside.[5]
The complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections incurred for her the ire of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out of her desire to avoid any procedural defects, she decided to forego the presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel Plando as her witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People of the Philippines v. Payakan Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead, she requested another Prosecutor to inform the Fourth Division that she was then suffering from migraine, and to request the cancellation of the hearing.
The complainant was surprised to learn later on that the Fourth Division had issued a warrant for the arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the hearing.
On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,[6] in which he explained that he had arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006 in order to appear in court, and had called up the complainant, who had told him that she would not be presenting him as a witness due to lack of time for the necessary conference; and that she had also told him about her having migraine on that morning.
On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the complainant to comment on Atty. Plando's motion. In her comment dated May 24, 2006,[7] the complainant averred that she had decided "not to proceed with the presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006 due to her apprehension that the Honorable Court might again conduct the hearing in division"; and that incurring the ire of the Justices by her continuing objections to the hearing procedure had been a stressful situation that had induced her migraine.
Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the order dated May 26, 2006,[8] the Fourth Division directed the complainant in the same order to answer questions from the court itself on June 6, 2006 "relative to statements made in [her] Comment dated May 24, 2006."
For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was accompanied by Acting Director Elvira Chua of Bureau IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer Yolanda Pineda. According to the complainant, Justice Hernandez berated her for bringing her own stenographer. The Fourth Division then directed Stenographer Pineda to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for taking notes without prior leave of court.[9]
Complying with the directive to show cause, Pineda submitted an explanation/compliance,[10] explaining that Director Chua had asked her to attend the hearing on June 6, 2006, and to take stenographic notes of the proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pineda's explanation in her own manifestation and explanation,[11] stating that the complainant had requested that a stenographer from the Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take notes at the hearing; and that "on 27 April 2006 when Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present her NBI Agent witness in Davao City, she left Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said date so that it would be physically impossible for her to be in court at 8:30 in the morning."
The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20, 2006,[12] directing the complainant to comment on Director Chua's manifestation and explanation, and to explain why she should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness on April 26 and 27, 2006. She complied by submitting her compliance on July 10, 2006.[13] The incident has remained unresolved by the Fourth Division.
The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it appear that they had all been present during the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.
B.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings.
Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the complainant during the hearing held in Cebu City in September 2006 the following:
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ong's) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools.
Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then observing trial from the gallery: You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, thus:
C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferrada's Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Manifest Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited the Fourth Division's resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Puno's demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the case upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected,[14] which finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been perfected was based on a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous, and constituted gross ignorance of the law.
Comments of Respondents
Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed their joint comment.[15] Although admitting having tried cases in the provinces by apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among themselves, they emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the outset that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three members of the Division were present in the same courtroom or venue, thereby preserving the collegial nature of the Division as required by law, specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were within hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily confer with each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases separately being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based on the equitable principle of estoppel.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in the best interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that even assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a mere procedural lapse.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainant's allegation on their use of intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of stenographic notes to prove that there was no record of the intemperate and discriminatory utterances on the date specified by the complainant.[16] Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce a copy of the order that contained his following alleged utterance:
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before them about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had done so casually and conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing each other from time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually made in jest, and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting.
Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded the possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of government funds, because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any of the scheduled cases.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by dismissing the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]
Justice Ponferrada's separate comment[18] echoed his co-respondents' assertions in their joint comment.
Report of the Court Administrator
In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,[19] we noted the comments of respondent Justices, and referred the matter to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In his report dated October 6, 2009,[20] then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a Member of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit, because:
Ruling of the Court
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court Administrator.
A.
Respondents' Violation of the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The contention is not well-taken.
Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial is defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is "an executive body with each member having approximately equal power and authority."[22] In a collegial court, therefore, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division from the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence of a quorum and precludes collegiality.
As if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and in attendance during sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents' non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.[24] They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.[25] For this reason alone, respondent Justices' adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct - defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence,[26] or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules[27] - considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules;[28] on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro,[29] viz:
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices' signing of the orders issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrator's finding and recommendation that no evidence supported the complainant's charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainant's charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.[30] It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."[31]
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."
At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.[32]
D.
Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, classifies the offense of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:
and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in an instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest of the charges are considered as aggravating circumstances.
That respondent Justices' responsibilities as members of a Division were different compels us to differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong
Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules of the Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings coming before the Division.
In exercising his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to guarantee that his Division's proceedings came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot, of course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar with the pertinent law and correct procedure, considering his already long tenure and experience as of then as a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, having risen from Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and commensurate penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine of P15,000.00, after taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this administrative offense was his first and the aggravating circumstance of the light charge of unbecoming conduct. The penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar of such offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
2.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had no direction and control of how the proceedings of the Division were conducted. Direction and control was vested in Justice Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada simply relied without malice on the soundness and wisdom of Justice Ong's discretion as their Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them into traveling the path of reluctance to halt Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold that their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their lack of malice.
In addition, the fact that this is the first case for Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada is a mitigating circumstance in their favor.
Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, aggravated by a light charge but appreciating his reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of this offense being his first, the Court admonishes him with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, without any aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of its being a first offense. However, he is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
Final Note
It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable, competent and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government and the well-being of the people.[34] We warn, therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the part of anyone involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be countenanced.[35] Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; hence, it is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, and Peralta, JJ., no part.
Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the dissenting opinion of J., Nachura.
Abad, J., see dissenting opinion.
Perez, J., no part, acted on the matter as Court Administrator.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-19.
[2] Section 1, Rule IV, reads:
Section 1. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. -- The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and resolution of cases filed with it: Provided, however, that cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one region may be heard in another region: Provided, further, that for this purpose the Presiding Justice shall authorize any Division or Divisions of the Sandiganbayan to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila, and, where the greater interest of justice so requires, outside the Philippines.
[3] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[4] Id., pp. 20-21 (bold prints are not in the original but provided for emphasis).
[5] See Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), April 24, 2006, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 449-450.
[6] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[7] Id., pp. 29-31.
[8] Id., p. 32-33.
[9] TSN, June 6, 2006, p. 4, rollo, pp. 44-45.
[10] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[11] Id., pp. 63-67.
[12] Id., p. 62.
[13] Id., pp. 122-130.
[14] Id., pp. 285-361.
[15] Id., pp. 402-441.
[16] See TSN of the proceedings taken on August 30, 2006, Annex 4, Rejoinder.
[17] Rollo, p. 513.
[18] Id., pp. 519-530.
[19] Id., p. 531.
[20] See Report dated October 6, 2009; part of the rollo, but without pagination.
[21] As amended by Republic Act No. 8249.
[22] Webster's Third New World International Dictionary, 445 (1993).
[23] G.R. No. 126496 and 126526, April 30, 1997, 271 SCRA 790.
[24] Requierme Jr. v. Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 25, 34.
[25] Community Rural Bank of Guimba v. Talavera, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 34; Domondon v. Lopez, 383 SCRA 376, June 20, 2002; De Vera v. Judge Dames II, 369 Phil. 470, July 13, 1999.
[26] Almojuela, Jr. v. Judge Ringor, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1521, July 27, 2004; Lim v. Judge Fineza, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-02-1705, May 5, 2003.
[27] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, supra, note 26.
[28] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, Adm. Matter No. 1098-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 166, 171-172; citing In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.
[29] A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, December 11, 1995, 251 SCRA 111, 117-118.
[30] Section 2, Canon 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
[31] Zacarias v. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 387, 392.
[32] Almendra v. Asis, A.M. RTJ-00-1550, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 69, 77.
[33] Literally, first among equals.
[34] Preamble, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[35] Alejandro v. Martin, A.M. No. P-07-2349, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 698, 704.
[36] 3rd "Whereas" Clause, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
ABAD, J.:
I dissent from the majority decision ably written for the Court by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
In 1988 Assistant Special Prosecutor Rohermia Jamsani-Rodriguez from the Office of the Ombudsman charged Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division of (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law.
Regarding the first and second charges, complainant Rodriguez assailed the procedure that respondent Justices adopted during the Fourth Division's hearings in Davao City from April 24 to April 28, 2006. Rodriquez alleged that, rather than sit as a collegial body, Justice Ong, as Chairman, heard cases by himself, while Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada together heard at a short distance the other cases, thus resulting in separate and simultaneous hearings. Rodriguez said that she objected to the procedure but this was brushed aside.
Following an investigation, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, submitted a report dated October 6, 2009, recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit. But the majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct and respondent Justices Ong and Hernandez guilty of unbecoming conduct. The Court dismissed all the other charges.
I disagree with the findings of guilt.
One. The majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct for failure to hear the cases before them as a collegial body. It ruled that P.D. 1606 and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan required the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum for conducting business and holding trial. Thus, the exclusion or absence of any member of the Division negated the existence of a quorum and precluded collegiality.
But, while the procedure that respondent Justices adopted did not strictly follow the requirement to the letter, I submit that their acts cannot be characterized either as simple or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.[1] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.[2]
To be considered misconduct, the transgression must have been committed by unlawful behavior or gross negligence. Here, respondent Justices conducted the separate and simultaneous hearings in the same venue and within hearing and communicating distance of each other. They adopted this arrangement to maximize their presence in Davao City and render speedy justice to the parties that wait months before the Court could visit Mindanao again.
The actions of the Justices also resulted in saving the litigants, the lawyers, the witnesses, and the Court considerable time, effort, and resources.[3] None of the Justices was motivated by corruption or an illegal purpose; on the contrary, they did everything in good faith. In fact, complainant Rodriguez herself recognized in her memorandum to her superior that it was commendable on the part of the Justices to have adopted the procedure which turned out to be advantageous to the prosecution.[4]
Clearly, there is nothing unlawful or grossly negligent in what respondent Justices did. At most, it could only be regarded as irregular, which is not sufficient to make them liable for any misconduct.
Two. In weighing respondent Justices' individual liabilities, the majority in the Court made a distinction between the Chairman and the members of the Fourth Division. It explained that as Chairman, Justice Ong possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the Division's proceedings and eventually steered it into the path of procedural irregularity. On the other hand, the majority mitigated the liabilities of Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada supposedly because they were mere Division members who had no direction and control of how the proceedings went.
I submit that the distinction is unwarranted and placed respondent Ong at an unfair disadvantage.
As the majority decision noted, the Sandiganbayan being a collegial court, each member has approximately equal power and authority. The members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.[5] Thus, while the Chairman supervises and directs the proceedings of the Division, his authority is limited to that extent. All Division members share any decision on what proceedings to adopt in the conduct of its business. They act by consensus or majority rule. In fact, respondent Justices pointed out in their respective comments that they adopted the challenged procedure in the best interest of the service. This admission negates any impression that Chairman Ong imposed his will on Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada or that the latter two merely relied on their Chairman's judgment.
It is not fair to conclude that since Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada were mere members, they had no voice in how their Division conducted its business and proceedings. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which they are obliged to make independently.[6]
I submit that Justice Ong does not deserve the sanction, even if light, that the Court has chosen to impose on him.
[1] Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., G.R. No. 176409, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 148, 156.
[2] Rubio v. Munar, Jr., G.R. No. 155952, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 597, 602.
[3] Decision, p. 9.
[4] Id. at 3.
[5] Id. at 14.
[6] Section 2, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that this decision is limited to the determination of the administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and does not extend to the ascertainment of whatever might be the effects of any irregularity they committed as members of the Fourth Division on the trial proceedings. This clarification stresses that the proceedings, if procedurally infirm, resulted from the acts of the Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as individual Justices. The remedy against any procedural infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006, the Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice in Davao City.
Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the complainant sent a memorandum to Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio) to invite his attention to the irregular arrangement being adopted by the Fourth Division in conducting its provincial hearings.[3] The memorandum reads as follows:
The Prosecution Bureau IV is due to leave for Davao City on April 23, 2006 for their scheduled hearing which will be held on April 24 to 28, 2006. In conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth Division has adopted a different procedure. They do not sit as collegial body, instead they divide the division into two. In such a manner, the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone and the other members will hear other cases, conducting hearing separately and simultaneously.
We find this procedure to be advantageous to the Prosecution and also commendable on the part of the Justices. While there are no objections manifested by the defense lawyers, we are apprehensive of the consequences, considering that this constitutes procedural lapses. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the conviction of the accused by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was invalidated by the court when it was shown that the members of the court who heard his case were constantly changing. The Petitioner assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in its capacity as a trial court.
In one of her hearings, the undersigned has already called the attention of the Hon. Chairman and expresses (sic) her concern on the matter, and even opined that they might be charged of falsification, by issuing orders that they heard the cases as a collegial body, when in fact only the Chairman was present during the trial and the other members are hearing cases in the other chamber.
The Chairman, however, welcomes any question on the procedure they are presently adopting.
We do not want to take chances. In cases where conviction are issued, the accused would surely assail this procedure.
For your information and appropriate action.[4]
The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the other Prosecutors to object to the arrangement and to place their objections on record.
During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial body. Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio's instructions, the complainant objected to the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside.[5]
The complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections incurred for her the ire of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out of her desire to avoid any procedural defects, she decided to forego the presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel Plando as her witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People of the Philippines v. Payakan Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead, she requested another Prosecutor to inform the Fourth Division that she was then suffering from migraine, and to request the cancellation of the hearing.
The complainant was surprised to learn later on that the Fourth Division had issued a warrant for the arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the hearing.
On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,[6] in which he explained that he had arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006 in order to appear in court, and had called up the complainant, who had told him that she would not be presenting him as a witness due to lack of time for the necessary conference; and that she had also told him about her having migraine on that morning.
On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the complainant to comment on Atty. Plando's motion. In her comment dated May 24, 2006,[7] the complainant averred that she had decided "not to proceed with the presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006 due to her apprehension that the Honorable Court might again conduct the hearing in division"; and that incurring the ire of the Justices by her continuing objections to the hearing procedure had been a stressful situation that had induced her migraine.
Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the order dated May 26, 2006,[8] the Fourth Division directed the complainant in the same order to answer questions from the court itself on June 6, 2006 "relative to statements made in [her] Comment dated May 24, 2006."
For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was accompanied by Acting Director Elvira Chua of Bureau IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer Yolanda Pineda. According to the complainant, Justice Hernandez berated her for bringing her own stenographer. The Fourth Division then directed Stenographer Pineda to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for taking notes without prior leave of court.[9]
Complying with the directive to show cause, Pineda submitted an explanation/compliance,[10] explaining that Director Chua had asked her to attend the hearing on June 6, 2006, and to take stenographic notes of the proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pineda's explanation in her own manifestation and explanation,[11] stating that the complainant had requested that a stenographer from the Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take notes at the hearing; and that "on 27 April 2006 when Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present her NBI Agent witness in Davao City, she left Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said date so that it would be physically impossible for her to be in court at 8:30 in the morning."
The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20, 2006,[12] directing the complainant to comment on Director Chua's manifestation and explanation, and to explain why she should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness on April 26 and 27, 2006. She complied by submitting her compliance on July 10, 2006.[13] The incident has remained unresolved by the Fourth Division.
The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it appear that they had all been present during the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings.
Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the complainant during the hearing held in Cebu City in September 2006 the following:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ong's) own alma mater. The complainant opined that the query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools.
Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then observing trial from the gallery: You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing nothing.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, thus:
Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferrada's Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Manifest Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited the Fourth Division's resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Puno's demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the case upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected,[14] which finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been perfected was based on a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous, and constituted gross ignorance of the law.
Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed their joint comment.[15] Although admitting having tried cases in the provinces by apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among themselves, they emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the outset that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three members of the Division were present in the same courtroom or venue, thereby preserving the collegial nature of the Division as required by law, specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were within hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily confer with each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases separately being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based on the equitable principle of estoppel.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in the best interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that even assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a mere procedural lapse.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainant's allegation on their use of intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of stenographic notes to prove that there was no record of the intemperate and discriminatory utterances on the date specified by the complainant.[16] Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce a copy of the order that contained his following alleged utterance:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before them about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had done so casually and conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing each other from time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually made in jest, and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting.
Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded the possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of government funds, because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any of the scheduled cases.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by dismissing the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]
Justice Ponferrada's separate comment[18] echoed his co-respondents' assertions in their joint comment.
In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,[19] we noted the comments of respondent Justices, and referred the matter to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In his report dated October 6, 2009,[20] then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a Member of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit, because:
Viewed in the foregoing light, the charge of grave misconduct cannot stand. It is understood that grave misconduct is such which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a private individual and requires reliable evidence showing that the judicial act complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law. Our perusal of the record shows that respondent's adoption of the assailed practice was not motivated by corruption and/or an illegal purpose. Indeed, the best interest of the service was clearly aimed at. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the error or mistake if there be such must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.
For the very same reasons, respondents cannot likewise be held liable for falsification of public documents arising out of the alleged falsity of the collegiality reflected in the minutes and/or stenographic notes taken during the proceedings in which the assailed practice was adopted. For liability to be assessed for the offense of falsification of official documents thru untruthful narration of the facts, the rule is settled that the following elements should concur, viz: (a) the offender makes in a document an untruthful statement in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with wrongful intent to injure a third person. The absence of the enumerated elements clearly discounts respondents' liability for said offense.
Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, it is a fundamental evidentiary rule that the party who alleges a fact must prove the same. For all of complainant's imputations against respondents, the record is bereft of any showing that the latter are guilty of oppressive conduct and/or grave misconduct, particularly with reference to the comment the former was required to file regarding the motion to lift bench warrant filed by the witness Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos. 28103-104. Given the variance between the allegations in said motion and the reasons complainant initially advanced for the non-presentation of said witness at the April 27, 2006 hearing in said cases, respondents were clearly acting within their prerogative when they decided to clarify the matter from the former and her colleague, Prosecutor Almira Abella-Orfanel. Although subsequently required to explain why she should not be cited for contempt in the June 20, 2006 order issued in the case, the record is, more importantly, bereft of any showing that complainant was, in fact, declared in contempt of court or actually fined in the sum of P18,000.00 as purportedly threatened by respondents.
Squarely refuted in the affidavits executed by her colleagues, namely, Prosecutors Cornelio Somido, Almira Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and Rabenranath Uy, complainant's bare allegations clearly deserve scant consideration insofar as they impute such further irregularities against respondents as threatening or humiliating her during the hearing/s conducted in the aforesaid cases and/or causing disrespect to Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio or otherwise allowing interference in the latter's handling of a case. Because administrative proceedings like the one at bench are governed by the substantial evidence rule, the same may be said of the disparaging comments respondents are supposed to have made regarding the barong and/or intelligence of practitioners appearing before them which are, on the whole, devoid of any bases in the record outside of complainant's averments and the affidavit belatedly executed by Assistant Special Prosecutor Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By substantial evidence is meant such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion and does not mean just any evidence in the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in basis. The test is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate.
As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant has not discharged the onus of proof by substantial evidence. The intemperate and immoderate statements attributed to respondents are, to repeat, without sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not equivalent to impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about their respective alma maters, the intention being to break the usual monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting or to put practitioners appearing before them at ease. It cannot be said that public confidence in the Judiciary was eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards either the parties or to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that members of the bench like respondents are presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice and undue interest cannot be presumed lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is, consequently, not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. These principles find resonance in the case at bench where, in addition to the total dearth of evidence to prove the charge of manifest partiality, it appears that respondents' grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed in the following wise in the June 5, 2006 resolution issued by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 171116, to wit:
"G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO PUNO). xx xx On the basis thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari dated 2 March 2006 assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan for petitioner's failure to submit a valid affidavit of service of copies of the petition on respondent and the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules, there being no jurat and signature of the affiant in the attached affidavit of service of the petition.
"In any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x x x." (emphasis supplied)
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court Administrator.
Respondents' Violation of the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The contention is not well-taken.
Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:
Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division; Provided, that when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) Divisions of three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit separately at the same time. Each of the five (5) most senior Associate Justices including the Presiding Justice, shall be the Chairman of a Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices next in rank shall be the Senior Member of a Division; and each of the last five (5) Associate Justices shall be the Junior Member of a Division.
Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial is defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is "an executive body with each member having approximately equal power and authority."[22] In a collegial court, therefore, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division from the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence of a quorum and precludes collegiality.
As if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and in attendance during sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-
xxx when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents' non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.[24] They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.[25] For this reason alone, respondent Justices' adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct - defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence,[26] or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules[27] - considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules;[28] on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro,[29] viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices' signing of the orders issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrator's finding and recommendation that no evidence supported the complainant's charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainant's charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.[30] It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."[31]
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction."
At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.[32]
Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, classifies the offense of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. - xxxOn the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
- Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
- A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P 20,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:
- Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
xxx xxx xxx
and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.
Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in an instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest of the charges are considered as aggravating circumstances.
That respondent Justices' responsibilities as members of a Division were different compels us to differentiate their individual liabilities.
Justice Ong
Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules of the Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers of supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings coming before the Division.
In exercising his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to guarantee that his Division's proceedings came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot, of course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar with the pertinent law and correct procedure, considering his already long tenure and experience as of then as a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, having risen from Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and commensurate penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine of P15,000.00, after taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this administrative offense was his first and the aggravating circumstance of the light charge of unbecoming conduct. The penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar of such offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had no direction and control of how the proceedings of the Division were conducted. Direction and control was vested in Justice Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada simply relied without malice on the soundness and wisdom of Justice Ong's discretion as their Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them into traveling the path of reluctance to halt Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold that their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their lack of malice.
In addition, the fact that this is the first case for Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada is a mitigating circumstance in their favor.
Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, aggravated by a light charge but appreciating his reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of this offense being his first, the Court admonishes him with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, without any aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance without malice and the mitigating circumstance of its being a first offense. However, he is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable, competent and independent Judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government and the well-being of the people.[34] We warn, therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the part of anyone involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be countenanced.[35] Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; hence, it is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Leonardo-De Castro, and Peralta, JJ., no part.
Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the dissenting opinion of J., Nachura.
Abad, J., see dissenting opinion.
Perez, J., no part, acted on the matter as Court Administrator.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-19.
[2] Section 1, Rule IV, reads:
Section 1. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. -- The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and resolution of cases filed with it: Provided, however, that cases originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one region may be heard in another region: Provided, further, that for this purpose the Presiding Justice shall authorize any Division or Divisions of the Sandiganbayan to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila, and, where the greater interest of justice so requires, outside the Philippines.
[3] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[4] Id., pp. 20-21 (bold prints are not in the original but provided for emphasis).
[5] See Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), April 24, 2006, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 449-450.
[6] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[7] Id., pp. 29-31.
[8] Id., p. 32-33.
[9] TSN, June 6, 2006, p. 4, rollo, pp. 44-45.
[10] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[11] Id., pp. 63-67.
[12] Id., p. 62.
[13] Id., pp. 122-130.
[14] Id., pp. 285-361.
[15] Id., pp. 402-441.
[16] See TSN of the proceedings taken on August 30, 2006, Annex 4, Rejoinder.
[17] Rollo, p. 513.
[18] Id., pp. 519-530.
[19] Id., p. 531.
[20] See Report dated October 6, 2009; part of the rollo, but without pagination.
[21] As amended by Republic Act No. 8249.
[22] Webster's Third New World International Dictionary, 445 (1993).
[23] G.R. No. 126496 and 126526, April 30, 1997, 271 SCRA 790.
[24] Requierme Jr. v. Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 25, 34.
[25] Community Rural Bank of Guimba v. Talavera, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1909, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 34; Domondon v. Lopez, 383 SCRA 376, June 20, 2002; De Vera v. Judge Dames II, 369 Phil. 470, July 13, 1999.
[26] Almojuela, Jr. v. Judge Ringor, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1521, July 27, 2004; Lim v. Judge Fineza, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-02-1705, May 5, 2003.
[27] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, supra, note 26.
[28] Ajeno v. Judge Inserto, Adm. Matter No. 1098-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 166, 171-172; citing In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.
[29] A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, December 11, 1995, 251 SCRA 111, 117-118.
[30] Section 2, Canon 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
[31] Zacarias v. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 387, 392.
[32] Almendra v. Asis, A.M. RTJ-00-1550, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 69, 77.
[33] Literally, first among equals.
[34] Preamble, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[35] Alejandro v. Martin, A.M. No. P-07-2349, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 698, 704.
[36] 3rd "Whereas" Clause, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I dissent from the majority decision ably written for the Court by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
In 1988 Assistant Special Prosecutor Rohermia Jamsani-Rodriguez from the Office of the Ombudsman charged Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division of (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law.
Regarding the first and second charges, complainant Rodriguez assailed the procedure that respondent Justices adopted during the Fourth Division's hearings in Davao City from April 24 to April 28, 2006. Rodriquez alleged that, rather than sit as a collegial body, Justice Ong, as Chairman, heard cases by himself, while Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada together heard at a short distance the other cases, thus resulting in separate and simultaneous hearings. Rodriguez said that she objected to the procedure but this was brushed aside.
Following an investigation, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, submitted a report dated October 6, 2009, recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit. But the majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct and respondent Justices Ong and Hernandez guilty of unbecoming conduct. The Court dismissed all the other charges.
I disagree with the findings of guilt.
One. The majority in the Court found respondent Justices guilty of simple misconduct for failure to hear the cases before them as a collegial body. It ruled that P.D. 1606 and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan required the actual presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum for conducting business and holding trial. Thus, the exclusion or absence of any member of the Division negated the existence of a quorum and precluded collegiality.
But, while the procedure that respondent Justices adopted did not strictly follow the requirement to the letter, I submit that their acts cannot be characterized either as simple or grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.[1] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.[2]
To be considered misconduct, the transgression must have been committed by unlawful behavior or gross negligence. Here, respondent Justices conducted the separate and simultaneous hearings in the same venue and within hearing and communicating distance of each other. They adopted this arrangement to maximize their presence in Davao City and render speedy justice to the parties that wait months before the Court could visit Mindanao again.
The actions of the Justices also resulted in saving the litigants, the lawyers, the witnesses, and the Court considerable time, effort, and resources.[3] None of the Justices was motivated by corruption or an illegal purpose; on the contrary, they did everything in good faith. In fact, complainant Rodriguez herself recognized in her memorandum to her superior that it was commendable on the part of the Justices to have adopted the procedure which turned out to be advantageous to the prosecution.[4]
Clearly, there is nothing unlawful or grossly negligent in what respondent Justices did. At most, it could only be regarded as irregular, which is not sufficient to make them liable for any misconduct.
Two. In weighing respondent Justices' individual liabilities, the majority in the Court made a distinction between the Chairman and the members of the Fourth Division. It explained that as Chairman, Justice Ong possessed and wielded powers of supervision, direction, and control over the Division's proceedings and eventually steered it into the path of procedural irregularity. On the other hand, the majority mitigated the liabilities of Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada supposedly because they were mere Division members who had no direction and control of how the proceedings went.
I submit that the distinction is unwarranted and placed respondent Ong at an unfair disadvantage.
As the majority decision noted, the Sandiganbayan being a collegial court, each member has approximately equal power and authority. The members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.[5] Thus, while the Chairman supervises and directs the proceedings of the Division, his authority is limited to that extent. All Division members share any decision on what proceedings to adopt in the conduct of its business. They act by consensus or majority rule. In fact, respondent Justices pointed out in their respective comments that they adopted the challenged procedure in the best interest of the service. This admission negates any impression that Chairman Ong imposed his will on Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada or that the latter two merely relied on their Chairman's judgment.
It is not fair to conclude that since Justices Hernandez and Ponferrada were mere members, they had no voice in how their Division conducted its business and proceedings. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which they are obliged to make independently.[6]
I submit that Justice Ong does not deserve the sanction, even if light, that the Court has chosen to impose on him.
[1] Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., G.R. No. 176409, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 148, 156.
[2] Rubio v. Munar, Jr., G.R. No. 155952, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 597, 602.
[3] Decision, p. 9.
[4] Id. at 3.
[5] Id. at 14.
[6] Section 2, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.