SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188979, September 05, 2012 ]PEOPLE v. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO, APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PEOPLE v. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA Y VELASCO, APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 15, 2009 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759. The CA affirmed the February 22, 2007 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 209, Mandaluyong City, finding appellant Christopher Pareja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under an Amended Information that reads:
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister's room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.[5] AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket.[6] The appellant removed AAA's clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.[7] The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.[8] The appellant stopped when AAA's cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant's upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room.[9] AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.[10]
3 The Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAA's brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead hurled invectives at CCC.[11] AAA went to the house of her other brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD, at Block 19, Welfareville Compound, and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2) siblings went to the Women and Children's Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident.[12]
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled "filling materials" at his house, located at Block 38, Fabella Compound, on the evening of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and slept.[13] On the next day, the appellant, accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to the municipal hall to ask for financial assistance for his wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctor told him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the appellant and his companions went to Pasig City to find blood donors.[14]
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the clothes of his son, two policemen entered his house and informed him that a complaint for attempted rape had been filed against him. The police brought him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a detention cell.[15] The appellant added that he filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against the police officers who beat him up.[16]
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of February 22, 2007, under the following terms:
The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that a slight penetration took place when the appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina as he was trying to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the presence of people in the other room did not make it impossible for the appellant to have raped the victim, because lust is no respecter of time and place. It also held that the victim's lack of tenacity in resisting the appellant's sexual aggression did not amount to consent or voluntary submission to the criminal act.[18]
In his brief,[19] the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victim's vagina. He added that the victim's testimony was incredible and contrary to human experience.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
Carnal Knowledge Not Proven With
Moral Certainty
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.[20] "Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman."[21] Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that it is the central element in the crime of rape.[22]
In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA recounted the alleged rape, as follows:
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellant's penis did not penetrate, but merely 'touched' (i.e., "naidikit"), AAA's private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay[24] also disclosed that the appellant was holding the victim's hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance coupled with the victim's declaration that she was resisting the appellant's attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CA's conclusion that the appellant's penis penetrated, however slightly, the victim's female organ.
Did the touching by the appellant's penis of the victim's private part amount to carnal knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan,[25] the Court laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ."[27] Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness."[28]
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. AAA's testimony did not establish that the appellant's penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from AAA's testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victim's labias. In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico,[29] we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAA's nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellant's acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim's private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has not hesitated to strike down convictions for consummated rape when the evidence failed to show that penetration, however slight, of the victim's vagina took place.
In People v. Bon,[30] the Court found the appellant guilty of attempted rape only, as there was no indication that the appellant's penis even touched the labia of the pudendum of the victim. We further held that the appellant could not be convicted of consummated rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v. Miranda,[31] where the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim's private parts, but was unsuccessful, so he inserted his fingers instead. We convicted the accused of attempted rape only due to lack of evidence to establish that there was even a slight penile penetration. We noted, however, that the appellant's act of inserting his fingers would have constituted rape through sexual assault had the offense occurred after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog,[32] the victim declared that the accused placed his penis on her vagina; and claimed that it touched her private parts. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for rape, and convicted him of attempted rape only, because we found the victim's testimony too ambiguous to prove the vital element of penile penetration. We added that the victim's testimony was "replete with repeated denial of penile insertion."[33]
Similarly, in People v. Quarre,[34] the evidence for the prosecution consisted only of the victim's testimony that the accused tried, but failed, to insert his penis into her vagina, and she felt pain in the process. No medico- legal examination report was presented in evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the accused's conviction for rape, and found him guilty of attempted rape only.
In People v. Ocomen,[35] the Court also set aside the appellant's conviction for rape because no proof was adduced of even the slightest penetration of the female organ, aside from a general statement of the victim that she had been "raped."
People v. Monteron[36] is another noteworthy case where the Court set aside the appellant's conviction for rape. In this case, the victim testified that the accused placed his penis on top of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In finding the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we held that there was no showing that the accused's penis entered the victim's vagina. We added that the pain that the victim felt might have been caused by the accused's failed attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,[37] the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim's vagina, but failed to secure penetration. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for three (3) counts of rape and found him guilty of attempted rape only. We explained the necessity of carefully ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,[38] the Court found the accused guilty of attempted rape only, because the victim did not declare that there was the slightest penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary, she categorically stated that the accused was not able to insert his penis into her private parts because she was moving her hips away. We further ruled that the victim's attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was unavailing to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco,[39] the victim testified that the accused "poked" her vagina. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for qualified rape, and convicted him instead only of attempted rape after failing to discern from the victim's testimony that the accused attained some degree of penile penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape.
In People v. Dimapilis,[40] the Court refused to convict the accused for consummated rape on the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt the accused's penis pressed against her vagina as he tried to insert it. We explained that in order to constitute consummated rape, there must be entry into the vagina of the victim, even if only in the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,[41] the Court reversed the accused's conviction for rape and convicted him of attempted rape only, as there was paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. We reasoned out that the victim's statements that the accused was "trying to force his sex organ into mine" and "binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not prove that the accused's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion."[42] We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for attempted rape is two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua is prision mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years. Without any attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional whose range is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on attempted rape cases.[43]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario; rollo, pp. 2-17.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 34-42.
[4] CA rollo, p. 87.
[5] Records, pp. 109-110, 115-117.
[6] Id. at 118-120.
[7] Id. at 121-124.
[8] Id. at 126-128.
[9] Id. at 130-132.
[10] Id. at 133.
[11] Id. at 135-137.
[12] Id. at 140-147.
[13] Records, pp. 300-302.
[14] Id. at 307-310.
[15] Id. at 311-315.
[16] Id. at 316.
[17] Supra note 2, at 41.
[18] Supra note 1, at 9-14.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 72-85.
[20] Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
[21] See People v. Bon, 444 Phil. 571, 579 (2003).
[22] See People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 182517, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 485, 493.
[23] Records, pp. 113-131.
[24] Id. at 5-6.
[25] 385 Phil. 912 (2000).
[26] Id. at 920-922 (citations omitted).
[27] See People v. Pancho, 462 Phil. 193, 205-206 (2003).
[28] People v. Brioso, supra note 22, at 495.
[29] G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 748, citing People v. Collado, 405 Phil. 880 (2001).
[30] 536 Phil. 897 (2006).
[31] 519 Phil. 531 (2006).
[32] 469 Phil. 385 (2004).
[33] Id. at 393.
[34] 427 Phil. 422 (2002).
[35] 432 Phil. 57 (2002).
[36] 428 Phil. 401 (2002).
[37] 420 Phil. 727 (2001). 38 417 Phil. 18 (2001).
[39] 406 Phil. 947 (2001).
[40] 397 Phil. 607 (2000).
[41] 367 Phil. 755 (1999).
[42] See People v. Poras, G.R. No. 177747, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 624, 644.
[43] Supra note 29, at 752.
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under an Amended Information that reads:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge of [AAA],[3] 13 years of age, sister of the common law spouse of accused, against her will and consent, thus debasing and/or demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim thereby prejudicing her normal development as a child.[4]
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister's room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.[5] AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket.[6] The appellant removed AAA's clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and briefs.[7] The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.[8] The appellant stopped when AAA's cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant's upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room.[9] AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.[10]
3 The Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAA's brother, CCC, went to her room and asked her why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA did not answer, and instead hurled invectives at CCC.[11] AAA went to the house of her other brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA proceeded to the house of her older sister, DDD, at Block 19, Welfareville Compound, and narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2) siblings went to the Women and Children's Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police Station and reported the incident.[12]
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled "filling materials" at his house, located at Block 38, Fabella Compound, on the evening of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and slept.[13] On the next day, the appellant, accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law, went to the municipal hall to ask for financial assistance for his wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctor told him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the appellant and his companions went to Pasig City to find blood donors.[14]
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the clothes of his son, two policemen entered his house and informed him that a complaint for attempted rape had been filed against him. The police brought him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, forced him to admit the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a detention cell.[15] The appellant added that he filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against the police officers who beat him up.[16]
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of February 22, 2007, under the following terms:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences him as he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim, [AAA,] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.[17]
The CA, in its decision dated June 15, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape, and held that a slight penetration took place when the appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina as he was trying to insert it.
The appellate court further ruled that the presence of people in the other room did not make it impossible for the appellant to have raped the victim, because lust is no respecter of time and place. It also held that the victim's lack of tenacity in resisting the appellant's sexual aggression did not amount to consent or voluntary submission to the criminal act.[18]
In his brief,[19] the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him for the crime of rape, as the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest penetration of his penis into the victim's vagina. He added that the victim's testimony was incredible and contrary to human experience.
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
Carnal Knowledge Not Proven With
Moral Certainty
By definition, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.[20] "Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman."[21] Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that it is the central element in the crime of rape.[22]
In her testimony of February 9, 2004, AAA recounted the alleged rape, as follows:
x x x x
x x x x
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellant's penis did not penetrate, but merely 'touched' (i.e., "naidikit"), AAA's private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay[24] also disclosed that the appellant was holding the victim's hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance coupled with the victim's declaration that she was resisting the appellant's attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CA's conclusion that the appellant's penis penetrated, however slightly, the victim's female organ.
Did the touching by the appellant's penis of the victim's private part amount to carnal knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan,[25] the Court laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.[26] (italics supplied)
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ."[27] Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness."[28]
As earlier discussed, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile penetration. AAA's testimony did not establish that the appellant's penis touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from AAA's testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victim's labias. In the absence of testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico,[29] we ruled that when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAA's nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellant's acts demonstrated the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim's private parts.
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has not hesitated to strike down convictions for consummated rape when the evidence failed to show that penetration, however slight, of the victim's vagina took place.
In People v. Bon,[30] the Court found the appellant guilty of attempted rape only, as there was no indication that the appellant's penis even touched the labia of the pudendum of the victim. We further held that the appellant could not be convicted of consummated rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v. Miranda,[31] where the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim's private parts, but was unsuccessful, so he inserted his fingers instead. We convicted the accused of attempted rape only due to lack of evidence to establish that there was even a slight penile penetration. We noted, however, that the appellant's act of inserting his fingers would have constituted rape through sexual assault had the offense occurred after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog,[32] the victim declared that the accused placed his penis on her vagina; and claimed that it touched her private parts. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for rape, and convicted him of attempted rape only, because we found the victim's testimony too ambiguous to prove the vital element of penile penetration. We added that the victim's testimony was "replete with repeated denial of penile insertion."[33]
Similarly, in People v. Quarre,[34] the evidence for the prosecution consisted only of the victim's testimony that the accused tried, but failed, to insert his penis into her vagina, and she felt pain in the process. No medico- legal examination report was presented in evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the accused's conviction for rape, and found him guilty of attempted rape only.
In People v. Ocomen,[35] the Court also set aside the appellant's conviction for rape because no proof was adduced of even the slightest penetration of the female organ, aside from a general statement of the victim that she had been "raped."
People v. Monteron[36] is another noteworthy case where the Court set aside the appellant's conviction for rape. In this case, the victim testified that the accused placed his penis on top of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In finding the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we held that there was no showing that the accused's penis entered the victim's vagina. We added that the pain that the victim felt might have been caused by the accused's failed attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,[37] the accused tried to insert his penis into the victim's vagina, but failed to secure penetration. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for three (3) counts of rape and found him guilty of attempted rape only. We explained the necessity of carefully ascertaining whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,[38] the Court found the accused guilty of attempted rape only, because the victim did not declare that there was the slightest penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary, she categorically stated that the accused was not able to insert his penis into her private parts because she was moving her hips away. We further ruled that the victim's attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was unavailing to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco,[39] the victim testified that the accused "poked" her vagina. The Court set aside the accused's conviction for qualified rape, and convicted him instead only of attempted rape after failing to discern from the victim's testimony that the accused attained some degree of penile penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape.
In People v. Dimapilis,[40] the Court refused to convict the accused for consummated rape on the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt the accused's penis pressed against her vagina as he tried to insert it. We explained that in order to constitute consummated rape, there must be entry into the vagina of the victim, even if only in the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,[41] the Court reversed the accused's conviction for rape and convicted him of attempted rape only, as there was paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. We reasoned out that the victim's statements that the accused was "trying to force his sex organ into mine" and "binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not prove that the accused's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of the victim's vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion."[42] We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for attempted rape is two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua is prision mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years. Without any attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional whose range is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on attempted rape cases.[43]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and
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(1)
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we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE;
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(2)
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we SENTENCE him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 1 0 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and
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(3)
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we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P25,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
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SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario; rollo, pp. 2-17.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 34-42.
[4] CA rollo, p. 87.
[5] Records, pp. 109-110, 115-117.
[6] Id. at 118-120.
[7] Id. at 121-124.
[8] Id. at 126-128.
[9] Id. at 130-132.
[10] Id. at 133.
[11] Id. at 135-137.
[12] Id. at 140-147.
[13] Records, pp. 300-302.
[14] Id. at 307-310.
[15] Id. at 311-315.
[16] Id. at 316.
[17] Supra note 2, at 41.
[18] Supra note 1, at 9-14.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 72-85.
[20] Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
[21] See People v. Bon, 444 Phil. 571, 579 (2003).
[22] See People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 182517, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 485, 493.
[23] Records, pp. 113-131.
[24] Id. at 5-6.
[25] 385 Phil. 912 (2000).
[26] Id. at 920-922 (citations omitted).
[27] See People v. Pancho, 462 Phil. 193, 205-206 (2003).
[28] People v. Brioso, supra note 22, at 495.
[29] G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 748, citing People v. Collado, 405 Phil. 880 (2001).
[30] 536 Phil. 897 (2006).
[31] 519 Phil. 531 (2006).
[32] 469 Phil. 385 (2004).
[33] Id. at 393.
[34] 427 Phil. 422 (2002).
[35] 432 Phil. 57 (2002).
[36] 428 Phil. 401 (2002).
[37] 420 Phil. 727 (2001). 38 417 Phil. 18 (2001).
[39] 406 Phil. 947 (2001).
[40] 397 Phil. 607 (2000).
[41] 367 Phil. 755 (1999).
[42] See People v. Poras, G.R. No. 177747, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 624, 644.
[43] Supra note 29, at 752.