The present administrative case against Regional Trial Court Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon^[1] of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1, stemmed from an affidavit-complaint executed by Eliza Mina and her son Ramir Mina,^[2] charging respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence and manifest bias and partiality.

As an antecedent, a case for ejectment was filed by the spouses Reynaldo Paul and Ma. Clara Chico, against the spouses Florencio and Eliza Mina, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga Bataan, docketed as Civil Case No. 1752.

On July 7, 1998, the MTC, through Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula, rendered a Decision in favor of the spouses Chico, thus: 

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the defendants by ordering the defendants and all persons claiming right under them to surrender peacefully Lot 774 to the plaintiff by demolishing their house thereon and vacating the said land; 

To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as actual damage and a reasonable rent of P1,000.00 per month from May 1981 up to the removal of their house in the subject lot; 

To pay costs of suit. 

No award for moral damages, there being no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to that effect. 

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 1 thereof, presided over by Judge Vianzon.

On October 2, 1998, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.

On October 8, 1998, the spouses Chico filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allowing execution pending appeal.^[3] Respondent judge did not act upon the motion for execution right away.

In the meantime, the spouses Mina appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was, however, dismissed in a Resolution dated September 22, 1999. No appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, on October 16, 1999, the judgment against the spouses Mina became final and executory.

On April 6, 2000, months after the judgment against the spouses Mina had become final, counsel for the spouses Chico reiterated their Motion for Execution before the RTC, which motion, up to that time, had not been acted upon by respondent judge.

Instead of remanding the case to the MTC, the latter being the court of origin, Judge Vianzon granted the motion for execution on April 12, 2000 and, thereafter, ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition on July 19, 2000.

On July 25, 2000, complainant Eliza Mina filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Writ of Demolition, on the ground that the RTC had no authority to issue the writs. However, Judge Vianzon merely noted the motion to quash.

Consequently, on July 28, 2000, the writs in question were enforced. The personal belongings of the spouses Mina were removed and their house was demolished.

Hence, the present complaint.

Respondent judge in his Comment states:

(1) That the spouses Mina are estopped from questioning the legality of the issuance of the writs of execution and demolition because at the time the motions for this issuance were being heard, their counsel did not manifest any objection to his authority to issue said writs. In fact, complainants actively participated in the hearings thereon and it was only when he had issued orders adverse to them that they questioned his authority;

(2) That if complainants truly believed that he committed an error in issuing the writs of execution and demolition, the complainants should have brought the matter to his attention so that he could have immediately remanded the records of the case to the MTC;

(3) That although he could have readily acted on the Motion for Execution filed as early as October 8, 1998, he in fact deferred ruling upon the same in consideration of the appeal taken by the spouses Mina to the Court of Appeals. He waited until the Court of Appeals' decision had become final and executory, so that said appeal would not be rendered moot if he ordered immediate execution pending appeal; and,

(4) That he denies the allegation that he gave undue benefit, advantage or preference to the spouses Chico. He states that he does not even know them nor has he even met them. He further avers that, if ever there was any bias, partiality or undue advantage and benefit, the same was in favor of the spouses Mina who, "because of pity of the undersigned judge" were able to stay for almost two more years after he had rendered his decision, and it was only after counsel for the prevailing party reiterated their motion for execution, that he finally acted and resolved the same.

Upon evaluation of the parties' pleadings and the evidence on record, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the petition meritorious, stating that respondent judge's actuation showed a total disregard or ignorance of the elementary provisions of law involved in the case. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Vianzon be fined in the amount of P2,000 and warned that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.

The findings and recommendations of the OCA are well-taken, except with regard to the penalty.

After a judgment has attained finality, as in this case, Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court^[4] applies, viz: 

Sec. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. 

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. 

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (Emphasis ours.)

Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court also provides:

Sec. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

It is, therefore, clear that in the execution of the judgment in ejectment cases, the issuance of a demolition order is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court which rendered the decision. The Regional Trial Court that affirms the decision of the Municipal Trial Court cannot order execution of its judgment. The exception is when the Regional Trial Court grants execution pending appeal.

In the present case, the execution ordered by the respondent judge was not one in a case pending appeal. For the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on September 22, 1999 and the same became final and executory on October 16, 1999. The order granting the motion for execution was issued on April 12, 2000. By the latter date, the judgment of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory, depriving the RTC of jurisdiction to issue the order. It is of no moment that the motion for execution was filed on October 8, 1998.

Relevant herein is the ruling in City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, 369 (1991):

The rule is that if the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court is appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision thereafter becomes final, the case should be remanded through the Regional Trial Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court for execution. The only exception is the execution pending appeal, which can be issued by the Regional Trial Court under Section 18 [now Section 21] of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under Section 10 [now Section 21] of the same Rule.

It follows that respondent judge's act of issuing the writs of execution and demolition was done outside the scope of his authority.

Respondent judge's explanations are unavailing.

It is undisputed that at the time the writs of execution and demolition were issued, the judgment in question had already become final and executory. In fact, respondent judge himself asserts that he waited for the said decision to become final and executory before acting on the prevailing party's motion for execution.

Respondent, moreover, argues that it was the duty of herein complainants to call his attention to his error, so that he could have immediately remanded the records of the case to the proper MTC.

We give credence to complainants' averment that while it is true that they participated in the hearings on the motion for execution, they did so in the belief that respondent judge was acting regularly and within the scope of his authority under the law. It was only later on, when the irregularity of the judge's action became apparent, that they brought the matter to his attention. However, respondent judge merely ignored their objection and continued to preside over the incident, notwithstanding the formal objection to his lack of authority. We agree with complainants that even without their objection, Judge Vianzon should have known at the outset that, at that point, he had no more authority to hear and try the incident on the writ of execution.

It must be stressed that occupying the exalted position of a judge entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. He is mandated to be conversant with the law^[5] and to have more than a cursory acquaintance with the rules and authoritative doctrines.^[6]

When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. Judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.^[7] We explained, in the case of Guillen v. Judge Cañon,^[8] that:

 

Respondent's actions also visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct). Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules (Jovenal Oporto, Jr. vs. Judge Eddie P. Monserate, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1109, April 16, 2001). Thus, this Court has consistently held that:

A judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Agunday vs. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134 [1999]).

Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge (De Austria vs. Beltran, 313 SCRA 443 [1999]).

As to the penalty, gross ignorance of the law is now punishable with severe sanctions under the amendment of Rule 140,^[9] Rules of Court, by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.^[10] Considering that the offense herein was committed before the aforesaid amendment of the Rules, the imposable penalty should be a fine as recommended by the OCA. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of the offense, which goes against a basic rule of procedure, the Court increases the recommended amount of the fine to P20,000.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1, is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely under the more stringent provisions of the Rules as amended. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.
 

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^[1] The complaint was originally against the Judge and a co-respondent, Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles. However, in a Resolution dated March 13, 2002, this Court dismissed the complaint against the latter, for lack of merit.

^[2] In representation of his father Florencio Mina, since the latter died before the filing of the instant complaint.

^[3] Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken thereon.

^[4] Execution, Satisfaction and Effects of Judgment.

^[5] See Lopez v. Fernandez, 99 SCRA 603.

^[6] See Daplas v. Arquiza, 99 SCRA 141.

^[7] Domondon, et al. v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696. June 20, 2002.

^[8] A.M. No. MTJ-01-1381. January 14, 2002.

^[9] Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.

^[10] Effective September 11, 2001, under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge and the same is to be penalized in one of three ways: 1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3) A fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.