FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 95891-92, February 28, 2000 ]PEOPLE v. OSMUNDO FUERTES +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSMUNDO FUERTES @ "DODO"; AGUSTIN LUYONG @ "JACK" AND "JACKIE PANGALAN" (AT LARGE); EDGAR GIBONE; FRANCISCO SALVA @ "BOCHOY"; AND ROLANDO TANO @ "BOY NEGRO" AND "BRANDO", ACCUSED, OSMUNDO FUERTES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
PEOPLE v. OSMUNDO FUERTES +
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OSMUNDO FUERTES @ "DODO"; AGUSTIN LUYONG @ "JACK" AND "JACKIE PANGALAN" (AT LARGE); EDGAR GIBONE; FRANCISCO SALVA @ "BOCHOY"; AND ROLANDO TANO @ "BOY NEGRO" AND "BRANDO", ACCUSED, OSMUNDO FUERTES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For gathering firewood and quenching their thirst with coconuts gathered from a tree inside a hacienda managed by Osmundo Fuertes, Napoleon Aldeguer, aged 14, and Mateo Aldeguer, aged 16, were bound, gagged, brutally hacked to death and thrown at the
bottom of a dried creek.
Indicted for the dastardly deeds were Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" and "Jackie Pangalan", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva @ Buchoy, and Rolando Tano @ "Boy Negro" and "Brando" in two (2) Informations for Murder docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1582 and 1583.
Criminal Case No. 1582 charges
Accused Francisco Salva was, upon motion of the prosecution,[2] discharged by the trial court in order to be utilized as a state witness. Joint trial of the two cases, upon motion of the prosecution without any objection from the defense,[3] thereafter ensued.
Subsequently, accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" was apprehended and committed to the Provincial Jail. On September 1, 1987, said accused assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "guilty" upon arraignment[4] in both cases.
On the basis, among others, of his extra-judicial confession,[5] executed in the presence of his defense counsel, narrating the incident and his participation therein as well as the post-mortem examination reports[6] made by Dr. Gil G. Mantilla, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, judgment[7] was thereafter rendered against accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", in a Decision dated September 14, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In the morning of November 1, 1986, Francsico Salva was riding on a horse and pasturing some cows and carabaos within the premises of Hacienda Ong located in Lumagaob, Barrio Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental.[9]
Thereupon, he saw two boys gathering young coconuts.[10] Salva approached the two boys and asked them why they were gathering young coconuts and the two boys replied that "they were thirsty".[11]
Thereafter, Salva reported the matter to appellant (who was overseer of the Hacienda) and the latter promptly ordered Salva and some other persons including accused Edgar Gibone to board a jeep which he drove to the place where the two boys were gathering coconuts.[12] When they arrived at the place, the two boys were already on a hill, prompting appellant and his group to chase them, but they failed to catch them.[13]
Thereafter, appellant and his companions returned to appellant's house bringing with them two bundles of firewood allegedly gathered and left by the two boys. When they arrived at appellant's house, appellants and his companions "ate" and thereafter appellant sent somebody to fetch accused Rolando Tano and Jack.[14]
Later in the afternoon, Rolando Tano and Jack arrived at appellant's house. Thereupon, Salva and Edgar Gibone were summoned by appellant and were instructed to go with Rolando Tano and Jack to the place where the two boys were earlier seen gathering coconuts to apprehend them should they return.[15] Upon arriving at the place, they allegedly hid in the "Canyan tree" and after a while the two boys appeared. After a brief chase, they were able to catch the two boys. The two boys were "hand-tied" and brought to the house of Joaquin Reyes.[16]
Upon reaching the house of Joaquin Reyes, Jack ordered Salva and Gibone to hide.[17] Thereafter, Jack and Tano asked Felisa Reyes, the wife of Joaquin Reyes, for water to drink and also instructed the latter to fetch appellant at the latter's house.[18]
Felisa Reyes complied with the request and proceeded to appellant's house and informed the latter that two persons were waiting for him in her house. She described the two persons to appellant who, in turn, told her that said persons were Jack and Boy Negro.[19]
Thereafter, appellant instructed Felisa Reyes to go home as he and his companions "will just follow".[20] Felisa Reyes went back home and after a while appellant, together with two other persons arrived. Upon seeing the two boys, appellant allegedly started scolding them and called them thieves.[21]
After scolding the two boys, appellant and Jack had a conversation during which they allegedly agreed that the two boys be killed.[22] Thereafter, appellant and his two companions left. Jack then ordered Salva and Gibone to proceed to the "dead creek" which they promptly did.
Later on, Jack, Rolando Tano and the two boys also arrived at the "dead creek" followed by appellant.[23]
At the "dead creek", Jack removed the shirts of the two boys upon being ordered to do so by appellant.[24] Jack and Rolando Tano tore the shirts and with the torn shirts covered the mouths of the two boys.[25] Jack stabbed the smaller of the two boys, who was later identified as Napoleon Aldeguer, with a bolo at the latter's abdomen.[26] Upon being stabbed, Napoleon fell to the ground as Jack kept on stabbing him.[27]
Jack handed the bolo to Rolando Tano and the latter started stabbing the other boy who was later identified as Mateo Aldeguer.[28]
Rolando Tano handed the bolo to Edgar Gibone who was threatened by Jack that should he not stab Mateo Aldeguer, he will, in turn, be stabbed by Jack. Edgar Gibone complied by stabbing Mateo Aldeguer.[29]
Edgar Gibone was instructed by Jack to hand the bolo to Salva but the latter refused to accept the bolo prompting Jack to threaten him with death. Salva accepted the bolo and hacked the left thigh of Napoleon Aldeguer as instructed by Jack.[30]
Jack took the bolo from Salva and hacked the neck of Napoleon Aldeguer.[31]
After stabbing the Aldeguers, Jack and Rolando Tano left and "followed" the dead creek. Appellant Edgar Gibone and Salva left and proceeded to the house of one Nardo where appellant allegedly warned Gibone and Salva "not to reveal what happened.[32]
Later in the day, Rolando Tano and Jack allegedly arrived at the house of appellant and were met by the latter in his office where he gave each a small envelope.[33]
In the afternoon of November 2, 1986, the bodies of Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer were found in Hacienda Ong.
The Postmortem Examination Reports[34] Issued By Dr, Gil Mantilla who examined the bodies of the victms contained the following findings:
POST MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT
Accused-appellant Osmundo Fuertes had a different story to tell. He declared that he had nothing to do with the twin killings.[35] He testified that as of November 1, 1986, he was the overseer of Hacienda Ong, having been employed in that capacity since 1972.[36] On that fateful day of November 1, 1986, he was at home.[37] The first thing he did in the morning was to take a bath.[38] Thereafter, he checked the daily time record and prepared the payroll.[39] At around 5:00 p.m., Francisco Salva who was watering the plants went upstairs and informed him that there were persons looking for him. Upon going downstairs he saw Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan who asked him if he saw her brothers,[40] the two victims. He replied that he did not see them.[41] Thereafter, he together with his wife, two children --- namely, Osmundo Jr. and John-Ayster Tucayao, Allan Pisetas, Edgar Gibone, Mauricio Hornejas and Francsico Salva, Jr. had supper at 6:00 p.m.[42] While having supper, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived with some companions also looking for the Aldeguer boys.[43] He likewise told Valles that he did not see them.[44] Later at around 9:00 p.m. when they were already sleeping, they were roused by a shout from the gate.[45] When he went downstairs to verify who it was, he came upon P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions who were still looking for the two victims.[46] He allowed the group to go to the playground of the house and upon the latter's request that they be permitted to search the bodega and the surrounding areas of the hacienda he gave them his permission and accompanied them going to the bodega. He even gave them a flashlight to use but they only saw copra, big baskets and a pail.[47]
Accused-appellant further declared that on November 2, 1986 at 6:00 a.m., he, his wife, his sons, Osmundo Jr. and John, Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva and Ayster Tucayao went to the San Nicolas Tolentino church.[48] From there, they proceeded to the Madang public market to buy vegetables and at the same time to meet his children from Davao City, namely, Estella and Ana Grace.[49] From the public market, they proceeded back to the hacienda arriving at around 9:30 a.m.[50] While they were having breakfast, he heard someone calling outside. Upon peeping out of the window to verify who it was, he found out that the callers were policemen inquiring about the Aldeguer boys.[51] Again, he told the police that he did not see the victims. The policemen declined his offer to have breakfast settling for a drink of water instead, then left.[52] After lunch, at around 2:00 p.m. accused-appellant presided at a purok meeting being its president.[53] At around 4:00 p.m., while the meeting was still going on, a jeep with policemen on board arrived.[54] One of the policemen alighted and informed accused-appellant that the two Aldeguer boys had been found, that they were dead and that the bodies were already at the funeral parlor.[55] After informing accused-appellant of the whereabouts of the two victims, the police left and the purok meeting continued, ending at 4:30 p.m.[56] At around 5:00 p.m. while accused-appellant was at home, one Jun Talaboc, an ex-policeman came.[57] Upon apprising Talaboc about what transpired on that afternoon, particularly the discovery of the two dead bodies, Talaboc advised accused-appellant to transfer to the Mati poblacion warning him that it was dangerous to stay. Talaboc cited several violent incidents which resulted in the shooting of a policeman at Matiao; the killing of a father and son at Pomoanon and the slaying of an ex-councilman in Mapantad.[58]
Testifying that he feared for his safety and that of his family, accused-appellant ordered his wife to pack up everything and immediately proceeded to the place of Police Chief Cipriano Sefuentes at past 6:00 p.m.[59] Upon being advised by Sefuentes to check in at a hotel because his life was in danger, accused-appellant decided to proceed to the house of one Captain Serrano at Capitol Hill, Mati, Davao arriving therein at 8:00 p.m.[60] Accused-appellant and his family stayed at the Serrano residence up to the time of his arrest.[61]
Greta Fuertes, the wife of the accused-appellant corroborated her husband's story practically echoing the latter's account point by point. She testified that she and accused-appellant had four children, two of whom are in Davao City while the other two are living in Hacienda Ong.[62] On November 1, 1986, she and her husband were at home.[63] In the afternoon of the same day while her husband was playing with their two sons,[64] Francisco Salva @ Butsoy informed them that Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan was looking for her brothers.[65] Later, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived also looking for the Aldeguer boys.[66] At 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Pat. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions arrived again looking for her brothers.[67] Her husband lent a flashlight to Napoleon Aguinaldo and together with the group, her husband went to the copra drier.[68]
She further testified that on November 2, 1986, they went to the Catholic church and attended the first mass at 6:00 a.m.[69] Thereafter, they proceeded to the public market to buy some things and to meet their two children from Davao City.[70] They returned to the hacienda at 9:30 a.m.[71] After lunch, they attended a purok meeting until 4:30 p.m. when policemen arrived and talked with her husband.[72] Later, retired policeman Talaboc informed her husband that their lives were in danger as a result of which they hastily left and proceeded to Captain Serrano's house at Capitol Hill with their four children where they slept.[73]
Accused-appellant, in sum, denies any participation in the commission of the crime claiming that he is being framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes who wanted to extort P50,000.00 from him. Accused-appellant also claims that Francisco Salva is a 'coached' witness whose credibility is suspect, hence, his guilt can not be predicated thereon. He likewise points out certain excerpts from the testimony of self-confessed killer Agustin Luyong allegedly clearing him of any participation in the crime charged. He concludes that "the passion and outrage which attended the commission of the crime should not blur the evidence" which points to his innocence.
We disagree.
While it is true, as pointed out by accused-appellant, that the challenged decision convicting him of the crime charged rests mainly on the testimony of Francisco Salva @ Butsoy who was initially accused together with appellant but was subsequently discharged and utilized as a state witness, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that appellant's conviction is not predicated solely on Salva's testimony. Appellant's conviction is amply supported by the mass of the evidence on record. Particularly damaging to accused-appellant's pretensions at innocence is the following Sworn Statement[74] of Agustin Luyong who entered a plea of guilty and was convicted on the basis thereof,[75] viz:
From the above-quoted testimonies of Luyong and Gibone on how the crimes were committed, there is no doubt that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. "[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed;[79] or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest."[80] It is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose.[81]
Conspiracy is undoubtedly present in the case at bar since all the accused performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose: they lay in wait for the two (2) victims, captured, hog-tied and gagged them and finally took turns in stabbing and hacking them to death with bolos at the instigation of herein accused-appellant who promised and, in fact, paid Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy Negro sums of money enclosed in small envelopes.[82] Parenthetically, the records show that accused-appellant even took active part in trussing up the victims before they were brought to the place where they were killed.[83] Conspiracy having been established, '[a]ll the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in the contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all."[84]
Treachery, likewise, attended the killing of the two (2) victims. There is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[85] For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that: 1.] the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2.] the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[86]
In this case, the means, method and form of execution employed gave the victims no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; they, likewise, were deliberately adopted by the malefactors to ensure that their persons would not be endangered[87] considering that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns in hacking them with bolos.[88] The obvious helplessness of the victims when they were killed and even as they pleaded for their lives need not be overemphasized.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, although alleged, is absorbed in treachery and can no longer be appreciated separately.[89] In this connection, it bears stressing that when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.[90] Stated differently, when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, it absorbs abuse of superior strength and the latter can not be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance.[91]
Evident premeditation must likewise be appreciated in the commission of the offenses. Evident premeditation can be presumed where, as in this case, conspiracy is directly established.[92] The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[93] Its requisites are: 1.] the time the accused determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; 3.] a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[94]
In this case, when accused-appellant was informed by Francisco Salva in the morning of that fateful day of November 1, 1986 that he saw the two (2) victims gathering young coconuts at the hacienda grounds, appellant promptly ordered Salva and some others, including Edgar Gibone, to board a jeep which he drove to the place where the victims were seen gathering coconuts[95] with the intention of pursuing them. Although they gave chase, appellant and his group failed to catch the two (2) boys who were already on the crest of a hill at the time.[96] The chase was then called off and the pursuers returned to appellant's house where he sent somebody to fetch Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Boy Negro/Brando.[97]
Later in the afternoon, Jack and Boy Negro/Brando arrived at appellant's house where the latter ordered them to catch the victims and to kill them[98] should they return.[99] The two boys indeed returned and were caught by Jack and Boy Negro/Brando who "hand-tied" them and brought them to the house of Joaquin Reyes.[100] Appellant was then fetched from his house upon the capture of the victims,[101] where, after castigating the two boys and calling them thieves,[102] ordered Jack and Boy Negro/Brando to kill them.[103]
Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and preparation.[104] The foregoing facts show too clearly that the killing of the victims were calculated and premeditated. In this case, accused-appellant had more than ample time to coolly reflect upon the consequences of his act when the victims were able to escape the first time they were pursued by appellant and his group. Instead, appellant had Jack and Boy Negro/Brando summoned and ordered them to catch the victims and kill them if they returned. Appellant was afforded even more time to contemplate on the repercussions of his deed when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando set out to do his bidding. However, instead, of desisting from his murderous inclinations, accused-appellant clung to his resolve when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando returned with the two victims and ordered them killed.
Likewise, there can be no question that the crimes were committed in consideration of a price promise or reward (precio promesa o recompensa) considering that Agustin Luyong @ Jack was hired by accused-appellant for a price of P5,000.00 to kill the two (2) victims and in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the job.[105] However while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying circumstances like treachery,[106] as in this case.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy (ignominia), although alleged can not be appreciated in this case. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.[107] The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame.[108] In this case, there is no showing that the offenses were perpetrated in a manner which tended to make its effects more humiliating to the victims.
Neither can the act of slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach be considered indications of ignominia because what is required is that the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering.[109] Thus, it was held that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.[110]
Before its amendment by R. A. No. 7659, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
The civil indemnity which is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim is affirmed.[114] Conformably, however, with controlling jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased to P50,000.00.[115]
The trial court, in sentencing the accused-appellant, erroneously equated reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment. This Court once again reiterates that the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same.
"While 'life imprisonment' may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that. First, 'life imprisonment' is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, 'life imprisonment', unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, 'life imprisonment' does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years."[116]
WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the civil indemnity for the heirs of the victims be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Record, pp. 223, 234, 238.
[2] Ibid., pp. 297-299.
[3] TSN, 20 May 1987, pp. 9-10.
[4] TSN, 1 September 1987, pp. 8-11.
[5] Exhibit A.
[6] Exhibits B and D.
[7] Record, pp. 521-535.
[8] Record, pp. 1388-1389; RTC Decision, pp. 29-30.
[9] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 7.
[10] Ibid., p. 8.
[11] Ibid., p. 9.
[12] Ibid., p. 10.
[13] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[14] Ibid., p. 12.
[15] Ibid., p. 15, Exh. E-2.
[16] Ibid., p. 16.
[17] Ibid., p. 17.
[18] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 11-22.
[19] Ibid., p. 13.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 16.
[22] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 23.
[23] Ibid., p. 24.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[26] Ibid., p. 25.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[29] Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[30] Ibid., pp. 27-28.
[31] Ibid., p. 28.
[32] Ibid., p. 29.
[33] Ibid., p. 32.
[34] Exhibits U and V.
[35] TSN, 6 April 1989, p. 23.
[36] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Id., p. 7.
[39] Id.
[40] Id., pp. 7-8.
[41] Id., p. 8.
[42] Id., pp. 8-9.
[43] Id., p. 9.
[44] Id.
[45] Id., pp. 9-10.
[46] Id., p. 10.
[47] Id.
[48] Id., pp. 11-12.
[49] Id., p. 12.
[50] Id., pp. 12-13.
[51] Id., pp. 13-14.
[52] Id.
[53] Id., pp. 14-15.
[54] Id., p. 9.
[55] Id.
[56] Id., pp. 69-70.
[57] Id., p. 71.
[58] Id.
[59] Id., pp. 71-72.
[60] Id., pp. 20, 72.
[61] Id., pp. 73-74.
[62] TSN, 21 February 1989, pp. 5-6.
[63] Ibid., p. 7.
[64] Id., pp. 7-8.
[65] Id., pp. 8-9.
[66] Id., p. 11.
[67] Id., pp. 12-13.
[68] Id., pp. 13-16.
[69] Id., pp. 16-17.
[70] Id., p. 17.
[71] Id., pp. 17-18.
[72] Id., pp. 18-20, 37.
[73] Id., pp. 20-22, 36-39.
[74] Exhibit A.
[75] Record, pp. 53-67.
[76] Exhibit G.
[77] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 10-17; italics supplied.
[78] People v. Stephen Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, 9 June 1999, citing People v. Tuason, 261 SCRA 711 [1996].
[79] People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; see also People v. Andres, 296 SCRA 318 [1998]; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998].
[80] People v. Isabelo Perez y Halog, et al., G.R. No. 130501, 2 September 1999, p. 21, citing People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305 [1997]; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 [1998]; People v. Obelllo, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]; People v. Sumalpong, supra.
[81] People v. Jose Apelado y Palmores, et al., G.R. No. 114937, 11 October 1999, p. 9, citing People v. Berganio, 110 Phil. 322 [1960].
[82] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 32.
[83] See Question 6 and Answer; Exhibit A, p. 2; Folder of Exhibits, p. 33; Record, p. 569.
[84] People v. Eduardo Altabano y Ellorin, et al., G.R. No. 121344, 29 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489 [1996], citing People v. Apawan, 235 SCRA 355 [1994].
[85] People v. Rolando Gaspar, et al., G.R. No. 131479, 19 November 1999, citing People v. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]; People v. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 [1992]; People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115 [1996]; People v. Bionat, 278 SCRA 454 [1997]; People v. Tumaob, 291 SCRA 133 [1998]; People v. Leonardo Francisco @ Yoling, G.R. No. 110873, 23 September 1999, p. 9 citing People v. Tanedo, 266 SCRA 34 [1997].
[86] People v. Eduardo Villablanca, et al., G.R. No. 89662, 1 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711 [1997]; People v. Valles, 267 SCRA 103 [1997].
[87] People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213 [1998]; People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 [1998]; People v. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151 [1998]; People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751 [1998].
[88] See People v. Saqing, 30 SCRA 845 [1969] and People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 [1986] where the victims were bound before they were killed.
[89] People v. Leonardo Francisco, supra.
[90] People v. Francisco Villablanca, et al., supra., citing People v. Violin, 266 SCRA 224 [1997].
[91] People v. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997].
[92] People v. Padlan, 290 SCRA 388 [1998].
[93] People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27 [1998]; People v. Bautista, 278 SCRA 613 [1997].
[94] People v. Raul Sesbreno, G.R. No. 121764, 9 September 1999.
[95] TSN, 2 August 1988, pp. 8-10.
[96] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[97] Id., p. 12.
[98] Exh. G, p. 4, see Q-16 and Answer; Folder of Exhibits, p. 15.
[99] Id., p. 15 ; Exh. E-2.
[100] Id., p. 16.
[101] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 11-12.
[102] Ibid., p. 16.
[103] TSN, 2 August 1988, p.23.
[104] People v. Dominador Padama, Jr., G.R. No. 132137, 1 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Magsombol, 252 SCRA 187 [1996] and People v. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991].
[105] See Exh. A, Question 5 and Answer, p. 2; Record, p. 569; Folder of Exhibits, p. 33.
[106] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1997 Ed., p. 356, citing U.S. v. Gamponia, 36 Phil. 817 [1917].
[107] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book I, 14th Ed. [1998], p. 443, citing U.S. v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417 [1903], and People v. Acaya, 163 SCRA 768 [1988]; Aquino, Revised Penal Code, supra, p. 444.
[108] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, supra., p. 444.
[109] People v. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429 [1991].
[110] People v. Balondo, 30 SCRA 155 [1969]; People v. Ferrera, 151 SCRA 113 [1987].
[111] Article 64, par. 3.
[112] People v. Jose Binas @ Nestor Binas, G.R. No.121630, 8 December 1999, p. 40, citing People v. Pulusan 290 SCRA 353 [1998]; People v. Nestor O. Juachon, G.R. No. 111630, 6 December 1999, p. 15.
[113] People v. Rodrigo Mangahas, G.R. No. 118777, 28 July 1999, p. 23, citing People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997].
[114] People v. Rogelie Floro, 7 October 1999, p. 12, citing People v. Suplito, G.R. No. 104944, 16 September 1999; People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 96092, 17 August 1999, and People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 & 138952, 6 July 1999.
[115] People v. Moroy "Sonny" Gallo, G.R. Bo. 128361, 16 November 1999, p. 11, citing People v. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, 10 February 1999; People v. Jeronico M. Lobino @ Hapon, G.R. No. 123071, 28 October 1999, p. 14.
[116] People v. Balasa, GR Nos. 106357, 108601-02, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49, citing People v. Ballabare, 264 SCRA 350 [1996], citing People v. Retuta, 234 SCRA 645 [1994].
Indicted for the dastardly deeds were Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" and "Jackie Pangalan", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva @ Buchoy, and Rolando Tano @ "Boy Negro" and "Brando" in two (2) Informations for Murder docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1582 and 1583.
Criminal Case No. 1582 charges
"That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp bladed/pointed instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and/or stab with said weapons one NAPOLEON ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which caused his death, and not contented with that, sliced the left leg of the lifeless body of said Napoleon Aldeguer.Criminal Case No. 1583 alleges
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was committed in consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp bladed/pointed instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and/or stab with said weapons one MATEO ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his death, and not contented with that, stabbed the abdomen of the lifeless body of said Mateo Aldeguer.Accused Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva @ "Butchoy" and Rolando Tano @ Boy Negro, upon arraignment, entered pleas of "not guilty" to both charges.[1] Trial thereafter proceeded against the four (4) accused because accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", and "Jackie Pangalan" was still at large.
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was committed in consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused Francisco Salva was, upon motion of the prosecution,[2] discharged by the trial court in order to be utilized as a state witness. Joint trial of the two cases, upon motion of the prosecution without any objection from the defense,[3] thereafter ensued.
Subsequently, accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" was apprehended and committed to the Provincial Jail. On September 1, 1987, said accused assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "guilty" upon arraignment[4] in both cases.
On the basis, among others, of his extra-judicial confession,[5] executed in the presence of his defense counsel, narrating the incident and his participation therein as well as the post-mortem examination reports[6] made by Dr. Gil G. Mantilla, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, judgment[7] was thereafter rendered against accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", in a Decision dated September 14, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, in Crim. Case No. 1582, the Court finds the accused Agustin Luyong alias "Jack" guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder for the killing of Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr., and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr. in the sum of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and Crim. Case No. 1583, the Court likewise finds the accused Agustin Luyong alias "Jack" guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder for the killing of Mateo Aldeguer, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the legal heirs of the victim, Mateo Aldeguer, in the sum of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay proportionate costs of these proceedings.After a joint trial, accused Rolando Tano, Edgar Gibone and appellant Osmundo Fuertes, were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged in a judgment dated December 4, 1989,[8] the dispositive portion of which reads:
In the service of the above penalties, the rules provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED."
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations:Dissatisfied, accused Osmundo Fuertes @ Dodo interposed this appeal alleging
(a) in Criminal Case No. 1582, the Court finds the accused Osmundo Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and Rolando Tano alias "Boy Negro" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of MURDER for the killing of Napoleon Aldeguer, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim Napoleon Aldeguer, the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00);
(b) in Criminal Case No. 1583, the Court finds the accused Osmundo Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and Rolando Tano alias "Boy Negro" GUILTY as principals of the crime of MURDER for the killing of Mateo Aldeguer, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim Mateo Aldeguer the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), plus the costs of the proceedings.
The rules provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed in the service of the above sentences.
SO ORDERED."
- THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO, AND RELYING HEAVILY ON, THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS FRANCISCO SALVA.
- THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED AMONG THE ACCUSED.
In the morning of November 1, 1986, Francsico Salva was riding on a horse and pasturing some cows and carabaos within the premises of Hacienda Ong located in Lumagaob, Barrio Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental.[9]
Thereupon, he saw two boys gathering young coconuts.[10] Salva approached the two boys and asked them why they were gathering young coconuts and the two boys replied that "they were thirsty".[11]
Thereafter, Salva reported the matter to appellant (who was overseer of the Hacienda) and the latter promptly ordered Salva and some other persons including accused Edgar Gibone to board a jeep which he drove to the place where the two boys were gathering coconuts.[12] When they arrived at the place, the two boys were already on a hill, prompting appellant and his group to chase them, but they failed to catch them.[13]
Thereafter, appellant and his companions returned to appellant's house bringing with them two bundles of firewood allegedly gathered and left by the two boys. When they arrived at appellant's house, appellants and his companions "ate" and thereafter appellant sent somebody to fetch accused Rolando Tano and Jack.[14]
Later in the afternoon, Rolando Tano and Jack arrived at appellant's house. Thereupon, Salva and Edgar Gibone were summoned by appellant and were instructed to go with Rolando Tano and Jack to the place where the two boys were earlier seen gathering coconuts to apprehend them should they return.[15] Upon arriving at the place, they allegedly hid in the "Canyan tree" and after a while the two boys appeared. After a brief chase, they were able to catch the two boys. The two boys were "hand-tied" and brought to the house of Joaquin Reyes.[16]
Upon reaching the house of Joaquin Reyes, Jack ordered Salva and Gibone to hide.[17] Thereafter, Jack and Tano asked Felisa Reyes, the wife of Joaquin Reyes, for water to drink and also instructed the latter to fetch appellant at the latter's house.[18]
Felisa Reyes complied with the request and proceeded to appellant's house and informed the latter that two persons were waiting for him in her house. She described the two persons to appellant who, in turn, told her that said persons were Jack and Boy Negro.[19]
Thereafter, appellant instructed Felisa Reyes to go home as he and his companions "will just follow".[20] Felisa Reyes went back home and after a while appellant, together with two other persons arrived. Upon seeing the two boys, appellant allegedly started scolding them and called them thieves.[21]
After scolding the two boys, appellant and Jack had a conversation during which they allegedly agreed that the two boys be killed.[22] Thereafter, appellant and his two companions left. Jack then ordered Salva and Gibone to proceed to the "dead creek" which they promptly did.
Later on, Jack, Rolando Tano and the two boys also arrived at the "dead creek" followed by appellant.[23]
At the "dead creek", Jack removed the shirts of the two boys upon being ordered to do so by appellant.[24] Jack and Rolando Tano tore the shirts and with the torn shirts covered the mouths of the two boys.[25] Jack stabbed the smaller of the two boys, who was later identified as Napoleon Aldeguer, with a bolo at the latter's abdomen.[26] Upon being stabbed, Napoleon fell to the ground as Jack kept on stabbing him.[27]
Jack handed the bolo to Rolando Tano and the latter started stabbing the other boy who was later identified as Mateo Aldeguer.[28]
Rolando Tano handed the bolo to Edgar Gibone who was threatened by Jack that should he not stab Mateo Aldeguer, he will, in turn, be stabbed by Jack. Edgar Gibone complied by stabbing Mateo Aldeguer.[29]
Edgar Gibone was instructed by Jack to hand the bolo to Salva but the latter refused to accept the bolo prompting Jack to threaten him with death. Salva accepted the bolo and hacked the left thigh of Napoleon Aldeguer as instructed by Jack.[30]
Jack took the bolo from Salva and hacked the neck of Napoleon Aldeguer.[31]
After stabbing the Aldeguers, Jack and Rolando Tano left and "followed" the dead creek. Appellant Edgar Gibone and Salva left and proceeded to the house of one Nardo where appellant allegedly warned Gibone and Salva "not to reveal what happened.[32]
Later in the day, Rolando Tano and Jack allegedly arrived at the house of appellant and were met by the latter in his office where he gave each a small envelope.[33]
In the afternoon of November 2, 1986, the bodies of Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer were found in Hacienda Ong.
The Postmortem Examination Reports[34] Issued By Dr, Gil Mantilla who examined the bodies of the victms contained the following findings:
NAME MATEO ALDEGUER SEX Male AGE 16 Years Old ADDRESS Mapantad, Mati, Davao Oriental TIME EXAMINED 5:45 P.M. PLACE EXAMINED Padilla Funeral Parlor Rizal Extension, Mati, Davao Oriental
FINDING
1. Hacked Wound, Neck, Right Side, 2 Inches along the level of the Jaw; 2. Stabbed Wound, 1. 2 Inches Anterior Axillary Line below The Clavicle. 2. ½ Inch below the Right Nipple, 2 Inches Mid-Axillary 2 Inches along the 12th Rib; 3. 1 ¼ Epigastric Area; 4. 1 Inch Anterior Axillary from the Nippele (sic); 5. 1 ½ Inches located below the Nipple or the 6th Rib; 6. ½ Inch Middle Third, Left Arm; 7. 2 Inches, right Side, Posterior axillary line; 8. 2 Inches, Left Scapular Angle; 9. 1 ½ Inches along the Lumbar Vertebra; RIGOR MORTIS - Present POST MORTEM LIVIDITY - Present CAUSE OF DEATH - Severe Hemorrhage, Secondary to Stabbed Wounds and Incised Wounds.
SGD. GIL G. MANTILLA
Assistant Provincial Health Officer
NAPOLEON C. ALDEGUER, JR. SEX Male 14 Years Old ADDRESS Mapantad, Mati, Davao Oriental TIME EXAMINED 5:30 P.M. PLACE EXAMINED Padilla Funeral Parlor Rizal Extension, Mati, Davao Oriental
FINDINGS
2. Stabbed Wound, 2 Inches, Mid-Clavicular Area, 1 Inch below the Clavicle; 2. ½ Inch below the Nipple, 5th Inter Costal Space; 1 Inch at the Right Sternal Line, at the Level of the 4th Vertebral (sic), Right; 4. At the 8th Rib, Mid-Axillary Line, Right; 2 Inches at the Mid-Scapular region, 2 inches at the Scapular Angle, Left; 6. 2 Inches at the 8th Posterior Rib, 1 Inch Left from the Mid-Spinal Column; RIGOR MORTIS - Present POST MORTEM LIVIDITY - Present CAUSE OF DEATH - Severe Hemorrhage, Secondary to Stabbed Wounds and Incised Wounds
SGD. GIL S. MANTILLA, M.D.
Assistant Provincial Health Officer
Assistant Provincial Health Officer
Accused-appellant Osmundo Fuertes had a different story to tell. He declared that he had nothing to do with the twin killings.[35] He testified that as of November 1, 1986, he was the overseer of Hacienda Ong, having been employed in that capacity since 1972.[36] On that fateful day of November 1, 1986, he was at home.[37] The first thing he did in the morning was to take a bath.[38] Thereafter, he checked the daily time record and prepared the payroll.[39] At around 5:00 p.m., Francisco Salva who was watering the plants went upstairs and informed him that there were persons looking for him. Upon going downstairs he saw Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan who asked him if he saw her brothers,[40] the two victims. He replied that he did not see them.[41] Thereafter, he together with his wife, two children --- namely, Osmundo Jr. and John-Ayster Tucayao, Allan Pisetas, Edgar Gibone, Mauricio Hornejas and Francsico Salva, Jr. had supper at 6:00 p.m.[42] While having supper, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived with some companions also looking for the Aldeguer boys.[43] He likewise told Valles that he did not see them.[44] Later at around 9:00 p.m. when they were already sleeping, they were roused by a shout from the gate.[45] When he went downstairs to verify who it was, he came upon P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions who were still looking for the two victims.[46] He allowed the group to go to the playground of the house and upon the latter's request that they be permitted to search the bodega and the surrounding areas of the hacienda he gave them his permission and accompanied them going to the bodega. He even gave them a flashlight to use but they only saw copra, big baskets and a pail.[47]
Accused-appellant further declared that on November 2, 1986 at 6:00 a.m., he, his wife, his sons, Osmundo Jr. and John, Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva and Ayster Tucayao went to the San Nicolas Tolentino church.[48] From there, they proceeded to the Madang public market to buy vegetables and at the same time to meet his children from Davao City, namely, Estella and Ana Grace.[49] From the public market, they proceeded back to the hacienda arriving at around 9:30 a.m.[50] While they were having breakfast, he heard someone calling outside. Upon peeping out of the window to verify who it was, he found out that the callers were policemen inquiring about the Aldeguer boys.[51] Again, he told the police that he did not see the victims. The policemen declined his offer to have breakfast settling for a drink of water instead, then left.[52] After lunch, at around 2:00 p.m. accused-appellant presided at a purok meeting being its president.[53] At around 4:00 p.m., while the meeting was still going on, a jeep with policemen on board arrived.[54] One of the policemen alighted and informed accused-appellant that the two Aldeguer boys had been found, that they were dead and that the bodies were already at the funeral parlor.[55] After informing accused-appellant of the whereabouts of the two victims, the police left and the purok meeting continued, ending at 4:30 p.m.[56] At around 5:00 p.m. while accused-appellant was at home, one Jun Talaboc, an ex-policeman came.[57] Upon apprising Talaboc about what transpired on that afternoon, particularly the discovery of the two dead bodies, Talaboc advised accused-appellant to transfer to the Mati poblacion warning him that it was dangerous to stay. Talaboc cited several violent incidents which resulted in the shooting of a policeman at Matiao; the killing of a father and son at Pomoanon and the slaying of an ex-councilman in Mapantad.[58]
Testifying that he feared for his safety and that of his family, accused-appellant ordered his wife to pack up everything and immediately proceeded to the place of Police Chief Cipriano Sefuentes at past 6:00 p.m.[59] Upon being advised by Sefuentes to check in at a hotel because his life was in danger, accused-appellant decided to proceed to the house of one Captain Serrano at Capitol Hill, Mati, Davao arriving therein at 8:00 p.m.[60] Accused-appellant and his family stayed at the Serrano residence up to the time of his arrest.[61]
Greta Fuertes, the wife of the accused-appellant corroborated her husband's story practically echoing the latter's account point by point. She testified that she and accused-appellant had four children, two of whom are in Davao City while the other two are living in Hacienda Ong.[62] On November 1, 1986, she and her husband were at home.[63] In the afternoon of the same day while her husband was playing with their two sons,[64] Francisco Salva @ Butsoy informed them that Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan was looking for her brothers.[65] Later, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived also looking for the Aldeguer boys.[66] At 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Pat. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions arrived again looking for her brothers.[67] Her husband lent a flashlight to Napoleon Aguinaldo and together with the group, her husband went to the copra drier.[68]
She further testified that on November 2, 1986, they went to the Catholic church and attended the first mass at 6:00 a.m.[69] Thereafter, they proceeded to the public market to buy some things and to meet their two children from Davao City.[70] They returned to the hacienda at 9:30 a.m.[71] After lunch, they attended a purok meeting until 4:30 p.m. when policemen arrived and talked with her husband.[72] Later, retired policeman Talaboc informed her husband that their lives were in danger as a result of which they hastily left and proceeded to Captain Serrano's house at Capitol Hill with their four children where they slept.[73]
Accused-appellant, in sum, denies any participation in the commission of the crime claiming that he is being framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes who wanted to extort P50,000.00 from him. Accused-appellant also claims that Francisco Salva is a 'coached' witness whose credibility is suspect, hence, his guilt can not be predicated thereon. He likewise points out certain excerpts from the testimony of self-confessed killer Agustin Luyong allegedly clearing him of any participation in the crime charged. He concludes that "the passion and outrage which attended the commission of the crime should not blur the evidence" which points to his innocence.
We disagree.
While it is true, as pointed out by accused-appellant, that the challenged decision convicting him of the crime charged rests mainly on the testimony of Francisco Salva @ Butsoy who was initially accused together with appellant but was subsequently discharged and utilized as a state witness, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that appellant's conviction is not predicated solely on Salva's testimony. Appellant's conviction is amply supported by the mass of the evidence on record. Particularly damaging to accused-appellant's pretensions at innocence is the following Sworn Statement[74] of Agustin Luyong who entered a plea of guilty and was convicted on the basis thereof,[75] viz:
Equally damaging to the cause of accused-appellant is the Sworn Statement of Edgar Gibone[76] which reads:
The foregoing statements of Luyong and Gibone were executed separately in the presence of lawyers personally chosen by them and after they were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. It also appears that the above statements were not merely subscribed and sworn to before Fiscals Salvador M. Bijis and Nino A. Batingana, respectively, but they also bear certifications that show clearly that the statements of Luyong and Gibone were given freely and intelligently. Writing finis to any further pretensions of innocence by the accused-appellant are the following excerpts from the testimony of Felisa Reyes:
As a crime, murder is looked upon as "[o]ne of the instances when man descends to a level lower than that of a beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a deliberate destruction of a member of the same species for reasons other than survival."[78] Nowhere is it more evident than in this case.
From the above-quoted testimonies of Luyong and Gibone on how the crimes were committed, there is no doubt that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. "[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed;[79] or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest."[80] It is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose.[81]
Conspiracy is undoubtedly present in the case at bar since all the accused performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose: they lay in wait for the two (2) victims, captured, hog-tied and gagged them and finally took turns in stabbing and hacking them to death with bolos at the instigation of herein accused-appellant who promised and, in fact, paid Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy Negro sums of money enclosed in small envelopes.[82] Parenthetically, the records show that accused-appellant even took active part in trussing up the victims before they were brought to the place where they were killed.[83] Conspiracy having been established, '[a]ll the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in the contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all."[84]
Treachery, likewise, attended the killing of the two (2) victims. There is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[85] For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that: 1.] the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2.] the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[86]
In this case, the means, method and form of execution employed gave the victims no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; they, likewise, were deliberately adopted by the malefactors to ensure that their persons would not be endangered[87] considering that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns in hacking them with bolos.[88] The obvious helplessness of the victims when they were killed and even as they pleaded for their lives need not be overemphasized.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, although alleged, is absorbed in treachery and can no longer be appreciated separately.[89] In this connection, it bears stressing that when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.[90] Stated differently, when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, it absorbs abuse of superior strength and the latter can not be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance.[91]
Evident premeditation must likewise be appreciated in the commission of the offenses. Evident premeditation can be presumed where, as in this case, conspiracy is directly established.[92] The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[93] Its requisites are: 1.] the time the accused determined to commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; 3.] a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[94]
In this case, when accused-appellant was informed by Francisco Salva in the morning of that fateful day of November 1, 1986 that he saw the two (2) victims gathering young coconuts at the hacienda grounds, appellant promptly ordered Salva and some others, including Edgar Gibone, to board a jeep which he drove to the place where the victims were seen gathering coconuts[95] with the intention of pursuing them. Although they gave chase, appellant and his group failed to catch the two (2) boys who were already on the crest of a hill at the time.[96] The chase was then called off and the pursuers returned to appellant's house where he sent somebody to fetch Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Boy Negro/Brando.[97]
Later in the afternoon, Jack and Boy Negro/Brando arrived at appellant's house where the latter ordered them to catch the victims and to kill them[98] should they return.[99] The two boys indeed returned and were caught by Jack and Boy Negro/Brando who "hand-tied" them and brought them to the house of Joaquin Reyes.[100] Appellant was then fetched from his house upon the capture of the victims,[101] where, after castigating the two boys and calling them thieves,[102] ordered Jack and Boy Negro/Brando to kill them.[103]
Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and preparation.[104] The foregoing facts show too clearly that the killing of the victims were calculated and premeditated. In this case, accused-appellant had more than ample time to coolly reflect upon the consequences of his act when the victims were able to escape the first time they were pursued by appellant and his group. Instead, appellant had Jack and Boy Negro/Brando summoned and ordered them to catch the victims and kill them if they returned. Appellant was afforded even more time to contemplate on the repercussions of his deed when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando set out to do his bidding. However, instead, of desisting from his murderous inclinations, accused-appellant clung to his resolve when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando returned with the two victims and ordered them killed.
Likewise, there can be no question that the crimes were committed in consideration of a price promise or reward (precio promesa o recompensa) considering that Agustin Luyong @ Jack was hired by accused-appellant for a price of P5,000.00 to kill the two (2) victims and in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the job.[105] However while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying circumstances like treachery,[106] as in this case.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy (ignominia), although alleged can not be appreciated in this case. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.[107] The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame.[108] In this case, there is no showing that the offenses were perpetrated in a manner which tended to make its effects more humiliating to the victims.
Neither can the act of slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach be considered indications of ignominia because what is required is that the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering.[109] Thus, it was held that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.[110]
Before its amendment by R. A. No. 7659, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:Considering the presence of several aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance the penalty in its maximum period which is death[111] would be imposable under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Fortunately for accused-appellant, since the crimes were committed during the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.[112] This penalty is single and indivisible, thus, it shall be imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.[113]
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of nay of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6.With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
The civil indemnity which is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim is affirmed.[114] Conformably, however, with controlling jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased to P50,000.00.[115]
The trial court, in sentencing the accused-appellant, erroneously equated reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment. This Court once again reiterates that the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same.
"While 'life imprisonment' may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that. First, 'life imprisonment' is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, 'life imprisonment', unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, 'life imprisonment' does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years."[116]
WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the civil indemnity for the heirs of the victims be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Record, pp. 223, 234, 238.
[2] Ibid., pp. 297-299.
[3] TSN, 20 May 1987, pp. 9-10.
[4] TSN, 1 September 1987, pp. 8-11.
[5] Exhibit A.
[6] Exhibits B and D.
[7] Record, pp. 521-535.
[8] Record, pp. 1388-1389; RTC Decision, pp. 29-30.
[9] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 7.
[10] Ibid., p. 8.
[11] Ibid., p. 9.
[12] Ibid., p. 10.
[13] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[14] Ibid., p. 12.
[15] Ibid., p. 15, Exh. E-2.
[16] Ibid., p. 16.
[17] Ibid., p. 17.
[18] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 11-22.
[19] Ibid., p. 13.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 16.
[22] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 23.
[23] Ibid., p. 24.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[26] Ibid., p. 25.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[29] Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[30] Ibid., pp. 27-28.
[31] Ibid., p. 28.
[32] Ibid., p. 29.
[33] Ibid., p. 32.
[34] Exhibits U and V.
[35] TSN, 6 April 1989, p. 23.
[36] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Id., p. 7.
[39] Id.
[40] Id., pp. 7-8.
[41] Id., p. 8.
[42] Id., pp. 8-9.
[43] Id., p. 9.
[44] Id.
[45] Id., pp. 9-10.
[46] Id., p. 10.
[47] Id.
[48] Id., pp. 11-12.
[49] Id., p. 12.
[50] Id., pp. 12-13.
[51] Id., pp. 13-14.
[52] Id.
[53] Id., pp. 14-15.
[54] Id., p. 9.
[55] Id.
[56] Id., pp. 69-70.
[57] Id., p. 71.
[58] Id.
[59] Id., pp. 71-72.
[60] Id., pp. 20, 72.
[61] Id., pp. 73-74.
[62] TSN, 21 February 1989, pp. 5-6.
[63] Ibid., p. 7.
[64] Id., pp. 7-8.
[65] Id., pp. 8-9.
[66] Id., p. 11.
[67] Id., pp. 12-13.
[68] Id., pp. 13-16.
[69] Id., pp. 16-17.
[70] Id., p. 17.
[71] Id., pp. 17-18.
[72] Id., pp. 18-20, 37.
[73] Id., pp. 20-22, 36-39.
[74] Exhibit A.
[75] Record, pp. 53-67.
[76] Exhibit G.
[77] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 10-17; italics supplied.
[78] People v. Stephen Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, 9 June 1999, citing People v. Tuason, 261 SCRA 711 [1996].
[79] People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; see also People v. Andres, 296 SCRA 318 [1998]; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998].
[80] People v. Isabelo Perez y Halog, et al., G.R. No. 130501, 2 September 1999, p. 21, citing People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305 [1997]; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 [1998]; People v. Obelllo, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]; People v. Sumalpong, supra.
[81] People v. Jose Apelado y Palmores, et al., G.R. No. 114937, 11 October 1999, p. 9, citing People v. Berganio, 110 Phil. 322 [1960].
[82] TSN, 02 August 1988, p. 32.
[83] See Question 6 and Answer; Exhibit A, p. 2; Folder of Exhibits, p. 33; Record, p. 569.
[84] People v. Eduardo Altabano y Ellorin, et al., G.R. No. 121344, 29 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Salvatierra, 257 SCRA 489 [1996], citing People v. Apawan, 235 SCRA 355 [1994].
[85] People v. Rolando Gaspar, et al., G.R. No. 131479, 19 November 1999, citing People v. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]; People v. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 [1992]; People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115 [1996]; People v. Bionat, 278 SCRA 454 [1997]; People v. Tumaob, 291 SCRA 133 [1998]; People v. Leonardo Francisco @ Yoling, G.R. No. 110873, 23 September 1999, p. 9 citing People v. Tanedo, 266 SCRA 34 [1997].
[86] People v. Eduardo Villablanca, et al., G.R. No. 89662, 1 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711 [1997]; People v. Valles, 267 SCRA 103 [1997].
[87] People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213 [1998]; People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 [1998]; People v. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151 [1998]; People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751 [1998].
[88] See People v. Saqing, 30 SCRA 845 [1969] and People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 [1986] where the victims were bound before they were killed.
[89] People v. Leonardo Francisco, supra.
[90] People v. Francisco Villablanca, et al., supra., citing People v. Violin, 266 SCRA 224 [1997].
[91] People v. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997].
[92] People v. Padlan, 290 SCRA 388 [1998].
[93] People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27 [1998]; People v. Bautista, 278 SCRA 613 [1997].
[94] People v. Raul Sesbreno, G.R. No. 121764, 9 September 1999.
[95] TSN, 2 August 1988, pp. 8-10.
[96] Ibid., pp. 10-11.
[97] Id., p. 12.
[98] Exh. G, p. 4, see Q-16 and Answer; Folder of Exhibits, p. 15.
[99] Id., p. 15 ; Exh. E-2.
[100] Id., p. 16.
[101] TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 11-12.
[102] Ibid., p. 16.
[103] TSN, 2 August 1988, p.23.
[104] People v. Dominador Padama, Jr., G.R. No. 132137, 1 October 1999, p. 8, citing People v. Magsombol, 252 SCRA 187 [1996] and People v. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991].
[105] See Exh. A, Question 5 and Answer, p. 2; Record, p. 569; Folder of Exhibits, p. 33.
[106] Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1997 Ed., p. 356, citing U.S. v. Gamponia, 36 Phil. 817 [1917].
[107] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book I, 14th Ed. [1998], p. 443, citing U.S. v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417 [1903], and People v. Acaya, 163 SCRA 768 [1988]; Aquino, Revised Penal Code, supra, p. 444.
[108] Reyes, Revised Penal Code, supra., p. 444.
[109] People v. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429 [1991].
[110] People v. Balondo, 30 SCRA 155 [1969]; People v. Ferrera, 151 SCRA 113 [1987].
[111] Article 64, par. 3.
[112] People v. Jose Binas @ Nestor Binas, G.R. No.121630, 8 December 1999, p. 40, citing People v. Pulusan 290 SCRA 353 [1998]; People v. Nestor O. Juachon, G.R. No. 111630, 6 December 1999, p. 15.
[113] People v. Rodrigo Mangahas, G.R. No. 118777, 28 July 1999, p. 23, citing People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997].
[114] People v. Rogelie Floro, 7 October 1999, p. 12, citing People v. Suplito, G.R. No. 104944, 16 September 1999; People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 96092, 17 August 1999, and People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 & 138952, 6 July 1999.
[115] People v. Moroy "Sonny" Gallo, G.R. Bo. 128361, 16 November 1999, p. 11, citing People v. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, 10 February 1999; People v. Jeronico M. Lobino @ Hapon, G.R. No. 123071, 28 October 1999, p. 14.
[116] People v. Balasa, GR Nos. 106357, 108601-02, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49, citing People v. Ballabare, 264 SCRA 350 [1996], citing People v. Retuta, 234 SCRA 645 [1994].