This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,^[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br. 37),  declaring the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.

The Facts:

Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23).  On March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261.  On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family Code."^[3]  The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of 1997.

In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial. Assistant City Prosecutor IsabeloSabanal appeared for the State.

When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2)it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3)it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.

In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon 1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that,on September 20, 2002, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal separation.

The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,^[4] granted the petition and reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the decretal portion, partially reads:

[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x xx.

xxxx

In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

xxxx

We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee's undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs, however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its unbiased brunt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.^[5]

Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 Resolution,^[6] stating that the arguments of Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant the reconsideration or reversal of its decision.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OF THE RTC DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP'S CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACK OF DUE DISCRETION.

III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.

Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman.  Robert avers that a sexmaniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering from a deep psychological problem.

Position of the State

The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.

With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive value and were not controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations due to outside factors other than  psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote:

Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to obtain the reliefs pleaded.  Among others, respondent's Retraction of Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a few months before she married an American.  This irregularity was even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:

x x x x

The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a minor, her son by the Appellant.  It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant's complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically incapacitated.  The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the Constitution. x x x

The Court's Ruling

The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luzwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition is bereft of merit.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.^[7]

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.^[8]

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,^[9]the Court reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,^[10] based on Article 36 of the Family Code.Thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

x x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x xx.

x x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.

x x x x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x xx.

x x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

x x x x

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x xx.

x x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert's evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.

First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.  Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and hadno serious value as evidence.

Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.

The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity,cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.^[11]Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.^[12]

As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert arguesthat the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert's testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the Philippines,^[13] the Court ruled that the respondent's act ofliving an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent's unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City, was insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,^[14] the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x xx. (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.

In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.

Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the NAMT decision are as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the petitioner the respondent understandably ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.

WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon 1095 par. 2 CIC on the part of the woman Respondent but NOT on the part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)^[15]

In Santos v. Santos,^[16]the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
   
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
   
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In Najera v. Najera,^[17]the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law.In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered. Elucidating, the Court wrote:

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals considered the  Matrimonial Tribunal's decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004  when it resolved petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit.  It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:

[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.

However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: AldanaCeledonia (petitioner-appellant's mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates (psychologist).  Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner.  But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant's sister-in-law and friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and veracity of the latter's testimonies, this Court is without any clue.

True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void xxx.

And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.  The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.

Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.^[31]

Santos v. Santos^[18]cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095.  The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1.  those who lack sufficient use of reason;

2.  those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;

3.  those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.  For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:

The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear   before the Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract  x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.x x x.

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent.  Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)

Hence, Robert's reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos^[19]), which for ready reference reads:

Canon 1095.  The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

x x x x

3.  those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,^[20] interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.

In Republic v. Galang,^[21]it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz.

As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be considered and settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr.,^* and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Carpio, (Chairperson), J., I join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent. see separate opinion.

---

^* Designated Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 1910, dated January 12, 2015.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 47-60, penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.

^[2] Id. at 76-77.

^[3] Id. at 48.

^[4] Id. at 47 penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, and Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring.

^[5] Id. at 57-59.

^[6] Id. at 76.

^[7] Republic v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.

^[8] Ligarde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315, 320 321.

^[9] G.R. No. 159594, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 33, 42-43.

^[10] 335 Phil. 664, 676 678 (1997).

^[11] Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, 668 SCRA 215, 221.

^[12] Republic v. Gracia, supra note 7.

^[13] Supra note 8, at 322.

^[14] Supra note 10, at 679.

^[15] Rollo, p. 83.

^[16] 310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995).

^[17] 609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009), also citing Santos v. Santos, supra.

^[18] Supra note 16.

^[19] Supra note 16.

^[20] Supra note 10, at 679.

^[21] G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 543-544.

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Dissenting Opinion

Leonen, J.:

Petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) filed separate Petitions one before our courts and another before the tribunals of the Catholic Church to have his marriage with Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) declared void.

On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court voided their marriage after finding Luz to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.^[1]

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal) declared their marriage invalid ab initio "on the ground of the grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties[.]"^[2]  The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal affirmed this declaration on April 8, 2003.^[3]

Despite the declarations of nullity by both the trial court and the church tribunals, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision by declaring the marriage valid and subsisting.^[4]  This prompted Robert's appeal before this court.^[5]

Robert submits that the trial court had considered all evidence before it ruled "that the totality of unrebutted and credible evidence showing the wife's actions before and during the marriage leaves no doubt as to her incapacity to act as wife. . . . Unfortunately, the Honorable Court of Appeals had comfortably substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court by ruling that the absence of the psychological examination of the wife underscores the evidential gap to sustain the Decision of nullity of marriage rendered by the RTC."^[6]  Even the church tribunals^[7] found Luz to be "suffering from Grave Lack of Discretion in Judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage[.]"^[8]  Robert refers to Luz's sexual indiscretion with different men and her failure to act as homemaker for her family as bases for her incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.^[9]  He argues that "nymphomania is much more than sexual infidelity, an illness rooted within the body of a woman."^[10]  Luz was sexually involved not with one man, but with several.^[11]  She would even bring her paramour to their conjugal home, showing no sense of right or wrong.^[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General counters that Robert's evidence failed to establish that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological disorder depriving her of the ability to assume the essential marital duties.^[13]  The church tribunals' findings have persuasive effect, but these are not controlling.^[14]  In any case, the church tribunals' decisions anchored on "lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights and obligations [that] is due to outside factors other than a psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code."^[15]

The Office of the Solicitor General also argues collusion, considering that Luz had executed a Retraction of Testimony and Waiver of Custody^[16] without the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, or a few months before she married an American.^[17]

The ponencia affirmed the Court of Appeals in setting aside the trial court Decision voiding the marriage.  It found that Robert failed to prove Luz's alleged psychological incapacity as to warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.^[18]

I dissent.

Preliminarily, the argument on collusion deserves no merit.  The factual antecedents alleged that Robert filed the Complaint for declaration of nullity on March 16, 1994.  The trial court denied the Complaint.  Luz submitted a Retraction of Testimony and Waiver of Custody during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals.^[19]

On January 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by voiding the Complaint and Answer for failure to comply with Article 48 of the Family Code on collusion.  The case was remanded to the designated family court.  The lower court then rendered the September 20, 2002 Decision voiding the marriage of Robert and Luz.^[20]

Thus, the issue on collusion was already addressed when the case was remanded to the trial court, and the city prosecutor would be furnished a copy of the Complaint and Answer.  This complies now with Article 48 of the Family Code:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.

Psychological incapacity
guidelines

Examining the development of jurisprudence^[21] interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code will lead to Santos v. Court of Appeals^[22] as the first case attempting to lay down standards for the concept of "psychological incapacity."  The marriage in Santos was declared valid and subsisting for failure to meet the following characteristics:

Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.  The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. . . .

. . . . Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.  There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.  This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.^[23]  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Two years later, this court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina^[24] listed specific guidelines when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.  Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.  This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.  Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."  It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.  Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.  Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.  The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.  Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.  Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.  The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."  The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.  Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.  Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.  Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.  Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.  The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.  In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.  Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.  It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.  Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.  Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.^[25]  (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

This court has since applied the Molina guidelines in deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.^[26]  In all psychological incapacity cases resolved from 1997 to 2009 applying the Molina guidelines, only the parties in Antonio v. Reyes^[27] were found to have complied with all the requirements of Molina.^[28]

Medical, psychiatric, or
psychological examination

Luz did not appear during trial.^[29]  Robert disclosed that she was already living in California, USA and was married to an American.^[30]  This can explain why no medical, psychiatric, or psychological examination could be conducted on Luz.  In any event, the reversal of the trial court's finding of psychological incapacity cannot hinge on this lack of examination.

In 2000, this court in Marcos v. Marcos^[31] ruled that "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."^[32]

This court then issued A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC also known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.  This rule took effect on March 15, 2003.

The rule provides that "[t]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged."^[33]  It also states that "[i]n case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition."^[34]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC thus codified the ruling in Marcos that examination by a physician or psychologist is not a conditio sine qua non for a declaration of nullity of marriage.^[35]

In 2010, this court voided the marriage in Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes^[36] discussing that "[t]he lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors [and] [n]either do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence."^[37]

Thus, the psychological report of Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva, a Guidance Psychologist II of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center in Cagayan de Oro,^[38] cannot be considered hearsay on the ground that Luz was not interviewed and examined.  A marriage involves two persons only.  Necessarily, these two are in the best position to testify on the other's behavior during their marriage.  Put in this context, Robert's testimony cannot be disregarded for being self-serving.

In any event, Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva administered five tests^[39] on Robert before concluding that "Robert Malillin [sic] is psychologically incapacitated to [c]arry out the responsibility of married life especially with an individual who is equally emotionally infertile and immature[.]"^[40]  Robert quoted Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva's testimony as follows:

Q:	Can you explain to the court what is your recommendation?
A:	He is emotionally infantile and immature considering also that he is of age and as there is chronological age responsibility, we have profound emotional quotation chronologically. In one of my interview with client, he manifested that he was left out that most have created the vaccum. . . . often times in his relationship with woman, he would look for a woman, more or less has a mother figure.
Q:	As you said in your recommendation, Mr. Malillin is psychologically incapacitated to carry out responsibility with the emotional infantile and immature, egocentric and mother dependence?
A:	In our psychological examination, there is said stress in him as a person as that of the child, the ego, the adult, the parents, what is dominant traits in person, what behavior appear when I say youth, the individual display more on a child on him, it is the child who is concern with the feeling or reaction, if the person react more incapable impulses that is distracted, he is more of infantile than adult, in the case of Robert Malillin if we cite, he related to me that he is having some affairs with some women so I can see that he is quite speaking of nature and individual getting through serious responsibilities of married life.
Q:	Since you stated that you have interviewed this Robert Malillin, several incidents, have you talk matters regarding his wife?
A:	Yes, he told me that the wife had several affairs in fact, there was a short doubt of his first son because upon learning that he offered marriage, the woman refused and that fuel his doubt later because he learns that the woman is with another guys and he said that woman contracting loans without his knowledge and the woman is not even taking care of the child.
Q:	Considering that Mr. Malilllin had dispute with his wife, he would say that the wife is infantile and immature?
A:	The transaction is the same because they were both child and the child here has no decision made then there is nothing to reach up.
Q:	Base on your observation with this case Malillin is infantile and immature?
A:	Both parties were infantile, immature, what would happen, just imagine two children living, what would be the relationship of the husband and wife, they would keep on challenging each other.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal
interpretations

The ponencia discussed that the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal Decision was not offered during trial as required under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court.^[42]  The ponencia added that even if the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal Decision was considered, this was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 on grave lack of discretion and not the third paragraph, which was similar to Article 36 of the Family Code.^[43]

Robert could not have offered the church tribunal rulings during trial since the trial court had rendered its Decision on September 20, 2002, or before the Metropolitan Tribunal rendered its Decision on October 10, 2002.^[44]

The Metropolitan Tribunal's Decision even included a restrictive clause "to the effect that neither of the parties may enter into another marriage without the express permission of this tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament as well as for the protection of the intended spouse."^[45]  The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirmed this nullity Decision, discussing its findings as follows:

The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based on the deposition of the Petitioner the Respondent understand[a]bly ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for Contempt of Court and premised on the substantially concordant testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgment for marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence and affective instability that were sufficiently evidenced by the three following more salient factors in the Case which are de officio abbreviated and generalized for judicial prudence in deference [to] her person:  One, THAT the Respondent already practiced a fundamental ambivalence in her emotional constitution by engaging in multiple carnal attachements [sic] at an early age.  Two, THAT the Respondent was in effect ultimately rendered pregnant by the Petitioner when she was but nineteen years old.  Three, THAT the Respondent after her de facto marriage with the Petitioner demonstrated her affective instability by entertaining as well several carnal relationships that finally terminated the union of some fourteen years that were punctuated by several temporary separations and that brought to life no less than three children.  As to the matter of the relatively long time frame of the union, it should be noted that just as the mere passage of time does not nullify an ab initio valid marriage, neither does it ipso facto validate an ab initio null and void marriage.  As to the question of the number of children born of the union, just as there are valid marriages without children, the[re] are invalid marriages with children.  The presence of children from a union directly prove biological potency on the part of both the Parties in Causa not necessarily their tenure of due discretion in judgement for marriage.^[46] (Emphasis supplied)

On Canon 1095, the marriage in Antonio v. Reyes^[47] was also annulled by the Metropolitan Tribunal. That marriage was affirmed with modification by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,^[48] finding that "respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion."^[49]  This court discussed that:

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity.  This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.  It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.  Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36.  Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.  Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.

. . . .

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.  Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.  In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.^[50]  (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Najera v. Najera^[51] came three years later and differentiated the second and third paragraphs of Canon 1095.  This court discussed how Article 36 of the Family Code was based on the third paragraph of Canon 1095 as a ground and not the second paragraph:^[52]

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
   
   
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
   
   
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.^[53]  (Emphasis supplied)

The facts of Najera are not in point.  In Najera, the trial court considered the evidence presented and decreed only the legal separation of the parties, and not annulment of the marriage.^[54]  The Court of Appeals no longer considered the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal's Decision since "it was made on a different set of evidence of which [w]e have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness . . . [a]nd based on the evidence on record, [w]e find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court."^[55]

On the other hand, both the trial court and the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal voided the marriage between Robert and Luz.  Assuming the two tribunals considered different sets of evidence, they nevertheless reached the same conclusion of declaring the nullity of the marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage by the church requires two positive decisions to be executory one by the first instance tribunal and another by the second instance tribunal.^[56]  This process, though not conclusive, warrants respect by this court.  The decisions of these tribunals must be considered for their persuasive effect, especially in fulfillment of the intent behind Article 36 of the Family Code "to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith [such that] . . . subject to our law on evidence[,] what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void."^[57]

In the end, every case filed on Article 36 of the Family Code requiring an application of the Molina guidelines must be considered on a case-to-case basis.^[58]

Flexible Molina guidelines

In 2009, this court in Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te^[59] voided Kenneth and Rowena's marriage on the ground of their psychological incapacity.  This court observed how "[t]he resiliency with which the concept [of psychological incapacity] should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina[.]"^[60]  This court expressed fear that Molina became a straitjacket for all subsequent Article 36 cases.^[61]

This court in Ngo Te was clear in "not suggesting the abandonment of Molina[,]"^[62] but stressed how "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."^[63]  Ting v. Velez-Ting^[64] promulgated a month after Ngo Te suggested a "relaxation of the stringent requirements"^[65] laid down in Molina.

In 2010, Suazo v. Suazo^[66] explained that Ngo Te "stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity"^[67] and upholds an evidentiary approach:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

. . . .

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.  And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.  Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.^[68]  (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Since Ngo Te, it appears that only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic,^[69] Halili v. Santos-Halili,^[70] Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,^[71] and Aurelio v. Aurelio^[72] obtained a decree of nullity of their marriage under Article 36.

The difficulty in obtaining a declaration of nullity of marriage in this jurisdiction, so evident from our jurisprudence with only a handful of granted petitions, reflects an absolute position taken by the state to contest all petitions until it reaches this court.

The Constitution no doubt mandates the state to protect the social institution that is marriage the foundation of the family.  However, the Constitution also mandates the state to defend "[t]he right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood[.]"^[73]  In other words, the right to family must be based on one's own personal convictions.  The state, under the guise of protecting the marriage, should not force two people to stay together, albeit in paper, when they are incapable of complying with their essential marital obligations with each other.

Right to family

In Antonio v. Reyes, this court discussed that "the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family."^[74]

The Constitution describes marriage as "inviolable"^[75] while the law portrays it as a "permanent union."^[76]  Nevertheless, the state cannot insist on such permanence and inviolability under the pretense of its constitutional mandate to protect the existence of every marriage.  The state's interest in any and all marriages entered into by individuals should not amount to an unjustified intrusion into one's right to autonomy and human dignity.^[77]

The notion of "permanent" is not a characteristic that inheres without a purpose.  The Family Code clearly provides for the purpose of entering into marriage, that is, "for the establishment of conjugal and family life."^[78]  Consequently, the state's interest in protecting the marriage must anchor on ensuring a sound conjugal union capable of maintaining a healthy environment for a family, resulting in a more permanent union.  The state's interest cannot extend to forcing two individuals to stay within a destructive marriage.

The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,"^[79] but this does not go as far as reaching into the choices of intimacy inherent in human relations.  These choices form part of autonomy, protected by the liberty^[80] and human dignity^[81] clauses.  Human dignity includes our choices of association, and we are as free to associate and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.

Our choices of intimate partners define us inherent ironically in our individuality.  Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society.  The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the state's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.

The Molina guidelines provide that church tribunal decisions have persuasive effect on our courts.  Nevertheless, the notion of "psychological incapacity" should not be religious.  None of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching.  We are a secular state.  The separation of state and church must at all times be inviolable.^[82]

The state protects the family by not forcing its structure; otherwise, there will be "broken families."  The Constitution does not define "family," but characterizes it as "the basic autonomous social institution."^[83]  The state should encourage all family arrangements, whether or not borne out of love or "in love."  The presumption should be in favor of choices.

Thus, when both husband and wife, the trial court that considered first-hand all evidence presented, as well as two levels of church tribunals, have all determined without reservation that one or both of the parties are incapable of complying with the essential marital obligations, or gravely lack the discretion of judgment regarding these marital obligations, the state must be open to the possibility that there was never a marriage as contemplated by the Constitution and law to protect.

Under these conditions, there is no interest, public or private, to protect in the continued declaration of the existence of a marriage.  If at all, the couple now separated and living their own lives are imposed with an unjust burden of a false status.  This is pure and simple cruelty.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 52 53.

^[2] Id. at 68.

^[3] Id. at 72 74.

^[4] Id. at 59.

^[5] Id. at 11 12.

^[6] Id. at 286.

^[7] Id. at 289 290.

^[8] Id. at 289.

^[9] Id. at 285.

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id. at 286.

^[12] Id. at 284.

^[13] Id. at 212 213.

^[14] Id. at 217.

^[15] Id. at 219.

^[16] Id. at 201 204.

^[17] Id. at 219 220.

^[18] Ponencia, p. 16.

^[19] Id. at 200 201.

^[20] Id. at 205 206.

^[21] See Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 535 538 [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

^[22] 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

^[23] Id. at 39 40.

^[24] 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

^[25] Id. at 676 679.  The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages).  See Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 839 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division], Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division], Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division], and Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 410 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

^[26] Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 840 842 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632, 639 640 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 732 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 356 358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 498 500 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740 742 [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900, 915 916 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 186 187 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713, 719 720 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249, 256 259 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 847 850 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 932 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

^[27] 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

^[28] Another case where the parties successfully obtained a decree of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity is Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].  However, Chi Ming Tsoi was not decided under the Molina guidelines.  This court had yet to promulgate Molina when Chi Ming Tsoi was decided.

^[29] Rollo, p. 260.

^[30] Id. at 265 and 267.

^[31] 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[32] Id. at 850.

^[33] VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES RULE, sec. 2(d).

^[34] VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES RULE, sec. 14(b).

^[35] Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 842 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[36] G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

^[37] Id. at 487.

^[38] Rollo, p. 266.

^[39] Id. Petitioner, in his Memorandum, enumerated the tests:

DAP - the client is asked to draw a person.  The objective is to know the client's inner side, and his emotional dynamics. . . .

HTP - to protect the client's orientation to society and ability to realize it. . . .

LCT - the client is asked to arrange the color cards.  The objective is to determine client's monetary stress, roaming wishes, and conflicts. . . .

IQ - to tap the client's intellectual function. . . .

BVMGT - to determine the client's perceptual ability, a projective tool to determine the client's emotional dynamics, preoccupation, inferiority, and immaturity. . . .

^[40] Id. at 266-A, citing TSN, May 7, 2001, p. 10.

^[41] Id. at 266-A 267, quoting TSN, May 7, 2001, pp. 11 14.

^[42] Ponencia, p. 10.

^[43] Id.

^[44] Rollo, pp. 287 288.

^[45] Id. at 68.

^[46] Id. at 73 74.

^[47] 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

^[48] Id. at 346.

^[49] Id. at 347.

^[50] Id. at 353 366.

^[51] 609 Phil. 316 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[52] Id. at 335 336.

^[53] Id. at 335.

^[54] Id. at 324 325.

^[55] Id. at 334.

^[56] See Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines website (visited February 11, 2015).

^[57] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 679 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

^[58] Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 370 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

^[59] 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

^[60] Id. at 692.

^[61] Id. at 696.

^[62] Id. at 699.

^[63] Id.

^[64] 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

^[65] Id. at 692.

^[66] 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[67] Id. at 179.

^[68] Id. at 179 180.

^[69] 606 Phil. 177, 199 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].

^[70] 607 Phil. 1, 8 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division].

^[71] G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 461, 495 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

^[72] G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 561, 564 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

^[73] CONST., art. XV, sec. 3(1).

^[74] Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 355 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].

^[75] CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.

^[76] FAMILY CODE, art. 1.

^[77] CONST., art. II, sec. 11 provides that "[t]he State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."

^[78] FAMILY CODE, art. 1.

^[79] Family Code, art. 1.

^[80] CONST., art. III, sec. 1 states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

^[81] CONST., art. II, sec. 11.

^[82] CONST., art II, sec. 6.

^[83] CONST., art. II, sec. 12.