EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, July 26, 2016 ]RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION A.M. NO. 12-9-5-SC RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE ANGELITA A, GACUTAN A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR- FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC JUDGE AND AS COMELEC COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL SERVICE AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY PAY. +
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. NO. 12-9-5-SC
RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE ANGELITA A, GACUTAN
A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC
RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR- FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC JUDGE AND AS COMELEC COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL SERVICE AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY PAY.
R E S O L U T I O N
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION A.M. NO. 12-9-5-SC RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE ANGELITA A, GACUTAN A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR- FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC JUDGE AND AS COMELEC COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL SERVICE AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY PAY. +
RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
A.M. NO. 12-9-5-SC
RE: COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE ANGELITA A, GACUTAN
A.M. NO. 13-02-07-SC
RE: REQUEST OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE REMEDIOS A. SALAZAR- FERNANDO THAT HER SERVICES AS MTC JUDGE AND AS COMELEC COMMISSIONER BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF HER JUDICIAL SERVICE AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION/ADJUSTMENT OF HER LONGEVITY PAY.
R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Resolution dated June 16, 2015, penned by Honorable Justice Arturo D. Brion (Brion), in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and 13-02-07-SC, resolved, among other matters, to deny the request of Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Gacutan) to include her services as Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in the computation of her longevity pay.
CA Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said ruling, praying that herein ponente's dissent to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015, joined by five other Justices, prevails. In addition, CA Justice Gacutan submitted that the grant by the Court of her request that her services in the NLRC (as of 2006) be included in computing her longevity pay would be a reward for her past continuous services as a lifelong public servant who eventually retired from the judiciary, and that "by granting her request, there is no judicial legislation - there is only the recognition of justice and equity to which we in the judiciary stand for."
After conscientious review, the Court resolves to grant CA Justice Gacutan's Motion for Reconsideration. CA Justice Gacutan's services as NLRC Commissioner should be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but only from August 26, 2006, when Republic Act No. 9347, which amended Section 216 of the Labor Code, took effect.
Herein ponente had already thoroughly and extensively discussed in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 the bases for her position - now adopted by the Court - that longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is treated as part of salary and extended to certain officials in the Executive Department who are, by law, granted the same salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. Pertinent parts of said Concurring and Dissenting Opinion are worth reproducing below:
The Literal Language of the Law
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of CA Justice Gacutan and MODIFY the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and 13-02-07^SC, insofar as to GRANT CA Justice Gacutan's request that her services as NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, when Republic Act No, 9347 took effect.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I join the dissent of J., Brion.
Brion, J., Please see my Dissenting Opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J., Brion.
Leonen, J., I join the dissent of J., Brion.
Jardeleza,* J., No part.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on July 26, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matters, the original of which was received by this Office on August 19, 2016 at 2:52 p.m.
* No part.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the ponencia's grant of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by former Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) asking the Court to reconsider the portion of the Court's Resolution[1] in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA,[2] 12-9-5-SC,[3] and 13-02-07-SC[4] affecting her longevity pay.
On June 16, 2015, the Court had previously issued a Resolution, penned by Justice Arturo D, Brion, addressing the letter-requests of several retired CA justices asking for the re-computation of their longevity pay. These letter-requests had been consolidated, and the Court held in the Resolution's disposition:
Justice Gacutan specifically responded to the June 16, 2015 ponencia's ruling that the judiciary is not in a position to recognize past services in the Executive, a different branch of government, and cannot thus determine the continuous, efficient, and meritorious service that the grant of longevity pay requires.[6]
According to Justice Gacutan, the determination of efficiency and meritorious service in her case may not be solely determined by the judiciary. She then proceeded to enumerate her illustrious career in the Executive, in the NLRC, and in the CA, and noted that the Judicial and Bar Council would not have nominated her for the position of CA Justice if its members had not favorably considered her intelligence, integrity, character, and experience.[7]
Reasons for my Dissent
I vote to DENY with finality Justice Gacutan's Motion for Reconsideration as it does not present any new or compelling argument to justify the Court's reversal of its Decision. The arguments Justice de Castro and Justice Velasco raised in their dissents to the June 16, 2015 Resolution have been thoroughly deliberated upon by the Court in its main ruling, and thus have already been sufficiently addressed.
The Petitioner's Past Service in the Executive is not a Material Issue,
When the Court, in the June 16, 2015 Resolution, said that the judiciary is not in a position to determine past continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Executive, it was not a personal attack on Justice Gacutan's illustrious career in Government, The observation was meant to expound on the concept that longevity pay for members of the judiciary is confined to services rendered within the judiciary. In other words, the character of her past executive service is not a material issue in the Court's denial of her request.
The grant of longevity pay in the judiciary is based on Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, No. 129 (BP 129)[8] which provides:
The Court reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
Notably, Section 42 ofBP 129 on longevity pay is separate from the provision on the salary of members of the judiciary found in Section 41 of BP 129[9] This separate placement reflects the longevity pay's status as a separate benefit for members of the judiciary who have rendered "continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary;" longevity pay is not part of the salary that judges and justices are granted under Section 41.
In other words, all judges and justices are entitled to the salary prescribed for them under Section 41 of BP 129, but only those who have complied with the requisites of Section 42 are entitled to receive the additional longevity pay benefit.
Thus, when Section 42 of BP 129 required that the total salary of judges and justices receiving longevity pay should not exceed the salary of those next in rank, it simply meant that the addition of longevity pay cannot result in judges and justices of lower rank receiving a bigger total compensation than those with higher rank.
The salary of judges and justices depend on the salary grade (and subsequent step increments) of their positions under the Compensation and Classification System referred to in Section 41 of BP 129. The proviso in Section 42 of the same law operates to limit the amount of longevity pay granted when it disrupts the compensation system referred to in Section 41. It does not integrate longevity pay in the salary due to judges and justices under the compensation system, as not all of them are entitled to receive longevity pay in the first place.
None of the laws that grant similarity of salaries and benefits between executive officials and their counterparts in the judiciary mention that services in these executive positions would be included in the computation of longevity pay in the judiciary.
In Justice Gacutan's case, her services as past National Labor Relations Commission Commissioner (NLRC) places her under the operation of Republic Act No. 9347[10] (RA No. 9347), which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code to read:
The Compensation and Position Classification System prescribes the salary to be received by government employees depending on the salary grade their positions are classified in.[11]
Viewed in this light, the provision of the same rank as CA Associate Justices to NLRC Commissioners in Article 216 of the Labor Code simply meant that the latter shall have the same salary grade as the former.
As an additional benefit, NLRC commissioners may be granted the longevity pay that judges and justices receive under Section 42 of BP 129, for the commissioners' meritorious, efficient, and continuous service in the NLRC. But this is for CONGRESS, NOT FOR THIS COURT, to decide upon and grant. The grant to the members of the Executive Department of this kind of benefit is an act that the Constitution exclusively assigns to Congress. This is an authority and prerogative that the Constitution exclusively grants to Congress. -
To recapitulate, RA No. 9347 merely used the salary, allowances, and benefits received by CA Justices as a yardstick for the salary, allowances, and benefits to be received by NLRC commissioners. This is what RA No. 9347 meant when it granted NLRC commissioners the same salary, allowances, and benefits as CA Associate Justices.
The grant of an equivalent judicial rank does not (and cannot) make an official in the executive a member of the judiciary; thus, benefits that accrue only to members of the judiciary cannot be granted to executive officials. This is a consequence of the separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution.
In more concrete terms, incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service outside the judiciary and who had been granted equivalent judicial rank under these previous positions, cannot credit their past non-judicial service as service in the judiciary for purposes of securing benefits applicable only and earned while a member of the judiciary, unless Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
Section 42 of BP 129 is clear in requiring five years of meritorious, efficient, and continuous services in the judiciary subsequent legislation conferring the same salary and benefits that judges and justices enjoy to designated counterparts in the executive did not amend this requirement, expressly or impliedly.
RA No. 9347, in particular, did not specifically provide that the services in the NLRC may be tacked with the length of judicial service for purposes of computing longevity pay in the judiciary. Neither can the tackmg of these periods be implied from the language of Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended, as the provision merely uses the salary and benefits of CA Associate justices as a yardstick for determining the salary and benefits of NLRC commissioners.
It must be pointed out that the grant of the requested longevity pay can be a blow disastrous to the reputation of the judiciary and to this Court's role as the final authority in interpreting the Constitution, when the public realizes that this Court engaged in judicial legislation, through interpretation, to undeservedly favor its own judges and justices.
The Court should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for discretion, [12]
In terms of the longevity pay's purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the judiciary, as the element of loyalty - the virtue that longevity pay rewards - is not at all present.
I cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation -an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. The Court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. The Court cannot rewrite the law to conform to what it or certain of its Members think should be the law.
Not to be forgotten is the effect of this Court's grant on the use of public funds; funds granted to other than the legitimate beneficiaries are misdirected funds that may be put to better use by those sectors of society who need them more.
For these reasons, I vote DENY with FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan.
[1] Dated June 16, 2015.
[2] Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[3] Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan.
[4] Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her Services as MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be considered as Part of Her Judicial Service and Included in the computation/adjustment of Her longevity pay.
[5] Motion for Reconsideration of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan dated September 21, 2015.
[6] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
[7] Id. at 4 - 5.
[8] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[9] According to Section 41, judges and justices shall "receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." Presidential Decree No. 985 pertains to the government's Position Classification CompensationSystem, which provides for the salary schedule of government employees classified according to their salary grade and corresponding salary rate. PD 985 has been subsequently replaced with Republic Act No. 6758, which provides for the current the Compensation and Position Classification System of the government.
[10] An Act Rationalizing the Composition and Functions of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[11] Section 10 of PD 985 describes the government's Compensation in this wise:
The same principle applies even in retirement laws, where all doubts are liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefited. Liberal interpretation is not warranted where the law is clear and unambiguous. Fetalino and Calderon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, citing In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel, Adm. Matter No. 1155-CAR, 194 Phil, 9 (1981) and Re: Judge AlexZ. Reyes, Adm. Matter No. 91-6-007-CTA, December21, 1992, 216 SCRA 720.
CA Justice Gacutan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said ruling, praying that herein ponente's dissent to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015, joined by five other Justices, prevails. In addition, CA Justice Gacutan submitted that the grant by the Court of her request that her services in the NLRC (as of 2006) be included in computing her longevity pay would be a reward for her past continuous services as a lifelong public servant who eventually retired from the judiciary, and that "by granting her request, there is no judicial legislation - there is only the recognition of justice and equity to which we in the judiciary stand for."
After conscientious review, the Court resolves to grant CA Justice Gacutan's Motion for Reconsideration. CA Justice Gacutan's services as NLRC Commissioner should be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but only from August 26, 2006, when Republic Act No. 9347, which amended Section 216 of the Labor Code, took effect.
Herein ponente had already thoroughly and extensively discussed in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 the bases for her position - now adopted by the Court - that longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is treated as part of salary and extended to certain officials in the Executive Department who are, by law, granted the same salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. Pertinent parts of said Concurring and Dissenting Opinion are worth reproducing below:
The Literal Language of the Law
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended, provides:Clearly, the foregoing ratiocination does not constitute judicial legislation. It is firmly grounded on existing laws, jurisprudence, and executive contemporaneous construction. It was Congress which enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, granting certain officials of the Executive Department the same salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary, and "salary" refers to basic monthly pay plus longevity pay per the plain language of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129. Justice Brion opines that the grant of longevity pay to executive officials would effectively be a misplaced exercise of liberality at the expense of public funds and to the prejudice of sectors who are more in need of these funds. It bears to stress though that it is irrefragably within the legislative power of Congress to enact Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, and it is beyond the judicial power of the Court to question the wisdom behind said legislations.SEC. 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to [five percent] 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary: Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added,exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. (Emphasis supplied.)As a rule, therefore, the grant of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is premised on the rendition of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary, That is the express language of the law.
Nonetheless, there are existing laws which expressly require the qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant the salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public officers in the Executive Department, such as the following;
(a) the Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor Generals of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG); and
(b) the Chief Legal Counsel and the Assistant Chief Legal Counsel, the Chief State Prosecutor, and the members of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) in the Department of Justice.
The intention of the above laws is to establish a parity in qualifications required, the rank conferred, and the salaries and benefits given to members of the Judiciary and the public officers covered by the said laws, The said laws seek to give equal treatment to the specific public officers in the executive department and the Judges and Justices who are covered by Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, and other relevant laws. In effect, these laws recognize that public officers who are expressly identified in the laws by the special nature of their official functions render services which are as important as the services rendered by the Judges and Justices. They acknowledge the respective roles of those public officers and of the members of the Judiciary in the promotion of justice and the proper functioning of our legal and judicial systems.
Thus, the laws operate under the principle of "equal in qualifications and equal in rank, equal in salaries and benefits received." The reasonable and logical implication of this principle is that, in the context of the dispute resolution mechanism in particular and of the justice system in general, the services rendered by the public officers concerned and the members of the Judiciary are equal in importance.
I respectfully submit the following arguments:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Each of these arguments is discussed in detail below.
The law is clear: the term "salary"
covers basic monthly pay plus
longevity pay.
That the language of the law itself, in this case, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, is the starting and referential point of discussion of longevity pay under that law is not in dispute. It provides:SEC. 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to [five percent] 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary: Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. (Emphases supplied.)There is disagreement, however, on the construction of the above-quoted provision with other relevant laws, such as Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9417, Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9347, and Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10071, which require the qualifications for appointment, confer the rank, and grant the same salaries, privileges, and benefits of members of the Judiciary on other public officers in the Executive Department.
For Justice Brion, "salary" used in the aforesaid other laws should not include longevity pay. He insists that Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is clear and unequivocal, that longevity pay is granted to a Judge or Justice who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. Service in the Judiciary within the required period is the only condition for entitlement to longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129.
The approach of Justice Brion on the matter is novel. It is, however, negated by the language and intent of relevant laws, as well as by the long-standing interpretation of the Court and the Executive Branch on the matter.
The concept of longevity pay as
"salary" should not to be confused
with "rank."
Under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, longevity pay is an amount equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay given to Judges and Justices for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary, It is not only an amount given as an addition to the basic monthly pay but, more importantly, it forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof.
In other words, longevity pay is "salary" and it should not be confused with "rank."
That is how this Court has treated the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 since 1986, particularly in Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, It is a treatment which reflects the Court's reading of the text of the law and its understanding of the law's legislative intent,
x x xx
xxx [T]he settled meaning of "rank," particularly that it does not include the privilege to use the title of Judge or Justice should not be used to determine the import of the term "salary" as used in the different laws. Otherwise, there would be no point in mentioning in the laws "rank" separately from "salary." "Rank" unquestionably has nothing to do with the amount of compensation or pay an official is entitled to under the law. The said term pertains only to the "class" or "standing" in an organization or societal structure.
The legislative intent of salary
increases for certain Executive
officials accords with "salary" as
inclusive of longevity pay.
In conferring upon certain officials in the Executive the same salaries, aside from their rank, as those of their respective judicial counterparts, Congress intended to make the salaries of the former at par with the latter. The legislative records support this.
In particular, the following portion of the interpellations in connection with Senate Bill No. 2035, which became Republic Act No. 9347, is enlightening:Asked by the Chair whether the proposed amendment (Section 4) to Article 216 of the Labor Code means an increase in salaries, Senator Ejercito Estrada (J) clarified that the section proposes that the arbiters be at par with the judges of the regional trial courts, and the commissioners at par with the justices of the Court of Appeals. (Emphases supplied.)In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 2659, which became Republic Act No, 10071, Senator Francis Joseph Escudero adopted as part of his sponsorship speech several explanatory notes of related bills, including the explanatory note of Senator Edgardo Angara for Senate Bill No. 213. The relevant portion of the explanatory note reads:At the heart of a strong justice system is the indispensable and complementary role of the State's prosecutorial and counselling arm. The National Prosecution Service [NPS] and the Office of the Chief State Counsel [OCSC] are mandated to uphold the rule of law as a component of the justice system.This legislative intent to grant certain officials of the Executive Department the same salaries as that of their respective judicial counterparts should be read in conjunction with how salary is defined in the law and treated vis-a-vis longevity pay in prevailing case law. In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and have taken into account, prior laws and jurisprudence on the subject of legislation. Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals instructs:
It is sad to note, however, that our prosecutors and state counselors earn less than those in the Judiciary. Such situation has produced a migratory effect. After spending a few years in the NPS or the OCSC, they resign and join the ranks of the judiciary, x x x.
This bill seeks to correct the aforementioned inequities, The increase in salaries and the granting of additional services and privileges to the members of the National Prosecution Service and the Office of the Chief State Counsel, will place them at par with those in the Judiciary [and] would deter the current practice of migration, x x x. (Emphases supplied.)[I]t is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto. (Citation omitted.)Thus, Congress knew, or is presumed to have known, the concept of longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 as part of the total salary of members of the Judiciary when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which granted certain officials of the OSG, the NLRC, and the NPS, respectively, the same salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary. Moreover, armed with that knowledge, Congress is presumed to have intended to adopt the definition of "salary" (as constituting basic monthly salary plus longevity pay) when it enacted Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which will be in keeping with the legislative intent to equalize the salary of certain executive officials with members of the Judiciary. To do otherwise will negate the express legislative intent.
As it is part of the salary of a member of the Judiciary, it should perforce be part of the salary of the public officers granted by law with the same rank and salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. Accordingly, the increase in the salary of Judges and Justices by virtue of the longevity pay should also result in the corresponding increase in the salary of the public officers who, under relevant laws, enjoy the same rank and salary as their judicial counterparts. Otherwise, the law's express language and its intention to grant the same rank and salary of a member of the Judiciary to the said public officers will be defeated,
xxxx
In other words, by enacting Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, which granted certain officials of the Executive Department the same salary as their respective counterparts in the Judiciary, Congress manifested its intent to treat "salary" the way it has been treated in Batas Pambansa Big, 129 as interpreted by this Court, that is, basic monthly pay plus longevity pay.
Since the above-mentioned laws do not make any distinction with respect to the term "salary" as it is expressly provided for in Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, we should not make any distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus.
It is in light of the legislative intent that the insistence of Justice Brion to strictly adhere to the sentence structure of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, without regard to other laws on the matter, contradicts such legislative intent and constitutes judicial legislation, which will in effect treat "salary" in a way that is not borne out by the language of the law and the established Court rulings on the matter.
The longevity pay forms part of the salary of a Judge or Justice, since Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 says it is "added" to the said salary. Thus, the salary of the members of the Judiciary refers to their respective basic pay plus the longevity pay to which they may be entitled by virtue of their continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. That should also be the definition of the "salary" of the concerned public officers who enjoy the same rank and salary as Judges or Justices, if the word "same" employed in the laws pertaining to executive officials is to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning.
A narrow and restrictive approach which limits the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, as amended, to service rendered in the Judiciary only is to unduly restrict the definition of salary, fixing it to the basic pay. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words, is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. It is to amend the laws by judicial fiat, x x x,
The Court's long-standing
interpretation of the term "longevity
pay" as part of "salary" is correct.
This Court has long recognized that the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 is among the salaries and benefits enjoyed by members of the Judiciary that are extended to the public officers conferred by law with the rank of Judges of the lower courts or Justices of the Court of Appeals.
The Court's Resolution dated September 12, 1985 in Request of Judge Fernando Santiago for the Inclusion of His Services as Agrarian Counsel in the Computation of His Longevity Pay granted Judge Santiago's request and his longevity pay was computed "from the date of his assumption of office as Agrarian Counsel on August 9, 1963 and not from the date he assumed office as Judge of the Court of First Instance on June 1, 1970," The basis of this is Section 160 of Republic Act No. 3844 which provides;Section 160. Creation of Office of Agrarian Counsel. - To strengthen the legal assistance to agricultural lessees and agricultural owner-cultivators referred to in this Code, the Tenancy Mediation Commission is hereby expanded and shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Agrarian Counsel. The head of the Office shall hereafter be known as Agrarian Counsel and shall have the rank, qualifications and salary of First Assistant Solicitor General. He shall be assisted by a Deputy. Agrarian Counsel, who shall have the rank, qualifications and salary of Assistant Solicitor General. The Agrarian Counsel and Deputy Agrarian Counsel shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of Congress and shall be under the direct supervision of the Secretary of Justice, (Emphasis supplied.)Under Republic Act No. 335, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 478, the Assistant Solicitor General has the "same rank, qualifications for appointment, and salary as a Judge of the Court of First Instance," now Regional Trial Court.
In the Resolution dated July 25, 1991 in In Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of Hon. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, this Court said:The Court approved the request of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco for the adjustment of his longevity pay not only for purposes of his retirement but also for his entire judicial service by including as part thereof his period of service from August 9, 1963 to September 1, 1972 as Chief Prosecuting Attorney (Chief State Prosecutor) considering that under Republic Act No. 4140, the Chief State Prosecutor is given the same rank, qualification and salary of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. (Emphasis supplied.)In the Resolution dated November 19, 1992 in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente, this Court adverted to the Santiago and Gancayco Resolutions and said:This refers to the letter of former Associate Justice Buenaventura S. dela Fuente, dated September 27, 1992, requesting a recomputation of his longevity pay. It appears that former Justice dela Fuente had been the Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, since June 22, 1963 until his promotion to the Court of Appeals in 1974, the qualifications for the appointment to which position aswell as its rank and salary, pursuant to R.A. 2705, as amended by R.A. 4152, shall be the same as those prescribed for the first and next ranking assistant solicitors general, Accordingly, in line with the rulings of this Court in Re: Adjustment of Longevity Pay of Hon. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, dated July 25, 1991 and Administrative Matter No. 85-8-8334-RTC. - Re: Request of Judge Fernando Santiago for the inclusion of his services as Agrarian Counsel in the computation of his longevity pay, dated September 12, 1985, the Court Resolved to (a) APPROVE the aforesaid request of former Associate Justice Buenaventura S, dela Fuente[,] and (b) AUTHORIZE the recomputation of his longevity pay from June 22, 1963, when he assumed office and began discharging the functions of Chief Legal Counsel.In Re: Request of Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Court of Appeals, that Her Services as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna be Credited as Part of Her Services in the Judiciary for Purposes of Her Retirement, this Court stated:[Republic Act No. 10071] validates the recognition of the services of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, whom we credited for his service as Chief Prosecuting Attorney (Chief State Prosecutor), based on Republic Act No. 4140 which likewise grants his office (as Chief Prosecuting Attorney) the rank, qualification and salary of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. In the same manner, the current law also validates the crediting of past service to Justice Buenaventura dela Fuente who was the Chief Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. (Citations omitted.)Also, in Guevara-Salonga, this Court granted the request of Court of Appeals Justice Guevara-Salonga for the crediting of her services as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna as part of her services in the Judiciary for purposes of her retirement pursuant to Sections 16 and 24 of Republic Act No. 10071 which respectively provide:
Sec. 16. Qualifications, Ranks and Appointments of Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Officers. - x x x.Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor IV shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a judge of the Regional Trial Court.The Resolutions in Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga reveal that this Court has consistently approached and applied the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 liberally, that is, as applicable by statutory extension to those covered by the same qualifications and given the same rank and salary as the members of the Judiciary. They evince the view that the services rendered in their respective offices by the public officers required by law to have the same qualifications, rank, and salary of their counterparts in the Judiciary are considered to be substantially the same as service in the Judiciary for purposes of the said public officers' enjoyment of the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor III shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor II shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in cities.
Prosecutors with the rank of Prosecutor I shall have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries, allowances, emoluments and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of a Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Municipalities.
Sec. 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied;)
xxxx
That the said laws manifest a liberal attitude towards the public officers they respectively cover is reinforced by this Court's treatment in Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan of the longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 as something that "forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof." In particular, the Court adopted a liberal stance and ruled:[L]ongevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the salary of the recipient thereof which may not be reduced, despite the subsequent appointment of a justice or judge next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and not having acquired any longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or decrease of the salary of an incumbent justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution; hence, such recipient may continue to earn and receive additional longevity pay as may be warranted by subsequent services in the judiciary, because the purpose of .the Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as such. The provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge concerned, after adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice or judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointee to the position next higher in rank, x x x, (Emphasis supplied.)Justice Brion, however, claims that the said cases are not controlling herein, as they are allegedly a strained and erroneous application of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 that should be abandoned.
Such claim of grave mistake should be premised on a clear finding that prior rulings were wrong. In this case, I do not find Justice Brion's characterization of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga as "erroneous" and mere "aberrations" as proper.
xxx While certain members of the Judiciary may feel an exclusive franchise to the rank, salary, and benefits accorded to them by law, we cannot impose our own views on Congress which has ample power to enact laws as it sees fit, absent any grave abuse of discretion or constitutional infraction on its part.
xxx x
The executive contemporaneous
construction of longevity pay is
consistent with the law, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Contemporaneous construction is the interpretation or construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administer the statute. It includes the construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government.
In this connection, the contemporaneous construction by the Department of Justice and other offices in the executive branch disclose a similar treatment of the longevity pay provision of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 as shown by the following pertinent portions of the 2nd Indorsement dated November 21, 1988 by the then Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey, A. Ordonez:To reiterate, the above opinion of then Justice Secretary Ordonez constitutes contemporaneous construction of the issue at hand.It bears reiterating that in the case of Justice Reyes, she has been receiving longevity pay since before her appointment in the Judiciary, that is, while she was, and on the basis of her being, Chief State Counsel x x x. The inclusion by the Supreme Court of her services as Assistant Chief State Counsel and[,] later, as Chief State Counsel in the computation of her longevity pay as a member of the Judiciary constitutes a judicial affirmance by the highest court of the land of the validity of the grant of longevity pay to her way back in 1985 while she was still an official of the Executive Department. (Emphasis supplied.)
- Longevity pay forms part of the salary of the recipient (Resolution of the Supreme Court in Adm. Matter No. 86-9-2394-0, Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan). Thus, when the law grants to certain officials of the executive department the "rank and salary" of a member of the Judiciary, it should be deemed to include longevity pay, which is part of salary; otherwise, the law's intention to grant the same rank and salary of a justice/judge to executive officials would be defeated or nullified.
- The statement x x x that those executive officials who were granted longevity pay "were either justice or judge of the court at the time of the grant" is not entirely correct. Former Chief State Counsel, now Court of Appeals Justice Minerva P.G, Reyes, was granted longevity pay in 1985 when she was the incumbent Chief State Counsel. Assistant Solicitors General Ramon Barcelona, Romeo dela Cruz, Zoilo Andin and Amado Aquino are presently receiving longevity pay for their length of service as Assistant Solicitors General.
- The Supreme Court computed the longevity pay of Judge Fernando Santiago "from the date of his assumption of office as Agrarian Counsel [which was an executive office] on August 9, 1963 and not from the date he assumed office as Judge of the Court of First Instance on June 1, 1970" (Adm. Matter No. 85-8-8384-RTC). The same thing was done in the case of Justices Vicente Mendoza, Santiago Kapunan, Jose Racela, Lorna L. de la Fuente and Minerva P,G. Reyes, whose respective services in the Executive Department were credited in their favor for purposes of the longevity pay.
Justice Brion asserts that administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts. He is absolutely correct. That is the rule. In the same vein, that rule also means that courts should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.
As I have shown above, the contemporaneous construction of the then Justice Secretary is in accordance with both statutory law and case law,
Longevity pay is not a mere
"benefit."
x x x x
xxx [LJongevity pay is not a mere benefit, but is salary, as it is a component of the "total salary." That is how this Court treated longevity pay as a contemporaneous interpretation of Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, 129. That is also how Congress presumably intended to treat longevity pay when it granted a salary which is the same as that of members of the Judiciary to certain officials in the Executive Department under relevant laws, including Republic Act Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071, as Congress did not qualify or limit the term "salary" in these laws.
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, 129 clearly states that the longevity pay is "added" to the basic monthly salary and forms part of the "total salary" of a Judge or Justice. Thus, the salary of the members of the Judiciary refers to their respective basic pay plus the longevity pay to which they may be entitled by virtue of their continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary, That should also be the definition of the "salary" of the concerned public officers who enjoy the same salary as Judges or Justices, if the word "same" employed in the laws pertaining to executive officials is to be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning.
x x x x
Therefore, longevity pay under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129 must be treated as salary and to extend it to certain officials in the Executive Department who are, by law, granted the same salary as their counterparts in the Judiciary. That is, after all, how Congress intended it to be. That is how it was interpreted in Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-Salonga. (Citations omitted.)CONCLUSION
x x x x
The Instant Requests Considered
Justices Veloso and Gacutan anchor their claim on Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9347, which reads:Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. -The Chairman and Members of the Commission shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. Labor Arbiters shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and other benefits and privileges as those of the Judges of the Regional Trial Courts. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of the existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (Emphases supplied.)Republic Act No. 9347 took effect on August 26, 2006. Prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9347, Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, provides:Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. - The Chairman and members of the Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as, those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of a Regional Director of said department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as, that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials. (Emphases supplied.)II. A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
xx x x
Justice Gacutan was still a Commissioner of the NLRC when Republic Act No. 9347 took effect. From the date of effectivity of the law onwards, her services as NLRC Commissioner are therefore covered by the beneficial effect of the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by Republic Act No. 9347, which gave the NLRC Commissioners the same rank and salary as Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals. As Republic Act No. 9347 expresses the intent to place the NLRC Commissioners in exactly the same footing as their counterparts in the Court of Appeals, and "salary" includes longevity pay, then Justice Gacutan's longevity pay should be reckoned from August 26, 2006, the date Republic Act No. 9347 took effect, at which time she was still NLRC Commissioner. Thus, five years after that date, or on August 26, 2011, she became entitled to receive longevity pay equivalent to 5% of her monthly basic pay at that time; and, she is now entitled to adjustment of salary, allowances, and benefits only as of that date.
As regards her request that her entire services as NLRC Commissioner be credited as part of her government service for the purpose of retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, the same may be allowed as it is in accordance with Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, which requires fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government as a condition for coverage of the said law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of CA Justice Gacutan and MODIFY the Resolution dated June 16, 2015 in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA, 12-9-5-SC, and 13-02-07^SC, insofar as to GRANT CA Justice Gacutan's request that her services as NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay, but reckoned only from August 26, 2006, when Republic Act No, 9347 took effect.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I join the dissent of J., Brion.
Brion, J., Please see my Dissenting Opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J., Brion.
Leonen, J., I join the dissent of J., Brion.
Jardeleza,* J., No part.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on July 26, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled administrative matters, the original of which was received by this Office on August 19, 2016 at 2:52 p.m.
* No part.
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the ponencia's grant of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by former Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) asking the Court to reconsider the portion of the Court's Resolution[1] in A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA,[2] 12-9-5-SC,[3] and 13-02-07-SC[4] affecting her longevity pay.
On June 16, 2015, the Court had previously issued a Resolution, penned by Justice Arturo D, Brion, addressing the letter-requests of several retired CA justices asking for the re-computation of their longevity pay. These letter-requests had been consolidated, and the Court held in the Resolution's disposition:
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T, Candelaria and the Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty, Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores;Justice Gacutan now asks the Court to reconsider the denial we decreed by including in the computation of her longevity pay. She noted in her motion that two members of the Court (Justice Teresita J> Leonardo-De Castro - the ponente of the present Resolution - and Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.) issued Opinions that grant her request, and likewise adopted the arguments of these dissenting justices.[5]
(2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A, Salazar- Fernando that her services as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, be included in the computation of her longevity pay;
(3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar- Fernando that her services as COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay;
(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as NLR€ Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity pay from the time she started her judicial service;
(5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for lack of merit; and
(6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity pay benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, pursuant to the guidelines and declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution, [emphasis supplied]
Justice Gacutan specifically responded to the June 16, 2015 ponencia's ruling that the judiciary is not in a position to recognize past services in the Executive, a different branch of government, and cannot thus determine the continuous, efficient, and meritorious service that the grant of longevity pay requires.[6]
According to Justice Gacutan, the determination of efficiency and meritorious service in her case may not be solely determined by the judiciary. She then proceeded to enumerate her illustrious career in the Executive, in the NLRC, and in the CA, and noted that the Judicial and Bar Council would not have nominated her for the position of CA Justice if its members had not favorably considered her intelligence, integrity, character, and experience.[7]
I vote to DENY with finality Justice Gacutan's Motion for Reconsideration as it does not present any new or compelling argument to justify the Court's reversal of its Decision. The arguments Justice de Castro and Justice Velasco raised in their dissents to the June 16, 2015 Resolution have been thoroughly deliberated upon by the Court in its main ruling, and thus have already been sufficiently addressed.
The Petitioner's Past Service in the Executive is not a Material Issue,
When the Court, in the June 16, 2015 Resolution, said that the judiciary is not in a position to determine past continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Executive, it was not a personal attack on Justice Gacutan's illustrious career in Government, The observation was meant to expound on the concept that longevity pay for members of the judiciary is confined to services rendered within the judiciary. In other words, the character of her past executive service is not a material issue in the Court's denial of her request.
The grant of longevity pay in the judiciary is based on Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big, No. 129 (BP 129)[8] which provides:
Section 42. Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.Laws subsequent to BP 129 conferred the same salaries and benefits granted to members of the judiciary, and to certain public officials in the executive who had been given ranks equivalent to those granted in the judiciary. The Court clarified in the June 16, 2015 Resolution that these laws do not expand the concept of longevity pay as provided in Section 42 of BP 129, and do not operate to include services in executive positions in determining the grant of longevity pay.
The Court reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
The language and terms of Section 42 ofBP 129 are very clear and unambiguous, A plain reading of Section 42 shows that it grants longevity pay to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary, The granted monthly longevity pay is equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
1. The Grant of Longevity Pay is only for Judges and Justices for Service in the Judiciary.
Notably, Section 42 ofBP 129 on longevity pay is separate from the provision on the salary of members of the judiciary found in Section 41 of BP 129[9] This separate placement reflects the longevity pay's status as a separate benefit for members of the judiciary who have rendered "continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary;" longevity pay is not part of the salary that judges and justices are granted under Section 41.
In other words, all judges and justices are entitled to the salary prescribed for them under Section 41 of BP 129, but only those who have complied with the requisites of Section 42 are entitled to receive the additional longevity pay benefit.
Thus, when Section 42 of BP 129 required that the total salary of judges and justices receiving longevity pay should not exceed the salary of those next in rank, it simply meant that the addition of longevity pay cannot result in judges and justices of lower rank receiving a bigger total compensation than those with higher rank.
The salary of judges and justices depend on the salary grade (and subsequent step increments) of their positions under the Compensation and Classification System referred to in Section 41 of BP 129. The proviso in Section 42 of the same law operates to limit the amount of longevity pay granted when it disrupts the compensation system referred to in Section 41. It does not integrate longevity pay in the salary due to judges and justices under the compensation system, as not all of them are entitled to receive longevity pay in the first place.
2. Justice Gacutan's Request has no Basis in Law.The inclusion of past services in another branch of government in the computation of longevity pay in the judiciary has no express basis in law.
None of the laws that grant similarity of salaries and benefits between executive officials and their counterparts in the judiciary mention that services in these executive positions would be included in the computation of longevity pay in the judiciary.
In Justice Gacutan's case, her services as past National Labor Relations Commission Commissioner (NLRC) places her under the operation of Republic Act No. 9347[10] (RA No. 9347), which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code to read:
ART. 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the Commission shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. Labor Arbiters shall have the same rank, receive an annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and other benefits and privileges as those of the judges of the regional trial courts. In no case, however, shall the provision of this Article result in the diminution of the existing salaries, allowances and benefits of the aforementioned officials.The "salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks of pertains to the "compensation and allowances" under Section 41 of BP 129, as found in the salary schedule of the government's Compensation and Position Classification System, Thus, Article 216 provided NLRC commissioners with the same salary received by Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals as prescribed in the salary schedule found in the government's Compensation and Position Classification System,
The Compensation and Position Classification System prescribes the salary to be received by government employees depending on the salary grade their positions are classified in.[11]
Viewed in this light, the provision of the same rank as CA Associate Justices to NLRC Commissioners in Article 216 of the Labor Code simply meant that the latter shall have the same salary grade as the former.
As an additional benefit, NLRC commissioners may be granted the longevity pay that judges and justices receive under Section 42 of BP 129, for the commissioners' meritorious, efficient, and continuous service in the NLRC. But this is for CONGRESS, NOT FOR THIS COURT, to decide upon and grant. The grant to the members of the Executive Department of this kind of benefit is an act that the Constitution exclusively assigns to Congress. This is an authority and prerogative that the Constitution exclusively grants to Congress. -
To recapitulate, RA No. 9347 merely used the salary, allowances, and benefits received by CA Justices as a yardstick for the salary, allowances, and benefits to be received by NLRC commissioners. This is what RA No. 9347 meant when it granted NLRC commissioners the same salary, allowances, and benefits as CA Associate Justices.
The grant of an equivalent judicial rank does not (and cannot) make an official in the executive a member of the judiciary; thus, benefits that accrue only to members of the judiciary cannot be granted to executive officials. This is a consequence of the separation of powers principle that underlies the Constitution.
In more concrete terms, incumbent judges and justices who had previous government service outside the judiciary and who had been granted equivalent judicial rank under these previous positions, cannot credit their past non-judicial service as service in the judiciary for purposes of securing benefits applicable only and earned while a member of the judiciary, unless Congress by law says otherwise and only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
The grant of longevity pay for past services in the NLRC, based on the grant of longevity pay to judges and justices of the judiciary, amounts to prohibited judicial legislation.
3. The Grant of Longevity Pay Prayed for is an Act of Judicial Legislation.
Section 42 of BP 129 is clear in requiring five years of meritorious, efficient, and continuous services in the judiciary subsequent legislation conferring the same salary and benefits that judges and justices enjoy to designated counterparts in the executive did not amend this requirement, expressly or impliedly.
RA No. 9347, in particular, did not specifically provide that the services in the NLRC may be tacked with the length of judicial service for purposes of computing longevity pay in the judiciary. Neither can the tackmg of these periods be implied from the language of Article 216 of the Labor Code, as amended, as the provision merely uses the salary and benefits of CA Associate justices as a yardstick for determining the salary and benefits of NLRC commissioners.
It must be pointed out that the grant of the requested longevity pay can be a blow disastrous to the reputation of the judiciary and to this Court's role as the final authority in interpreting the Constitution, when the public realizes that this Court engaged in judicial legislation, through interpretation, to undeservedly favor its own judges and justices.
The liberal approach does not allow the inclusion of the period of services in the NLRC (or any executive office) to the period of judicial service to grant longevity pay in the judiciary, The law is clear and unequivocal in its requirements for the grant of longevity pay, and cannot thus be amended through a claimed liberal approach.
4. A Grant would effectively be a Misplaced Exercise of Liberality at the Expense of Public Funds and to the Prejudice of Sectors who are More in Need of these Funds.
The Court should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option. It has no place where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and do not at all leave room for discretion, [12]
In terms of the longevity pay's purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the judiciary, as the element of loyalty - the virtue that longevity pay rewards - is not at all present.
I cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the point of engaging in judicial legislation -an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids this Court to do. The Court may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or include, under its terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. The Court cannot rewrite the law to conform to what it or certain of its Members think should be the law.
Not to be forgotten is the effect of this Court's grant on the use of public funds; funds granted to other than the legitimate beneficiaries are misdirected funds that may be put to better use by those sectors of society who need them more.
For these reasons, I vote DENY with FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by former Court of Appeals Associate Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan.
[1] Dated June 16, 2015.
[2] Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[3] Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan.
[4] Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her Services as MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be considered as Part of Her Judicial Service and Included in the computation/adjustment of Her longevity pay.
[5] Motion for Reconsideration of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita Alberto-Gacutan dated September 21, 2015.
[6] Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
[7] Id. at 4 - 5.
[8] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[9] According to Section 41, judges and justices shall "receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." Presidential Decree No. 985 pertains to the government's Position Classification CompensationSystem, which provides for the salary schedule of government employees classified according to their salary grade and corresponding salary rate. PD 985 has been subsequently replaced with Republic Act No. 6758, which provides for the current the Compensation and Position Classification System of the government.
[10] An Act Rationalizing the Composition and Functions of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[11] Section 10 of PD 985 describes the government's Compensation in this wise:
Section 10. The Compensation Systems. The Compensation System consists of (a) a Salary Schedule; (b) a Wage Schedule; (c) policies relating to allowances, bonuses, pension plans, and other benefits accruing to employees covered; and (d) the rules and regulations which are herein provided, including those which may be promulgated thereafter for its administration. The Salary or Wage Schedules shall each consist of twenty-eight grades, with eight prescribed steps within each grade. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and responsibility which distinguishes it from other grades in the Schedule. Each class of position in the Position Classification System provided under this Decree shall be assigned a salary or wage grade. The Salary and Wage Schedules shall be administered in accordance with the rules provided in this Decree.A similar system had been subsequently adopted through RA 6758, which provides:
Section 5. Position Classification System. - The Position Classification System shall consist of classes of positions grouped into four main categories, namely: professional supervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its implementation.[12] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (The Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano y. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).xxxx
Section 6. Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System. - All positions in the government covered under Section 4 hereof shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in accordance with the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System which shall be prepared by the DBM.
The same principle applies even in retirement laws, where all doubts are liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefited. Liberal interpretation is not warranted where the law is clear and unambiguous. Fetalino and Calderon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, citing In Re: Claim of CAR Judge Noel, Adm. Matter No. 1155-CAR, 194 Phil, 9 (1981) and Re: Judge AlexZ. Reyes, Adm. Matter No. 91-6-007-CTA, December21, 1992, 216 SCRA 720.