EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017 ]AGUINALDO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III +
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), PETITIONERS, VS. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, AND HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, RESPONDENTS,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, INTERVENOR.
R E S O L U T I O N
AGUINALDO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III +
HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), PETITIONERS, VS. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, AND HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, RESPONDENTS,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, INTERVENOR.
R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc held:
THE JBC MOTIONS
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) successively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
At the outset, the Court notes the revelation of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that it is not taking any position in this particular case on President Aquino's appointments to the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court quotes the relevant portions from the Motion, as follows:
In its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente) the JBC argues as follows: (a) Its Motion for Intervention was timely filed on November 26, 2016, three days before the promulgation of the Decision in the instant case; (b) The JBC has a legal interest in this case, and its intervention would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; (c) Even assuming that the Motion for Intervention suffers procedural infirmities, said Motion should have been granted for a complete resolution of the case and to afford the JBC due process; and (d) Unless its Motion for Intervention is granted by the Court, the JBC is not bound by the questioned Decision because the JBC was neither a party litigant nor impleaded as a party in the case, the JBC was deprived of due process, the assailed Decision is a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem, and a decision rendered in violation of a party's right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction.
On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 9[3] of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with the Constitution. According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy. Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the JBC. The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of precedence, but for practical reasons, i.e., to distinguish one list from the others and to avoid confusion. The JBC also points out that the acts invoked against the JBC are based on practice or custom, but "practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right." The JBC, as a constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.
Lastly, the JBC moves for the inhibition of the ponente of the assailed Decision based on Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.[4] The JBC alleges that the ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had personal knowledge of the voting procedures and format of the short lists, which are the subject matters of this case. The ponente was even present as consultant during the meeting on October 26, 2015 when the JBC voted upon the candidates for the six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan created under Republic Act No. 10660. The JBC then expresses its puzzlement over the ponente's participation in the present proceedings, espousing a position contrary to that of the JBC. The JBC questions why it was only in her Decision in the instant case did the ponente raise her disagreement with the JBC as to the clustering of nominees for each of the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The JBC further quoted portions of the assailed Decision that it claims bespoke of the ponente's "already-arrived-at" conclusion as to the alleged ill acts and intentions of the JBC. Hence, the JBC submits that such formed inference will not lend to an even-handed consideration by the ponente should she continue to participate in the case.
Ultimately, the JBC prays:
The JBC, in its latest Motion, insists on its legal interest, injury, and standing to intervene in the present case, as well as on the timeliness of its Motion for Intervention.
The JBC proffers several reasons for not immediately seeking to intervene in the instant case despite admitting that it received copies of the appointments of the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the Office of the President (OP) on January 25, 2016, to wit: (a) Even as its individual Members harbored doubts as to the validity of the appointments of respondents Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi) and Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg) as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the JBC agreed as a body in an executive session that it would stay neutral and not take any legal position on the constitutionality of said appointments since it "did not have any legal interest in the offices of Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan"; (b) None of the parties prayed that the act of clustering by the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and (c) The JBC believed that the Court would apply the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the discharge by the JBC of its official functions and if the Court would have been inclined to delve into the validity of the act of clustering by the JBC, it would order the JBC to comment on the matter.
The JBC impugns the significance accorded by the ponente to the fact that Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno), Chairperson of the JBC, administered the oath of office of respondent Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice on January 25, 2016. Chief Justice Sereno's act should not be taken against the JBC because, the JBC reasons, Chief Justice Sereno only chairs the JBC, but she is not the JBC, and the administration of the oath of office was a purely ministerial act.
The JBC likewise disputes the ponente's observation that clustering is a totally new practice of the JBC. The JBC avers that even before Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship, the JBC has generally followed the rule of one short list for every vacancy in all first and second level trial courts. The JBC has followed the "one list for every vacancy" rule even for appellate courts since 2013. The JBC even recalls that it submitted on August 17, 2015 to then President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino) four separate short lists for four vacancies in the Court of Appeals; and present during the JBC deliberations were the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Velasco) as consultants, who neither made any comment on the preparation of the short lists.
On the merits of the Petition, the JBC maintains that it did not exceed its authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with the literal language of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, when it prepared six short lists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. It cites the cases of Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections[6] and Ocampo v. Enriquez,[7] wherein the Court allegedly adopted the textualist approach of constitutional interpretation.
The JBC renounces any duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications. It asserts that while there might have been favorable experiences with the past practice of submitting long consolidated short lists, past practices cannot be used as a source of rights and obligations to override the duty of the JBC to observe a straightforward application of the Constitution.
The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making short lists. It presents different scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz.: (a) There are two different sets of applicants for the vacancies; (b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the interval in the deliberations on the vacancies as the House of Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex officio seat for the Legislature; (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in the Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because of the location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain personalities; (d) The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first and second level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so the JBC chooses nominees for those particular posts with more years of service as against those near retirement.
To the JBC, it seems that the Court was in a hurry to promulgate its Decision on November 29, 2016, which struck down the practice of clustering by the JBC. The JBC supposes that it was in anticipation of the vacancies in the Court as a result of the retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Brion) on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively. The JBC then claims that it had no choice but to submit two separate short lists for said vacancies in the Court because there were two sets of applicants for the same, i.e., there were 14 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Brion.
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and possibly unique situations, there can be no general rule against clustering. Submitting separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for the JBC to observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list for every vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every such vacancy.
It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary. The JBC alleges that its individual Members gave several reasons why there was an apparent indication of seniority assignments in the six short lists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, particularly: (a) The JBC can best perform its job by indicating who are stronger candidates by giving higher priority to those in the lower-numbered list; (b) The indication could head off the confusion encountered in Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals;[8] and (c) The numbering of the lists from 16th to 21st had nothing to do with seniority in the Sandiganbayan, but was only an ordinal designation of the cluster to which the candidates were included.
The JBC ends with a reiteration of the need for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant case as she appears to harbor hostility possibly arising from the termination of her JBC consultancy.
The prayer of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention reads:
THE RULING OF THE COURT
There is no legal or factual basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant case.
The Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente filed by the JBC is denied.
The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,[10] which requires that "[a] motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor." Yet, even if technical rules are relaxed herein, there is still no valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente.
There is no ground[11] for the mandatory inhibition of the ponente from the case at bar.
The ponente has absolutely no personal interest in this case. The ponente is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm that is or was the counsel in the case; the ponente or her spouse, parent, or child has no pecuniary interest in the case; and the ponente is not related to any of the parties in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discussed and decided to adopt the unprecedented method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists, one for every vacancy. The ponente does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering method of nomination for appellate courts and even the Supreme Court.
With due respect to Chief Justice Sereno, it appears that when the JBC would deliberate on highly contentious, sensitive, and important issues, it was her policy as Chairperson of the JBC to hold executive sessions, which excluded the Supreme Court consultants. At the JBC meeting held on October 26, 2015, Chief Justice Sereno immediately mentioned at the beginning of the deliberations "that, as the Council had always done in the past when there are multiple vacancies, the voting would be on a per vacancy basis."[12] Chief Justice Sereno went on to state that the manner of voting had already been explained to the two ex officio members of the JBC who were not present during the meeting, namely, Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III (Pimentel) and then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Caguioa).[13] Then the JBC immediately proceeded with the voting of nominees. This ponente was not consulted before the JBC decision to cluster nominees was arrived at and, therefore, she did not have the opportunity to study and submit her recommendation to the JBC on the clustering of nominees.
It is evident that prior to the meeting on October 26, 2015, the JBC had already reached an agreement on the procedure it would follow in voting for nominees, i.e., the clustering of the nominees into six separate short lists, with one short list for each of the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. That Senator Pimentel and DOJ Secretary Caguioa, who were not present at the meeting on October 26, 2015, were informed beforehand of the clustering of nominees only proves that the JBC had already agreed upon the clustering of nominees prior to the said meeting.
Notably, Chief Justice Sereno inaccurately claimed at the very start of the deliberations that the JBC had been voting on a per vacancy basis "as the Council had always done," giving the impression that the JBC was merely following established procedure, when in truth, the clustering of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court was a new practice only adopted by the JBC under her Chairmanship. In the Decision dated November 29, 2016, examples were already cited how, in previous years, the JBC submitted just one short list for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts, including the Supreme Court, which will again be presented hereunder.
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold executive sessions when taking up sensitive matters. The ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court and then JBC consultants, as well as other JBC consultants, were excluded from such executive sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were unable to participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters involving the nomination of candidates for vacancies in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The matter of the nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which became the subject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno,[14] was taken up by the JBC in such an executive session. This ponente also does not know when and why the JBC deleted from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, which gave due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court for vacancies in the Court. The amendment of the JBC Rules could have been decided upon by the JBC when the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno of their duties as consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have similarly taken up and decided upon the clustering of nominees for the six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice during one of its executive sessions prior to October 26, 2015.
Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly present during the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was already fait accompli. Questions as to why and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no longer on the table for discussion during the said meeting. As the minutes of the meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out, the JBC proceedings focused on the voting of nominees. It is stressed that the crucial issue in the present case pertains to the clustering of nominees and not the nomination and qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of nominees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the ponente is duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional implications.
Neither is there any basis for the ponente's voluntary inhibition from the case at bar. Other than the bare allegations of the JBC, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the ponente's purported bias and prejudice, sufficient to overcome the presumption that she had rendered her assailed ponencia in the regular performance of her official and sacred duty of dispensing justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. Significant herein is the following disquisition of the Court on voluntary inhibition of judges in Gochan v. Gochan,[15] which is just as applicable to Supreme Court Justices:
All the basic issues raised in the Petition had been thoroughly passed upon by the Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and the JBC already expressed its disinterest to question President Aquino's "cross-reaching" in his appointment of the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Even if the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the JBC, praying for the grant of its Motion for Intervention and the reversal of the Decision dated November 29, 2016, are admitted into the records of this case and the issues raised and arguments adduced in the said two Motions are considered, there is no cogent reason to reverse the Decision dated November 29, 2016, particularly, in view of the admission of the JBC of the lack of unanimity among the JBC members on the issue involving the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their disinterest to question the "cross-reaching" or non-observance by President Aquino of such clustering.
Hence, the Court will no longer belabor the issue that only three JBC Members signed the Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration and only four JBC Members signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, as well as the fact that Chief Justice Sereno, as Chairperson of the JBC, did not sign the three Motions.
To determine the legal personality of the signatories to file the JBC Motions, the Court has accorded particular significance to who among the JBC Members signed the Motions and to Chief Justice Sereno's act of administering the oath of office to three of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including respondent Econg, in resolving the pending Motions of the JBC. However, in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, the JBC now reveals that not all of its Members agree on the official position to take in the case of President Aquino's appointment of the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Thus, the position of the JBC on the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice rests on shaky legal ground.
The JBC takes exception as to why the Court allowed the Petition at bar even when it did not strictly comply with the rules, as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The Court, in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, gave consideration to petitioners' assertion that they had to secure first official copies of the six short lists before they were able to confirm that President Aquino, in appointing the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, actually disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate short lists. While the Court is hard-pressed to extend the same consideration to the JBC which made no immediate effort to explain its failure to timely question or challenge the appointments of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices whether before the OP or the courts, the Court will nevertheless now allow the JBC intervention by considering the issues raised and arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration in-Intervention of the JBC in the interest of substantial justice.
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the JBC reproaches the Court for supposedly hurrying the promulgation of its Decision on November 29, 2016 in anticipation of the impending vacancies in the Supreme Court due to the retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion in December 2016. On the contrary, it appears that it was the JBC which hurriedly proceeded with the two separate publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016 of the opening of the application for the aforesaid vacancies, respectively, which was contrary to previous practice, even while the issue of clustering was set to be decided by the Court. Moreover, a scrutiny of the process the Petition went through before its promulgation negates any haste on the part of the Court. Bear in mind that the Petition at bar was filed on May 17, 2016 and petitioners' Reply, the last pleading allowed by the Court in this case, was filed on August 3, 2016. The draftponencia was calendared in the agenda of the Supreme Court en banc, called again, and deliberated upon several times before it was actually voted upon on November 29, 2016. Indeed, it appears that it was the JBC which rushed to release the separate short lists of nominees for the said Supreme Court vacancies despite knowing the pendency of the instant Petition and its own filing of a Motion for Intervention herein on November 28, 2016. The JBC went ahead with the release of separate short lists of nominees for the posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice vice retired Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016, respectively.
Even if the Court allows the intervention of the JBC, as it will now do in the case at bar, the arguments of the JBC on the merits of the case fail to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 29, 2016.
a. The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Noteworthy is the fact that the Court unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees into six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without limits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appointing power.
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power in the following ways: The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606[16]), rules (Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan[17]), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals[18]), vest exclusively upon the President.
b. Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
Without casting aspersion or insinuating ulterior motive on the part of the JBC - which would only be highly speculative on the part of the Court hereunder are different scenarios, using the very same circumstances and nominees in this case, to illustrate how clustering could be used to favor or prejudice a particular nominee and subtly influence President Aquino's appointing power, had President Aquino faithfully observed the clustering.
The six nominees actually appointed by President Aquino as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices were the following:
c. There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC.
The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal, objective, and rational basis for determining which nominee shall be included in a cluster. Simply saying that it is the result of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory. A review of the voting patterns by the JBC Members for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice only raises more questions and doubts than answers. It would seem, to the casual observer, that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members exercised block voting most of the time. Out of the 89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total of 37 qualified nominees spread across six separate short lists. Out of the 37 qualified nominees, the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members coincidentally voted for the same 28 nominees in precisely the same clusters, only varying by just one vote for the other nine nominees.
It is also interesting to note that all the nominees were listed only once in just one cluster, and all the nominees subsequently appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were distributed among the different clusters, except only for respondents Econg and Musngi. Was this by chance or was there already an agreement among the Chief Justice and the regular JBC Members to limit the nomination of a candidate to a specific cluster for one specific vacancy, thus, excluding the same candidate from again being nominated in a different cluster for another vacancy? It is understandable that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members would agree on whom to nominate because their nominations were based on the qualifications of the candidates. What is difficult to comprehend is how they determined the distribution of the nominees to the different clusters in the absence of any criteria or standard to be observed in the clustering of nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any of its Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case. Resultantly, the Court also asks why were respondents Econg and Musngi nominated in a single cluster? And why was then Atty. Trespeses not included in the same cluster as respondents Econg and Musngi, or the clusters of then Undersecretary Reynaldo P. Cruz, RTC Judge Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega, or Assistant Solicitor General Karl B. Miranda? Furthermore, what criteria was used when Chief Justice Sereno and the other four regular JBC Members voted for then Atty. Trespeses for only one particular cluster, i.e., for the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and nowhere else? Atty. Trespeses did not receive any vote in the other clusters except for the lone vote for him of an ex officio JBC Member for the vacancy for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the vacant posts. It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description for each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any cogent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
d. There is technically no clustering of nominees for first and second level trial courts.
The Court further points out that its Decision dated November 29, 2016 only discussed vacancies in collegiate courts. The constant referral by the JBC to separate short lists of nominees for vacant judgeship posts in first and second level trial courts as proof of previous clustering is inapt. The separate short lists in such situations are technically not clustering as the vacancies happened and were announced at different times and candidates applied for specific vacancies, based on the inherent differences in the location and jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of nominees to the same, hence, justifying a separate short list for each vacant post.
e. While clustering of nominees was observed in the nominations for vacancies in the Court of Appeals in 2015, it escaped scrutiny as the appointments to said vacancies were not challenged before the Court.
As an example of previous clustering in a collegiate court, the JBC attached to its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention a transmittal letter dated August 17, 2015 of the JBC addressed to President Aquino, which divided the nominees into four clusters for the four vacancies for Court of Appeals Associate Justice. The JBC contends that during the deliberations on said nominations, the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Justice Velasco were both present as JBC consultants but did not rmse any objection.
While it may be true that the JBC already observed clustering in 2015, it is still considered a relatively new practice, adopted only under Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship of the JBC. The clustering then escaped scrutiny as no party questioned the appointments to the said vacancies. The view of the consultants was also not solicited or requested by the JBC. The Court now observes that the vacancies for Court of Appeals Associate Justice in 2015 were not all simultaneous or closely successive, most of which occurring months apart, specifically, vice the late Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias who passed away on November 20, 2014; vice retired Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, who opted for early retirement effective on January 31, 2015; vice Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, who compulsorily retired on June 12, 2015; and vice Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican who compulsorily retired on July 4, 2015. Even so, the JBC published a single announcement for all four vacancies on March 15, 2015, with the same deadlines for submission of applications and supporting documents. This is in stark contrast to the two-week interval between the compulsory retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively, for which the JBC still made separate publications, required submission of separate applications, separately processed the applications, and submitted separate short lists. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the nominations for the four vacant posts of Court of Appeals Associate Justice were contained in a single letter dated August 17, 2015, addressed to President Aquino, through then Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., whereas in the case of the Sandiganbayan, the JBC submitted six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015, transmitting one short list for each of the six vacancies. The separate letters of transmittal further reinforce the intention of the JBC to prevent the President from "cross-reaching" or disregarding the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and, thus, unduly limit the President's exercise of his power to appoint members of the Judiciary.
f. The separate short lists for the current vacancies in the Supreme Court are not in issue in this case, but has been brought up by the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-inIntervention.
The Court takes the occasion herein to clarify that the application of its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2017 to the situation involving closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court may be properly addressed in an actual case which squarely raises the issue. It also bears to stress that the current vacancies in the Supreme Court as a result of the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion are not in issue in this case, but has been brought to the fore by the JBC itself in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Therefore, the Court will refrain from making any pronouncements on the separate short lists of nominees submitted by the JBC to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (Duterte) on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016 so as not to preempt the President's decision on how to treat the separate short lists of nominees for the two current vacancies in the Supreme Court. The Court will only address the statements made by the JBC in relation to said short lists by reciting some relevant historical facts relating to the filling-up of previous vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The JBC avers that it had no choice but to submit separate short lists of nominees to President Duterte for the vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who retired on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively, because there were different sets of applicants for each, with 14 applicants for the seat vacated by Associate Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Associate Justice Brion. The situation is the own doing of the JBC, as the JBC announced the expected vacancies left by the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion, which were merely two weeks apart, through two separately paid publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016, respectively, in newspapers of general circulation; invited the filing of separate applications for the vacancies with different deadlines; and
separately processed the applications of candidates to the said vacancies. The JBC would inevitably end up with two different sets of nominees, one set for the position vacated by Justice Perez and another set for that vacated by Justice Brion, notwithstanding that the JBC undeniably found all nominees in both sets to be qualified to be appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as they all garnered at least four votes.
There had been no similar problems in the past because the JBC jointly announced simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in the Supreme Court in a single publication, invited the filing by a candidate of a single application for all the vacancies on the same deadline, jointly processed all applications, and submitted a single list of qualified nominees to the President, thus, resulting in a simple, inexpensive, and efficient process of nomination. Such was the case when the JBC announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice following the retirements of Associate Justices Quisumbing and Chico-Nazario in 2009. Pertinent portions of the JBC publication are reproduced below:
The JBC again announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice due to the retirements of Associate Justices Nachura and Carpio Morales, thus:
How the new procedure adopted by the JBC of submitting two separate lists of nominees will also affect the seniority of the two Supreme Court Associate Justices to be appointed to the current vacancies is another issue that may arise because of the new JBC procedure. Unlike the present two separate lists of nominees specifying the vacant post to which they are short-listed for appointment, the short list of nominees submitted by the JBC before did not identify to which of the vacant positions, when there are more than one existing vacancies, a qualified candidate is nominated to as there was only one list of nominees for all vacancies submitted to the President. Correspondingly, the appointment papers issued by the President, as in the cases of Supreme Court Associate Justices Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, did not specify the particular vacant post to which each of them was appointed. The appointment papers of the afore-named Supreme Court Associate Justices were all similarly worded as follows:
g. The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts encroached on the President's power to determine the seniority of the justices appointed to the said court.
The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that its individual members have different reasons for designating numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. The varying reason/s of each individual JBC Members raises the concern whether they each fully appreciated the constitutional and legal consequences of their act, i.e., that it encroached on the power, solely vested in the President, to determine the seniority of the justices appointed to a collegiate court. Each of the six short lists submitted by the JBC to President Aquino explicitly stated that the nominees were for the Sixteenth (16th), Seventeenth (17th), Eighteenth (18th), Nineteenth (19th), Twentieth (20th), and Twenty-First (21st) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, respectively; and on the faces of said short lists, it could only mean that President Aquino was to make the appointments in the order of seniority pre-detennined by the JBC, and that nominees who applied for any of the vacant positions, requiring the same qualifications, were deemed to be qualified to be considered for appointment only to the one vacant position to which his/her cluster was specifically assigned. Whatever the intentions of the individual JBC Members were, they cannot go against what has been clearly established by law,[19] rules,[20] and jurisprudence.[21] In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:
Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the ground that it is not a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other reliefs and remedies, for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016 denying the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case. However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into consideration the issues raised and arguments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious.
To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate short lists. The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 that:
As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a separate administrative matter (viz., Item No.2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to submit its comment and be heard on the same. The administrative matter was already raffled to another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same should be consolidated in the said administrative matter.
Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa, it must be pointed out that he has conceded that the President did not commit an unconstitutional act in "disregarding the clustering done by the JBC" when he chose Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for intervention, which the Court has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.
Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the separate short lists of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte for the present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these were not in issue nor deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the decision the President may take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of his power to appoint members of the Judiciary under the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., no part.
Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., I concur in the result. (Please see Separate Opinion. The November 29, 2016 Decision does not apply to closely successive vacancies like those created with retirement of Justice Brion and Perez.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I concur in the result and also join the Separate Opinion of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I concur in the result. See Separate Opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Separate Opinion.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on February 21, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on March 1, 2017 at 1:44 p.m.
[1] Rollo, pp. 250-251.
[2] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 18-19.
[3] Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shaH issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
[4] Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
[5] Rollo, p. 277.
[6] 707 Phil. 754 (2013).
[7] G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, & 226294, November 8, 2016.
[8] 646 Phil. 1 (2010).
[9] Supra note 2 at 32.
[10] A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, May 4, 2010.
[11] Rule 8, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 1. Grounds for Inhibition. - A Member of the Court shall inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any of these and similar reasons:
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any of those mentioned above.
The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.
[12] Judicial and Bar Council Minutes, 10-2015, October 26, 2015, Monday, En Banc Conference Room, New Supreme Court Building, 10:00 a.m., p. 2.
[13] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[14] G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279.
[15] 446 Phil. 433, 447-448 (2003).
[16] Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and compensation. - x x x
x x x x
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.
[17] Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence. -
x x x x
(b) Rule on Precedence - The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments.
[18] Supra note 8.
[19] Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, supra note 16.
[20] Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra note 17.
[21] Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, supra note 8.
[22] Rollo, p. 238.
[23] Id. at 242.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I agree that there is no compelling reason for Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro (Justice Leonardo-de Castro) to inhibit in the case at bar. Justice Leonardo-de Castro explained at length the extent of her participation, or non-participation, in the closed door meetings of the JBC when she was still a consultant thereof She is not privy to the decision of the JBC to approve the rule on the clustering of nominees, much less to its implementation.
I likewise concur with the majority that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) should be allowed to intervene in the present proceeding. The nullification of the JBC's act of clustering the nominees for the Sandiganbayan vacancies was a precondition before the Court could have upheld the validity of the subject appointments. In fact, this was where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) primarily anchored its defenses. I cannot, therefore, agree that "[t]he declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for simultaneous vacancies in the collegiate court is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling."[1] On the contrary, it is, as it remains to be, the very core of the controversy. It thus behooved this Court to hear the counter-arguments of the JBC against the OSG's contention.
Beyond quibble then is that the JBC is clothed with legal interest to take part in this case. The Court's attempt at curbing the august body's practice is more than palpable in the language of the Decision. The fallo of the adverted ruling reads:
My misgivings on the above declaration stem from the fact that separate application processes would yield varying number of applicants and different persons applying. It would then be erroneous to treat as one group the applicants who vied for different posts. The shortlists for the posts vacated by Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Justice Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) would assist in illustrating this point:[4]
First, the ruling of majority permits the commingling of shortlists and would automatically render Hon. Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, a nominee for the position vacated by Associate Justice Jose P. Perez even though she only applied for the post vacated by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion. This is an anomaly since Hon. Lazaro Javier only applied for the latter post.
Noteworthy is that the application process for the two vacancies was separate and distinct. The JBC announced on August 4, 2016 that it will be receiving applications and nominations for the post to be vacated by Justice Perez until September 20, 2016. In contrast, the call for applications and nominations for the post vacated by Justice Brion was published on August 18, 2016, with the deadline set on October 4, 2016.
From September 21, 2014 to October 4, 2016, the JBC was then only receiving applications nominations for the Supreme Court post vacated by Justice Brion. Had Hon. Lazaro-Javier filed her application/nomination during this period, then she could not, by any stretch of the imagination or legalese, be considered an applicant, let alone a nominee, for the post vacated by Justice Perez.
Second, the wording of the decision may likewise result in the appointment of one who did not get the necessary minimum number of votes. Sec. 2, Rule 8 of JBC No. 2016-01, otherwise known as the JBC Rules, provides:
Third, precisely because there were two application processes, the voting for the nominees was conducted separately. Thus, it was possible for applicants/nominees for both vacant positions to be voted upon twice by the same member of the JBC. The following example provided by the JBC is telling:[5]
These are legitimate concerns that would arise should the Court sustain its Decision. These contingencies should have been clearly addressed before we refrained from limiting the application of the ruling pro hac vice and instead ruled that it may validly and similarly be invoked in situations "wherein there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, xxx regardless of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies."[6]
As a final word, the Court is well aware that the treatment of the vacancies that resulted from the mandatory retirements of Justices Perez and Brion is capable of repetition to those from the retirements of Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza and Bienvenido L. Reyes on July 6, 2017 and August 13, 2017, respectively. We must then be prudent in resolving this collateral issue before the Court is hounded by controversies surrounding the legitimacy of the succeeding appointees to the Court.
The foregoing premises considered, I hereby register my vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Although the unconstitutionality of the clustering is sustained, the application of the doctrine should be limited to simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, not to closely successive vacancies thereto.
[1] Draft Resolution, p. 17.
[2] November 29, 2016, p. 32.
[3] Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. xxx
[4] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 20-21.
[5] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 20-21.
[6] November 29, 2016 Decision.
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result insofar as the finding that respondents did not gravely abuse their discretion in making appointments to the Sandiganbayan as all six vacancies were opened for the first time. I do not find any reasonable basis to cluster nominees in this case, where the law created simultaneous new vacancies for a collegial court. I agree with the ponencia that future vacancies for collegial appellate courts and this Court, are not at issue in this case. Hence, this Court should rule on the issues as it does not render advisory opinions.
I likewise concur in the ponencia's denial of the Motion for Inhibition filed by the Judicial and Bar Council. This Court, in its Internal Rules, provided the grounds[1] on which a member of the Court must inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case, and none of the cited reasons apply to the ponente. I am convinced that there is no reason for the ponente to voluntarily inhibit herself from resolving or participating in this case.
The ponente has adequately explained that she was neither privy nor consulted by the Judicial and Bar Council on the move to cluster the applicants to the newly created Sandiganbayan positions into six (6) separate shortlists.[2]
I see no reason to doubt the ponente's statement of impartiality. In the years that I have worked alongside the ponente, I have personally witnessed her unblemished character and unwavering commitment to upholding the rule of law. Historically, her moral compass has never waned. I have no reason to doubt her impartiality in this case.
However, the Judicial and Bar Council should be allowed to intervene in the case. As the party who committed the act of clustering the Sandiganbayan applicants-an act that was eventually declared unconstitutional-the Judicial and Bar Council clearly has a legal interest in the matter under litigation. Without the participation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the doctrine in this case will only be about the discretion of the President when there are simultaneous vacancies in newly created divisions of a collegial court. This policy should not extend to other vacancies caused by retirements in the future.
Nonetheless, I reiterate that the Decision[3] dated November 29, 2016 only affects collegial bodies such as the Sandiganbayan, when there are simultaneous vacancies. When there are successive vacancies in collegial courts, such as what happened in this Court, with the recent retirement of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Associate Justice Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion), there may be valid reasons for the submission of two (2) separate shortlists to the President. However, again, that is not at issue in this case.
On November 16, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council interviewed the following candidates for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice to replace Associate Justice Perez, who compulsorily retired on December 14, 2016:
In comparison, the applicants for the Sandiganbayan applied for all six vacancies. From September 28, 2015 to October 13, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council interviewed the following candidates for the six newly created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
With the forthcoming mandatory retirement of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes on July 6, 2017 and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza on August 13, 2017, this Court will have another set of vacancies. By the time the two positions for Supreme Court Associate Justice become vacant, the Judicial and Bar Council might be composed of different members. The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council regularly changes because of the term-sharing arrangement practiced by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice sits as the Judicial and Bar Council ex-officio member from January to June, while the Chair of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights takes over from July to December. Because of the different dates of the vacancies, as well as the possibly different composition of the Judicial and Bar Council, two different shortlists should be submitted.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, the Judicial and Bar Council explained that it merely followed Article VIII, Section 9[13] of the 1987 Constitution when it clustered into six separate shortlists the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.[14] It contended that clustering was a practical solution meant to distinguish one shortlist from another and avoid confusion.[15]
The Judicial and Bar Council[16] was created under the 1987 Constitution. It was intended to be a fully independent constitutional body functioning as a check-and-balance on the President's power of appointment.
Before the existence of the Judicial and Bar Council, the executive and legislative branches had the exclusive prerogative of appointing members of the judiciary, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, this appointment process was highly susceptible to political pressure and partisan activities and eventually prompted the need for a separate, competent, and independent body to recommend to the President nominees to the Judiciary.[17]
The Judicial and Bar Council is not merely a technical committee that evaluates the fitness and integrity of applicants in the Judiciary. It is a constitutional organ participating in the process that guides the direction of the Judiciary. Its composition represents a cross section of the legal profession, retired judges and Justices, and the Chief Justice. More than a technical committee, it has the power to examine the judicial philosophies of the applicants and make selections, which it submits to the President. The President may have the final discretion to choose, but he or she chooses only from that list.
This is the complex relationship mandated by the sovereign through the Constitution. It ensures judicial independence, checks and balances on the Judiciary, and assurance for the rule of law.
In the proper actual case, the exact metes and bounds of the discussion of the Judicial and Bar Council can be determined. Here, however, the President did not abuse his discretion when he decided that there was no reason to cluster the applicants for the Sandiganbayan vacancies.
As a collegial court, the Sandiganbayan seats members who equally share power and sit in divisions of three (3) members each. The numerical designation of each division only pertains to the seniority or order of precedence based on the date of appointment. The Rule on Precedence is in place primarily for the orderly functioning of the Sandiganbayan, as reflected in Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan:
Additionally, in single courts, applicants may apply for each available vacancy; thus, to find the same applicant in shortlists for vacancies in different single courts is common. On the other hand, applicants in collegial courts apply only once even when there are simultaneous vacancies because among divisions in a collegial court, there is no substantial difference to justify the creation of separate shortlists or clusters for each vacancy.
I am of the view that Former President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the shortlists submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council for the simultaneous new vacancies and in treating all six shortlists as one from which he could choose the Sandiganbayan Justices. I reserve judgment on future vacancies in any collegial appellate court. This Court is unanimous on the scope of this judgment.
On the issue of this Court's supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, I acknowledge that this Court has already taken cognizance and docketed as separate matters the deletion of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 and the removal of incumbent Supreme Court Senior Associate Justices as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council.[18]
However, I reiterate that the Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to submit its revised internal rules to this Court for approval. Jardeleza v. Sereno[19] emphasized that this Court's power of judicial review is only to ensure that rules are followed.[20] It has neither the power to lay down these rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them.[21]
The Internal Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council is necessary and incidental to the function conferred to it by the Constitution. The Constitution may have provided the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, but it has given the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its mandate. This Court cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council's internal rules and policies. To do so would be an unconstitutional affront to the Judicial and Bar Council's independence.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur only in the result.
[1] S. CT. INT. RULES, Rule 8, sec. 1 provides:
Rule 8, Section 1. Grounds for Inhibition - A Member of the Court shall inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any of these and similar reasons:
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any of those mentioned above.
The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.
[2] Resolution (G.R. No. 224302), pp. 5-6.
[3] Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[4] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated October 20, 2016 <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Announcement_SC%20Public%20Int%20and%20LEB%20Vacancies_10-20-16.pdf> (visited February 6, 2017).
[5] Id.
[6] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated October 28, 2016 <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announccments/2016/Announcement_SC%20Public%20Int_Justice%20Brion_10-28-16.pdf> (visited February 6, 2017).
[7] Id.
[8] Judicial and Bar Council, letter dated December 2, 2016 <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Perez_12-2-16.pdf> (visited February 6, 2017).
[9] Judicial and Bar Council, letter dated December 9, 2016 <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2016/Shortlist_SC-Brion_12-9-16.pdf> (visited February 6, 2017).
[10] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated September 11, 2015 <http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/2015/Announcement_9-11-15_Revised.pdf> (visited February 6, 2017).
[11] Id.
[12] G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> 3-4 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[13] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 9 provides:
SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a Jist of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
[14] Resolution (G.R. No. 224302), pp. 13-14.
[15] Id. at 15.
[16] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8.
[17] Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 188 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[18] Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/november2016/224302.pdf> 40 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[19] G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[20] Id. at 326.
[21] Id.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my position on the final disposition of the case wherein the Court, in dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari, declared the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) unconstitutional and the appointments of Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as valid. As explained below, I maintain my position that the dismissal of the Petition and the upholding of the appointments of the six newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan are in order. It is, however, the ruling on the unconstitutionality of the questioned act of the JBC that I am espousing a separate view.
In the Decision dated November 29, 2016, I joined the Concurring Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. Justice Leonen stated:
On the motion for inhibition, the ponente is in the best position to determine whether her involvement with the JBC justifies her possible inhibition in this case. The ponente has found no basis for her inhibition, and I accept her decision unqualifiedly.
On the JBC's motion to intervene, I reiterate the position taken by J. Leonen, to which I concurred, that the JBC should be allowed to intervene. To be sure, the JBC is not an ordinary body. It was created by no less than our Constitution, and given the constitutional mandate of recommending to the President the nominees to every vacancy in the judiciary.[2] Hence, since the JBC's very action has been declared by the Court unconstitutional, the JBC clearly has a legal interest in the matter in litigation and is so situated as to be adversely affected by the disposition of the Court.[3] Everyone deserves a day in court. The JBC is no exception.
The very purpose and singular function of the JBC is involved in the Petition as the petitioners' reliefs are grounded on the simple formulation that the President's act of appointing Justices Musngi and Econg was made in violation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. This, in turn, is premised on the petitioners' belief that the President could not appoint Justices for any given position (in specific reference to the 16th and 21st stations/Associate Justice positions) outside of the list of nominees that had been clustered by the JBC for each of the stations/Associate Justice positions.
In plain terms, the Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the action of the JBC would be unconstitutional. Inversely, if the answer is in the negative, meaning the Court upholds as constitutional the appointments made following the clustering by the JBC, then that would, in tum, mean that the JBC had acted pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
My basis is the plain language of the above Constitutional provision which mandates the JBC to recommend nominees to any vacancy in the judiciary-to prepare a list of at least three nominees for every vacancy.[4]
So long as the grouping of at least three nominees for every vacancy by the JBC did not impinge on the President's appointing power, there is, in my view, no violation of the Constitution. Thus, I cannot view as grave abuse of discretion the act of the JBC in adopting the six lists it came up with following its "textualist approach of constitutional interpretation".
In the same vein, that President Aquino chose to disregard JBC's clustering, and considered all the 37 nominees named in the six lists, is likewise "textually compliant" with Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution (i.e., because there are at least three nominees for each of the six Associate Justice positions).[5] For this reason, I cannot find the act of President Aquino as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In fine, I find nothing unconstitutional in the questioned action of the JBC-in the same manner that Ifind nothing unconstitutional in the act of President Aquino in disregarding the clustering done by the JBC, and in choosing Associate Justices for each of the vacancies "outside" of the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to RECONSIDER the Decision dated November 29, 2016 and to DELETE from the dispositive portion the declaration that "the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council [as] UNCONSTITUTIONAL."
[1] Hon. Philip A. Aguinaldo, et al. v. His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen, p. 1.
[2] Section 8(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides: "The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. x x x"
[3] RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Sec. 1.
[4] A list containing at least three nominees consists a group. A group may also be called a cluster. However, a "cluster" is defined by Merriam-Webster as: "a number of similar things that occur together: such as a : two or more consecutive consonants or vowels in a segment of a speech b : a group of buildings and especially houses built together on a sizable tract in order to preserve open spaces larger than the individual yard for common recreation c : an aggregation of stars or galaxies that appear close together in the sky and are gravitationally associated x x x d : a larger than expected number of cases of disease (as leukemia) occurring in a particular locality, group of people, or period of time e : a number of computers networked together in order to function as a single computing system x x x." MERRIAMWEBSTER available athttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cluster; last accessed on February 27, 2017. As a verb, "cluster" means "to come together to form a group." Id. Either a group or a cluster has no fixed legal meaning. "Clustering" has no defmitive legal import.
[5] Meaning, since there were 6 positions, there should have been at least a minimum of 18 nominees in compliance with the Constitution. Thus, since there were, in fact, 37 nominees for the 6 positions, then the Constitutional requirement was still met.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item No. 2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of this Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.[1]
I
THE JBC MOTIONS
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) successively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
At the outset, the Court notes the revelation of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that it is not taking any position in this particular case on President Aquino's appointments to the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The Court quotes the relevant portions from the Motion, as follows:
The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's pronouncement that the former's act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was unconstitutional. Whether the President can cross-reach into the lists is not the primary concern of the JBC in this particular case. At another time, perhaps, it may take a position. But not in this particular situation involving the newly created positions in the Sandiganbayan in view of the lack of agreement by the JBC Members on that issue.Nonetheless, the JBC did not categorically withdraw the arguments raised in its previous Motions, and even reiterated and further discussed said arguments, and raised additional points in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Hence, the Court is still constrained to address said arguments in this Resolution.
What the President did with the lists, for the purpose of this particular dispute alone as far as the JBC is concerned, was the President's exclusive domain.[2]
In its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente) the JBC argues as follows: (a) Its Motion for Intervention was timely filed on November 26, 2016, three days before the promulgation of the Decision in the instant case; (b) The JBC has a legal interest in this case, and its intervention would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; (c) Even assuming that the Motion for Intervention suffers procedural infirmities, said Motion should have been granted for a complete resolution of the case and to afford the JBC due process; and (d) Unless its Motion for Intervention is granted by the Court, the JBC is not bound by the questioned Decision because the JBC was neither a party litigant nor impleaded as a party in the case, the JBC was deprived of due process, the assailed Decision is a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem, and a decision rendered in violation of a party's right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction.
On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 9[3] of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with the Constitution. According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy. Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the JBC. The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of precedence, but for practical reasons, i.e., to distinguish one list from the others and to avoid confusion. The JBC also points out that the acts invoked against the JBC are based on practice or custom, but "practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right." The JBC, as a constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.
Lastly, the JBC moves for the inhibition of the ponente of the assailed Decision based on Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.[4] The JBC alleges that the ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had personal knowledge of the voting procedures and format of the short lists, which are the subject matters of this case. The ponente was even present as consultant during the meeting on October 26, 2015 when the JBC voted upon the candidates for the six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan created under Republic Act No. 10660. The JBC then expresses its puzzlement over the ponente's participation in the present proceedings, espousing a position contrary to that of the JBC. The JBC questions why it was only in her Decision in the instant case did the ponente raise her disagreement with the JBC as to the clustering of nominees for each of the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. The JBC further quoted portions of the assailed Decision that it claims bespoke of the ponente's "already-arrived-at" conclusion as to the alleged ill acts and intentions of the JBC. Hence, the JBC submits that such formed inference will not lend to an even-handed consideration by the ponente should she continue to participate in the case.
Ultimately, the JBC prays:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that the DECISION dated 29 November 2016 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be issued granting the Motion for Intervention of the JBC.The JBC subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016), praying at the very beginning that it be deemed as sufficient remedy for the technical deficiency of its Motion for Intervention (i.e., failure to attach the pleading-in-intervention) and as Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of its Motion for Intervention.
It is likewise prayed that the ponente inhibit herself from further participating in this case and that the JBC be granted such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.[5]
The JBC, in its latest Motion, insists on its legal interest, injury, and standing to intervene in the present case, as well as on the timeliness of its Motion for Intervention.
The JBC proffers several reasons for not immediately seeking to intervene in the instant case despite admitting that it received copies of the appointments of the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the Office of the President (OP) on January 25, 2016, to wit: (a) Even as its individual Members harbored doubts as to the validity of the appointments of respondents Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi) and Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg) as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the JBC agreed as a body in an executive session that it would stay neutral and not take any legal position on the constitutionality of said appointments since it "did not have any legal interest in the offices of Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan"; (b) None of the parties prayed that the act of clustering by the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and (c) The JBC believed that the Court would apply the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the discharge by the JBC of its official functions and if the Court would have been inclined to delve into the validity of the act of clustering by the JBC, it would order the JBC to comment on the matter.
The JBC impugns the significance accorded by the ponente to the fact that Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno), Chairperson of the JBC, administered the oath of office of respondent Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice on January 25, 2016. Chief Justice Sereno's act should not be taken against the JBC because, the JBC reasons, Chief Justice Sereno only chairs the JBC, but she is not the JBC, and the administration of the oath of office was a purely ministerial act.
The JBC likewise disputes the ponente's observation that clustering is a totally new practice of the JBC. The JBC avers that even before Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship, the JBC has generally followed the rule of one short list for every vacancy in all first and second level trial courts. The JBC has followed the "one list for every vacancy" rule even for appellate courts since 2013. The JBC even recalls that it submitted on August 17, 2015 to then President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino) four separate short lists for four vacancies in the Court of Appeals; and present during the JBC deliberations were the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Velasco) as consultants, who neither made any comment on the preparation of the short lists.
On the merits of the Petition, the JBC maintains that it did not exceed its authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with the literal language of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, when it prepared six short lists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. It cites the cases of Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections[6] and Ocampo v. Enriquez,[7] wherein the Court allegedly adopted the textualist approach of constitutional interpretation.
The JBC renounces any duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications. It asserts that while there might have been favorable experiences with the past practice of submitting long consolidated short lists, past practices cannot be used as a source of rights and obligations to override the duty of the JBC to observe a straightforward application of the Constitution.
The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making short lists. It presents different scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz.: (a) There are two different sets of applicants for the vacancies; (b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the interval in the deliberations on the vacancies as the House of Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex officio seat for the Legislature; (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in the Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because of the location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain personalities; (d) The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first and second level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so the JBC chooses nominees for those particular posts with more years of service as against those near retirement.
To the JBC, it seems that the Court was in a hurry to promulgate its Decision on November 29, 2016, which struck down the practice of clustering by the JBC. The JBC supposes that it was in anticipation of the vacancies in the Court as a result of the retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Brion) on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively. The JBC then claims that it had no choice but to submit two separate short lists for said vacancies in the Court because there were two sets of applicants for the same, i.e., there were 14 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Brion.
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and possibly unique situations, there can be no general rule against clustering. Submitting separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for the JBC to observe the constitutional standards of (a) one list for every vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every such vacancy.
It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary. The JBC alleges that its individual Members gave several reasons why there was an apparent indication of seniority assignments in the six short lists for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, particularly: (a) The JBC can best perform its job by indicating who are stronger candidates by giving higher priority to those in the lower-numbered list; (b) The indication could head off the confusion encountered in Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals;[8] and (c) The numbering of the lists from 16th to 21st had nothing to do with seniority in the Sandiganbayan, but was only an ordinal designation of the cluster to which the candidates were included.
The JBC ends with a reiteration of the need for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant case as she appears to harbor hostility possibly arising from the termination of her JBC consultancy.
The prayer of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed that JBC's Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro of the JBC be granted and/or given due course and that:
- the Court's pronouncements in the Decision dated 29 November 2016 with respect to the JBC's submission of six shortlists of nominees to the Sandiganbayan be modified to reflect that the JBC is deemed to have followed Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution in its practice of submitting one shortlist of nominees for every vacancy, including in submitting on 28 October 2015 six lists to former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III for the six vacancies of the Sandiganbayan, or for the Court to be completely silent on the matter; and
- the Court delete the treatment as a separate administrative matter of the alleged new rules and practices of the JBC, particularly the following: (1) the deletion or non-inclusion of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council; and (2) the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the JBC, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of the Decision. And as a consequence, the Court excuse the JBC from filing the required comment on the said matters.[9]
II
THE RULING OF THE COURT
There is no legal or factual basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant case.
The Motion for Inhibition of the Ponente filed by the JBC is denied.
The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,[10] which requires that "[a] motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor." Yet, even if technical rules are relaxed herein, there is still no valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente.
There is no ground[11] for the mandatory inhibition of the ponente from the case at bar.
The ponente has absolutely no personal interest in this case. The ponente is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm that is or was the counsel in the case; the ponente or her spouse, parent, or child has no pecuniary interest in the case; and the ponente is not related to any of the parties in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discussed and decided to adopt the unprecedented method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists, one for every vacancy. The ponente does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering method of nomination for appellate courts and even the Supreme Court.
With due respect to Chief Justice Sereno, it appears that when the JBC would deliberate on highly contentious, sensitive, and important issues, it was her policy as Chairperson of the JBC to hold executive sessions, which excluded the Supreme Court consultants. At the JBC meeting held on October 26, 2015, Chief Justice Sereno immediately mentioned at the beginning of the deliberations "that, as the Council had always done in the past when there are multiple vacancies, the voting would be on a per vacancy basis."[12] Chief Justice Sereno went on to state that the manner of voting had already been explained to the two ex officio members of the JBC who were not present during the meeting, namely, Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III (Pimentel) and then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Caguioa).[13] Then the JBC immediately proceeded with the voting of nominees. This ponente was not consulted before the JBC decision to cluster nominees was arrived at and, therefore, she did not have the opportunity to study and submit her recommendation to the JBC on the clustering of nominees.
It is evident that prior to the meeting on October 26, 2015, the JBC had already reached an agreement on the procedure it would follow in voting for nominees, i.e., the clustering of the nominees into six separate short lists, with one short list for each of the six newly-created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. That Senator Pimentel and DOJ Secretary Caguioa, who were not present at the meeting on October 26, 2015, were informed beforehand of the clustering of nominees only proves that the JBC had already agreed upon the clustering of nominees prior to the said meeting.
Notably, Chief Justice Sereno inaccurately claimed at the very start of the deliberations that the JBC had been voting on a per vacancy basis "as the Council had always done," giving the impression that the JBC was merely following established procedure, when in truth, the clustering of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court was a new practice only adopted by the JBC under her Chairmanship. In the Decision dated November 29, 2016, examples were already cited how, in previous years, the JBC submitted just one short list for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts, including the Supreme Court, which will again be presented hereunder.
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold executive sessions when taking up sensitive matters. The ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court and then JBC consultants, as well as other JBC consultants, were excluded from such executive sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were unable to participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters involving the nomination of candidates for vacancies in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The matter of the nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which became the subject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno,[14] was taken up by the JBC in such an executive session. This ponente also does not know when and why the JBC deleted from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, which gave due weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court for vacancies in the Court. The amendment of the JBC Rules could have been decided upon by the JBC when the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno of their duties as consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have similarly taken up and decided upon the clustering of nominees for the six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice during one of its executive sessions prior to October 26, 2015.
Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly present during the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was already fait accompli. Questions as to why and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no longer on the table for discussion during the said meeting. As the minutes of the meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out, the JBC proceedings focused on the voting of nominees. It is stressed that the crucial issue in the present case pertains to the clustering of nominees and not the nomination and qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of nominees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the ponente is duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional implications.
Neither is there any basis for the ponente's voluntary inhibition from the case at bar. Other than the bare allegations of the JBC, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the ponente's purported bias and prejudice, sufficient to overcome the presumption that she had rendered her assailed ponencia in the regular performance of her official and sacred duty of dispensing justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. Significant herein is the following disquisition of the Court on voluntary inhibition of judges in Gochan v. Gochan,[15] which is just as applicable to Supreme Court Justices:
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably - both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected. (Emphasis supplied.)Furthermore, it appears from the admitted lack of consensus on the part of the JBC Members as to the validity of the clustering shows that the conclusion reached by the ponente did not arise from personal hostility but from her objective evaluation of the adverse constitutional implications of the clustering of the nominees for the vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. It is unfortunate that the JBC stooped so low in casting aspersion on the person of this ponente instead of focusing on sound legal arguments to support its position. There is absolutely no factual basis for the uncalled for and unfair imputation of the JBC that the ponente harbors personal hostility against the JBC presumably due to her removal as consultant. The ponente's removal as consultant was the decision of Chief Justice Sereno, not the JBC. The ponente does not bear any personal grudge or resentment against the JBC for her removal as consultant. The ponente does not view Chief Justice Sereno's move as particularly directed against her as Associate Justice Velasco had been similarly removed as JBC consultant. The ponente has never been influenced by personal motive in deciding cases. The ponente, instead, perceives the removal of incumbent Supreme Court Justices as consultants of the JBC as an affront against the Supreme Court itself as an institution, since the evident intention of such move was to keep the Supreme Court in the dark on the changes in rules and practices subsequently adopted by the JBC, which, to the mind of this ponente, may adversely affect the exercise of the supervisory authority over the JBC vested upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution.
All the basic issues raised in the Petition had been thoroughly passed upon by the Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and the JBC already expressed its disinterest to question President Aquino's "cross-reaching" in his appointment of the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Even if the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention of the JBC, praying for the grant of its Motion for Intervention and the reversal of the Decision dated November 29, 2016, are admitted into the records of this case and the issues raised and arguments adduced in the said two Motions are considered, there is no cogent reason to reverse the Decision dated November 29, 2016, particularly, in view of the admission of the JBC of the lack of unanimity among the JBC members on the issue involving the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their disinterest to question the "cross-reaching" or non-observance by President Aquino of such clustering.
Hence, the Court will no longer belabor the issue that only three JBC Members signed the Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration and only four JBC Members signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, as well as the fact that Chief Justice Sereno, as Chairperson of the JBC, did not sign the three Motions.
To determine the legal personality of the signatories to file the JBC Motions, the Court has accorded particular significance to who among the JBC Members signed the Motions and to Chief Justice Sereno's act of administering the oath of office to three of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including respondent Econg, in resolving the pending Motions of the JBC. However, in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, the JBC now reveals that not all of its Members agree on the official position to take in the case of President Aquino's appointment of the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. Thus, the position of the JBC on the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice rests on shaky legal ground.
The JBC takes exception as to why the Court allowed the Petition at bar even when it did not strictly comply with the rules, as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari. The Court, in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, gave consideration to petitioners' assertion that they had to secure first official copies of the six short lists before they were able to confirm that President Aquino, in appointing the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, actually disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate short lists. While the Court is hard-pressed to extend the same consideration to the JBC which made no immediate effort to explain its failure to timely question or challenge the appointments of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices whether before the OP or the courts, the Court will nevertheless now allow the JBC intervention by considering the issues raised and arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration in-Intervention of the JBC in the interest of substantial justice.
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the JBC reproaches the Court for supposedly hurrying the promulgation of its Decision on November 29, 2016 in anticipation of the impending vacancies in the Supreme Court due to the retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion in December 2016. On the contrary, it appears that it was the JBC which hurriedly proceeded with the two separate publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016 of the opening of the application for the aforesaid vacancies, respectively, which was contrary to previous practice, even while the issue of clustering was set to be decided by the Court. Moreover, a scrutiny of the process the Petition went through before its promulgation negates any haste on the part of the Court. Bear in mind that the Petition at bar was filed on May 17, 2016 and petitioners' Reply, the last pleading allowed by the Court in this case, was filed on August 3, 2016. The draftponencia was calendared in the agenda of the Supreme Court en banc, called again, and deliberated upon several times before it was actually voted upon on November 29, 2016. Indeed, it appears that it was the JBC which rushed to release the separate short lists of nominees for the said Supreme Court vacancies despite knowing the pendency of the instant Petition and its own filing of a Motion for Intervention herein on November 28, 2016. The JBC went ahead with the release of separate short lists of nominees for the posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice vice retired Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016, respectively.
Even if the Court allows the intervention of the JBC, as it will now do in the case at bar, the arguments of the JBC on the merits of the case fail to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 29, 2016.
a. The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Noteworthy is the fact that the Court unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees into six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without limits. It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appointing power.
In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power in the following ways: The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only. Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606[16]), rules (Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan[17]), and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals[18]), vest exclusively upon the President.
b. Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
Without casting aspersion or insinuating ulterior motive on the part of the JBC - which would only be highly speculative on the part of the Court hereunder are different scenarios, using the very same circumstances and nominees in this case, to illustrate how clustering could be used to favor or prejudice a particular nominee and subtly influence President Aquino's appointing power, had President Aquino faithfully observed the clustering.
The six nominees actually appointed by President Aquino as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices were the following:
It would be safe to say that all the aforementioned six nominees were strong contenders. If all six nominees were placed in the same cluster, then only one of them would have been actually appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and the other five could no longer be considered for the still unfilled vacancies. If then Atty. Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses), Judicial Staff Head, OCJ, was included in the cluster with respondent Econg, PHILJA Chief of Office for PMC, and respondent Musngi, Undersecretary for Special Concerns and Chief of Staff of the Executive Secretary, OP, then he would have lesser chance of being appointed as he would have to vie for a single vacancy with two other strong contenders; and only one of the three would have been appointed. Evidently, the appointments to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice would have been different by simply jumbling the clusters of nominees. Even if we go back in history, had the JBC clustered the nominees for the posts vacated by Supreme Court Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) and Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Chico-Nazario), and if Associate Justices Perez and Jose Catral Mendoza (Mendoza) were together in the same cluster, then only one of them would have been appointed. Also, had the JBC clustered the nominees for the vacancies resulting from the retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (Nachura) and Conchita Carpio Morales (Carpio Morales), and if Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (Reyes) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Perlas Bemabe) were together in the same cluster, then the appointment of one of them would have already excluded the other.
VACANCY IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN PERSON APPOINTED SHORT LISTED FOR FORMER POSITION HELD 16th Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi 21st Associate Justice Undersecretary for Special Concerns/ Chief of Staff of the Executive Secretary, OP, for 5 years 17th Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz 19th Associate Justice Undersecretary, Office of the Executive Secretary, OP, for 4-1/2 years 18th Associate Justice Geraldine Faith A. Econg 21st Associate Justice Former Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, for 6 years Chief of Office, Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) 19th Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega 17th Associate Justice Judge, RTC, Malolos Bulacan, for 10 years 20th Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda 20th Associate Justice Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for 15 years 21st Associate Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses 18th Associate Justice Judicial StaffHead, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ), Supreme Court, for 2 years
c. There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC.
The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal, objective, and rational basis for determining which nominee shall be included in a cluster. Simply saying that it is the result of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory. A review of the voting patterns by the JBC Members for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice only raises more questions and doubts than answers. It would seem, to the casual observer, that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members exercised block voting most of the time. Out of the 89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total of 37 qualified nominees spread across six separate short lists. Out of the 37 qualified nominees, the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members coincidentally voted for the same 28 nominees in precisely the same clusters, only varying by just one vote for the other nine nominees.
It is also interesting to note that all the nominees were listed only once in just one cluster, and all the nominees subsequently appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were distributed among the different clusters, except only for respondents Econg and Musngi. Was this by chance or was there already an agreement among the Chief Justice and the regular JBC Members to limit the nomination of a candidate to a specific cluster for one specific vacancy, thus, excluding the same candidate from again being nominated in a different cluster for another vacancy? It is understandable that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members would agree on whom to nominate because their nominations were based on the qualifications of the candidates. What is difficult to comprehend is how they determined the distribution of the nominees to the different clusters in the absence of any criteria or standard to be observed in the clustering of nominees. This was never explained by the JBC in any of its Motions even when the issue of clustering is vital to this case. Resultantly, the Court also asks why were respondents Econg and Musngi nominated in a single cluster? And why was then Atty. Trespeses not included in the same cluster as respondents Econg and Musngi, or the clusters of then Undersecretary Reynaldo P. Cruz, RTC Judge Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega, or Assistant Solicitor General Karl B. Miranda? Furthermore, what criteria was used when Chief Justice Sereno and the other four regular JBC Members voted for then Atty. Trespeses for only one particular cluster, i.e., for the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and nowhere else? Atty. Trespeses did not receive any vote in the other clusters except for the lone vote for him of an ex officio JBC Member for the vacancy for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the vacant posts. It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description for each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any cogent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
d. There is technically no clustering of nominees for first and second level trial courts.
The Court further points out that its Decision dated November 29, 2016 only discussed vacancies in collegiate courts. The constant referral by the JBC to separate short lists of nominees for vacant judgeship posts in first and second level trial courts as proof of previous clustering is inapt. The separate short lists in such situations are technically not clustering as the vacancies happened and were announced at different times and candidates applied for specific vacancies, based on the inherent differences in the location and jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of nominees to the same, hence, justifying a separate short list for each vacant post.
e. While clustering of nominees was observed in the nominations for vacancies in the Court of Appeals in 2015, it escaped scrutiny as the appointments to said vacancies were not challenged before the Court.
As an example of previous clustering in a collegiate court, the JBC attached to its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention a transmittal letter dated August 17, 2015 of the JBC addressed to President Aquino, which divided the nominees into four clusters for the four vacancies for Court of Appeals Associate Justice. The JBC contends that during the deliberations on said nominations, the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Justice Velasco were both present as JBC consultants but did not rmse any objection.
While it may be true that the JBC already observed clustering in 2015, it is still considered a relatively new practice, adopted only under Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship of the JBC. The clustering then escaped scrutiny as no party questioned the appointments to the said vacancies. The view of the consultants was also not solicited or requested by the JBC. The Court now observes that the vacancies for Court of Appeals Associate Justice in 2015 were not all simultaneous or closely successive, most of which occurring months apart, specifically, vice the late Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias who passed away on November 20, 2014; vice retired Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, who opted for early retirement effective on January 31, 2015; vice Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, who compulsorily retired on June 12, 2015; and vice Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican who compulsorily retired on July 4, 2015. Even so, the JBC published a single announcement for all four vacancies on March 15, 2015, with the same deadlines for submission of applications and supporting documents. This is in stark contrast to the two-week interval between the compulsory retirements of Supreme Court Associate Justices Perez and Brion on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively, for which the JBC still made separate publications, required submission of separate applications, separately processed the applications, and submitted separate short lists. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the nominations for the four vacant posts of Court of Appeals Associate Justice were contained in a single letter dated August 17, 2015, addressed to President Aquino, through then Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., whereas in the case of the Sandiganbayan, the JBC submitted six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015, transmitting one short list for each of the six vacancies. The separate letters of transmittal further reinforce the intention of the JBC to prevent the President from "cross-reaching" or disregarding the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and, thus, unduly limit the President's exercise of his power to appoint members of the Judiciary.
f. The separate short lists for the current vacancies in the Supreme Court are not in issue in this case, but has been brought up by the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-inIntervention.
The Court takes the occasion herein to clarify that the application of its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2017 to the situation involving closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court may be properly addressed in an actual case which squarely raises the issue. It also bears to stress that the current vacancies in the Supreme Court as a result of the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion are not in issue in this case, but has been brought to the fore by the JBC itself in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Therefore, the Court will refrain from making any pronouncements on the separate short lists of nominees submitted by the JBC to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (Duterte) on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016 so as not to preempt the President's decision on how to treat the separate short lists of nominees for the two current vacancies in the Supreme Court. The Court will only address the statements made by the JBC in relation to said short lists by reciting some relevant historical facts relating to the filling-up of previous vacancies in the Supreme Court.
The JBC avers that it had no choice but to submit separate short lists of nominees to President Duterte for the vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who retired on December 14, 2016 and December 29, 2016, respectively, because there were different sets of applicants for each, with 14 applicants for the seat vacated by Associate Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Associate Justice Brion. The situation is the own doing of the JBC, as the JBC announced the expected vacancies left by the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion, which were merely two weeks apart, through two separately paid publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016, respectively, in newspapers of general circulation; invited the filing of separate applications for the vacancies with different deadlines; and
separately processed the applications of candidates to the said vacancies. The JBC would inevitably end up with two different sets of nominees, one set for the position vacated by Justice Perez and another set for that vacated by Justice Brion, notwithstanding that the JBC undeniably found all nominees in both sets to be qualified to be appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as they all garnered at least four votes.
There had been no similar problems in the past because the JBC jointly announced simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in the Supreme Court in a single publication, invited the filing by a candidate of a single application for all the vacancies on the same deadline, jointly processed all applications, and submitted a single list of qualified nominees to the President, thus, resulting in a simple, inexpensive, and efficient process of nomination. Such was the case when the JBC announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice following the retirements of Associate Justices Quisumbing and Chico-Nazario in 2009. Pertinent portions of the JBC publication are reproduced below:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening, for application or recommendation, of the: two (2) forthcoming vacant positions of ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT vice Bon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Bon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario, who will compulsorily retire on 6 November and 5 December 2009, respectively. x x xThe JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, submitted to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single short list dated November 29, 2009 with a total of six nominees for the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice, from which, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Associate Justices Perez and Mendoza.
Applications or recommendation for the two (2) positions in the Supreme Court must be submitted not later than 28 September 2009 (Monday) x x x to the JBC Secretariat, 2nd Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme Court, Padre Faura St., Manila (Tel. No. 552-9512; Fax No. 552-9607; email address jbc_supreme court@yahoo.com.ph or jbc@sc.judiciary.gov.ph). Applicants or recommendees must submit six (6) copies of the following:
x x x x
The JBC again announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice due to the retirements of Associate Justices Nachura and Carpio Morales, thus:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening, for application or recommendation, of the following positions:The single short list dated June 21, 2011, submitted by the JBC, under the Chairmanship of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, presented, for President Aquino's consideration, six nominees for the two vacant posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice, with President Aquino subsequently appointing Associate Justices Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe.Applications or recommendations for vacancies in nos. 1-3 must be filed on or before 28 March 2011 (Monday) x x x to the JBC Secretariat, 2nd Flr. Centennial Bldg., Supreme Court, Padre Faura St., Manila (Tel. No. 552-9512; Fax No. 552-9598; email address jbc supremecourt@yahoo.com.ph. Those who applied before these vacancies were declared open must manifest in writing their interest on or before the said deadline. In case of recommendations, the recommendees must signify their acceptance either in the recommendation letter itself or in a separate document.
- ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT (vice Hon. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, who will compulsorily retire on 13 and 19 June 2011, respectively);
x x x x
New applicants or recommendees for positions in the appellate courts must submit the following on or before 4 April 2011 (Monday) x x x:
x x x x
How the new procedure adopted by the JBC of submitting two separate lists of nominees will also affect the seniority of the two Supreme Court Associate Justices to be appointed to the current vacancies is another issue that may arise because of the new JBC procedure. Unlike the present two separate lists of nominees specifying the vacant post to which they are short-listed for appointment, the short list of nominees submitted by the JBC before did not identify to which of the vacant positions, when there are more than one existing vacancies, a qualified candidate is nominated to as there was only one list of nominees for all vacancies submitted to the President. Correspondingly, the appointment papers issued by the President, as in the cases of Supreme Court Associate Justices Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, did not specify the particular vacant post to which each of them was appointed. The appointment papers of the afore-named Supreme Court Associate Justices were all similarly worded as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.As earlier stated, the Court makes no ruling on the abovementioned divergence between the procedures in the nomination for existing vacancies in the Supreme Court followed by the JBC before and by the present JBC as it may be premature to do so and may prejudge whatever action President Duterte may take on the two separate short lists of nominees for the current Supreme Court vacancies which were submitted by the JBC.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your Oath of Office.
g. The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts encroached on the President's power to determine the seniority of the justices appointed to the said court.
The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that its individual members have different reasons for designating numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. The varying reason/s of each individual JBC Members raises the concern whether they each fully appreciated the constitutional and legal consequences of their act, i.e., that it encroached on the power, solely vested in the President, to determine the seniority of the justices appointed to a collegiate court. Each of the six short lists submitted by the JBC to President Aquino explicitly stated that the nominees were for the Sixteenth (16th), Seventeenth (17th), Eighteenth (18th), Nineteenth (19th), Twentieth (20th), and Twenty-First (21st) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, respectively; and on the faces of said short lists, it could only mean that President Aquino was to make the appointments in the order of seniority pre-detennined by the JBC, and that nominees who applied for any of the vacant positions, requiring the same qualifications, were deemed to be qualified to be considered for appointment only to the one vacant position to which his/her cluster was specifically assigned. Whatever the intentions of the individual JBC Members were, they cannot go against what has been clearly established by law,[19] rules,[20] and jurisprudence.[21] In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President.It is also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion for Reconsideration, the clustering of nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate short lists can rid the appointment process to the Judiciary of political pressure; or conversely, how the previous practice of submitting a single list of nominees to the President for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, reqmrmg the same qualifications, made the appointment process more susceptible to political pressure. The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.
It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.[22]
Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the ground that it is not a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other reliefs and remedies, for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016 denying the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case. However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into consideration the issues raised and arguments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious.
To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate short lists. The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 that:
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.[23]The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned.
As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a separate administrative matter (viz., Item No.2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to submit its comment and be heard on the same. The administrative matter was already raffled to another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same should be consolidated in the said administrative matter.
Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa, it must be pointed out that he has conceded that the President did not commit an unconstitutional act in "disregarding the clustering done by the JBC" when he chose Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for intervention, which the Court has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of merit.
Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the separate short lists of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte for the present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these were not in issue nor deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the decision the President may take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of his power to appoint members of the Judiciary under the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., no part.
Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., I concur in the result. (Please see Separate Opinion. The November 29, 2016 Decision does not apply to closely successive vacancies like those created with retirement of Justice Brion and Perez.
Reyes, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I concur in the result and also join the Separate Opinion of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I concur in the result. See Separate Opinion.
Caguioa, J., See Separate Opinion.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on February 21, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on March 1, 2017 at 1:44 p.m.
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) | |
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA | |
Clerk of Court |
[1] Rollo, pp. 250-251.
[2] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 18-19.
[3] Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shaH issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
[4] Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where
(a) | The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; |
(b) | The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; |
(c) | The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy; |
(d) | The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; |
(e) | The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review; |
(f) | The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or |
(g) | The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings[.] |
[5] Rollo, p. 277.
[6] 707 Phil. 754 (2013).
[7] G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, & 226294, November 8, 2016.
[8] 646 Phil. 1 (2010).
[9] Supra note 2 at 32.
[10] A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, May 4, 2010.
[11] Rule 8, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 1. Grounds for Inhibition. - A Member of the Court shall inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any of these and similar reasons:
(a) | the Member of the Court was the ponente of the decision or participated in the proceedings in the appellate or trial court; |
(b) | the Member of the Court was counsel, partner or member of a law firm that is or was the counsel in the case subject to Section 3(c) of this rule; |
(c) | the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or child is pecuniarily interested in the case; |
(d) | the Member of the Court is related to either party in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; |
(e) | the Member of the Court was executor, administrator, guardian or trustee in the case; and |
(f) | the Member of the Court was an official or is the spouse of an official or former official of a government agency or private entity that is a party to the case, and the Justice or his or her spouse has reviewed or acted on any matter relating to the case. |
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any of those mentioned above.
The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.
[12] Judicial and Bar Council Minutes, 10-2015, October 26, 2015, Monday, En Banc Conference Room, New Supreme Court Building, 10:00 a.m., p. 2.
[13] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[14] G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279.
[15] 446 Phil. 433, 447-448 (2003).
[16] Sec. 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and compensation. - x x x
x x x x
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.
[17] Sec. 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence. -
x x x x
(b) Rule on Precedence - The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments.
[18] Supra note 8.
[19] Section 1, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, supra note 16.
[20] Rule II, Section 1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra note 17.
[21] Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, supra note 8.
[22] Rollo, p. 238.
[23] Id. at 242.
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I agree that there is no compelling reason for Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro (Justice Leonardo-de Castro) to inhibit in the case at bar. Justice Leonardo-de Castro explained at length the extent of her participation, or non-participation, in the closed door meetings of the JBC when she was still a consultant thereof She is not privy to the decision of the JBC to approve the rule on the clustering of nominees, much less to its implementation.
I likewise concur with the majority that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) should be allowed to intervene in the present proceeding. The nullification of the JBC's act of clustering the nominees for the Sandiganbayan vacancies was a precondition before the Court could have upheld the validity of the subject appointments. In fact, this was where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) primarily anchored its defenses. I cannot, therefore, agree that "[t]he declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for simultaneous vacancies in the collegiate court is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling."[1] On the contrary, it is, as it remains to be, the very core of the controversy. It thus behooved this Court to hear the counter-arguments of the JBC against the OSG's contention.
Beyond quibble then is that the JBC is clothed with legal interest to take part in this case. The Court's attempt at curbing the august body's practice is more than palpable in the language of the Decision. The fallo of the adverted ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan as VALID. The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar Council in the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket as a separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item No. 2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 35-40 of this Decision. The Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment on said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.I am amenable to the afore-quoted decretal portion of the November 29, 2016 Decision but, regrettably, I cannot fully agree with the following statement made in the discussion therein:[2]
SO ORDERED.
The ruling of the Court in this case shall similarly apply to the situation wherein there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, to which the President shall make appointments on the same occasion, regardless of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies. The President is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. (emphasis added)This sweeping statement automatically makes an issue on how future nominations and appointments are to be made. It is not a mere pro hac vice ruling on the particular appointments in issue herein, but precedent setting. Preferably, the Court ought to take up the issue on whether or not the clustering of nominees is valid for closely successive appointments when there is an actual justiciable controversy on the matter. However, the Court's power of supervision over the JBC,[3] to my mind, permits us to grab the bull by the horns and resolve the boundaries of the doctrine set herein to serve as a guide not only to the JBC but also to the incumbent President.
My misgivings on the above declaration stem from the fact that separate application processes would yield varying number of applicants and different persons applying. It would then be erroneous to treat as one group the applicants who vied for different posts. The shortlists for the posts vacated by Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Justice Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Justice Brion) would assist in illustrating this point:[4]
If I may convey some possible permutations and a few observations:
Shortlist for the position vacated by Associate Justice Jose P. Perez Shortlist for the position vacated by Associate Justice D. Brion Reyes, Jose Jr. C. - 7 votes Carandang, Rosmari D. - 6 votes Bruselas, Apolinario Jr. D.- 5 votes Bruselas, Apolinario Jr. D. - 5 votes Dimaampao, Japar B. - 5 votes Reyes, Jose Jr. C. - 4 votes Martires, Samuel R. - 5 votes Dimaampao, Japar B. - 4 votes Reyes, Andres Jr. B. - 4 votes Lazaro-Javier, Amy C. - 4 votes Tijam, Noel G. - 4 votes Ventura-Jimeno, Rita Linda S.- 4 votes
First, the ruling of majority permits the commingling of shortlists and would automatically render Hon. Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, a nominee for the position vacated by Associate Justice Jose P. Perez even though she only applied for the post vacated by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion. This is an anomaly since Hon. Lazaro Javier only applied for the latter post.
Noteworthy is that the application process for the two vacancies was separate and distinct. The JBC announced on August 4, 2016 that it will be receiving applications and nominations for the post to be vacated by Justice Perez until September 20, 2016. In contrast, the call for applications and nominations for the post vacated by Justice Brion was published on August 18, 2016, with the deadline set on October 4, 2016.
From September 21, 2014 to October 4, 2016, the JBC was then only receiving applications nominations for the Supreme Court post vacated by Justice Brion. Had Hon. Lazaro-Javier filed her application/nomination during this period, then she could not, by any stretch of the imagination or legalese, be considered an applicant, let alone a nominee, for the post vacated by Justice Perez.
Second, the wording of the decision may likewise result in the appointment of one who did not get the necessary minimum number of votes. Sec. 2, Rule 8 of JBC No. 2016-01, otherwise known as the JBC Rules, provides:
In this case, Hon. Andres Reyes, Jr. applied for both vacant positions, but obtained the required number of votes and was included in the shortlist only for the post vacated by Justice Perez. There were 14 applicants/nominees for the said post as compared to the 17 for the post vacated by Justice Brion. Competition may have been tougher in the application process for Justice Brion's replacement, resulting in Hon. Reyes not reaching the voting threshold. Whatever the reason for his non-inclusion in the shortlist for Justice Brion's post may be, the fact remains that he could not be appointed for the same. He could only qualify as a nominee for the post vacated by Justice Perez.RULES
VOTING REQUIREMENTS
xxx
Sec. 2. Votes Required For Inclusion as Nominees. - For applicants to be considered for nomination, they should obtain the affirmative vote of at least four (4) Members of the Council.
Third, precisely because there were two application processes, the voting for the nominees was conducted separately. Thus, it was possible for applicants/nominees for both vacant positions to be voted upon twice by the same member of the JBC. The following example provided by the JBC is telling:[5]
Table 1. Filled-up Ballot of Member X (where maximum no. of choices is 8)As couched, the November 29, 2016 Decision would affect the manner by which the JBC members cast their votes: Should they be entitled to only one ballot since the clustered shortlists are to be considered as one comprehensive shortlist? Should they set a guideline in determining the maximum number of choices according to the number of vacancies to be filled?
Applicants for Vacancy
(vice J. Perez) Applicants for Vacancy
(vice J. Brion) A 1 A B B C C D 2 D 1 E E F 3 F 2 G 4 G 3 H H I 5 I 4 J J K 6 K 5 L L M 7 M 6 N 8 N 7 O P Q 8
These are legitimate concerns that would arise should the Court sustain its Decision. These contingencies should have been clearly addressed before we refrained from limiting the application of the ruling pro hac vice and instead ruled that it may validly and similarly be invoked in situations "wherein there are closely successive vacancies in a collegiate court, xxx regardless of whether the JBC carried out combined or separate application process/es for the vacancies."[6]
As a final word, the Court is well aware that the treatment of the vacancies that resulted from the mandatory retirements of Justices Perez and Brion is capable of repetition to those from the retirements of Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza and Bienvenido L. Reyes on July 6, 2017 and August 13, 2017, respectively. We must then be prudent in resolving this collateral issue before the Court is hounded by controversies surrounding the legitimacy of the succeeding appointees to the Court.
The foregoing premises considered, I hereby register my vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention. Although the unconstitutionality of the clustering is sustained, the application of the doctrine should be limited to simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, not to closely successive vacancies thereto.
[1] Draft Resolution, p. 17.
[2] November 29, 2016, p. 32.
[3] Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. xxx
[4] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 20-21.
[5] Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, pp. 20-21.
[6] November 29, 2016 Decision.
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result insofar as the finding that respondents did not gravely abuse their discretion in making appointments to the Sandiganbayan as all six vacancies were opened for the first time. I do not find any reasonable basis to cluster nominees in this case, where the law created simultaneous new vacancies for a collegial court. I agree with the ponencia that future vacancies for collegial appellate courts and this Court, are not at issue in this case. Hence, this Court should rule on the issues as it does not render advisory opinions.
I likewise concur in the ponencia's denial of the Motion for Inhibition filed by the Judicial and Bar Council. This Court, in its Internal Rules, provided the grounds[1] on which a member of the Court must inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case, and none of the cited reasons apply to the ponente. I am convinced that there is no reason for the ponente to voluntarily inhibit herself from resolving or participating in this case.
The ponente has adequately explained that she was neither privy nor consulted by the Judicial and Bar Council on the move to cluster the applicants to the newly created Sandiganbayan positions into six (6) separate shortlists.[2]
I see no reason to doubt the ponente's statement of impartiality. In the years that I have worked alongside the ponente, I have personally witnessed her unblemished character and unwavering commitment to upholding the rule of law. Historically, her moral compass has never waned. I have no reason to doubt her impartiality in this case.
However, the Judicial and Bar Council should be allowed to intervene in the case. As the party who committed the act of clustering the Sandiganbayan applicants-an act that was eventually declared unconstitutional-the Judicial and Bar Council clearly has a legal interest in the matter under litigation. Without the participation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the doctrine in this case will only be about the discretion of the President when there are simultaneous vacancies in newly created divisions of a collegial court. This policy should not extend to other vacancies caused by retirements in the future.
Nonetheless, I reiterate that the Decision[3] dated November 29, 2016 only affects collegial bodies such as the Sandiganbayan, when there are simultaneous vacancies. When there are successive vacancies in collegial courts, such as what happened in this Court, with the recent retirement of Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Associate Justice Perez) and Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion), there may be valid reasons for the submission of two (2) separate shortlists to the President. However, again, that is not at issue in this case.
On November 16, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council interviewed the following candidates for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice to replace Associate Justice Perez, who compulsorily retired on December 14, 2016:
1. RUEDA-ACOSTA, Persida V.The following were also candidates for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice (to replace Associate Justice Perez), although they were no longer interviewed because their previous interviews were still valid:
2. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S.
3. APAO-ADLAWAN, Rowena M.
4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B.
....
1. MARTIRES, Samuel R.
2. PARAS, Ricardo III., V. (also a candidate for the Sandiganbayan)
3. TIJAM, Noel G.[4] (Emphasis in the original)
1. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr., D.On November 17, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council interviewed the following candidates for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice to replace Associate Justice Brion, who compulsorily retired on December 29, 2016:
2. CARANDANG, Rosmari D.
3. CRUZ, Stephen C.
4. DAWAY, Reynaldo B.
5. QUIROZ, Alex L.
6. REYES, Andres Jr., B.
7. REYES, Jose Jr., C.[5] (Emphasis in the original)
1. BORJA, Romulo V.The following candidates were likewise considered for the position vacated by Associate Justice Brion:
2. LAZARO-JAVIER, Amy C.
3. SAN PEDRO, Joseph P.[6] (Emphasis in the original)
1. APAO-ADLAWAN, Rowena M.On December 2, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council forwarded to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) the following nominations for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice (to replace Associate Justice Perez):
2. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B.
3. MARTIRES, Samuel R.
4. PARAS, Ricardo III., V.
5. RUEDA-ACOSTA, Persida V.
6. TIJAM, Noel G.
7. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S.
....
1. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr., D.
2. CARANDANG, Rosmari D.
3. CRUZ, Stephen C.
4. DAWAY, Reynaldo B.
5. QUIROZ, Alex L.
6. REYES, Andres Jr., B.
7. REYES, Jose Jr., C.[7] (Emphasis in the original)
One (1) week later, on December 9, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council forwarded to President Duterte a second shortlist for the position of Supreme Court Associate Justice (to replace Associate Justice Brion) with the following nominees:
1. REYES, Jose Jr. C. - 7 votes 2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario Jr. D. - 5 votes 3. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. - 5 votes 4. MARTIRES, Samuel R. - 5 votes 5. REYES, Andres Jr. B. - 4 votes[8]
Although the two situations appear similar, in that the Judicial and Bar Council submitted two separate shortlists for the two vacancies in this Court and six separate shortlists for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, the similarity ends there. The two shortlists for this Court were for the two vacanctes brought about by the mandatory retirement of two Associate Justices on two separate dates. Further, applicants such as Romulo V. Borja, Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, and Joseph P. San Pedro opted to apply only for the position vacated by Associate Justice Brion, while the other candidates applied for both vacancies.
1. CARANDANG, Rosmari D. - 6 votes 2. BRUSELAS, Apolinario, Jr. D. - 5 votes 3. REYES, Jose, Jr. C. - 5 votes 4. DIMAAMPAO, Japar B. - 4 votes 5. LAZARO-JAVIER, Amy C. - 4 votes 6. TIJAM, Noel G. - 4 votes 7. VENTURA-JIMENO, Rita Linda S. - 4 votes[9]
In comparison, the applicants for the Sandiganbayan applied for all six vacancies. From September 28, 2015 to October 13, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council interviewed the following candidates for the six newly created positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
The following candidates had been previously interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council and were also considered for the six newly created Sandiganbayan positions:
28 September 2015 (Monday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. BASCOS-SARABIA, Ma. Rita A. 1. ALAMEDA, Elmo M. 2. BERNAD, Ana Celeste P. 2. ALARCON-LEONES, Maria Lourdes 3. BITON, Lily V. 3. ALHAMBRA, Reynaldo A. 4. CALO, Ofelia L. 4. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, Rosanna Fe 29 September 2015 (Tuesday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. CARILLO, Edwin M. 1. ALISUAG, Tita B. 2. CRUZ, Reynaldo P. 2. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, Evangeline C. 3. SANTOS, Efren G. 3. CORPUS-MAÑALAC, Maryann E. 4. CRUZ-MANGROBANG, Ma. Celestina C. 30 September 2015 (Wednesday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. RAMOS, Renan E. 1. DE ALBAN, Isaac R. 2. DIZON, Ma. Antonia Edita C. 2. FALCIS, Rudiger II G. 3. POCO-DESLATE, Esperanza Isabel E. 3. FERNANDEZ, Bemelito R. 01 October 2015 (Thursday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. GONZALES, Teodora R. 1. JORGE-WAGAN, Wilhelmina B. 2. JACINTO, Bayani H. 2. POZON, Benjamin T. 3. KALLOS, Robert E. 3. REYES, Felix P. 4. TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, Rowena 02 October 2015 (Friday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. MACARAIG, Virgilio V. 1. APAO-ADLAWAN, Rowena 2. ARETA, Juanita G. 2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, Maria Theresa 3. MARIÑO-RICABLANCA, Cynthia R. 3. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Victoria C. 4. TENORIO, Buenaventura Albert Jr. J. 05 October 2015 (Monday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. MIRANDA, Karl B. 1. CORTEZ, Luisito G. 2. PAYOYO-VILLORDON, Tita Marilyn 2. DAMASING, Henry B. 3. TRESPESES, Zaldy V. 3. TAN, Rowena Nieves A. 4. QUIMBO, Rodolfo Noel S. 06 October 2015 (Tuesday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. SAGUN, Fernando Jr. T. 1. GENGOS, Vicente Jr. L. 2. GAMOTIN-NERY, Evelyn J. 2. HIDALGO, Georgina D. 3. MISLOS-LOJA, Rosalyn D. 3. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, Marissa 4. JUSTALERO, Globert J. 07 October 2015 (Wednesday)9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon 2:00 - 5:00 p.m. 1. GUANZON, Frances V. 1. SIO, Primo Jr. G. 2. MUSNGI, Michael Frederick L. 2. PAMPILO, Silvino Jr. T. 3. SANTOS, Maria Bernardita 3. PANGANIBAN, Elvira DC 12 October 2015 (Monday) 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon1. AGUINALDO, Philip A. 3. AVILA, Edgar M.... 2. BUNYI-MEDINA, Thelma 13 October 2015 (Tuesday) 2:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.1. RIVERA-COLASITO, Caroline 2. MALENAB-HORNILLA, Linda L.[10] (Emphasis in the original)
None of the candidates applied for a particular Sandiganbayan division, yet on October 26, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council grouped them in six (6) separate shortlists to correspond to the six (6) newly created Sandiganbayan divisions. The letters to Former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Former President Aquino) read:
1. ABUNDIENTE, Arthur L. 16. FIEL-MACARAIG, Geraldine C. 2. ACEBIDO, Jeoffre W. 17. GUTIERREZ, Alice C. 3. AGANON, Cesar L. 18. MENEZ, Martin T. 4. ALARAS, Selma P. 19. PAUIG, Vilma T. 5. ATAL-PAÑO, Perpetua 20. QUIMPO-SALE, Angelen Mary W. 6. BAGUIO, Celso O. 21. ROBENIOL, Gabriel T. 7. BAUTISTA, Jose Jr. L. 22. ROXAS, Ruben Reynaldo G. 8. BUSTOS-ONGKEKO, Divinagracia G. 23. SANDOVAL, Danilo S. 9. CRUZ, Danilo S. 24. SANTOS, Edgar Dalmacio 10. DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, Ma. Theresa E. 25. SOLIS-REYES, Jocelyn 11. DOCENA, Zaldy B. 26. SORIANO, Andres Bartolome 12. DOMINGO, Lorna Navarro 27. TACLA, Esteban Jr. A. 13. ECONG, Geraldine Faith A. 28. TIMBANG, Salvador Jr. V. 14. FERNANDEZ, Teodoro C. 29. VIVERO, Kevin Narce B. 15. FIDER-REYES, Maria Amifaith S. 30. ZURAEK, Merianthe Pacita M.[11] (Emphasis in the original)
1) For the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:Unlike the Sandiganbayan shortlists, some of the nominees for the Supreme Court vacancies appeared in both shortlists submitted to the President because they applied for both vacancies. This is a tacit recognition that these nominees qualified for both vacancies in this Court. This is contrary to the unique nature of the Sandiganbayan shortlists in this case, where the nominees were limited to only one shortlist each even if they qualified and applied for all of the vacancies.
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the SIXTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. AGUINALDO, PHILIP A. - 5 votes 2. ALHAMBRA, REYNALDO A. - 5 votes 3. CRUZ, DANILO S. - 5 votes 4. POZON, BENJAMIN T. - 5 votes 5. SANDOVAL, DANILO S. - 5 votes 6. TIMBANG, SALVADOR JR. - 5 votes
2) For the 17th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the SEVENTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. CORPUS-MAÑALAC, MARYANN E. - 6 votes 2. MENDOZA-ARCEGA, MARIA THERESA V. - 6 votes 3. QUIMBO, RODOLFO NOELS. - 6 votes 4. DIZON, MA. ANTONIA EDITA CLARIDADES - 5 votes 5. SORIANO, ANDRES BARTOLOME - 5 votes
3) For the 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the EIGHTEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. BAGUIO, CELSO O. - 5 votes 2. DE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, MA. TERESA E. - 5 votes 3. FERNANDEZ, BERNELITO R. - 5 votes 4. PANGANIBAN, ELVIRA DE CASTRO - 5 votes 5. SAGUN, FERNANDO JR. T. - 5 votes 6. TRESPESES, ZALDY V. - 5 votes
4) For the 19th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the NINETEENTH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. GUANZON, FRANCES V. - 6 votes 2. MACARAIG-GUILLEN, MARISSA - 6 votes 3. CRUZ, REYNALDO P. - 5 votes 4. PAUIG, VILMA T. - 5 votes 5. RAMOS, RENAN E. - 5 votes 6. ROXAS, RUBEN REYNALDO G. - 5 votes
5) For the 20th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTIETH ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. MIRANDA, KARL B. - 6 votes 2. ATAL-PANO, PERPETUA - 5 votes 3. BUNYI-MEDINA, THELMA - 5 votes 4. CORTEZ, LUISITO G. - 5 votes 5. FIEL-MACARAIG, GERALDINE C. - 5 votes 6. QUIMPO-SALE, ANGELENE MARY W. - 5 votes 7. JACINTO, BAYANI H. - 4 votes
6) For the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice:
Your Excellency:
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the honor to submit the following nominations for the vacancy for the TWENTY-FIRST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE of the SANDIGANBAYAN, with their respective votes:
1. JORGE-WAGAN, WILHELMINA B. - 6 votes 2. ECONG, GERALDINE FAITH A. - 5 votes 3. ROMERO-MAGLAYA, ROSANNA FE - 5 votes 4. ZURAEK, MERIANTHE PACITA M. - 5 votes 5. ALAMEDA, ELMO M. - 4 votes 6. FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, VICTORIA C. - 4 votes 7. MUSNGI, MICHAEL FREDERICK L. - 4 votes[12]
With the forthcoming mandatory retirement of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes on July 6, 2017 and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza on August 13, 2017, this Court will have another set of vacancies. By the time the two positions for Supreme Court Associate Justice become vacant, the Judicial and Bar Council might be composed of different members. The composition of the Judicial and Bar Council regularly changes because of the term-sharing arrangement practiced by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice sits as the Judicial and Bar Council ex-officio member from January to June, while the Chair of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights takes over from July to December. Because of the different dates of the vacancies, as well as the possibly different composition of the Judicial and Bar Council, two different shortlists should be submitted.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, the Judicial and Bar Council explained that it merely followed Article VIII, Section 9[13] of the 1987 Constitution when it clustered into six separate shortlists the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.[14] It contended that clustering was a practical solution meant to distinguish one shortlist from another and avoid confusion.[15]
The Judicial and Bar Council[16] was created under the 1987 Constitution. It was intended to be a fully independent constitutional body functioning as a check-and-balance on the President's power of appointment.
Before the existence of the Judicial and Bar Council, the executive and legislative branches had the exclusive prerogative of appointing members of the judiciary, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, this appointment process was highly susceptible to political pressure and partisan activities and eventually prompted the need for a separate, competent, and independent body to recommend to the President nominees to the Judiciary.[17]
The Judicial and Bar Council is not merely a technical committee that evaluates the fitness and integrity of applicants in the Judiciary. It is a constitutional organ participating in the process that guides the direction of the Judiciary. Its composition represents a cross section of the legal profession, retired judges and Justices, and the Chief Justice. More than a technical committee, it has the power to examine the judicial philosophies of the applicants and make selections, which it submits to the President. The President may have the final discretion to choose, but he or she chooses only from that list.
This is the complex relationship mandated by the sovereign through the Constitution. It ensures judicial independence, checks and balances on the Judiciary, and assurance for the rule of law.
In the proper actual case, the exact metes and bounds of the discussion of the Judicial and Bar Council can be determined. Here, however, the President did not abuse his discretion when he decided that there was no reason to cluster the applicants for the Sandiganbayan vacancies.
As a collegial court, the Sandiganbayan seats members who equally share power and sit in divisions of three (3) members each. The numerical designation of each division only pertains to the seniority or order of precedence based on the date of appointment. The Rule on Precedence is in place primarily for the orderly functioning of the Sandiganbayan, as reflected in Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 1. Composition of the Court and Rule on Precedence -In single courts such as the regional trial courts or municipal trial courts, each branch carries its own station code and acts separately and independently from other co-equal branches. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan divisions, as part of a collegial court, do not possess similar station codes. This is because there is no discernible difference between the divisions, and decisions are made not by one justice alone but by a majority or all of the members sitting in a division or En Banc. This reinforces the collegial nature of the Sandiganbayan: one that is characterized by the equal sharing of authority among the members.
(a) Composition - The Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices appointed by the President of the Philippines. (b) Rules on Precedence The Presiding Justice shall enjoy precedence over the other members of the Sandiganbayan in all official functions. The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of their appointments. (c) The Rule on Precedence shall apply: 1) In the seating arrangement; 2) In the choice of office space, facilities and equipment, transportation and cottages; (d) The Rule on Precedence shall not be observed: 1) In social and other non-official functions. 2) To justify any variation in the assignment of cases, amount of compensation, allowances or other forms of remuneration.
Additionally, in single courts, applicants may apply for each available vacancy; thus, to find the same applicant in shortlists for vacancies in different single courts is common. On the other hand, applicants in collegial courts apply only once even when there are simultaneous vacancies because among divisions in a collegial court, there is no substantial difference to justify the creation of separate shortlists or clusters for each vacancy.
I am of the view that Former President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the shortlists submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council for the simultaneous new vacancies and in treating all six shortlists as one from which he could choose the Sandiganbayan Justices. I reserve judgment on future vacancies in any collegial appellate court. This Court is unanimous on the scope of this judgment.
On the issue of this Court's supervision over the Judicial and Bar Council, I acknowledge that this Court has already taken cognizance and docketed as separate matters the deletion of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009 and the removal of incumbent Supreme Court Senior Associate Justices as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council.[18]
However, I reiterate that the Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to submit its revised internal rules to this Court for approval. Jardeleza v. Sereno[19] emphasized that this Court's power of judicial review is only to ensure that rules are followed.[20] It has neither the power to lay down these rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them.[21]
The Internal Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council is necessary and incidental to the function conferred to it by the Constitution. The Constitution may have provided the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, but it has given the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its mandate. This Court cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council's internal rules and policies. To do so would be an unconstitutional affront to the Judicial and Bar Council's independence.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur only in the result.
[1] S. CT. INT. RULES, Rule 8, sec. 1 provides:
Rule 8, Section 1. Grounds for Inhibition - A Member of the Court shall inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution of the case for any of these and similar reasons:
(a) | the Member of the Court was the ponente of the decision or participated in the proceedings in the appellate or trial court; |
(b) | the Member of the Court was counsel, partner or member of law firm that is or was the counsel in the case subject to Section 3(c) of this rule; |
(c) | the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or child is pecuniarily interested in the case; |
(d) | the Member of the Court is related to either party in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; |
(e) | the Member of the Court was executor, administrator, guardian or trustee in the case; and |
(f) | the Member of the Court was an official or is the spouse of an official or former official of a government agency or private entity that is a party to the case, and the Justice or his or her spouse has reviewed or acted on any matter relating to the case. |
A Member of the Court may in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other than any of those mentioned above.
The inhibiting Member must state the precise reason for the inhibition.
[2] Resolution (G.R. No. 224302), pp. 5-6.
[3] Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <
[4] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated October 20, 2016 <
[5] Id.
[6] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated October 28, 2016 <
[7] Id.
[8] Judicial and Bar Council, letter dated December 2, 2016 <
[9] Judicial and Bar Council, letter dated December 9, 2016 <
[10] Judicial and Bar Council, Announcement dated September 11, 2015 <
[11] Id.
[12] G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <
[13] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 9 provides:
SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a Jist of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
[14] Resolution (G.R. No. 224302), pp. 13-14.
[15] Id. at 15.
[16] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8.
[17] Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 188 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[18] Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016 <
[19] G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014, 733 SCRA 279 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[20] Id. at 326.
[21] Id.
SEPARATE OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I am filing this separate opinion to clarify my position on the final disposition of the case wherein the Court, in dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Certiorari, declared the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) unconstitutional and the appointments of Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as valid. As explained below, I maintain my position that the dismissal of the Petition and the upholding of the appointments of the six newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan are in order. It is, however, the ruling on the unconstitutionality of the questioned act of the JBC that I am espousing a separate view.
In the Decision dated November 29, 2016, I joined the Concurring Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. Justice Leonen stated:
I concur in the result in so far as finding that the respondents did not gravely abuse their discretion in making appointments to the Sandiganbayan, considering that all six vacancies were opened for the first time. I disagree that we make findings as to whether the Judicial and Bar Council gravely abused its discretion considering that they were not impleaded and made party to this case. Even for the Judicial and Bar Council, a modicum of fairness requires that we should have heard them and considered their arguments before we proceed to exercise any degree of supervision as they exercise their constitutionally mandated duties.[1]After the JBC filed on December 27, 2016 its Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and on February 6, 2017 its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016), the majority of the Court resolved to grant its motion/prayer for intervention and to deny the Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente. To this extent, I concur with the Court's Resolution.
On the motion for inhibition, the ponente is in the best position to determine whether her involvement with the JBC justifies her possible inhibition in this case. The ponente has found no basis for her inhibition, and I accept her decision unqualifiedly.
On the JBC's motion to intervene, I reiterate the position taken by J. Leonen, to which I concurred, that the JBC should be allowed to intervene. To be sure, the JBC is not an ordinary body. It was created by no less than our Constitution, and given the constitutional mandate of recommending to the President the nominees to every vacancy in the judiciary.[2] Hence, since the JBC's very action has been declared by the Court unconstitutional, the JBC clearly has a legal interest in the matter in litigation and is so situated as to be adversely affected by the disposition of the Court.[3] Everyone deserves a day in court. The JBC is no exception.
The very purpose and singular function of the JBC is involved in the Petition as the petitioners' reliefs are grounded on the simple formulation that the President's act of appointing Justices Musngi and Econg was made in violation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. This, in turn, is premised on the petitioners' belief that the President could not appoint Justices for any given position (in specific reference to the 16th and 21st stations/Associate Justice positions) outside of the list of nominees that had been clustered by the JBC for each of the stations/Associate Justice positions.
In plain terms, the Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges oflower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.To my mind, the pointed question to be resolved is this: "If respondent President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (President Aquino) had made his appointments of the six new Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan. based on the six separate lists prepared by the JBC, meaning one appointment per list, would he have violated the Constitution?"
x x x x
If the answer is in the affirmative, then the action of the JBC would be unconstitutional. Inversely, if the answer is in the negative, meaning the Court upholds as constitutional the appointments made following the clustering by the JBC, then that would, in tum, mean that the JBC had acted pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.President Aquino was presented with six lists to fill up the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. Each list has at least three nominees. An appointment coming from each of the six lists would be in keeping with the Constitutional provision. I cannot see it otherwise. Thus, had President Aquino picked one from each of the six lists prepared by the JBC, I would not have declared his action unconstitutional.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
My basis is the plain language of the above Constitutional provision which mandates the JBC to recommend nominees to any vacancy in the judiciary-to prepare a list of at least three nominees for every vacancy.[4]
So long as the grouping of at least three nominees for every vacancy by the JBC did not impinge on the President's appointing power, there is, in my view, no violation of the Constitution. Thus, I cannot view as grave abuse of discretion the act of the JBC in adopting the six lists it came up with following its "textualist approach of constitutional interpretation".
In the same vein, that President Aquino chose to disregard JBC's clustering, and considered all the 37 nominees named in the six lists, is likewise "textually compliant" with Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution (i.e., because there are at least three nominees for each of the six Associate Justice positions).[5] For this reason, I cannot find the act of President Aquino as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In fine, I find nothing unconstitutional in the questioned action of the JBC-in the same manner that Ifind nothing unconstitutional in the act of President Aquino in disregarding the clustering done by the JBC, and in choosing Associate Justices for each of the vacancies "outside" of the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to RECONSIDER the Decision dated November 29, 2016 and to DELETE from the dispositive portion the declaration that "the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council [as] UNCONSTITUTIONAL."
[1] Hon. Philip A. Aguinaldo, et al. v. His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016, Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen, p. 1.
[2] Section 8(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides: "The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. x x x"
[3] RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Sec. 1.
[4] A list containing at least three nominees consists a group. A group may also be called a cluster. However, a "cluster" is defined by Merriam-Webster as: "a number of similar things that occur together: such as a : two or more consecutive consonants or vowels in a segment of a speech b : a group of buildings and especially houses built together on a sizable tract in order to preserve open spaces larger than the individual yard for common recreation c : an aggregation of stars or galaxies that appear close together in the sky and are gravitationally associated x x x d : a larger than expected number of cases of disease (as leukemia) occurring in a particular locality, group of people, or period of time e : a number of computers networked together in order to function as a single computing system x x x." MERRIAMWEBSTER available at
[5] Meaning, since there were 6 positions, there should have been at least a minimum of 18 nominees in compliance with the Constitution. Thus, since there were, in fact, 37 nominees for the 6 positions, then the Constitutional requirement was still met.