[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]^[136]

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,^[137] as regards the information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest—that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.^[138] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.^[139]

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.^[140] In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.^[141]

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.^[142] Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.^[143]

In In Re Mosier,^[144] a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.^[145] It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.^[146]

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.^[147]

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.^[148] However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.^[149] This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence^[150] of any separability clause.^[151]

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a)	Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b)	Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c)	Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d)	When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e)	When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f)	When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g)	When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social, communitv or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h)	When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.[152] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.^[153]

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof,^[154] does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.^[155] Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.^[156] (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty" ^[157] is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";^[158] "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."^[159] Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."^[160]

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs^[161] recognized under Section 54^[162] of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."^[163] The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";^[164] while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."^[165] Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."^[166]

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."^[167] The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";^[168] while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."^[169] In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,^[170] hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on August 8, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on September 13, 2017 at 9:13 a.m.

^[1] Id. at 3-36.

^[2] Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on April 28, 2006.

^[3] Rollo, p. 6.

^[4] Id. at 37-40.

^[5] Id. at 41-43. Entitled "Ordinansa na Nag-aamyenda sa Ilang Bahagi ng Tuntunin 1, 2 at Tuntunin 4 ng Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02, Kilala Bilang Ordinansang Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila."

^[6] Id. at 44-47.

^[7] Id. at 48-60.

^[8] See id. at 5-6.

^[9] Namely, herein petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim and John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, and Ronel Baccutan, Mark Leo Delos Reyes, and Clarissa Joyce Villegas, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr, as leaders and members of the SPARK, respectively. Id. at 4-5.

^[10] Id. at 4.

^[11] See id. at 16.

^[12] Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006' AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on October 3, 2013.

^[13] See rollo, pp. 20-21.

^[14] See id.

^[15] See id. at 21-22.

^[16] Id. at 23.

^[17] Id. at 23-25.

^[18] Id. at 25.

^[19] Sec. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.

(b) If offender is Fifteen (15) years and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. for the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. for the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impositions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. for the THIRD OFFENSE AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor. (See id. at 45.)

^[20] Section 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances.- Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars.

^[21] See rollo, pp. 18-19.

^[22] Id. at 26-28.

^[23] See id. at 243-248.

^[24] Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 525 (2014).

^[25] Id.

^[26] Id.

^[27] Id. at 528.

^[28] Id. at 531; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[29] See G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, December 6, 2016.

^[30] See id.

^[31] See Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294, November 8, 2016.

^[32] Arroyo v. Department of Justice, 695 Phil. 302, 334 (2012); emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[33] Id. at 335; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[34] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519 (2013).

^[35] See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29.

^[36] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 519; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[37] See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[38] Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 123-124 (2014); emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[39] See TRO dated July 26, 2016 issued by Clerk of Court Felipa B. Anama; rollo, pp. 67-70.

^[40] Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241, 327-328; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[41] Id. at 328.

^[42] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 527; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[43] Rollo, p. 5.

^[44] Clarissa was seventeen (17) years old (see Certificate of Live Birth; id. at 63) at the time the petition was filed on July 22, 2016 (see id. at 3).

^[45] Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 100, 106.

^[46] Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 40, at 335-336; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[47] See rollo, pp. 19-21.

^[48] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 488 (2010); emphases and underscoring supplied.

^[49] See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566; 94 S. Ct. 1242; 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974) U.S. LEXIS 113.

^[50] Dissenting Opinion of Retired Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in Spouses. Romualdez v. COMELEC, 576 Phil. 357, 432 (2008).

^[51] 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477.

^[52] Id., citation omitted.

^[53] Section 16 of RA 10630 provides:

Section. 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, ordinances and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.

^[54] Section 11 of RA 10630 provides:

Section. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti- smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. x x x The child shall also be recorded as a 'child at risk' and not as a 'child in conflict with the law.' x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

^[55] Section 1. Short Title and Scope.- This Act shall be known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006." It shall cover the different stages involving children at risk and children in conflict with the law from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.

^[56] People v. Chong Hong, 65 Phil. 625, 628 (1938); emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[57] See rollo, pp. 26-28.

^[58] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526; 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) U.S. LEXIS 144; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[59] Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979) U.S. LEXIS 17.

^[60] Id.

^[61] 390 U.S. 629; 88 S. Ct. 1274; 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968) U.S. LEXIS 1880; 1 Media L. Rep. 1424; 44 Ohio Op. 2d 339.

^[62] Id; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[63] See Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 192 and 195.

^[64] Bellotti v. Baird, supra note 59.

^[65] See id.

^[66] Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; emphasis supplied.

^[67] Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[68] 150-A Phil. 241 (1972).

^[69] Id. at 248, citing Mormon Church v. US, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).

^[70] See Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 195-196.

^[71] Bellotti, supra note 59, citing See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Children to Their "Rights," 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605 and Ginsberg v. New York, supra note 61; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[72] See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (1998) U.S. App. LEXIS 26597.

^[73] See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 {1993) U.S. App. LEXIS 29974.

^[74] See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; and City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363; 1989 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 254; 83 A.L.R. 4th 1035.

^[75] Supra note 72.

^[76] Id.

^[77] Id.

^[78] See rollo, pp. 23-25.

^[79] See id.at 21-23.

^[80] Supra note 48.

^[81] Id. at 490; emphasis in the original omitted, citation omitted.

^[82] Id. at 490-491.

^[83] First Amendment (US Constitution). Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

^[84] 539 U.S. 113; 123 S. Ct. 2191; 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003) U.S. LEXIS 4782; 71 U.S.L.W. 4441; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5136; 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 347.

^[85] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra note 48, at 491.

^[86] Supra note 38.

^[87] See Associate Justice Marvic M.V. F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion; id. at 583-584; emphases and underscoring supplied.

^[88] See In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 158-A Phil. 1 (1974); Kwong v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 240 Phil. 219 (1987).

^[89] In Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 497-498 (1989), the Court ruled that the right to travel under our Constitution refer to right to move within the country, or to another country, but not the right to return to one's country. The latter right, however, is provided under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory.

^[90] UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project 61 (1970). See Kent v. Dulles, 351 U.S. 116; 78 S. Ct. 1113; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U.S. LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 705-706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of locomotion is one of the chief elements of the guaranty of liberty.

^[91] See Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945).

^[92] See Salvador H Laurel. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention. As Faithfully Reproduced from the Personal Record of Jose P. Laurel, Vol. III, 652 (1966). See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra note 90, at 705.

^[93] See City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (1992) Iowa Sup. LEXIS 91.

^[94] Id.

^[95] See Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) v. Heusdens, 678 Phil. 328, 399 (2011) and Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 523 Phil. 713, 752 (2006). See also Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 89, at 504. In Silverio v. CA (273 Phil. 128, 133 [1991]), the Court held that "the [State is] not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations [on this right)," and in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (supra note 90, at 716), it was held that "citizens [do] not possess an absolute freedom of locomotion."

^[96] The State under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to executive officers or administrative authorities (see Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 651).

^[97] Silverio v. CA, supra note 95, at 133.

^[98] See Section 2 of RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as "SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT" (July 27, 1992).

^[99] See Section 2 of RA 9775, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009," approved on November 17, 2009.

^[100] See Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004" (March 27, 2004).

^[101] See Section 2 of RA 9851, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES" otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY," approved on December 11, 2009.

^[102] See Section 2 of RA 9344.

^[103] See Sections 3 (a) and (b) of RA 10364, entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT No. 9208, ENTITLED 'AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "EXPANDED ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT of 2012," approved on February 6, 2013.

^[104] See Section 32 (b) of RA 9211, entitled "AN ACT REGULATING THE PACKAGING, USE, SALE, DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as "TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003" (September 2, 2003).

^[105] See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 8980, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as "ECCD ACT" (May 22, 2001).

^[106] See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9288, entitled "AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR ENSURING NEWBORN SCREENING," otherwise known as the "NEWBORN SCREENING ACT OF 2004" (May 10, 2004).

^[107] See Articles 1, 3, and 8 of PD 603, entitled "THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE," approved on December 10, 1974.

^[108] See Bellotti, supra note 59. See also Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984), stating that minors enjoy a myriad of constitutional rights shared with adults. Indeed, the Bill of Rights under the Constitution is not for adults alone; hence, the State should not afford less protection to minors' right simply because they fall below the age of majority.

^[109] See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531; 338 U.S. App. D.C. 11 (1999) U.S. App. LEXIS 13635; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72, citing Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; 106 S. Ct. 3159; 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) U.S. LEXIS 139; 54 U.S.L.W. 5054; Bellotti, supra note 59; Ginsberg v. New York, supra note 61; and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 804; 64 S. Ct. 784; 88 L. Ed. 1090 (1944) U.S. LEXIS 942.

^[110] See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646; 115 S. Ct. 2386; 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995) U.S. LEXIS 4275; 63 U.S.L.W. 4653; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4846; 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 229.

^[111] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.

^[112] Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 1327.

^[113] Labor Code of the Philippines, as renumbered, Articles 137 and 138.

^[114] See Section 8 (a) of RA 7610 and Section 5 (f) of RA 8239, entitled "PHILIPPINE PASSPORT ACT OF 1996," approved on November 22, 1996.

^[115] Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 109.

^[116] Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville; id.

^[117] Supra note 59.

^[118] Bellotti, id.; to wit: "The unique role in our society of the family x x x requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three [(3)] reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: [1] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and [3] the importance of the parental role in child rearing." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

^[119] Id.

^[120] Supra note 109.

^[121] Id., citations omitted.

^[122] See Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP (BSP), 487 Phil. 531 (2004); White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444 (2009); Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 77 (2010), citing Joaquin Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary 139-140 (2009). See also Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 124-127 (2013); and Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 97- 98 (2014).

^[123] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP (id. at 693- 696, citations omitted), it was opined that, "in the landmark case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1; 93 S. Ct. 1278; 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973] U.S. LEXIS 91), the U.S. Supreme Court in identifying a 'suspect class' as a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process, articulated that suspect classifications were not limited to classifications based on race, alienage or national origin but could also be applied to other criteria such as religion. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that suspect classifications deserving of Strict Scrutiny include those based on race or national origin, [alienage], and religion while classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, financial need, conscientious objection and age have been held not to constitute suspect classifications." See also Mosqueda v. Filipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 and 189305, August 16, 2016. See further White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (id. at 463), where it was held that "[s[trict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race[,] as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The [US] Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel."

^[124] See Dissenting Opinion of Retired Chief Justice Artermio V. Panganiban in Central Bank Employees Association. Inc. v. BSP, id. at 648.

^[125] See id.

^[126] See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, id.

^[127] In the US, courts have made several, albeit conflicting, rulings in determining the applicable level of scrutiny in cases involving minors' constitutional rights, specifically on the right to travel (see Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 [1981] U.S. App. LEXIS 16939; 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d [Callaghan] 879; McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 [1984] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16647; Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 [1989] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707; Qutb v. Strauss, supra note 73; Hutchins v. District of Columbia, supra note 109; Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 [1997] U.S. App. LEXIS 13409; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4317, 97 Daily Journal DAR 7221; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72; Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 [2003] U.S. App. LEXIS 25851; and Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 [2004] U.S. App. LEXIS 910). These conflicting rulings spring from the uncertainty on whether the right to interstate travel under US laws is a fundamental right (see US v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281; 41 S. Ct. 133; 65 L. Ed. 270 [1920] U.S. LEXIS 1159; and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618; 89 S. Ct. 1322; 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 [1969] U.S. LEXIS 3190). In contrast, the right to travel is clearly a fundamental right under Philippine law; thus, the strict scrutiny test is undeniably the applicable level of scrutiny.

See also In Re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83; 394 N.E.2d 368 [1978] Ohio Misc. LEXIS 94; citing earlier cases involving curfew ordinances on minors; People in the Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 [1989] Colo. LEXIS 10; 13 BTR 93; City of Panora v. Simmons, supra note 74; and City of Maquoketa v. Russell, supra note 93.

^[128] See In Re Mosier, id. citing People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444; 335 N.E.2d 612 (1975) Ill. App. LEXIS 2993.

^[129] Nunez v. City of San Diego, supra note 127.

^[130] Id.

^[131] Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 122, at 98. See also Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245,282 (2009).

^[132] Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, id. See also Dissenting Opinion of Ret. Chief Justice Panganiban and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, supra note 122, at 644 and 688-689, respectively.

^[133] See The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 97-98, citing 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Secs. 12 and 13 and Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 106 (2009).

^[134] Id.

^[135] Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 131, at 298.

^[136] Rollo, pp. 48-49.

^[137] Supra note 72.

^[138] Id.

^[139] In its Comment dated August 18, 2016 (see rollo, pp. 270-313), the local government of Quezon City attached statistical data on "Children in Conflict with Law" (CICL) incidents from the various barangays of its six (6) districts for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 (see id. at 330-333). The information is summarized as follows:

YEAR	NUMBER OF CICL
2013	2677
2014	5106
2015	4778

In 2014 and 2015, most of the reported CICL incidents were related to Theft, Curfew violations, and Physical Injury. The local government claimed that the decline of CICL incidents in 2015 was due to the enforcement of the curfew ordinance (id. at 298).

Also, together with its Comment dated August 16, 2016 (id. at 85-111 ), the local government of Manila submitted data reports of the Manila Police District (MPD) on CICL incidents, in Manila from 2014, 2015, and half of the year 2016 (id. at 116-197), as follows:

YEAR	NUMBER OF CICL
2014	74*
2015	30
January to July 2016	75**

* It includes a minor who violated RA 4136 or the '"Land Transportation and Traffic Code" (June 20, 1964) and RA 10586 or the "Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013," approved on May 27, 2013.

* It includes the number of minors who violated curfew hours.

A number from these reports involve incidents of Robbery (43), Theft (43), Physical Injuries (12), Rape (9), and Frustrated Homicide (6).

The local government of Manila likewise attached the Department of Social Welfare and Development's (DSWD) report on CICL for the years 2015 and half of the year 2016, summed as follows (id. at 198-199):

YEAR	NUMBER OF CICL
2015	845
January to June 2016	524

Further, it attached DSWD's report on minors who were at risk of running in conflict with law and CICL as a result of the local government of Manila's Campaign on Zero Street Dwellers in the City of Manila for the year 2016 (id. at 200-202):

Reached out Cases	2,194
**Reached out Cases with Offenses (CICL)	480

See also id. at 98-99 and 298.

^[140] See id. at 296-298.

^[141] See In Re Mosier, supra note 127.

^[142] See People in Interest of J.M, supra note 127.

^[143] Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984).

^[144] Note that the court in this US case used "no compelling interest" as the ground to declare the ordinance unconstitutional. The reasons set forth in its discussion, however, relates to the failure of the ordinance to be narrowly drawn as to infringe on constitutional rights (see supra note 127).

^[145] See Qutb v. Strauss (supra note 73), wherein a US court ruled that the assailed .curfew ordinance employed the least restrictive means of accomplishing its objectives as it contained various defenses or exceptions that narrowly tailored the ordinance and allowed the local government to meet its goals while respecting the rights of minors. In effect, the ordinance placed only minimal burden on the minors' constitutional rights. It held:

Furthermore, we are convinced that this curfew ordinance also employs the least restrictive means of accomplishing its goals. The ordinance contains various "defenses" that allow affected minors to remain in public areas during curfew hours. x x x To be sure, the defenses are the most important consideration in determining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored.

xxxx

x x x It is true, of course, that the curfew ordinance would restrict some late-night activities of juveniles; if indeed it did not, then there would be no purpose in enacting it. But when balanced with the compelling interest sought to be addressed— protecting juveniles and preventing juvenile crime— the impositions are minor. x x x. Thus, after carefully examining the juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by the city of Dallas, we conclude that it is narrowly tailored to address the city's compelling interest and any burden this ordinance places upon minors' constitutional rights will be minimal. (Emphases supplied)

^[146] Rollo, pp. 44.

Sec. 2. During curfew hours, no children and youths below eighteen (18) years of age shall be allowed in the streets, commercial establishments, recreation centers, malls or any other area outside the immediate vicinity of their residence, EXCEPT:

(a)	those accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian;
(b)	those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like;
(c)	students of night schools and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required to stay in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 P.M.; and
(d)	those working at night: PROVIDED, That children falling under categories c) and d) shall secure a certification from their Punong Barangay exempting them from the coverage of this Ordinance, or present documentation/identification proving their qualification under such category.

^[147] Id. at 38.

Tuntunin 3. Mga Eksemsyon

a. Eksemsyon dahil sa Gawain[:]

a.1	Mga mag-aaral na may klase sa gabi;
a.2	Mga kabataang naghahanapbuhay sa gabi;
a.3	Mga kabataang dumalo sa gawain/pagtitipon ng paaralan o simbahan na may pakikipag-ugnayan sa Tanggapan ng Sangguniang Barangay.

Ang lahat ng kabataan sa sakop ng Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila na nag-aaral o naghahanapbuhay na ang oras ng pagpasok o pag-uwi ay sakop ng "curfew" ay kailangang kumuha ng katibayan (certification) mula sa paaralan/tanggapan/pagawaan na pinapasukan ng may pagpapatunay ng Punong Barangay na sumasakop sa mga kinauukulan, upang ito ay magamit sa oras ng "curfew" sa kanilang pag-uwi o pagpasok.

b. Eskemsyong [sic] Insidental:

b.1	Mga kabataang may mga gawain sa ilalim ng superbisyon o pamamahala ng kanilang mga magulang/tagapag-alaga o mga indibiduwal na nasa hustong gulang (18 taon at pataas) na may awtoridad sa kanila.
b.2	Mga kabataang napasama sa mga aksidente, kalamidad at mga tulad nito.

k. Eksemsyong tuwing may okasyon:

k.1	Bisperas at Araw ng Pasko;
k.2	Bisperas at Araw ng Bagong Taon;
k.3	Bisperas at Araw ng Pistang Barangay;
k.4	Araw ng Santo/Araw ng mga Kaluluwa;
k.5	Huwebes Santo;
k.6	Biyernes Santo;
k.7	Sabado de Gloria; at
k.8	Pasko ng Pagkabuhay.

^[148] The Curfew Ordinances exempt minors from the curfews when they are engaged in night school, night work, or emergency situations (see id. at 38, 44, and 53-54).

^[149] Supra note 127.

^[150] See Tuntunin 4 of the Navotas Ordinance (rollo, p. 42); and Section 12 of the Manila Ordinance (rollo, p. 46).

^[151] The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x.

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them. (Tatad v. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 371 [1997], citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 Ed., pp. 28-29.)

^[152] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

^[153] Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 139-140 (2007).

^[154] Rollo, p. 57-59.

^[155] See amended Navotas Ordinance; id. at 41-42.

Tuntunin 1. PAMPATAKARANG KAPARUSAHAN AT MULTA.

a)	Unang Paglabag - ang mahuhuli ay dadalhin sa Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad (MSWDO). Ipapatawag ang magulang o tagapag-alaga sa kabataang lumabag at pagkuha ng tala hinggil sa pagkatao nito (Pangalan, Edad, Tirahan, Pangalan ng Magulang o Tagapag-alaga), at pagpapaalala, kasunod ang pagbabalik sa kalinga ng magulang o tagapagalaga ng batang nahuli.
b)	Pangalawang Paglabag - Ang batang lumabag ay [dadalhin] sa MSWDO, pagmumultahin ang magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00 piso, dahil sa kapabayaan o apat (4) na oras na gawaing sibiko-sosyal o pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-alaga at ang batang nahuli.
k)	Ikatlong Paglabag - pagmumulta ng magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang P300.00 piso dahil sa kapabayaan at apat (4) na oras ng gawaing sibiko-sosyal o pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-alaga at ang batang nahuli.
d)	Para sa pang-apat at paulit-ulit na lalabag ay papatawan ng kaparusahang doble sa itinakda ng Tuntuning 1.k ng ordinansang ito.
	1.1	Sa pagkakataong walang multang [maibibigay] ang magulang/tagapag-alaga ng kabataang [nahuli], ang Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad (MSDWO) ay magpapataw ng gawaing sibiko-social o pangkomunidad sa magulang at ang batang nahuli katumbas ng nasabing multa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
		a.	Apat (4) na oras na paglilinis ng kanal o lansangan na itinakda ng nasabing tanggapan.
		b.	Apat (4) na oras na pagtatanim ng puno sa Iugar na itatakda ng nasabing tanggapan.
		c.	Apat (4) na oras na gawaing pagpapaganda ng komunidad bilang suporta sa programang "Clean and Green" ng Pamahalaang Bayan. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

^[156] Rollo, p. 45.

^[157] Penalties (as punishment) are imposed either: (1) to "satisfy the community's retaliatory sense of indignation that is provoked by injustice" (Black's Law Dictionary, 8^th Ed., p. 1270) - or for retribution following the classical or juristic school of thought underlying the criminal law system (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., p. 9); (2) to "change the character of the offender" (Black's Law Dictionary, Eight Ed., p. 1270) - or for reformation pursuant to the positivist or realistic school of thought (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., pp. 9-10); (32 to "prevent the repetition of wrongdoing by disabling the offender" (Black's Law Dictionary, 8^th Ed., p. 1270)-following the utilitarian theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., p. 11); or (4) for both retribution and reformation pursuant to the eclectic theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., p. 11).

^[158] Black's Law Dictionary, 8^th Ed., p. 1168.

^[159] Philippine Law Dictionary, 3^rd Ed., p. 688.

^[160] Black's Law Dictionary, 8^th Ed., p. 1269.

^[161] Section 4 (f) of RA 9344 reads: Section 4. Definition of Terms- x x x.

xxxx

(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a community setting developed for purposes of intervention and diversion, as well as rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for reintegration into his/her family and/or community.

^[162] Section 54 of RA 9344 reads:

Section 54. Objectives of Community-Based Programs. -The objectives of community-based programs are as follows:

(a)	Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in conflict with the law in case he/she is studying, working or attending vocational learning institutions;
(b)	Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered by their relationship and to create greater awareness of their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
(c)	Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict with the law and encourage community support and involvement; and
(d)	Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law by preventing jail detention.

^[163] < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/admonition > (last accessed on March 14, 2017).

^[164] 8^th Ed., p. 52.

^[165] 3^rd Ed., p. 36.

^[166] See Section 52 (g), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) (promulgated on November 18, 2011 ), which states that: "[a] warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty." See also In the Matter of the Contempt Orders Against Lt. Gen. Calimlim, 584 Phil. 377, 384 (2008), citing Tobias v. Veloso, 188 Phil. 267, 274-275 (1980); Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Ms. Bayani for Dishonesty, 656 Phil. 222, 228 (2011); and Dalmacio-Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 690 Phil. 400, 409 (2012), to name a few.

See also Section 58 (i), Rule IV of Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 or the "Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service" (RURACCS) (September 27, 1999). The RRACCS (Section 46 (f), Rule 10) and its predecessor RURACCS (Section 52 (c), Rule IV), however, consider reprimand (or censure) as a penalty imposed for light offenses.

^[167] < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reprimand > (last accessed on March 14, 2017).

^[168] 8^th Ed., p. 1329.

^[169] 3^rd Ed., p. 818.

^[170] See Section 52 (f) Rule 10 of the RRACCS: "[t]he penalty of reprimand x x x." See also Tobias v. Veloso, supra note 166, at 275.

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have been struck down for failing to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables state intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not transgress the constitutionally enshrined natural and primary right of parents to rear their children.

However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance to the effect that parental permission in any form for any minor is also an exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring the application of that curfew regulation.

The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02^[1] was passed on August 26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 8046^[2] was passed on October 14, 2002. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2301^[3] was passed on July 31, 2014.

The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict implementation of these curfew ordinances as part of police operations under the broad umbrella of "'Oplan Rody." These operations were in fulfillment of President Rodrigo Duterte's campaign promise for a nationwide implementation of a curfew for minors.^[4]

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an association of youths and minors for "the protection of the rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its members Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), and Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Villegas) filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the ordinances are unconstitutional and in violation of Republic Act No. 9344.^[5]

I

Constitutional challenges against local legislation

Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge against the assailed ordinances.

They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared unconstitutional as the lack of expressed standards for the identification of minors facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.^[6]

Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly restrict a minor's liberty, in general, and right to travel, in particular.^[7]

Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the assailed ordinances intrude into or deprive parents of their "natural and primary right"^[8] to rear their children.

Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power"^[9] in that legislative power is delegated by the national legislature to local government units. They are presumed constitutional and, until judicially declared invalid, retain their binding effect. In Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates:^10]

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.^[11]

The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that the judiciary must accord to the legislature. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:^[12]

This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.^[13]

The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative bodies, whose members are equally presumed to have acted conscientiously and with full awareness of the constitutional and statutory bounds within which they may operate. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila^[14] explained:

As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."^[15]

The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for invalidating a law. In Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar:^[16]

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on ... baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.^[17]

Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica's College,^[18] outlined the test for determining the validity of an ordinance:

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.^[19]

The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the Constitution, as well as to the basic nature of ordinances as products of a power that was merely delegated to local government units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio:^[20]

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.^[21] (Citations omitted)

II

Appraising due process and equal protection challenges

At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."^[22] There are two (2) dimensions to this: first, is an enumeration of objects of protection—life, liberty and property; second, is an identification and delimitation of the legitimate mechanism for their modulation or abnegation—due process and equal protection. The first dimension lists specific objects whose bounds are amorphous; the second dimension delineates action, and therefore, requires precision.

Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the constitutional protection of due process are better understood dynamically and from a frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood integrally, operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.

"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life, liberty, and security of person"^[23] and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."^[24] As the American Declaration of Independence postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that they may be secured.^[25] Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not merely operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit of ideals.

"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential: not merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an empowering existence.^[26] "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this empowering existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As Justice George Malcolm, speaking for this Court in 1919, articulated:

Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.^[27]

It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects of due process protection admits amorphous bounds. The constitutional protection of life and liberty encompasses a penumbra of cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves—expanding liberty—alongside the contemporaneous reality in which the Constitution operates. People v. Hernandez^[28] illustrated how the right to liberty is multi-faceted and is not limited to its initial formulation in the due process clause:

[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)^[29] to the protection of several aspects of freedom.^[30]

While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding with contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for preserving life and liberty is immutable: any intrusion into it must be with due process of law and must not run afoul of the equal protection of the laws.

Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to the due process and equal protection clauses invokes three (3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly as we do now with the task of appraising local ordinances, White Light Corporation v. City of Manila^[31] discussed:

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right". Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.^[32] (Citations omitted)

An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges against government regulation must admit that the gravity of interests invoked by the government and the personal liberties or classification affected are not uniform. Hence, the three (3) levels of analysis that demand careful calibration: the rational basis test, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual considerations of: first, the interest invoked by the government; and second, the means employed to achieve that interest.

The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it.

Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would suffice if government is able to demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the availability of less restrictive measures [must have been] considered."^[33] This demands a conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for attaining its avowed interest. It is enough that the means employed is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the government may apply.

Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually—not only conceptually—being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.

Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas^[34] further explained:

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.^[35] (Emphasis supplied)

Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental rights and the non-discrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases, the burden falls upon the government to prove that it was impelled by a compelling state interest and that there is actually no other less restrictive mechanism for realizing the interest that it invokes:

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.^[36]

III

The present Petition entails fundamental rights and
defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.

By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the assailed ordinances, this restriction applies daily at specified times and is directed at minors, who remain under the authority of their parents.

Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this right is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that the right may be "impaired" in consideration of: national security, public safety, or public health.^[37] The ponencia underscores that the avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is "the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime."^[38] The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to find justification as a valid exercise of the State's police power, regulating—as opposed to completely negating—the right to travel.

Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of parents, equally at stake is the right that parents hold in the rearing of their children.

There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v. Torres^[39] identified the right of persons to be secure "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,"^[40] the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,^[41] liberty of abode,^[42] the right to form associations,^[43] and the right against self­incrimination^[44] as among these facets.

While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12 characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of the youth to be ''natural and primary."^[45] It adds that it is a right, which shall "receive the support of the Government."^[46]

Imbong v. Ochoa,^[47] affirms the natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of children as a facet of the right to privacy:

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family.^[48]

This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light^[49] unequivocally characterized the right to privacy as a fundamental right. Thus, alleged . statutory intrusion into it warrants strict scrutiny.^[50]

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard - the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.

. . . .

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.'' .. . In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty ...

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers"'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect ...

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.^[51] (Citations omitted)

In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons' privacy rights, this Court weighed the State's need for the "promotion of public morality" as against the individual patrons' "liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect ...

. . . .

[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.^[52] (Citation omitted)

Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed ordinances define status offenses. They identify and restrict offenders, not purely on the basis of prohibited acts or omissions, but on the basis of their inherent personal condition. Altogether and to the restriction of all other persons, minors are exclusively classified as potential offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive basis, as the commission of an offense relies merely on presence in public places at given times and not on the doing of a conclusively noxious act.

The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial classification. The assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution's unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose mandate is to "promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being."^[53]

This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children. Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously defines a "child at risk" and a "child in conflict with the law" and distinguishes them from the generic identification of a "child" as any "person under the age of eighteen (18) years."^[54] These concepts were adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with the protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed ordinances' broad and sweeping determination of presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and the protection that the Constitution mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is equally proper.

IV

The apparent factual bases for the
assailed ordinances are tenuous at best.

To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances, respondents City of Manila and Quezon City provide statistical data on the number of Children in Conflict with the Law (CICL).^[55] Quezon City's data is summarized as follows:^[56]

Year	No. of Barangays	Barangay with submissions	Barangays without submissions	No. of Barangays with Zero CICL	Total no. of CICL
2013	142	102 (January to June) 44 (July to December)	40 (January to June) 98 (July to December)	Not provided	2677
2014	142	119 (January to June) 82 (July to December)	23 (January to June) 60 (July to December)	32 (January to June) 25 (July to December)	2937
2015	142	142	0	51	4778

The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that the city is so overrun by juvenile crime that it may as well be totally rid of the public presence of children at specified times. While there is a perceptively raised number of CICLs in Quezon City, the data fails to specify the rate of these figures in relation to the total number of minors and, thus, fails to establish the extent to which CICLs dominate the city. As to geographical prevalence that may justify a city-wide prohibition, a substantial number of barangays reported not having CICLs for the entire year. As to prevalence that stretches across the relative maturity of all who may be considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as against adolescents), there was also no data showing the average age of these CICLs.

The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too conflicting to be authoritative. The data reports of the Manila Police Department, as summarized in the ponencia,^[57] state:

YEAR	NUMBER OF CICL
2014	74
2015	30
January to June 2016	75

The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the City of Manila has vastly different numbers. As summarized in the ponencia:^[58]

YEAR	NUMBER OF CICL
2015	845
January to June 2016	524

The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for January to August 2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.^[59] Of the 480 minors, 210 minors were apprehended for curfew violations, not for petty crimes.^[60] Again, the data fails to account for the percentage of CICLs as against the total number of minors in Manila.

The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,^[61] a United States Court of Appeals case, as basis for examining the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro Manila. Far from supporting the validity of the assailed ordinances, Shleifer discounts it. Shleifer relies on unequivocally demonstrated scientific and empirical data on the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on juvenile safety during curfew hours in Charlottesville, Virginia. Here, while local government units adduced data, there does not appear to have been a well-informed effort as to these data's processing, interpretation, and correlation with avowed policy objectives.

With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local government units' justifications of reducing crime and sweeping averments of "peace and order" hardly sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors' movement during curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to the reduction of CICLs appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical. Lacking in even a rational basis, it follows that there is no support for the more arduous requirement of demonstrating that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state interest.

V

It has not been demonstrated that the curfews
effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.

The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it also requires that the mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its ends:

Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise. First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.

Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The government must show that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows:

... The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.

Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available for achieving the governmental objective.^[62] (Citations omitted)

The governmental interests to be protected must not only be reasonable. They must be compelling. Certainly, the promotion of public safety is compelling enough to restrict certain freedoms. It does not, however, suffice to make a generic, sweeping averment of public safety.

To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide data on the frequency of crimes against unattended minors during curfew hours. Without this data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better achieved if they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours.

While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict minors' fundamental rights, it found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance's statement of its objectives reads:

WHEREAS ... the children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which led them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

. . . .

WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups, without lawful purpose or justification;

WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and supervision of the barangay officials and other authorities, these misguided minor children preferred to converge or flock together during the night time until the wee hours of the morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other public places, illegal drug use and sometimes drug peddling, engaging in troubles and other criminal activities which often resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;

WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of a growing number of the youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements in society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]^[63]

In order to achieve these objectives,^[64] the ponencia cites the ordinances' exemptions, which it found to be "sufficiently safeguard[ing] the minors' constitutional rights":^[65]

SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance:

(a)	Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b)	Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c)	Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents;
(d)	When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same place of employment activity, without any detour or stop;
(e)	When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f)	When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g)	When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h)	When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.[66]

The ponencia states:

[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.^[67]

The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization. It generalizes unattended minors out in the streets during curfew hours as potentially, if not actually, engaging in criminal activities, merely on the basis that they are not within the bounds of the stated exemptions. It is evident, however, that the exemptions are hardly exhaustive.

Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when she goes out at night to buy food from a convenience store because the rest of her family is already asleep.^[68] As a Quezon City resident, she violates the curfew merely for wanting to buy food when she gets home from school.

It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told to make a purchase at a nearby sari-sari store. None of these is within the context of a "party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school and organization" or part of an "official school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity." Still, these activities are not criminal or nefarious. To the contrary, socializing with friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere loafing or loitering as it may be, contributes to a person's social and psychological development. Doing one's chores is within the scope of respecting one's elders.

Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it can keep them safe from crime is not the least restrictive means to achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street comers, and visible police patrol.^[69] Public safety is better achieved by effective police work, not by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in broad daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment. Efficient law enforcement, more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will be safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.

The assailed ordinances' deficiencies only serve to highlight their most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens minors who are living in poverty.

For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who are not traditionally employed as the exemptions require that the minor be engaged in "an authorized employment activity." Curfew violators could include minors who scour garbage at night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell. The Department of Social Welfare and Development of Manila reports that for 2016, 2,194 minors were turned over as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.^[70] The greater likelihood that most, if not all, curfew violators will be street children—who have no place to even come home to—than actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating the ordinance will most likely have no parent or guardian to fetch them from barangay halls.

An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs show that for most of the crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades.^[71] Thus, to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs, not curfews, are the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from turning to a life of criminality.

VI

The assailed ordinances give
unbridled discretion to law enforcers.

The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to provide the least restrictive means for achieving their avowed ends but also in failing to articulate safeguards and define limitations that foreclose abuses.

In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.^[72]

The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:^[73]

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.^[74]

While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is permitted only in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness "as applied." In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:^[75]

[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.^[76]

The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council:^[77]

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.^[78] (Citation omitted)

Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the assailed ordinances, as-applied parties must assert actual violations of their rights and not prospective violations of the rights of third persons. In Imbong v. Ochoa:^[79]

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.^[80]

The ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper. It reasons that petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous provision in the assailed ordinances.^[81] It then proceeds to examine the provisions of the ordinances, vis-a-vis their alleged defects, while discussing how these defects may affect minors and parents who are not parties to this case. In effect, the ponencia engaged in a facial examination of the assailed ordinances. This facial examination is an improper exercise for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do not ostensibly involve the right to free speech.

The more appropriate stance would have been to examine the assailed ordinances, not in isolation, but in the context of the specific cases pleaded by petitioners. Contrary to the ponencia's position, the lack of specific provisions in the assailed ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so that actual transgressions into petitioner's rights were made.

The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do not state any guidelines on how law enforcement agencies may determine if a person apprehended is a minor.

For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance provides:

(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;^[82]

However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on the identification of age. It merely states that any member of the community may call the attention of barangay officials if they see minors during curfew hours:

SECTION 7. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION - Any person who has personal knowledge of the existence of any minor during the wee hours as provided under Section 3 hereof, must immediately call the attention of the barangay.^[83]

The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section 7^[84] addresses the lacunae as it articulates measures for determining age. However, none of the assailed ordinances actually refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their actions and prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the assailed ordinances' express provisions or by implied invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by silence reduces these prescriptions to mere suggestions, at best, or to mere afterthoughts of a justification, at worst.

Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers "unbridled discretion in carrying out [the assailed ordinances'] provisions."^[85] The present Petition illustrates how this has engendered abusive and even absurd situations.

Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-old—no longer a minor—student, recalled that when he was apprehended for violating the curfew, he showed the barangay tanod his registration card. Despite his presentation of an official document, the barangay tanod refused to believe him. Delos Reyes had to resort to showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to let him go.^[86]

Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends were apprehended by 10 barangay tanods for violating curfew even though he was already 19 years old at that time. He alleged that he and his friends were told to perform 200 squats and if they refused, they would be framed up for a crime. They were released only when the aunt of one (1) of his friends arrived.^[87]

These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by enforcing the assailed ordinances have not been resolved by "simply presenting any competent proof of identification"^[88] considering that precisely, the assailed ordinances state no mandate for law enforcers to check proof of age before apprehension. Clear and explicit guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose further violations of petitioners' due process rights. In the interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated on account of their vagueness.

VII

The doctrine of parens patriae
does not sustain the assailed ordinances.

The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into parental prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.

The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was understood to have "emanate[d] from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects who were unable to protect themselves."^[89] It was the King's "royal prerogative"^[90] to "take responsibility for those without capacity to look after themselves."^[91] At its outset, parens patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable persons had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this, it was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the people, to safeguard its citizens' welfare.

The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even as it gained independence and developed its own legal tradition. In Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States,^[92] the United States Supreme Court explained parens patriae as a beneficent state power and not an arbitrary royal prerogative:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.^[93] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the same case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise of parens patriae applies "to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority."^[94] It is from this reliance and expectation of the people that a state stands as "parent of the nation."^[95]

American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal traditions that it entailed facilitated our own jurisdiction's adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae.^[96] Originally, the doctrine was understood as "the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris."^[97]

However, significant developments have smce calibrated our own understanding and application of the doctrine.

Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 12.... The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the qualifier "primary." The present Article II, Section 12's counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution merely referred to "[t]he natural right and duty of parents":

Section 4.... The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the Government.^[98]

As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also merely spoke of"[t]he natural right and duty of parents":

Section 4. . . . The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency should receive the aid and support of the government.^[99]

The addition of the qualifier "primary" unequivocally attests to the constitutional intent to afford primacy and preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly stated, the Constitution now recognizes the superiority of parental prerogative. It follows, then, that state interventions, which are tantamount to deviations from the preeminent and superior rights of parents, are permitted only in instances where the parents themselves have failed or have become incapable of performing their duties.

Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v. Lorenzo,^[100] the authority cited by ponencia in explaining the State's role in the upbringing of children.^[101] In Nery, this Court alluded to the State's supreme authority to exercise parens patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when the 1935 Constitution was in operation.^[102] It stated:

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual[s] who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust.^[103]

This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the 1978 case of Vasco v. Court of Appeals,^[104] where, without moderation or qualification, this Court asserted that "the State is considered the parens patriae of minors.''^[105]

In contrast, Imbong v. Ochoa,^[106] a cased decided by this Court in 2014, unequivocally characterized parents' rights as being "superior" to the state:

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary, " that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.^[107] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents cannot fulfill their role, as in cases of neglect, abuse, or exploitation:

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.^[108]

As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or supplement to parents' authority over their children. It operates only when parental authority is established to be absent or grossly deficient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine considers the existence of harm and the subsequent inability of the person to protect himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child.

To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as well render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile.

More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this position. In these instances where the State exercised its powers over minors on account of parens patriae, it was only because the children were prejudiced and it was without subverting the authority of the parents themselves when they have not acted in manifest offense against the rights of their children.

Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,^[109] parens patriae was exercised in order to give the minor his day in court. This is a matter beyond the conventional capacities of parents, and therefore, it was necessary for the State to intervene in order to protect the interests of the child.

In People v. Baylon^[110] and other rape cases,^[111] this Court held that a rigorous application of the penal law is in order, since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully."^[112] In these criminal cases where minor children were victims, this Court, acting as the representative of the State exercising its parens patriae power, was firm in imposing the appropriate penalties for the crimes—no matter how severe—precisely because it was the only way to mitigate further harm to minors. Parens patriae is also the reason why "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse," as this Court held in People v. Malto.^[113] Again, these State actions are well outside the conventional capabilities of the parents and in no way encroach on the latter's authority.

Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.

VIII

In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance will sufficiently narrowly tailor its application so as to save it from its otherwise apparent breach of fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, in the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter review in a factual case whose factual ambient will be different. Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the result.

^[2] Entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes." See rollo, pp. 44-47.

^[3] Entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a Disciplinary Hours [sic] in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes." See rollo, pp. 48-60.

^[4] Rollo, p. 6, Petition.

^[5] Id. at 4-5, Petition.

^[6] Id. at 20, Petition.

^[7] Id. at 23, Petition.

^[8] Id. at 26, Petition.

^[9] City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, 495 Phil. 289, 308 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[10] 343 Phil. 670 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

^[11] Id. at 700-701, citing La Union Electric Cooperative v. Yaranon, 259 Phil. 457 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division] and Francisco v. Permskul, 255 Phil. 311 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

^[12] 421 Phil. 290 (2001) (Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

^[13] Id. at 342.

^[14] 128 Phil. 473 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[15] Id. at 475-476.

^[16] 727 Phil. 430 (2014) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[17] Id. at 447.

^[18] 706 Phil. 138 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[19] Id. at 157.

^[20] 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[21] Id. at 308.

^[22] CONST., art. III, sec. 1.

^[23] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3.

^[24] American Declaration of Independence (1776).

^[25] In the words of the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men[.]"

^[26] See Abraham H. Maslow's, A Theory of Human Motivation, PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, 50, 370-396 (1943).

^[27] Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 705 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

^[28] 99 Phil. 515 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

^[29] CONST. ( 1935), art. III, sec. I provides:

Section 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws
....
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(4) The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise.
(6) The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
(8) No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
. . . .
(11) No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
(12) No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
(13) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
(14) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.
(17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
(18) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
. . . .
(21) Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

^[30] People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 551-552 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]. This enumeration must not be taken as an exhaustive listing of the extent of constitutional protection vis-a-vis liberty. Emphasis is placed on how the penumbra of cognate rights evolves and expands with the times.

^[31] 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[32] Id. at 462-463.

^[33] Id. at 463.

^[34] 487 Phil. 531 (2004). (Per J. Puno, En Banc]

^[35] Id. at 599-600.

^[36] Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/december2015/221318.pdf > [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc] citing White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Concurring Opinion of J. Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon,712 Phil. 44, 112-143 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]; and Separate Concurring Opinion of C.J. Reynato S. Puno in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 106 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

^[37] CONST., art. II, sec. 12.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

^[38] Ponencia, p. 20.

^[39] 354 Phil. 948 (1998) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] states:

[T]he right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
. . . .
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
. . . .
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
. . . .
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (Citations omitted)

^[40] CONST., art. III, sec. 2.

^[41] CONST., art. III, Sec. 2.

^[42] CONST., art. III, sec. 6.

^[43] CONST., art. III, sec. 8.

^[44] CONST., art. III, sec. 17.

^[45] CONST., art. II, sec. 12: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

^[46] CONST., art. II, sec. 12.

^[47] 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[48] Id. at 193.

^[49] 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[50] White Light is notable, not only for characterizing privacy as a fundamental right whose intrusions impel strict scrutiny. It is also notable for extending a similar inquiry previously made by this Court in 1967, in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, et al. v. City of Manila, 128 Phil. 473 (1967) [Per J. Femando, En Banc].
There, operators of motels assailed a supposed infringement of their property rights by an ordinance increasing license fees for their motels. In upholding the validity of the ordinance, this Court distinguished between "freedom of the mind" and property rights and held that ''if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider." Since the case only involved property rights, this Court found that the state interest of curbing "an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals" sufficed. White Light extended the consideration of rights involved in similar establishments by examining, not only motel owners' property rights but also their clientele's privacy rights.

^[51] White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 464-466 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[52] Id. at 469-471.

^[53] CONST. art. II, sec. 13.

^[54] Section 4. Definition of Terms.- The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

. . . .

(c) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.

(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:

(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.

(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.

^[55] Rep. Act No. 9344, sec. 4 (e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws.

^[56] Rollo, pp. 330-333.

^[57] Ponencia, p. 28, fn 139.

^[58] Id.

^[59] Rollo, p. 201, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.

^[60] Id. at 202, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.

^[61] 159 F.3d 843 ( 1998).

^[62] Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio Morales in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-701 (2004) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing Skinner v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Attorney General of New York v. Soto Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903-904 (1986); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); Chapter 9 of G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th Ed., 1991); and Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972).

^[63] Rollo, pp. 317-318.

^[64] It should be pointed out that the statement "most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs" is an absurd generalization without any basis.

^[65] Ponencia, p. 33.

^[66] Rollo, pp. 322-323.

^[67] Ponencia, p. 34.

^[68] Rollo, p. 7, Petition.

^[69] Id. at 24, Petition.

^[70] Id. at 200, Annex 5 of City of Manila Comment.

^[71] See rollo, pp. 116-197, Annexes "1," "2," and "3'' of City of Manila Comment.

^[72] Rollo, p. 19, Petition.

^[73] 247-A Phil. 276 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

^[74] Id. at 286 citing TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978) and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).

^[75] 421 Phil. 290 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

^[76] Id. at 354-355 citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912); and G. GUNTHER & K. SULLIVAN,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1299 (2001).

^[77] 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[78] Id. at 489 citing David v. Macapagal Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

^[79] 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[80] Id. at 127 citing the Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008) (Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

^[81] Ponencia, pp. 11-12.

^[82] Rollo, p. 324.

^[83] Id. at 326.

^[84] Rep. Act No. 9344 , sec. 7. Determination of Age.- The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

^[85] People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

^[86] Rollo, p. 7, Petition.

^[87] Id. at 6.

^[88] Ponencia, p. 13.

^[89] Kay Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO STATE L. J. 519, 526 (1996).

^[90] J. Ryan and D. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 Ill. Bar J. 684 (1998), citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 257 (172).

^[91] Margaret Hall, The Vulnerability Jurisdiction: Equity, Parens Patriae, and the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 2(1) CAN. J. OF COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 185, 190-191 (2016), citing Sir James Munby, Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable and Incapacitous Adults - the Role of the Courts: An Example of Judicial Law-making, 26 CHILD & FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 64, 66 (2014).

^[92] 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).

^[93] Id.

^[94] Id.

^[95] J. Ryan and D. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. BAR J. 684 (1998); see also Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25. 2017, < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/april2017/199669.pdf > [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].

^[96] See Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 (1916) [Per J. Trent, Second Division].

^[97] Vasco v. Court of Appeals, 171 Phil. 673, 677 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division], citing 67 C.J.S. 624; and Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728 (1916) [Per J. Trent, Second Division].

^[98] CONST. (1973), art. II, sec. 4.

^[99] CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 4.

^[100] 150-A Phil. 241 (1972) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

^[101] Ponencia, p. 15.

^[102] CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 4 was worded almost as similarly as the 1973 Constitution.

^[103] Nery v. Lorenzo, 150-A Phil. 241, 248 (1972) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

^[104] 171 Phil. 673 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, Second Division].

^[105] Id. at 677.

^[106] 732 Phil. 1 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[107] Id. at 195 citing Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402.

^[108] Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 505 Phil. 529, 546 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]. See also Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].

^[109] 424 Phil. 933 (2000) (Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[110] 156 Phil. 87 (1974) [Per J. Fenando, Second Division].

^[111] See also People v. Cabodac, 284-A Phil. 303, 312 (1992) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division]; People v. Dolores, 266 Phil. 724 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division]; People v. Cawili, 160 Phil.. 25 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division]; and People v. Evangelista, 346 Phil. 717 (1997) [Per J. Belosillo, First Division]; People v. Malto, 560 Phil. 119 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

^[112] People v. Baylon, 156 Phil. 87, 95 (1974) [Per J. Fenando, Second Division].

^[113] 560 Phil. 119 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].