SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 211004, August 23, 2017 ]QUEEN ERRIKA L. SADDI v. MARICRIS RENOMERON +
QUEEN ERRIKA L. SADDI, PETITIONER, VS. MARICRIS RENOMERON, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
QUEEN ERRIKA L. SADDI v. MARICRIS RENOMERON +
QUEEN ERRIKA L. SADDI, PETITIONER, VS. MARICRIS RENOMERON, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 2013, setting aside the Decision dated June 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272 and dismissing petitioner's complaint for ejectment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[3] dated January 20, 2014.
The facts are as follows:
Renomeron {Renomeron) before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 75 (MeTC).
In her Complaint,[5] Saddi alleged that she is a resident of No. 18 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City, while the defendant, herein respondent Renomeron is a resident of No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City. On July 20, 2010, Saddi bought the property (120 square meters) located at No. 10 Graphite St., Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City from Rosalinda Restar-Ambata (Ambata), covered by TCT No. 009-2010001546 (in the name of Saddi).[6] The said property was formerly owned by the late Spouses Claro S. Restar and Concepcion T. Restar who died without issue.[7] The only heir of the Spouses Claro and Concepcion Restar is the sister of Claro S. Restar, Rosalinda Estar-Ambata.[8]
Saddi alleged that on August 4, 2010, while she was in prior possession of the property, as new owner, Renomeron, by strategy or stealth, introduced herself as the adopted daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron, the alleged sister of the late Concepcion Restar. Renomeron requested Saddi to allow her to stay in the subject property until August 8, 2010, since she was still looking for an apartment. Out of pity and consideration, Saddi allowed Renomeron to stay on the condition that she will leave the place on August 8, 2010 pursuant to an Eviction Letter[9] dated August 4, 2010. On August 8, 2010, Saddi requested Renomeron to leave or vacate the property so that she could renovate and introduce improvements thereon, but Renomeron refused to vacate the subject premises despite several demands, depriving Saddi of the actual physical possession of the said property. Saddi demanded what right Renomeron had for not vacating the premises despite her promise, but Renomeron could not show Saddi any document evincing her right over the property except for her bare claim that she is the adopted daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron.
Saddi alleged that Renomeron is a mere intruder in the subject property legally owned and registered in her name. She claimed that Renomeron prevented her from entering the property to make an inventory of the personal properties found thereat by padlocking the gates of the property.
Saddi referred the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation, which was futile because Renomeron refused to vacate the property. The Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Parang issued to her a Certificate to File Action.[10]
On December 1, 2010, Saddi sent Renomeron a final demand letter[11] dated November 26, 2010, asking Renomeron to pay P3,000.00 as monthly rent beginning August 8, 2010 and to vacate the premises within 15 days from receipt of the demand letter.[12] Despite numerous demands, Renomeron failed and refused to vacate the property.
Saddi prayed for the trial court to render judgment in her favor and to order Renomeron and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises; to pay her reasonable rent in the amount of P3,000.00 per month until she vacates the subject premises; to pay her moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing until the final determination of the case, and the costs of suit.
In her Answer,[13] defendant-herein respondent Maricris Renomeron specifically denied all the allegations in the Complaint except for the allegations on the respective address of the parties. By way of special and affirmative defenses, Renomeron alleged that Rosalinda Restar-Ambata is not the sole owner of the subject property, and that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Ambata is null and void because she falsely declared that she is the only heir of the late Spouses Claro and Concepcion Restar.
Renomeron alleged that when Claro Restar died on September 8, 2004,[14] he was survived by his wife Concepcion[15] and other collateral relatives, including Rosalinda Restar-Ambata. When Concepcion Restar died on October 7, 2008,[16] she was survived by her sisters, namely, Miguela Tonido Renomeron (Miguela), Victoria Tonigo Manidlagan (Victoria) and Fe Lucinaro-Cesar (Fe). Miguela is the full-blood sister of Concepcion Restar, since they were born of the same parents, Pastor Dumagat Tonido (Pastor) and Graciana Acedera,[17] while Victoria and Fe are the half-blood sisters of Concepcion, as they were born of the same father, Pastor.[18] On March 1, 2009, Victoria died and was survived by her children, namely, Rodelio Tonido Manidlagan, Joan Tonido Manidlagan-Salceda, Julius Tonido Manidlagan, Restituto Tonido Manidlagan, Jr., Aris Tonido Manidlagan, and Marivic Tonido Manidlagan-Ambagan.[19] On June 16, 2010, Miguela died and was survived by her daughter Maricris Renomeron, the defendant and respondent herein. [20]
Renomeron claimed that the Deed of Sale between Saddi and Ambata over the property located at No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City is null and void, because Ambata could not have effectively transferred ownership of those undivided portions of the property that belong to the other heirs and co-owners in accordance with the law on succession. The transfer of ownership over the property on account of the Deed of Sale executed between Saddi and Ambata would constitute an impossible service because there are other owners over the property who have even greater interest than Ambata. Renomeron contends that Saddi is not a buyer in good faith because she did not inquire as to the true ownership of the property. Considering that Saddi knew that Renomeron was occupying the subject property since they are neighbors, it should have warned Saddi that Renomeron had a right to occupy the same, thus, requiring her to make the necessary inquiry on her right to occupy the same.
Renomeron claimed that she has been occupying the subject property even before August 4, 2010. Hence, she never introduced herself to Saddi as the "adopted" daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron just to have an accommodation while looking for an apartment. Renomeron stated that she is the daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron and attached her Certificate of Live Birth[21] to her Answer.
Further, Renomeron stated that there can be no strategy or stealth on her part, because as alleged in the complaint, Saddi herself allowed her to stay in the subject property. She is not in possession of the property because of the tolerance of the owner, but, rather, she is in possession of the property as an heir or co-owner even before the alleged sale of the property. Renomeron alleged that she is not an intruder because the Deed of Sale over the property executed by Ambata in favor of Saddi, on the basis of which the property subject matter of this case was registered in the name of Saddi, is null and void. Renomeron alleged that she did not receive the final demand letter sent by Saddi on December 1, 2010.
Preliminary conference was conducted and terminated on August 17, 2011.
In her Position Paper,[22] plaintiff-herein petitioner Saddi stated, among others that were already alleged in the Complaint, that Renomeron was not in prior physical possession of the property. From the time that the subject property was sold to her, she already had the actual, material and physical possession of the property by operation of law. The allegation of Renomeron that she is an alleged heir is an issue that should be ventilated in another forum and not in an ejectment case where the only issue to be resolved is the issue of possession.
In her Position Paper,[23] defendant-herein respondent Renomeron averred that she is entitled to the physical possession of the property being a co-owner thereof and elaborated thereon as already alleged in her Answer. She claimed that she has been residing at the subject property even before Saddi bought the same in July 2010. Even her mother Miguela Tonido Renomeron resided at the subject property as shown in her given address in her Death Certificate,[24] which is 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City. She could not have employed strategy or stealth to acquire possession over the property because she was already in possession of the same even before Saddi bought the property. Possession of a hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case inheritance is accepted.[25]
The MeTC stated that the issues raised by the parties are: (1) Whether or not defendant (Renomeron) employed strategy or stealth in entering the subject premises and, thus, is a mere intruder and not in prior physical possession of the subject property for which an action for ejectment is proper; (2) whether or not plaintiff (Saddi) is entitled to damages and to reasonable rent; and (3) whether or not the defendant (Renomeron) is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property.[26]
In a Decision dated November 2, 2011, the MeTC held that plaintiff-herein petitioner Saddi is entitled to the possession of the subject property.
The MeTC held that under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action for unlawful detainer against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
The MeTC found that Renomeron's stay in the subject property was not through strategy or stealth, because as alleged in the Complaint, Saddi herself allowed Renomeron to stay in the subject property after she purchased it from Ambata on July 20, 2010. When Saddi terminated the tolerance she extended to Renomeron and demanded that she vacate the subject property and the latter refused, Renomeron's right to the possession of the property had expired and she is considered to be unlawfully detaining the property.[27]
The MeTC stated that while Renomeron claims that she is in prior physical possession of the subject property in the concept of an heir and part owner thereof, it is a well-settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only issue that need be resolved is the physical or material possession of the property involved and not the ownership thereof.[28] Moreover, the issues regarding the validity of the Deed of Sale, the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the title in the name of Saddi can only be assailed in the action expressly instituted for that purpose.[29]
The MeTC held that Saddi is not entitled to moral damages. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property as well as attorney's fees and cost of suit.[30]
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the MeTC reads:
Renomeron appealed the MeTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 (RTC) and raised these issues: (1) The lower court erred in holding that in ejectment cases, the only issue that needs to be resolved is the physical or material possession of the property involved and not the ownership thereof; and (2) the lower court erred in holding that there is unlawful detainer.
In a Decision dated June 15, 2012, the RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision. It held:
The motion for reconsideration of Renomeron was denied by the RTC in its Order[33] dated July 16, 2012.
Renomeron filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC gravely erred in affirming the decision of the MeTC. She contended that: (1) she is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property as a co-owner, being one of Concepcion Restar's heirs, as the child of Miguela, Concepcion Restar's sister; (2) she has been residing at the subject property as evidenced by the Death Certificate of Miguela wherein it was indicated therein that her residence was "No. 10 Graphite St., Twin River Subdivision 2, Parang, Marikina City," the address of the subject property; (3) Ambata had no right to self-adjudicate the subject property to herself as there are other heirs, including herself (Renomeron); (4) the Deed of Sale between Ambata and Saddi is void as there are other heirs/co-owners of the property, including herself; (5) Saddi is a buyer in bad faith; and (6) she (Renomeron) and Saddi are neighbors, so Saddi should have known that she has been living in the subject property.
The Court of Appeals stated that well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[34] In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."[35]
The Court of Appeals said that both the MeTC and the RTC considered the case as one for unlawful detainer, but the pertinent allegations in the Complaint read:
The Court of Appeals found that Saddi's allegations in her Complaint ran counter to the requirements of an unlawful detainer suit that the possession of the defendant be originally legal and his/her possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.[37] The appellate court said that in this case, paragraph 4 of the Complaint clarified that Renomeron's occupancy was inceptively unlawful as she allegedly employed "strategy or stealth" in gaining possession of the property. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession must inceptively be legal and becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the defendant's subsequent refusal.[38] Hence, the Court of Appeals held that Saddi took a misstep in filing her suit below.
The Court of Appeals stated that although Saddi alleged that she merely tolerated Renomeron's occupancy, the Eviction Letter[39] dated August 4, 2010, however, reads:
The Court of Appeals found that the pertinent allegations in the Complaint as well as the tenor of the Eviction Letter contradict, rather than support, Saddi's theory that her cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, her arguments advance the view that Renomeron's occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception, as she allegedly entered the property through "strategy or stealth;" also, the "tolerated stay" as stated in the Eviction Letter was in fact a period for her to pack up her things. Second, they contradict the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiffs supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.[40]
The Court of Appeals held:
The Court of Appeals stated that an ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
The issue is whether or not petitioner's Complaint against respondent had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration that the tolerance or permission given by her to the respondent was from the beginning of her possession when she stepped into the shoes of the seller. Petitioner states that she is the registered owner of the subject property and is in possession of the property from the time it was sold to her by the seller by operation of law. Respondent was allowed to occupy only a portion of the property, but when she (petitioner) allowed her to stay in the meantime, respondent refused to vacate the premises after the lapse of the period given to her and occupied the entire property, depriving her (petitioner) of actual physical possession of the subject property.
In her Comment,[44] respondent contends that petitioner cannot claim that she merely tolerated her (respondent's) possession of the subject property when petitioner only stepped in after the spurious sale between her and Ambata, considering that she (respondent) has been in possession of the property even before the said sale on July 20, 2010. In fact, her mother, Miguela (heir of Concepcion, being her full-blood sister), was residing in the said property with her. It was stated in Miguela's Death Certificate that her residence is at No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision 2, Parang, Marikina City. Likewise, in item number 25 of the Death Certificate, it is shown that she is the informant therein: Maricris Renomeron, daughter of the deceased Miguela, and she has the same address as that of the deceased. Respondent claims that she is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property and she may not be ejected from the property as her possession of the same is by virtue of being a co-owner thereof.
The petition is unmeritorious. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the instant case.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[45]
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[46]
In Spouses Golez v. Heirs of Bertulo,[47] the Court held:
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.[48]
Paragraph 4 of the Complaint alleged that on August 4, 2010, petitioner, as the new owner of the subject property, allowed respondent to stay in the subject property on the condition that respondent will leave the place on August 8,2010 pursuant to an Eviction Letter dated August 4, 2010, which Eviction Letter was attached to the Complaint as Annex "E." The Eviction Letter dated August 4, 2010, however, states that petitioner, as new owner, was requesting respondent to vacate the said place and was giving her four days to transfer or move out all her belongings in the said premises, evincing that respondent was in possession of the property even before August 4, 2010, the date when petitioner alleged that respondent asked her permission to stay in the property. Hence, as found by the Court of Appeals, the alleged tolerated four-day stay was actually for Renomeron to pack up her belongings from the premises and leave. Obviously, Renomeron was in prior possession of the property as petitioner was ejecting her from the property and gave her four days to pack up her belongings and vacate the property. Thus, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of the possession by defendant. Petitioner failed to clearly allege who specifically permitted respondent to occupy the subject property before she sought to eject respondent from the property and how and when such tolerance came about. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite is important in the light of respondent's claim that she has been occupying the property as a co-owner thereof even before the property was purchased by petitioner. As respondent's possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.[49] However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.[50] To recover possession, he must resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.[51] In this case, petitioner, as the plaintiff in the case below, failed to satisfy the essential requirement that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Hence, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the vendee-owner had not been amply alleged and proven.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 2013 and its Resolution dated January 20, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 125915 setting aside the Decision dated June 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272 and dismissing the Complaint for Ejectment are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on leave.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso (Chairperson), Twelfth Division, Court of
Appeals, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
(Members); rollo, pp. 22-37.
[3] Id. at 38.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 37, 39.
[7] Id. at 34.
[8] Id. at 35.
[9] Id. at 42.
[10] Id. at 43.
[11] Id. at 44.
[12] Id.at 43.
[13] Id. at 45-71.
[14] Id. at 53.
[15] Id. at 55.
[16] Id. at 56.
[17] Id at 58.
[18] Id. at 58-60.
[19] Id. at 61-68.
[20] Id. at 69-70.
[21] Id. at 70.
[22] Id.at 107-116.
[23] Id. at 72-106.
[24] Id. at 69.
[25] Id. at 76, citing Article 533 of the New Civil Code.
[26] CA rollo, p. 120.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 121, citing Tecson v. Gutierrez, 493 Phil. 132, 138 (2005); Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 594 (2004).
[29] Id. citing Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 476 Phil. 403, 414 (2004).
[30] Id. citing Teraña v. Judge De Sagun, 605 Phil. 22, 41 (2009); Sec. 17, Rule 70, Rules of Court.
[31] Id. at 121.
[32] Id. at 131.
[33] Id. at 138.
[34] Rollo, p. 32, citing Quizon v. Juan, 577 Phil. 470, 477-478 (2008)
[35] Id.
[36] CA rollo, pp. 29-30. (Emphasis in the original)
[37] Rollo, p. 33, citing Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 316 (2012).
[38] Id.
[39] CA rollo, p. 42.
[40] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[41] Id. at 35, citing Unida v. Heirs of Urban, 499 Phil. 64, 70 (2005), citing Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 131 Phil. 365, 373 (1968).
[42] Rollo, p. 37.
[43] Id. at 11.
[44] Id. at 57-73.
[45] Canlas v. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 924 (2009).
[46] Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009), citing Fernando v. Spouses Lim, 585 Phil. 141 155-156 (2008).
[47] G.R. No. 201289, March 30, 2016.
[48] Id.
[49] Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, 729 Phil. 315, 329 (20014).
[50] Id.
The facts are as follows:
Renomeron {Renomeron) before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 75 (MeTC).
In her Complaint,[5] Saddi alleged that she is a resident of No. 18 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City, while the defendant, herein respondent Renomeron is a resident of No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City. On July 20, 2010, Saddi bought the property (120 square meters) located at No. 10 Graphite St., Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City from Rosalinda Restar-Ambata (Ambata), covered by TCT No. 009-2010001546 (in the name of Saddi).[6] The said property was formerly owned by the late Spouses Claro S. Restar and Concepcion T. Restar who died without issue.[7] The only heir of the Spouses Claro and Concepcion Restar is the sister of Claro S. Restar, Rosalinda Estar-Ambata.[8]
Saddi alleged that on August 4, 2010, while she was in prior possession of the property, as new owner, Renomeron, by strategy or stealth, introduced herself as the adopted daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron, the alleged sister of the late Concepcion Restar. Renomeron requested Saddi to allow her to stay in the subject property until August 8, 2010, since she was still looking for an apartment. Out of pity and consideration, Saddi allowed Renomeron to stay on the condition that she will leave the place on August 8, 2010 pursuant to an Eviction Letter[9] dated August 4, 2010. On August 8, 2010, Saddi requested Renomeron to leave or vacate the property so that she could renovate and introduce improvements thereon, but Renomeron refused to vacate the subject premises despite several demands, depriving Saddi of the actual physical possession of the said property. Saddi demanded what right Renomeron had for not vacating the premises despite her promise, but Renomeron could not show Saddi any document evincing her right over the property except for her bare claim that she is the adopted daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron.
Saddi alleged that Renomeron is a mere intruder in the subject property legally owned and registered in her name. She claimed that Renomeron prevented her from entering the property to make an inventory of the personal properties found thereat by padlocking the gates of the property.
Saddi referred the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation, which was futile because Renomeron refused to vacate the property. The Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Parang issued to her a Certificate to File Action.[10]
On December 1, 2010, Saddi sent Renomeron a final demand letter[11] dated November 26, 2010, asking Renomeron to pay P3,000.00 as monthly rent beginning August 8, 2010 and to vacate the premises within 15 days from receipt of the demand letter.[12] Despite numerous demands, Renomeron failed and refused to vacate the property.
Saddi prayed for the trial court to render judgment in her favor and to order Renomeron and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises; to pay her reasonable rent in the amount of P3,000.00 per month until she vacates the subject premises; to pay her moral damages in the amount of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00, appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing until the final determination of the case, and the costs of suit.
In her Answer,[13] defendant-herein respondent Maricris Renomeron specifically denied all the allegations in the Complaint except for the allegations on the respective address of the parties. By way of special and affirmative defenses, Renomeron alleged that Rosalinda Restar-Ambata is not the sole owner of the subject property, and that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Ambata is null and void because she falsely declared that she is the only heir of the late Spouses Claro and Concepcion Restar.
Renomeron alleged that when Claro Restar died on September 8, 2004,[14] he was survived by his wife Concepcion[15] and other collateral relatives, including Rosalinda Restar-Ambata. When Concepcion Restar died on October 7, 2008,[16] she was survived by her sisters, namely, Miguela Tonido Renomeron (Miguela), Victoria Tonigo Manidlagan (Victoria) and Fe Lucinaro-Cesar (Fe). Miguela is the full-blood sister of Concepcion Restar, since they were born of the same parents, Pastor Dumagat Tonido (Pastor) and Graciana Acedera,[17] while Victoria and Fe are the half-blood sisters of Concepcion, as they were born of the same father, Pastor.[18] On March 1, 2009, Victoria died and was survived by her children, namely, Rodelio Tonido Manidlagan, Joan Tonido Manidlagan-Salceda, Julius Tonido Manidlagan, Restituto Tonido Manidlagan, Jr., Aris Tonido Manidlagan, and Marivic Tonido Manidlagan-Ambagan.[19] On June 16, 2010, Miguela died and was survived by her daughter Maricris Renomeron, the defendant and respondent herein. [20]
Renomeron claimed that the Deed of Sale between Saddi and Ambata over the property located at No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City is null and void, because Ambata could not have effectively transferred ownership of those undivided portions of the property that belong to the other heirs and co-owners in accordance with the law on succession. The transfer of ownership over the property on account of the Deed of Sale executed between Saddi and Ambata would constitute an impossible service because there are other owners over the property who have even greater interest than Ambata. Renomeron contends that Saddi is not a buyer in good faith because she did not inquire as to the true ownership of the property. Considering that Saddi knew that Renomeron was occupying the subject property since they are neighbors, it should have warned Saddi that Renomeron had a right to occupy the same, thus, requiring her to make the necessary inquiry on her right to occupy the same.
Renomeron claimed that she has been occupying the subject property even before August 4, 2010. Hence, she never introduced herself to Saddi as the "adopted" daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron just to have an accommodation while looking for an apartment. Renomeron stated that she is the daughter of Miguela T. Renomeron and attached her Certificate of Live Birth[21] to her Answer.
Further, Renomeron stated that there can be no strategy or stealth on her part, because as alleged in the complaint, Saddi herself allowed her to stay in the subject property. She is not in possession of the property because of the tolerance of the owner, but, rather, she is in possession of the property as an heir or co-owner even before the alleged sale of the property. Renomeron alleged that she is not an intruder because the Deed of Sale over the property executed by Ambata in favor of Saddi, on the basis of which the property subject matter of this case was registered in the name of Saddi, is null and void. Renomeron alleged that she did not receive the final demand letter sent by Saddi on December 1, 2010.
Preliminary conference was conducted and terminated on August 17, 2011.
In her Position Paper,[22] plaintiff-herein petitioner Saddi stated, among others that were already alleged in the Complaint, that Renomeron was not in prior physical possession of the property. From the time that the subject property was sold to her, she already had the actual, material and physical possession of the property by operation of law. The allegation of Renomeron that she is an alleged heir is an issue that should be ventilated in another forum and not in an ejectment case where the only issue to be resolved is the issue of possession.
In her Position Paper,[23] defendant-herein respondent Renomeron averred that she is entitled to the physical possession of the property being a co-owner thereof and elaborated thereon as already alleged in her Answer. She claimed that she has been residing at the subject property even before Saddi bought the same in July 2010. Even her mother Miguela Tonido Renomeron resided at the subject property as shown in her given address in her Death Certificate,[24] which is 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City. She could not have employed strategy or stealth to acquire possession over the property because she was already in possession of the same even before Saddi bought the property. Possession of a hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case inheritance is accepted.[25]
The MeTC stated that the issues raised by the parties are: (1) Whether or not defendant (Renomeron) employed strategy or stealth in entering the subject premises and, thus, is a mere intruder and not in prior physical possession of the subject property for which an action for ejectment is proper; (2) whether or not plaintiff (Saddi) is entitled to damages and to reasonable rent; and (3) whether or not the defendant (Renomeron) is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property.[26]
The MeTC's Ruling
In a Decision dated November 2, 2011, the MeTC held that plaintiff-herein petitioner Saddi is entitled to the possession of the subject property.
The MeTC held that under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action for unlawful detainer against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
The MeTC found that Renomeron's stay in the subject property was not through strategy or stealth, because as alleged in the Complaint, Saddi herself allowed Renomeron to stay in the subject property after she purchased it from Ambata on July 20, 2010. When Saddi terminated the tolerance she extended to Renomeron and demanded that she vacate the subject property and the latter refused, Renomeron's right to the possession of the property had expired and she is considered to be unlawfully detaining the property.[27]
The MeTC stated that while Renomeron claims that she is in prior physical possession of the subject property in the concept of an heir and part owner thereof, it is a well-settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only issue that need be resolved is the physical or material possession of the property involved and not the ownership thereof.[28] Moreover, the issues regarding the validity of the Deed of Sale, the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the title in the name of Saddi can only be assailed in the action expressly instituted for that purpose.[29]
The MeTC held that Saddi is not entitled to moral damages. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property as well as attorney's fees and cost of suit.[30]
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the MeTC reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Queen Errika L. Saddi, and against the defendant, Maricris Renomeron, and all other persons claiming rights under her, as follows:
a) Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
b) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P3,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject premises computed from November 26, 2010 until the subject premises are vacated;
c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Renomeron appealed the MeTC Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 (RTC) and raised these issues: (1) The lower court erred in holding that in ejectment cases, the only issue that needs to be resolved is the physical or material possession of the property involved and not the ownership thereof; and (2) the lower court erred in holding that there is unlawful detainer.
The RTC's Ruling
In a Decision dated June 15, 2012, the RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision. It held:
In the case at bar, the herein plaintiff presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 009-2010001546 as proof of her ownership of the subject property. Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face value of plaintiffs TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance (Heirs of Velasquez vs. CA, 382 Phil. 438) although this Court is not unmindful of the ruling that the mere issuance of a TCT does not exclude the possibility that the property may be under co-ownership, as what the defendant-appellants are alleging. However, the adjudication made regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as provisional and would not bar the filing of any action involving title to the property by the same parties. (De Luna vs. CA, et al., 212 SCRA 276). The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
Anent the second issue, a scrutiny of the Complaint clearly shows that plaintiff-appellee intended recovery of possession over the subject property in that her claim for possession is supported by the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication by Rosalinda Ambata Restar marked as Annex "B", a Deed of Absolute Sale marked as Annex "C", and TCT No. 0092010001546 under the name of the herein plaintiff-appellee, Queen Errika Saddi, evidencing the transfer of ownership over the property. As found by the court a quo, the plaintiff allowed defendant to stay in the subject property after she purchased it from Rosalinda Ambata Restar. When the plaintiff asked the defendant to vacate the same, as shown by the Eviction Letter addressed to the defendant-appellant which even reflects her signature therein, and defendant refused to do so, the latter's possession by tolerance became unlawful. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there is unlawful detainer when one unlawfully withholds possession of the property after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied, x x x[32]
The motion for reconsideration of Renomeron was denied by the RTC in its Order[33] dated July 16, 2012.
Renomeron filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC gravely erred in affirming the decision of the MeTC. She contended that: (1) she is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property as a co-owner, being one of Concepcion Restar's heirs, as the child of Miguela, Concepcion Restar's sister; (2) she has been residing at the subject property as evidenced by the Death Certificate of Miguela wherein it was indicated therein that her residence was "No. 10 Graphite St., Twin River Subdivision 2, Parang, Marikina City," the address of the subject property; (3) Ambata had no right to self-adjudicate the subject property to herself as there are other heirs, including herself (Renomeron); (4) the Deed of Sale between Ambata and Saddi is void as there are other heirs/co-owners of the property, including herself; (5) Saddi is a buyer in bad faith; and (6) she (Renomeron) and Saddi are neighbors, so Saddi should have known that she has been living in the subject property.
The CA's Ruling
The Court of Appeals stated that well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[34] In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."[35]
The Court of Appeals said that both the MeTC and the RTC considered the case as one for unlawful detainer, but the pertinent allegations in the Complaint read:
x x x x
3. On July 20, 2010, plaintiff bought the property located at No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision, Parang, Marikina City from Rosalinda Restar-Ambata, the only heir, and covered by TCT No. 009-2010001546. The said property was formerly owned by the late Spouses Claro S. Restar and Concepcion T. Restar. Spouses Restar that [sic] died intestate and without an [sic] issue and the only heir is the sister of Claro S. Restar herein Rosalinda Restar Ambata. Photocopy of the previous title, Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, the Deed of Sale and the new title in the name of the plaintiff are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", "C" and "D" and made an integral part of this Complaint.
4. On August 4, 2010, while plaintiff is in prior physical possession of the property as new owner, defendant by strategy or stealth, introduced [herself] to the plaintiff as the "adopted daughter" of Miguela T. Renomeron[,] herein alleged sister of the late Concepcion Restar, requested plaintiff to accommodate or grant her to stay in the subject property until August 8, 2010 since she was still looking for an apartment. Out of pity and consideration, plaintiff allowed defendant to stay on the condition that she will leave the place on August 8, 2010 pursuant to an eviction letter dated August 4, 2010. x x x
5. However, after August 8, 2010, when requested by the plaintiff to leave or vacate so that she could start renovating and introduce improvement over the said property, defendant refused to vacate despite several demands and thus deprived plaintiff of actual, material or physical possession of said property.
x x x[36]
The Court of Appeals found that Saddi's allegations in her Complaint ran counter to the requirements of an unlawful detainer suit that the possession of the defendant be originally legal and his/her possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.[37] The appellate court said that in this case, paragraph 4 of the Complaint clarified that Renomeron's occupancy was inceptively unlawful as she allegedly employed "strategy or stealth" in gaining possession of the property. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession must inceptively be legal and becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the defendant's subsequent refusal.[38] Hence, the Court of Appeals held that Saddi took a misstep in filing her suit below.
The Court of Appeals stated that although Saddi alleged that she merely tolerated Renomeron's occupancy, the Eviction Letter[39] dated August 4, 2010, however, reads:
To: Ms. Maricris Renomeron
#10 Graphite St. Twin River
Subdivision Parang, Marikina CityAugust 04, 2010
Eviction Letter
This is to inform you, that I, Queen Errika Saddi, am the new owner of the house and lot located at #10 Graphite St. Twin River Subdivision, Parang Marikina City, requesting for you to vacate the said place. I'm giving you 4 days (August 05, 2010 to August 08, 2010) to transfer or move-out all of your belongings in the said premises or we will do some legal actions.
Thank you(Sgd.)
Queen Errika Saddi
(Sgd.)
Maricris Renomeron(Sgd.)
Ruby Rowena L. Saddi
The Court of Appeals found that the pertinent allegations in the Complaint as well as the tenor of the Eviction Letter contradict, rather than support, Saddi's theory that her cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, her arguments advance the view that Renomeron's occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception, as she allegedly entered the property through "strategy or stealth;" also, the "tolerated stay" as stated in the Eviction Letter was in fact a period for her to pack up her things. Second, they contradict the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiffs supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.[40]
The Court of Appeals held:
The tenor of the Eviction Letter likewise implies that private respondent was purportedly evicting the petitioner as the former is the new owner of the property. However, it has been held that complainants in an unlawful detainer case cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the owner's title. Possession de facto must also be proved. A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms Our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. x x x[41]
The Court of Appeals stated that an ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed June 15, 2012 Decision is SET ASIDE. The Complaint for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 11-8343 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 75, is hereby DISMISSED.Saddi filed this petition, raising this issue:
SO ORDERED.[42]
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARIKINA AND IN DECLARING THAT THE HEREIN PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE FILED A CASE FOR ACCION PUBLICIANA INSTEAD OF EJECTMENT.[43]
The issue is whether or not petitioner's Complaint against respondent had sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration that the tolerance or permission given by her to the respondent was from the beginning of her possession when she stepped into the shoes of the seller. Petitioner states that she is the registered owner of the subject property and is in possession of the property from the time it was sold to her by the seller by operation of law. Respondent was allowed to occupy only a portion of the property, but when she (petitioner) allowed her to stay in the meantime, respondent refused to vacate the premises after the lapse of the period given to her and occupied the entire property, depriving her (petitioner) of actual physical possession of the subject property.
In her Comment,[44] respondent contends that petitioner cannot claim that she merely tolerated her (respondent's) possession of the subject property when petitioner only stepped in after the spurious sale between her and Ambata, considering that she (respondent) has been in possession of the property even before the said sale on July 20, 2010. In fact, her mother, Miguela (heir of Concepcion, being her full-blood sister), was residing in the said property with her. It was stated in Miguela's Death Certificate that her residence is at No. 10 Graphite Street, Twin River Subdivision 2, Parang, Marikina City. Likewise, in item number 25 of the Death Certificate, it is shown that she is the informant therein: Maricris Renomeron, daughter of the deceased Miguela, and she has the same address as that of the deceased. Respondent claims that she is entitled to the physical possession of the subject property and she may not be ejected from the property as her possession of the same is by virtue of being a co-owner thereof.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the instant case.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[45]
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[46]
In Spouses Golez v. Heirs of Bertulo,[47] the Court held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.[48]
Paragraph 4 of the Complaint alleged that on August 4, 2010, petitioner, as the new owner of the subject property, allowed respondent to stay in the subject property on the condition that respondent will leave the place on August 8,2010 pursuant to an Eviction Letter dated August 4, 2010, which Eviction Letter was attached to the Complaint as Annex "E." The Eviction Letter dated August 4, 2010, however, states that petitioner, as new owner, was requesting respondent to vacate the said place and was giving her four days to transfer or move out all her belongings in the said premises, evincing that respondent was in possession of the property even before August 4, 2010, the date when petitioner alleged that respondent asked her permission to stay in the property. Hence, as found by the Court of Appeals, the alleged tolerated four-day stay was actually for Renomeron to pack up her belongings from the premises and leave. Obviously, Renomeron was in prior possession of the property as petitioner was ejecting her from the property and gave her four days to pack up her belongings and vacate the property. Thus, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of the possession by defendant. Petitioner failed to clearly allege who specifically permitted respondent to occupy the subject property before she sought to eject respondent from the property and how and when such tolerance came about. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite is important in the light of respondent's claim that she has been occupying the property as a co-owner thereof even before the property was purchased by petitioner. As respondent's possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.[49] However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.[50] To recover possession, he must resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.[51] In this case, petitioner, as the plaintiff in the case below, failed to satisfy the essential requirement that plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Hence, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the vendee-owner had not been amply alleged and proven.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 2013 and its Resolution dated January 20, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 125915 setting aside the Decision dated June 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272 and dismissing the Complaint for Ejectment are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on leave.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso (Chairperson), Twelfth Division, Court of
Appeals, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
(Members); rollo, pp. 22-37.
[3] Id. at 38.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 37, 39.
[7] Id. at 34.
[8] Id. at 35.
[9] Id. at 42.
[10] Id. at 43.
[11] Id. at 44.
[12] Id.at 43.
[13] Id. at 45-71.
[14] Id. at 53.
[15] Id. at 55.
[16] Id. at 56.
[17] Id at 58.
[18] Id. at 58-60.
[19] Id. at 61-68.
[20] Id. at 69-70.
[21] Id. at 70.
[22] Id.at 107-116.
[23] Id. at 72-106.
[24] Id. at 69.
[25] Id. at 76, citing Article 533 of the New Civil Code.
[26] CA rollo, p. 120.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 121, citing Tecson v. Gutierrez, 493 Phil. 132, 138 (2005); Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557, 594 (2004).
[29] Id. citing Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 476 Phil. 403, 414 (2004).
[30] Id. citing Teraña v. Judge De Sagun, 605 Phil. 22, 41 (2009); Sec. 17, Rule 70, Rules of Court.
[31] Id. at 121.
[32] Id. at 131.
[33] Id. at 138.
[34] Rollo, p. 32, citing Quizon v. Juan, 577 Phil. 470, 477-478 (2008)
[35] Id.
[36] CA rollo, pp. 29-30. (Emphasis in the original)
[37] Rollo, p. 33, citing Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 316 (2012).
[38] Id.
[39] CA rollo, p. 42.
[40] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[41] Id. at 35, citing Unida v. Heirs of Urban, 499 Phil. 64, 70 (2005), citing Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 131 Phil. 365, 373 (1968).
[42] Rollo, p. 37.
[43] Id. at 11.
[44] Id. at 57-73.
[45] Canlas v. Tubil, 616 Phil. 915, 924 (2009).
[46] Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009), citing Fernando v. Spouses Lim, 585 Phil. 141 155-156 (2008).
[47] G.R. No. 201289, March 30, 2016.
[48] Id.
[49] Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, 729 Phil. 315, 329 (20014).
[50] Id.