Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari^[1] are the Decision^[2] dated August 25, 2016 and the Resolution^[3] dated November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 144608, which reversed the Decision^[4] dated October 16, 2014 and the Resolution^[5] dated December 29, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and accordingly, reinstated the Decision^[6] dated May 26, 2014 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) finding petitioner Grace R. Aluag (Aluag) to have been validly dismissed from service by respondent BIR Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BIRMPC).

The Facts

This case arose from a complaint^[7] for, inter alia, illegal dismissal filed by Aluag against BIRMPC and its officers, respondents Norma L. Lipana and Estelita V. Datu (respondents). Aluag alleged that she was employed as BIRMPC's cashier from November 16, 1994 until her termination on October 31, 2013.^[8] Her duties, among others, were to receive remittances and payments, deposit all collections daily, record fixed deposits, determine cash positions, issue checks for loans, collect cash receipts, and perform such other duties that the general manager may assign to her.^[9] She claimed that from the time of her employment, she was tasked to give only verbal weekly reports on BIRMPC's funds until 2010 when she was required to put them into writing. In 2011, BIRMPC's loan processors started accepting post-dated checks with the prior approval of the general manager, who then was Gerardo Flores (Flores).^[10] She added that in July 2013, upon Flores' instruction, she submitted a report of bounced checks and deposited the remaining checks in her possession.^[11]

On July 16, 2013 or ten (10) days before she gave birth, Aluag received a letter^[12] from BIRMPC's Board of Directors temporarily relieving her from her position pending an investigation against her and two (2) loan processors involving several suspicious loans, requiring her to submit an answer within ten (10) days.^[13] She complied only after she gave birth or on July 29, 2013, wherein she admitted that she: (a) was tasked to have all collections deposited everyday; (b) received verified post-dated checks for safekeeping and deposit to the bank when due; and (c) opted not to deposit matured checks upon request of the debtors.^[14] She then went on a maternity leave from July 30 to September 30, 2013, during which period, she received another letter from BIRMPC preventively suspending her from August 1 to October 31, 2013.^[15] Claiming that the suspension was illegal, she filed a complaint for illegal suspension with the NLRC. While the case was pending, Aluag received another letter^[16] dated October 31, 2013 terminating her employment; hence, she amended the complaint to one for illegal dismissal.^[17]

For their part, respondents averred that Aluag was legally dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. They narrated that while reviewing loan documents in June 2013, they found rampant violations of BIRMPC's by-laws, rules, and regulations. When they interviewed Aluag, the latter admitted the infractions, but claimed that Flores had full knowledge of them.^[18] Thereafter, respondents sent letters to Aluag and other concerned employees to explain why no charges should be filed against them and, later on, placed them under preventive suspension. To validate the extent of the irregularities and financial damage, they engaged the services of an external accountant who, in her report, observed that the cashier failed to regularly report post-dated checks received and did not observe proper monitoring of the checks' due dates to be deposited. The accountant also pointed out that some checks were not deposited at all.^[19] In light of the foregoing, BIRMPC terminated Aluag's employment effective November 1, 2013 on the ground of loss of trust and confidence for the following infractions: (a) acceptance of accommodation checks; (b) failure to deposit checks on due dates, pursuant to a member/debtor's request; (c) not reporting to the manager those checks with no sufficient funds or which accounts had already closed; and (d) failure to act upon returned checks.^[20]

The LA Ruling

In a Decision^[21] dated May 26, 2014, the LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. Nonetheless, it ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag the amounts of P15,416.48 and P3,557.65, representing her 13^th month pay and service incentive leave pay for the year 2013, respectively.^[22]

The LA found that as a company cashier, Aluag held a position of trust and confidence. Thus, her commission of various infractions, which substantially contributed damages to BIRMPC's financial position in the amount of P35,526,599.77, constituted sufficient basis for loss of trust and confidence.^[23] Further, the LA found that BIRMPC accorded Aluag her procedural due process rights, as two (2) notices were accordingly served on her, namely: (a) the written notice containing a statement of the cause of her dismissal, in order to afford her an opportunity to be heard and defend herself; and (b) the written notice of dismissal dated October 31, 2013, stating clearly the reasons therefor.^[24] The foregoing notwithstanding, the LA still ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag her 13^th month pay and service incentive leave pay for 2013, absent any showing that the latter had already paid the same.^[25]

Aggrieved, Aluag appealed^[26] to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision^[27] dated October 16, 2014, the NLRC reversed the LA ruling, and found Aluag to have been illegally dismissed. Accordingly, it ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag the amounts of P250,187.18 as backwages, P370,000.00 as separation pay, P15,416.48 as 13^th month pay, P3,557.65 as service incentive leave pay, and ten percent (10%) of the total monetary awards as attorney's fees.^[28]

Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that Aluag's perceived infractions were insufficient to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence because they were not violations of her ministerial duties as cashier.^[29] First, she merely received the accommodation checks which were previously verified by the loan processors and approved by the general manager. The NLRC noted that Aluag was neither clothed with the authority to inquire into the validity of the checks nor authorized to exercise discretion in receiving them.^[30] Second, Aluag's tasks did not include depositing the checks and no evidence was presented to show that the general manager assigned this task to her. The NLRC added that no evidence was presented to prove that the non-deposit of checks was due to debtors' requests.^[31] Third, Aluag did submit a report on dishonored checks to the general manager upon his request. The NLRC observed that this function is not among the routine duties of a cashier.^[32] Fourth, the NLRC stated that acting upon returned or dishonored checks is not among Aluag's duties, but is a discretionary function of the general manager.^[33] As regards the external accountant's report, the NLRC added that regular submission of reports and monitoring of the checks' status are not part of Aluag's routine responsibilities.^[34]

Respondents moved for reconsideration,^[35] which was denied in a Resolution^[36] dated December 29, 2015. Dissatisfied, respondents filed a petition for certiorari^[37] before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision^[38] dated August 25, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling and reinstated that of the LA. It held that Aluag was validly dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence, which were applicable because she served as a cashier - a position requiring trust and confidence.^[39] The CA rejected Aluag's argument that she was not liable for the charges levelled against her as these were beyond her duties as a cashier. It explained that Aluag could have been more circumspect by refusing to accept accommodation checks which appear to be unfunded based on BIRMPC's records, and denying to issue checks after verifying that the loan applicant still had unpaid loans with BIRMPC. Most importantly, she is tasked to deposit the checks on their due dates, which she failed to do.^[40] Thus, the CA concluded that it would already be inimical to BIRMPC's interests should it be compelled to keep Aluag within its employ.^[41]

Further, the CA held that BIRMPC complied with the two (2)-notice rule, as the evidence show that Aluag was properly notified of the charges against her to enable her to respond thereto, and of her eventual termination from service.^[42]

Aluag moved for reconsideration,^[43] but was denied in a Resolution^[44] dated November 9, 2016; hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, and accordingly held that BIRMPC had just cause to terminate Aluag's employment.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

I.

At the outset, the Court notes that, as aptly pointed out by respondents in their Comment,^[45] Aluag failed to serve a copy of the instant petition to the CA as required by Section 3, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.^[46] Resultantly, the CA issued a Resolution^[47] dated March 24, 2017 stating that its Decision had become final and executory on December 17, 2016, and, consequently, the Entry of Judgment^[48] was issued in due course. While Aluag filed a Motion and Manifestation^[49] dated June 13, 2017 before the CA explaining that the aforesaid omission was merely due to inadvertence and praying that the Entry of Judgment be set aside, records are bereft of any showing that the CA acted on the same.

Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to Section 5 (d) of Rule 56,^[50] of the Rules of Court, and item 2 of Revised Circular No. 1-88^[51] require a proof of service to the lower court concerned to be attached to the petition filed before the Court. The first two (2) provisions read:

Sec. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. - Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.

Sec. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

In the present case, Aluag failed to serve a copy of the petition to the CA, thereby giving the Court sufficient ground to deny her petition. Her omission even led to the CA's issuance of the resolution declaring the finality of its Decision. Verily, Aluag's procedural mishap is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of her petition, especially since the rules themselves expressly say so.^[52] "Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost,"^[53] as in this case.

In any event, the Court deems it appropriate to address the issue anent the validity of Aluag's dismissal so as to finally resolve the main controversy at hand.

II.

Preliminarily, "the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a CA's ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the correctness of the CA's Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA's Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision.^[54]

Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.^[55]

In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition."^[56]

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, as the latter tribunal's finding that BIRMPC illegally dismissed Aluag patently deviates from the evidence on record, as well as settled legal principles of labor law.

A valid dismissal necessitates compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements. Substantive due process mandates that an employee may be dismissed based only on just or authorized causes under the Labor Code. On the other hand, procedural due process requires the employer to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing before effecting the dismissal.^[57]

In the present case, BIRMPC alleged that Aluag's employment was terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 (c) (formerly Article 282 [c])^[58] of the Labor Code. The requisites for the existence of such ground are as follows: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence; and (b) he performs an act that would justify such loss of trust and confidence.^[59]

Anent the first requisite, case law instructs that "[t]here are two (2) classes of positions of trust: first, managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence."^[60] Being a cashier charged with the collection of remittances and payments, Aluag undoubtedly occupied a position of trust and confidence. Notably, in holding a position requiring full trust and confidence, Aluag "gave up some of the rigid guarantees available to ordinary employees."^[61]

As regards the second requisite, the employee's act causing the loss of confidence must be directly related to her duties rendering her woefully unfit to continue working for the employer.^[62] "In dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, thus making [her] unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in [her]."^[63] If there is sufficient evidence showing that the employer has ample reason to dismiss her, labor tribunals should not deny the employer the authority to dismiss her from employment.^[64]

In the present case, one of the infractions that BIRMPC cited in justifying Aluag's dismissal is her failure to deposit checks on due dates, pursuant to a member/debtor's request.^[65] While the NLRC held that Aluag was not directly responsible for depositing the checks on their due dates and that no evidence was presented showing that her failure to deposit the checks resulted from the request of debtors,^[66] a more thorough and circumspect review of the records reveals that the task of depositing checks on due dates definitely falls within Aluag's scope of responsibilities. For one, the list of Aluag's responsibilities as cashier stated that she was tasked to "have all collections deposited everyday."^[67] For another, she admitted in her explanation that she received verified post-dated checks for safekeeping and deposit to the bank when due.^[68] More relevantly, she likewise admitted in her explanation that she opted not to deposit matured checks upon request of the debtors.^[69] The external auditor's report^[70] also confirmed Aluag's infraction, thus:

The cashier failed to regularly report Post-Dated Checks (PDC) received and did not observe proper monitoring of checks due to be deposited. There are checks which were not deposited at all.^[71] (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, her failure to deposit the checks on their due dates means that she failed to deliver on her task to safeguard BIRMPC's finances. It is also well to note that she was not given any discretion to determine whether or not to deposit the checks. Under these circumstances, BIRMPC had ample reason to lose the trust and confidence it reposed upon her and thereby, terminate her employment. Indeed, it would be most unfair to require an employer to continue employing a cashier whom it reasonably believes is no longer capable of giving full and wholehearted trustworthiness in the stewardship of company funds,^[72] as in this case. In fine, BIRMPC had just cause for Aluag's dismissal.

On the issue of procedural due process, the Court exhaustively discussed the matter in Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc.^[73] as follows:

Anent the issue of procedural due process, Section 2 (I), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides for the required standard of procedural due process accorded to employees who stand to be terminated from work, to wit:

Section 2. Standard of due process; requirements of notice. - In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 [now Article 297] of the Labor Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

The foregoing standards were then further refined in Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera^[74] as follows:

To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment."^[75] (Emphases and underscoring in the original)

Proceeding from the foregoing parameters, the Court finds that BIRMPC sufficiently observed the standards of procedural due process in effecting Aluag's dismissal, considering that it: (a) issued a written notice specifying her infractions; (b) granted her ample opportunity to be heard or explain her side when she was required to submit an explanation; and (c) served a written notice of termination after verifying the infraction committed. Notably, the Court held in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company^[76] that procedural due process is met even without an actual hearing as long as the employee is accorded a chance to explain her side of the controversy, as what happened here.

All told, the CA correctly held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion, and hence, reinstated the LA ruling, considering that BIRMPC observed Aluag's procedural and substantive due process rights in dismissing her from employment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 25, 2016 and the Resolution dated November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144608 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

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^[1] Rollo, pp. 14-32.

^[2] Id. at 36-51. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, concurring.

^[3] Id. at 111-112.

^[4] Id. at 52-62. Penned by Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro with Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra, concurring.

^[5] CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 49-61. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog with Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra, concurring and Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro, dissenting.

^[6] Id. at 62-73. Penned by Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas.

^[7] NLRC records, p. 1; including dorsal portion.

^[8] See rollo, pp. 38-39.

^[9] Id. at 38.

^[10] See id. at 38-39.

^[11] See rollo, p. 39. See also CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 63-64.

^[12] NLRC records, pp. 23-24.

^[13] Rollo, p. 39.

^[14] See undated letter-explanation of Aluag; NLRC records, pp. 25-26.

^[15] Rollo, p. 39.

^[16] NLRC records, p. 30.

^[17] Rollo, p. 39. See also CA rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 64-65.

^[18] See rollo, p. 40 and CA rollo, Vol. I, p. 66.

^[19] See rollo, p. 41 and CA rollo, Vol. I, p. 67.

^[20] Rollo, p. 40 and CA rollo, Vol. I, p. 66.

^[21] CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 62-73.

^[22] Id. at 73.

^[23] See id. at 70-72.

^[24] Id. at 72.

^[25] Id. at 73.

^[26] See Memorandum of Appeal dated July 25, 2014: id. at 199 -219.

^[27] Rollo, pp. 52-62.

^[28] Id. at 61-62.

^[29] Id. at 57-58.

^[30] See id. at 58.

^[31] See id. at 59.

^[32] Id.

^[33] See id. at 59-60.

^[34] Id. at 60.

^[35] See motion for reconsideration dated October 28, 2014 (CA rollo, pp. 230-233) and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated November 26, 2014 (CA rollo, pp. 235-238).

^[36] Rollo, pp. 49-61. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog with Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra, concurring. Notably, the original ponente of the case, Commissioner Nieves Vivar-De Castro, dissented from the Assailed Resolution.

^[37] Dated March 8, 2016. Id. at 3-37.

^[38] Rollo, pp. 36-51.

^[39] See id. at 47.

^[40] See id. at 45-46.

^[41] Id. at 48.

^[42] Id. at 49.

^[43] See motion for reconsideration dated September 12, 2016, CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 425-442.

^[44] Rollo, pp. 111-112.

^[45] Dated June 9, 2017; id. at 69-97.

^[46] See id. at 79-81.

^[47] Id. at 99.

^[48] Id. at 100.

^[49] Id. at 102-104.

^[50] Section 5 (d), Rule 56 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:

x x x x

(d) failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition[.]

^[51] Supreme Court Resolution dated May 16, 1991 Re: Amendment to Circular No. 1-88, paragraph 2 of which reads thus:

(2) Form and Service of petition

A petition filed under Rule 45, or under Rule 65, or a motion for extension may be denied outright if it is not clearly legible, or there is no proof of service on the lower court, tribunal, or office concerned and on the adverse party in accordance with Section 3, 5 and 10 of Rule 13, attached to the petition or motion for extension when filed." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

^[52] See Indoyon, Jr. v. CA, 706 Phil. 200, 212 (2013).

^[53] Manila Mining Corporation v. Amor, G.R. No. 182800, April 20, 2015, 756 SCRA 15, 23-24; citations omitted.

^[54] See University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, G.R. No. 184262, April 24, 2017, citing Quebral v. Angbus Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 221897, November 7, 2016.

^[55] See University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, id., citing Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., G.R. No. 209499, January 28, 2015, 748 SCRA 633, 641.

^[56] See University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, id.; citations omitted.

^[57] See Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., G.R. No. 214399, June 28, 2016, 795 SCRA 32, 45, citing Alps Transportation v. Rodriguez, 711 Phil. 122, 129 (2013).

^[58] As amended and renumbered by Republic Act No. 10151, entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS, THEREBY REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-TWO, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 21, 2011. See also DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, Series of 2015, entitled "RENUMBERING THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED."

^[59] See Cebu People's Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Carbonilla, Jr., G.R. No. 212070, January 27, 2016, 782 SCRA418, 93, citing Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc., 718 Phil. 415, 425 (2013).

^[60] See Cebu People's Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Carbonilla, Jr., id. at 436-437.

^[61] P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. Velayo, 746 Phil. 781, 798 (2014).

^[62] See Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Matias, 497 Phil. 476, 478 (2005).

^[63] Cañeda v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 545 Phil. 560, 564 (2007).

^[64] See id.

^[65] See rollo, p. 40.

^[66] See id. at 59 where the NLRC held:

As borne by the Complainant's [(referring to Aluag)] responsibilities, depositing of checks is not one of the functions which the Complainant is bound to perform. No evidence was presented below proving that the General Manager assigned the task of depositing checks to the Complainant, which may prove responsibility to the same. There is likewise no evidence that the non-depositing of checks resulted from requests of the debtors. (Emphases supplied)

In response, respondents argued that collections in cash should be deposited on the day of receipt, but if the payments were made in post-dated checks, necessarily, these checks should be deposited on their due dates. (See id. at 96).

^[67] Rollo, p. 17.

^[68] NLRC records, p. 25.

^[69] Id. Aluag stated in her explanation, thus:

Ang hindi ko pagdeposito ng nagmatured na checks ng member na nagisyo sa atin ay dahil nakiusap naman sila na huwag muna ipasok kasi wala pa raw pondo yong check nila. Wla (sic) naman po akong ibang intensiyon doon para hindi ito ipasok sa bank. Ito po ay pinaaalam ko din sa General Manager na nakikiusap sila na huwag muna ipasok pero pagdating naman po ng petsa na sinabi nila ipinapasok ko rin naman ito sa bank. Yong iba pinapalitan nila ng Cash at binabayaran sa akin tapos isyuhan ko sila ng resibo.

^[70] Dated October 11, 2013. Id. at 27-29.

^[71] Id. at 28.

^[72] P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. Velayo, supra note 61, at 799, citing Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC, 227 Phil. 121, 127 (1986).

^[73] Supra note 57.

^[74] 710 Phil. 124, 136-137 (2013).

^[75] Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., supra note 57, at 47-49.

^[76] See 602 Phil. 522 (2009).