EN BANC
[ A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018 ]RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT +
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT (WITH ATTACHED PICTURES) AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS.
D E C I S I O N
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT +
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT (WITH ATTACHED PICTURES) AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS.
D E C I S I O N
MARTIRES, J.:
This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-complaint[1] charging Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in casinos, "selling" decisions, and immorally engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 20 September 2017. The matter was referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on 24 October 2017.[2]
The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to "selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.
The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her whole family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.
Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs[3] showing Justice Pizarro sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.
On 21 November 2017, the Court issued a Resolution[4] noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his comment on the anonymous letter-complaint.
On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment[5] wherein he admitted to his indiscretion. He stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino table. He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early retirement.
He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed, again, a parlor game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a dying man because, prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.
He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the accusation that he is the "most corrupt justice in the Philippines" noting that no administrative case had been filed against him for the past seven (7) years; that his first administrative case, which this Court resolved in his favor, actually involved his former driver in Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it appear that the driver was employed in the judiciary; and that all of the few administrative cases filed against him did not involve corruption; and that he was absolved in all.
Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress. He characterized such accusations as cowardly acts of his detractors, who even furnished copies of the anonymous complaint to the presiding justice of the appellate court and the leader of a major religious group, with the intent of destroying his character.
ISSUE
The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him for which he may be held administratively liable.
THE COURT'S RULING
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as well as justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.[6]
The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them.[7] This is consistent with the rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon. which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense.[8]
In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of its erring and undesirable members and personnel, such policy could only be implemented with the strict observance of due process, such that substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the Judiciary.[9] The Court is duty bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the Judiciary from baseless or unreasonable charges.[10]
Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.[11]
As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is clear that the anonymous complaint was not supported by public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules. Nevertheless, it is equally undisputed, as in fact it was admitted, that Justice Pizarro was the same person playing in a casino in Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to the anonymous complaint. He also admitted that he played in a casino sometime in 2009. The Court cannot simply ignore this evident and admitted fact. The issue now is whether Justice Pizarro may be held administratively liable for gambling in casinos.
Recently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reminded judges and court personnel to strictly comply with the prohibition against gambling or being seen in gambling places such as the casino.[12] The OCA cited Circular No. 4[13] issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 which reads:
With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the Court finds them inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the inferior courts nor can they be described as personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any word or phrase.[14] In the case of Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0.
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the aforestated Court issuances to justices of collegial courts does not necessarily mean that Justice Pizarro is absolutely cleared of his evident and admitted act of playing in casinos.
Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869, which consolidated P.D. No. 1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the franchise and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, did not define the meaning of the term "government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies" as well as the words used therein. The same is true with respect to the presidential issuances relative to such prohibition.[15] Considering, however, that the obvious purpose of the subject prohibition is the regulation of conduct of government officials, reference may be made to pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence pertaining thereto to comprehend the meaning of the term under scrutiny.
In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 defines "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government."[16] The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government" is broad enough to include the local governments and the central or national government which, in turn, consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as constitutional bodies and other bodies created in accordance with the constitution.[17]
Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or -controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as distinguished from a "clerk" or "employee" as "a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government." On the other hand, when used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with the operation," its definition could not be found in the Administrative Code and other similarly applicable statutes and rules. It is settled, however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.[18] The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.[19] Indeed, the lawmaker is presumed to have employed the words in the statute in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.[20]
Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must be given their ordinary meaning in relation to their ordinary use in organizations or institutions such as the government. Hence, the term "connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or "related;" "directly" may mean "immediately" "without any intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence" or "without any intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean "doing or performing action" or "administration." Additionally, "to operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to act."
From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion – essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292.
Applying the above definition to the present case, it is dear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the term "government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of the functions of the government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in the administration of justice; and in the performance of such function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.
Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a penalty for any act done in contravention of its provisions particularly the prohibition on gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr.,[21] it was held that such transgression constitutes violations of Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which respectively provide:
Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which pertinently provides:
The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.[23] No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.[24]
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary. Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's. first transgression, and further bearing in mind his immediate admission of his indiscretion as well as the number of years he has been in government service, the Court finds the imposition of a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Acting C.J.,) Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Leonen, J., see disenting opinion.
Bersamin, J., no part due to close relations to J. Pizzaro.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 13, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 17, 2018 at 8:40 a.m.
[1] Rollo, (no proper pagination).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Section 1, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.
[7] Rondina v. Justice Bello, Jr., 501 Phil. 319, 326 (2005).
[8] Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes alleging Illicit Activities of a certain Atty. Cajayon involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, 6 June 2017.
[9] Alegria v. Duque, 549 Phil. 25, 27 (2007).
[10] Relova v. Rosales, 441 Phil. 104, 107 (2002).
[11] Balasbas v. Monayao, 726 Phil. 664, 665 (2014).
[12] OCA Circular No. 231-2015 dated 12 October 2015.
[13] As cited in City Government of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr., 425 Phil. 592, 599-600 (2002).
[14] The Collector of Customs Airport Customhouse v. Villaluz, 163 Phil. 354, 389 (1976).
[15] Memorandum Circular No. 20, series of 1986, issued by Executive Secretary Joker P. Arroyo on 8 October 1986; Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 2001, issued by Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo on 28 August 2001; Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 2016 issued by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea on 20 September 2016.
[16] See also Act 2711, Section 2 or the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which was in effect upon the enactment of P.D. Nos. 1067-B and 1869.
[17] Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 159-A Phil. 21, 34 (1975); Executive Order No. 292, Book II; see also Act No. 2711, Article IV, Section 17.
[18] The Secretary of Justice v. Koruga. 604 Phil. 405, 416 (2009).
[19] South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 626 Phil. 566, 573 (2010).
[20] Delfino v. St. James Hospital, Inc., 532 Phil. 551, 558 (2006) citing People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352, 357 (1923).
[21] Supra note 13.
[22] Id. at 600.
[23] Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, 551 Phil. 174, 180 (2007).
[24] Anonymous v. Achas, 705 Phil. 17, 24-25 (2013) citing City Government of Tagbilaran v. Judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr., supra note 13 at 601.
LEONEN, J.:
Justice Pizarro's acts warrant not merely a fine of P100,000.00, but dismissal from the service. I dissent from the ponencia's conclusions concerning the imposable penalty.
Concededly, in City Government of Tagbiliran v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,[1] this Court imposed a P12,000.00 fine and issued a stern warning against the respondent therein for playing slot machines in a casino and going to cockpits and placing bets on cockfights. However, the facts and circumstances in this case show that a higher penalty must be imposed on respondent.
In contrast to City Government of Tagbiliran, the respondent in this case is not a Municipal Trial Court judge, but a Justice of the Court of Appeals. By virtue of his higher judicial rank as a member of a collegiate appellate court, a degree below only to this Court, respondent should be held to a higher standard of judicial conduct.
The ponencia's analysis of Supreme Court Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0 dated August 21, 1980 reasons that justices of collegiate courts are without the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos as they are neither judges of inferior courts nor personnel of the court. Instead, respondent was found to have violated, among others, Section 14(4)(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1896, which disallows government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies from playing in Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation casinos.
The difference between Supreme Court Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0 dated August 21, 1980, and Presidential Decree No. 1896, is that the former prohibits not only playing in gambling casinos, but even mere entry therein. This strict prohibition was emphasized in OCA Circular No. 231-15 dated October 12, 2015, in which judges and court personnel were strictly reminded that they cannot gamble or be seen in casinos.
The stricter version is also found in Memorandum Circular No. 20 issued on October 6, 1986,[2] Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued on August 28, 2011,[3] and Memorandum Circular No. 6 dated September 20, 2016.[4] This stringent prohibition against government officials entering or being present in gambling casinos is consistent with the code of conduct imposed on public servants. As stated in Memorandum Circular No. 6 dated September 20, 2016:
I disagree that only judges of the inferior courts and court personnel must abide by a severe proscription, while justices of collegiate courts, the latter of which necessarily includes the members of this Court, are given more leniency in the activities they may engage in. Members of the judiciary with higher judicial rank must abide by more stringent norms in the conduct of their professional and personal lives. High-ranking members of the judiciary are the benchmark by which their colleagues and subordinates model their own behavior. Should they act in such a manner not befitting their rank, they should be penalized accordingly. This is the price of occupying an exalted position within our ranks.[5]
By respondent's own admission, he had not only entered at least two casinos, but had gambled both times, albeit in what he terms in a parlor game concept:
This makes it at least two times he has violated the express prohibition laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1896.
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct emphasizes that the requirement of integrity not only in a judge's discharge of their office, but in their personal demeanor as well:
Moreover, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires propriety and the appearance of propriety in all of a judge's activities:
CANON 4
Propriety
Judges and justices must be irreproachable in their conduct, professional and personal, considering the exacting demands of moral righteousness and uprightness on the judiciary.[7] The personal restrictions imposed on members of the judiciary and all other court personnel on entry in gambling casinos may appear burdensome, even excessive, but appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions and public service.[8]
Respondent's repeated violations of Presidential Decree No. 1896 not only demonstrate his disregard of the law and the norms of judicial service, but also seriously taint the public's perception of the judiciary and corrode the image it strives to uphold.
In violating Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent committed gross misconduct.[9] Gross misconduct includes "an act that is inspired by the intention to violate the law, or that is a persistent disregard of well-known rules"[10], and tends to seriously undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.[11] As gross misconduct is a serious charge, dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties is one of the sanctions which may be imposed.[12] Considering respondent's judicial rank, as well as the fact that he had admitted to violating the law at least twice, such a severe penalty is necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to hold Court of Appeals Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of gross misconduct. I vote that he be DISMISSED from the service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
[1] 425 Phil. 592-603 (2002) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
[2] Titled "Enjoining Strict Enforcement of P.D. No. 1067-B Granting a Franchise to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to Establish, Operate and Maintain Gambling Casinos."
[3] Titled "Enjoining Government Personnel and All Concerned from Entering or Playing in Casinos."
[4] Titled "Enjoining All Government Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe and Comply with The Prohibition Against Going to Gambling Casinos."
[5] Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, 391 Phil. 835-845 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] citing Vda. De Enriquez v. Judge Bautista, 387 Phil. 544-554 (2000) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division); Anonymous v. Judge Achas, 705 Phil. 17-25 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
[6] Comment, p. 1.
[7] Atty. Rosales v. Judge Villanueva, 452 Phil. 121-128 (2003) [Per. J. Azcuna, First Division]; Dela Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, 402 Phil. 671-684 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[8] Ascaño, Jr. v. Judge Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015 [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
[9] Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states, in part:
[10] Rosqueta v. Asuncion, 730 Phil. 64-78 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[11] Id.
[12] Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states, in part:
Sec. 11 Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to "selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.
The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her whole family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.
Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs[3] showing Justice Pizarro sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.
On 21 November 2017, the Court issued a Resolution[4] noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his comment on the anonymous letter-complaint.
On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment[5] wherein he admitted to his indiscretion. He stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino table. He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early retirement.
He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed, again, a parlor game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a dying man because, prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.
He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the accusation that he is the "most corrupt justice in the Philippines" noting that no administrative case had been filed against him for the past seven (7) years; that his first administrative case, which this Court resolved in his favor, actually involved his former driver in Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it appear that the driver was employed in the judiciary; and that all of the few administrative cases filed against him did not involve corruption; and that he was absolved in all.
Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress. He characterized such accusations as cowardly acts of his detractors, who even furnished copies of the anonymous complaint to the presiding justice of the appellate court and the leader of a major religious group, with the intent of destroying his character.
The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him for which he may be held administratively liable.
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as well as justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.[6]
The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them.[7] This is consistent with the rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon. which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense.[8]
In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of its erring and undesirable members and personnel, such policy could only be implemented with the strict observance of due process, such that substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the Judiciary.[9] The Court is duty bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the Judiciary from baseless or unreasonable charges.[10]
Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.[11]
As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is clear that the anonymous complaint was not supported by public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules. Nevertheless, it is equally undisputed, as in fact it was admitted, that Justice Pizarro was the same person playing in a casino in Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to the anonymous complaint. He also admitted that he played in a casino sometime in 2009. The Court cannot simply ignore this evident and admitted fact. The issue now is whether Justice Pizarro may be held administratively liable for gambling in casinos.
Recently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reminded judges and court personnel to strictly comply with the prohibition against gambling or being seen in gambling places such as the casino.[12] The OCA cited Circular No. 4[13] issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 which reads:
The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos operating under Presidential Decree No. 1067-B. This is clearly violative or Section 5(3-b) of said Decree. It reads as follows:
(3-b) Persons not allowed to play –(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies."
In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en banc in Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are enjoined from playing in or being present in gambling casinos.
Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph 3 of which provides:3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. – A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." (emphases supplied and italics in the original)
With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the Court finds them inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the inferior courts nor can they be described as personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any word or phrase.[14] In the case of Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0.
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the aforestated Court issuances to justices of collegial courts does not necessarily mean that Justice Pizarro is absolutely cleared of his evident and admitted act of playing in casinos.
Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869, which consolidated P.D. No. 1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the franchise and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, did not define the meaning of the term "government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies" as well as the words used therein. The same is true with respect to the presidential issuances relative to such prohibition.[15] Considering, however, that the obvious purpose of the subject prohibition is the regulation of conduct of government officials, reference may be made to pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence pertaining thereto to comprehend the meaning of the term under scrutiny.
In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 defines "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government."[16] The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government" is broad enough to include the local governments and the central or national government which, in turn, consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as constitutional bodies and other bodies created in accordance with the constitution.[17]
Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or -controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as distinguished from a "clerk" or "employee" as "a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government." On the other hand, when used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with the operation," its definition could not be found in the Administrative Code and other similarly applicable statutes and rules. It is settled, however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.[18] The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.[19] Indeed, the lawmaker is presumed to have employed the words in the statute in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.[20]
Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must be given their ordinary meaning in relation to their ordinary use in organizations or institutions such as the government. Hence, the term "connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or "related;" "directly" may mean "immediately" "without any intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence" or "without any intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean "doing or performing action" or "administration." Additionally, "to operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to act."
From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion – essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292.
Applying the above definition to the present case, it is dear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the term "government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of the functions of the government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in the administration of justice; and in the performance of such function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.
Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a penalty for any act done in contravention of its provisions particularly the prohibition on gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr.,[21] it was held that such transgression constitutes violations of Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which respectively provide:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety –A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.x x x x
22. Infractions of law –The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[22]
Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which pertinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
x x x xCANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.[23] No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.[24]
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary. Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's. first transgression, and further bearing in mind his immediate admission of his indiscretion as well as the number of years he has been in government service, the Court finds the imposition of a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Acting C.J.,) Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Leonen, J., see disenting opinion.
Bersamin, J., no part due to close relations to J. Pizzaro.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 13, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 17, 2018 at 8:40 a.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
[1] Rollo, (no proper pagination).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Section 1, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC.
[7] Rondina v. Justice Bello, Jr., 501 Phil. 319, 326 (2005).
[8] Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes alleging Illicit Activities of a certain Atty. Cajayon involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, 6 June 2017.
[9] Alegria v. Duque, 549 Phil. 25, 27 (2007).
[10] Relova v. Rosales, 441 Phil. 104, 107 (2002).
[11] Balasbas v. Monayao, 726 Phil. 664, 665 (2014).
[12] OCA Circular No. 231-2015 dated 12 October 2015.
[13] As cited in City Government of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, Jr., 425 Phil. 592, 599-600 (2002).
[14] The Collector of Customs Airport Customhouse v. Villaluz, 163 Phil. 354, 389 (1976).
[15] Memorandum Circular No. 20, series of 1986, issued by Executive Secretary Joker P. Arroyo on 8 October 1986; Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 2001, issued by Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo on 28 August 2001; Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 2016 issued by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea on 20 September 2016.
[16] See also Act 2711, Section 2 or the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which was in effect upon the enactment of P.D. Nos. 1067-B and 1869.
[17] Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 159-A Phil. 21, 34 (1975); Executive Order No. 292, Book II; see also Act No. 2711, Article IV, Section 17.
[18] The Secretary of Justice v. Koruga. 604 Phil. 405, 416 (2009).
[19] South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 626 Phil. 566, 573 (2010).
[20] Delfino v. St. James Hospital, Inc., 532 Phil. 551, 558 (2006) citing People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352, 357 (1923).
[21] Supra note 13.
[22] Id. at 600.
[23] Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, 551 Phil. 174, 180 (2007).
[24] Anonymous v. Achas, 705 Phil. 17, 24-25 (2013) citing City Government of Tagbilaran v. Judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr., supra note 13 at 601.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Justice Pizarro's acts warrant not merely a fine of P100,000.00, but dismissal from the service. I dissent from the ponencia's conclusions concerning the imposable penalty.
Concededly, in City Government of Tagbiliran v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,[1] this Court imposed a P12,000.00 fine and issued a stern warning against the respondent therein for playing slot machines in a casino and going to cockpits and placing bets on cockfights. However, the facts and circumstances in this case show that a higher penalty must be imposed on respondent.
In contrast to City Government of Tagbiliran, the respondent in this case is not a Municipal Trial Court judge, but a Justice of the Court of Appeals. By virtue of his higher judicial rank as a member of a collegiate appellate court, a degree below only to this Court, respondent should be held to a higher standard of judicial conduct.
The ponencia's analysis of Supreme Court Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0 dated August 21, 1980 reasons that justices of collegiate courts are without the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos as they are neither judges of inferior courts nor personnel of the court. Instead, respondent was found to have violated, among others, Section 14(4)(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1896, which disallows government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies from playing in Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation casinos.
The difference between Supreme Court Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0 dated August 21, 1980, and Presidential Decree No. 1896, is that the former prohibits not only playing in gambling casinos, but even mere entry therein. This strict prohibition was emphasized in OCA Circular No. 231-15 dated October 12, 2015, in which judges and court personnel were strictly reminded that they cannot gamble or be seen in casinos.
The stricter version is also found in Memorandum Circular No. 20 issued on October 6, 1986,[2] Memorandum Circular No. 8 issued on August 28, 2011,[3] and Memorandum Circular No. 6 dated September 20, 2016.[4] This stringent prohibition against government officials entering or being present in gambling casinos is consistent with the code of conduct imposed on public servants. As stated in Memorandum Circular No. 6 dated September 20, 2016:
In view of its negative effect on the public perception of government service as a whole, the mere entry or presence of government officials and employees in a gambling casino shall be considered as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, unless the same was in the performance of official duties and functions.
I disagree that only judges of the inferior courts and court personnel must abide by a severe proscription, while justices of collegiate courts, the latter of which necessarily includes the members of this Court, are given more leniency in the activities they may engage in. Members of the judiciary with higher judicial rank must abide by more stringent norms in the conduct of their professional and personal lives. High-ranking members of the judiciary are the benchmark by which their colleagues and subordinates model their own behavior. Should they act in such a manner not befitting their rank, they should be penalized accordingly. This is the price of occupying an exalted position within our ranks.[5]
By respondent's own admission, he had not only entered at least two casinos, but had gambled both times, albeit in what he terms in a parlor game concept:
Stripped of all technicalities, and to save your Honors of your precious worktime, on the casino table photos, I plead guilty to my indiscretion. My specifics: the same was taken at a Clark casino when I was accompanying a balikbayan US-based provincemate and former friend in Saudi Arabia some forty (40) years ago. We played a little after early breakfast, without our identity introduced or known, in parlor game fashion, small not big stakes. The photos might have been taken by people with ulterior motives knowing that I am planning for early retirement. I also confess that, sometime in 2009, when I was found to be sick of terminal cancer and was "biking and biking until I die", I also played casino parlor game concept. Again, an indiscretion for a dying man.[6]
This makes it at least two times he has violated the express prohibition laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1896.
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct emphasizes that the requirement of integrity not only in a judge's discharge of their office, but in their personal demeanor as well:
CANON 2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice musty not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Moreover, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires propriety and the appearance of propriety in all of a judge's activities:
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. ...
Judges and justices must be irreproachable in their conduct, professional and personal, considering the exacting demands of moral righteousness and uprightness on the judiciary.[7] The personal restrictions imposed on members of the judiciary and all other court personnel on entry in gambling casinos may appear burdensome, even excessive, but appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions and public service.[8]
Respondent's repeated violations of Presidential Decree No. 1896 not only demonstrate his disregard of the law and the norms of judicial service, but also seriously taint the public's perception of the judiciary and corrode the image it strives to uphold.
In violating Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent committed gross misconduct.[9] Gross misconduct includes "an act that is inspired by the intention to violate the law, or that is a persistent disregard of well-known rules"[10], and tends to seriously undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.[11] As gross misconduct is a serious charge, dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties is one of the sanctions which may be imposed.[12] Considering respondent's judicial rank, as well as the fact that he had admitted to violating the law at least twice, such a severe penalty is necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to hold Court of Appeals Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of gross misconduct. I vote that he be DISMISSED from the service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
[1] 425 Phil. 592-603 (2002) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
[2] Titled "Enjoining Strict Enforcement of P.D. No. 1067-B Granting a Franchise to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to Establish, Operate and Maintain Gambling Casinos."
[3] Titled "Enjoining Government Personnel and All Concerned from Entering or Playing in Casinos."
[4] Titled "Enjoining All Government Officials and Employees to Strictly Observe and Comply with The Prohibition Against Going to Gambling Casinos."
[5] Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, 391 Phil. 835-845 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division] citing Vda. De Enriquez v. Judge Bautista, 387 Phil. 544-554 (2000) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division); Anonymous v. Judge Achas, 705 Phil. 17-25 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
[6] Comment, p. 1.
[7] Atty. Rosales v. Judge Villanueva, 452 Phil. 121-128 (2003) [Per. J. Azcuna, First Division]; Dela Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, 402 Phil. 671-684 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[8] Ascaño, Jr. v. Judge Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015 [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
[9] Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states, in part:
Sec. 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges include: ...
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. ...
[10] Rosqueta v. Asuncion, 730 Phil. 64-78 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[11] Id.
[12] Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states, in part:
Sec. 11 Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 hut not exceeding P40,000.00....