Death of the respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case shall not terminate the proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the dismissal of the complaint if the investigation was completed prior to his demise. If death intervenes before he has been dismissed from service, the appropriate penalty is forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued leaves.

Such is the situation in this administrative matter initiated against Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, in which the complaint charged him with extortion committed against prison inmates detained for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

Antecedents
On April 7, 2015, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the letter sent by Rev. Father Antoni A. Saniel, Director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of Butuan,^[1] denouncing the extortionate activities committed by Judge Abul against the detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan.^[2] Allegedly, Judge Abul had demanded money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 in exchange for the detainees' release from jail or the dismissal of the criminal cases.^[3] Father Saniel submitted with his letter the affidavits of Hazel D. Reyes (Reyes)^[4] and Anna Marie B. Montilla (Montilla) that attested to the extortion activities of Judge Abul.

In her affidavit, Reyes claimed that she was an "asset" of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA); that Judge Abul had extorted money from detainees accused of and undergoing trial for drug-related charges in exchange for their liberty; that a certain Naomi Saranggani, the wife of a detainee, had approached and asked her if she wanted her criminal case to be dismissed; that Saranggani had told her that Judge Abul summoned her to look for detainees facing drug-related charges who wanted their cases to be favorably resolved; that Saranggani had told her and Montilla that they should start raising money totalling P200,000.00 to pay Judge Abul; and that Montilla had related that when she attended her December 5, 2014 hearing, Judge Abul asked for her cellphone number so that they could directly communicate with each another.

On her part, Montilla averred that she had met Saranggani on November 4, 2014 when the latter went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail to await the release of her husband, Walid Saranggani; that Saranggani had asked if she (Montilla) had wanted to be released from prison herself because Judge Abul could arrange her release in exchange for the sum of P200,000.00; that Saranggani had then used her phone to call someone whom she kept addressing as "judge;" that Saranggani had then handed the phone to her to talk to the person, who introduced himself as Judge Abul, and asked if she could pay P100,000.00 in exchange for her release; that she had later on personally met Judge Abul during her scheduled hearing on December 5, 2014, and he had told her that they should help one another because she could be convicted based on the document that she had signed; that Judge Abul had asked her phone number in case he would want to see her after her release; that Saranggani had intimated to her that they paid P250,000.00 to Judge Abul to secure the release of her husband; and that she had learned through Saranggani that Judge Abul had also been instrumental in the release of other prisoners after they had paid him.

Investigation and Report
of the Judicial Audit Team

The OCA conducted a fact-finding investigation of the complaint filed by Father Saniel through a team led by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia.^[5]

The team interviewed Reyes and Montilla who confirmed their affidavits. Reyes and Montilla also separately confirmed that in February 2015, Judge Abul arrived at the provincial jail and talked to them; that Judge Abul asked Reyes to execute a disclaimer that he would prepare and that he would ensure her release from detention; that as to Montilla, Judge Abul appeared to be annoyed by her affidavit, and said to her that he would just inhibit but would see to it that she would be convicted.^[6]

The team reviewed the records of Criminal Case No. 15630 charging Walid Saranggani, Shaira Salic, Mike Saranggani and Ryan Umpa for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 and raffled to the RTC Branch presided by respondent. The team concluded that Criminal Case No. 15630 had been decided in haste and without regard to procedural rules that cast doubt on the regularity of the acquittal of all accused.^[7]

On February 28, 2017, the Court En Banc issued a resolution placing Judge Abul under preventive suspension, and required him to comment on the complaint and the investigation report.^[8]

Comment/Answer of Judge Abul
In his comment/answer,^[9] Judge Abul denied all the accusations, and insisted that the same were false, baseless and concocted by an evil and malicious mind for the sole purpose of besmirching his unblemished record of service in the Judiciary. He maintained that Fr. Saniel had no personal knowledge of the alleged extortion activities; that the declarations of Reyes and Montilla were not based on their personal knowledge and were thus inadmissible against him; that he did not go to the provincial jail to confront Reyes and Montilla, but only to talk to the jail warden to inquire if the prisoners were being allowed to leave jail; that the affidavits of Reyes and Montilla had been notarized before notary public Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, but the representative of the latter had stated that said affidavits were not notarized by Atty. Poculan; and that it was improbable for him to demand money from Reyes and Montilla considering that they had appeared to have no visible income to support themselves.

Pending review of this administrative case, the Court received the letter from the respondent's wife dated September 13, 2017 informing about Judge Abul's demise.^[10] Subsequently, the counsel for the late judge filed a Notice of Death and Motion to Dismiss,^[11] praying for the dismissal of the complaint in view of the respondent's death and the punitive nature of the administrative liabilities.^[12]

OCA Report and Recommendation
On February 20, 2018, the OCA submitted its report,^[13] and recommended therein as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

1.   The motion to dismiss filed by respondent Judge's counsel, Atty. Teristram B. Zoleta, be DENIED for lack of merit; and

2.   Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, be ADJUDGED GUILTY of grave misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and FINED  in the  amount of Five  Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.^[14]

The OCA disagreed with the urging of the respondent's counsel to dismiss the complaint in view of his intervening demise, observing:

It has been settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. However, it may necessitate the dismissal of the case upon a consideration of the following factors: first, if the respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the kind of penalty imposed.

In this case, none of the foregoing factors exists. First, respondent Judge's right to due process was not violated. As borne by the records, he was duly informed of the accusations against him, having been furnished with a copy of the letter-complaint of Fr. Saniel and its attached affidavits, as well as a copy of the investigation report of Atty. Garcia. In fact, he filed his comment thereon, which the Court received on 19 April. 2017. Second, his death alone is insufficient to justify the dismissal of the case on the ground of equitable or humanitarian consideration. A case was ordered dismissed by the Court by reason of the respondent's death for equitable and humanitarian considerations as the liability was incurred by reason of respondent's poor health. In this case, there was no circumstance other than respondent Judge's death that may warrant the invocation of equitable or humanitarian ground in his favor. Third, the penalty of fine may still be imposed notwithstanding his death. In fact, in one case, the respondent who died before the investigating judge was able to finish and submit his report but was duly notified of the proceedings against him and was directed to file his answer, although he opted not to comply therewith, was still meted the penalty of forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, after having been found guilty of grave misconduct.^[15]

The OCA found that the allegations against Judge Abul had been confirmed and validated by Judge Abul himself and by the court records; that the affidavits of Reyes and Montilla had appeared to be credible in light of Judge Abul's inability to impute any ill-motive, malice or bad faith to the accusers; and that based on the results of the investigation Judge Abul had violated Canon 2, Canon 3 and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary in a manner that amounted to grave misconduct.^[16]

Issue
Did Judge Abul's actuations amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary?

Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation.

Based on the sworn declarations of Reyes and Montilla, as well as the court records of Criminal Case No. 15630, there appeared to be sufficient grounds to hold Judge Abul administratively liable for extortion as charged against him. Consequently, the Court concurs with the following observations of the OCA, viz.:

Going into the merits of the case, it may be true that some of the statements made by Reyes and Montilla in their respective affidavits and before Atty. Garcia were not necessarily based on their own personal knowledge since they were just mostly conveyed to them by Naomi. Nonetheless, these statements cannot simply be brushed aside as hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against respondent Judge. It bears stressing that some of these statements were confirmed and validated by respondent Judge himself and by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630.

First, Reyes and Montilla claimed that respondent Judge went to the Agusan del Norte Provincial Jail on 4 or 5 February 2015, and this was admitted by respondent Judge, although he denied talking with them since his supposed purpose in going there was merely to ask its Officer-In-Charge, Mr. Antenorio, whether prisoners are allowed to leave the jail premises without the court's authority in light of the complaint-affidavits of Reyes and Montilla against him that were executed before Atty. Puculan on 13 January 2015. However, the positive assertion by Reyes and Montilla that he personally talked with them inside the Provincial Warden's office is more credible than his bare denial. Notably, Montilla claimed that it was Mr. Antenorio who convinced them to talk with respondent Judge. If, indeed, he did not purposely talk with Reyes and Montilla, he could have easily obtained an affidavit or statement from Mr. Antenorio to refute such allegation, but he conveniently failed to do so.

Second, the allegation of Reyes that Naomi told her and Montilla that the drugs case against her (Naomi's) husband and his co-accused was dismissed by respondent Judge on 24 November 2014, as well as the allegation of Montilla that Naomi went to the Provincial Jail sometime in November 2014 to fetch her husband and relatives after they were acquitted by respondent Judge, are not without factual basis. As borne by the records of Criminal Case No. 15630, the Decision acquitting the accused in said case was promulgated on 24 November 2014 without the presence of all the accused, even if such presence is required under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, thereby making it necessary for Naomi to fetch her husband and his co-accused from the Provincial Jail. The consistency between the statements of Reyes and Montilla and the circumstances of said case, as borne by the records, makes the allegations of Reyes and Montilla credible.

It bears stressing that respondent Judge was furnished with a copy of the Investigation Report dated 10 February 2017 of Atty. Garcia, where said statements and circumstances of the subject criminal case were clearly outlined. It was also stated therein that Reyes claimed that Naomi told her that her husband and his co-accused obtained a favorable decision after paying respondent Judge the amount of Php 250,000.00. Atty. Garcia characterized the proceedings in the same criminal case as a "patent irregularity" since respondent Judge "decided it with undue haste and without due regard to the procedural rules, resulting in the questionable acquittal of all the accused" However, despite the gravity of the irregularity imputed to him and despite being required to comment thereon, respondent Judge offered not a single word to refute the findings  and observations of Atty. Garcia, thereby giving the impression that respondent Judge has admitted such findings and observations.

The foregoing circumstances render the allegations of Reyes and Montilla not only admissible in evidence but also convincing, especially so that respondent Judge failed to offer any plausible imputation of ill motive, malice or bad faith on their part to make any false accusation against him. Montilla claims that she negotiated with respondent Judge over the phone regarding the amount he was asking in exchange for the dismissal of her case in the presence of Reyes and Naomi. Reyes corroborated Montilla's statement, having overheard the conversation between respondent Judge and Montilla as the phone was set on speaker mode. Montilla further claims that during the scheduled hearing of her case on 5 December 2014, respondent Judge called her to the lawyer's table, and admonished her for asking that the Php 200,000.00 she was supposed to pay him be reduced even if the affidavit she executed showed that she is guilty.^[17]

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of every whiff of impropriety not only in regard to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his office and even as a private individual.^[18] Indeed, judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel who have matters pending before them in order to avoid even the mere perception of possible bias or partiality. They should be scrupulously careful with respect to pending or prospective litigations before them to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must they possess proficiency in law but they must also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel, with great comfort, of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.^[19]

In view of this, whether or not Judge Abul really demanded money in exchange for either the liberty of Reyes and Montilla or the dismissal of the criminal case filed against them even became immaterial herein. By simply meeting and talking with them as the accused whose cases were then pending in his sala, Judge Abul already transgressed ethical norms and compromised his integrity and impartiality as the trial judge. His actuations flagrantly violated the following norms and canons of The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

x x x x

CANON 3
Impartiality

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

x x x x

CANON 4
Propriety

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

x x x x

As regards the acquittal of the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the Court agrees with and adopts the following relevant findings thereon by the OCA, to wit:

While there was no direct evidence that respondent Judge was paid Php 250,000.00 in consideration for the acquittal of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 15630, the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their acquittal on reasonable doubt give credence to the allegation of corruption against him. The decision was premature and grossly unprocedural, the same being in violation of Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Notably, he allowed the accused to manipulate the proceedings when he unduly acted favorably on their memorandum praying for their acquittal despite the vehement opposition thereto of the prosecution, correctly pointing out that the same could not be treated as demurrer to evidence having been filed out of time. Worse, without considering the merits of the prosecution's opposition to the memorandum despite its legal and logical soundness, he submitted the case for decision by merely stating in his order that "the defense has filed a memorandum indicating that they (sic) are submitting the case for decision based on prosecution's evidence and the prosecution has submitted its comment." With extraordinary and undue speed, he penned the decision on the same day that the case was submitted for decision, and he promulgated the decision without the presence of the accused in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Plainly enough, Judge Abul's actuations and behavior constituted grave misconduct. It is settled that grave misconduct exists where the requisites of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. As an element of grave misconduct, corruption consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.^[20]

Judge Abul's death intervened in the meantime. Nonetheless, and as recommended by the OCA, his death should not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint. In Gonzales v. Escalona,^[21] we held that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent public official had meanwhile ceased to hold office. Verily, jurisdiction over the case or subject matter, once acquired, continues until final resolution. With more reason is this true herein because Judge Abul was fully afforded due process during the investigation.

Worth noting is that the Court already sternly warned Judge Abul in Calo v. Judge Abul, Jr.^[22] "to be more circumspect in issuing orders which must truly reflect the actual facts they represent to obviate engendering views of partiality among others." The warning evidently fell on deaf ears in view of the clear showing that Judge Abul still committed another serious offense.

It is now time to impose the stiffer penalty on him.

Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, grave misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious offense that results in dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reappointment or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except accrued leave credits.^[23]

Had Judge Abul not died, he would have been meted the extreme penalty of dismissal, with the concomitant forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits due to him, except accrued leaves, as an accessory penalty. Considering that his intervening death has rendered his dismissal no longer feasible, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all such retirement and allied benefits, except accrued leaves, then becomes the viable sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES the late Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT; and, accordingly, FORFEITS all benefits, including retirement gratuity, exclusive of his accrued leaves, which shall be released to his legal heirs.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Reyes, Jr., J.,  Carandang,  and Inting, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J.,  See separate opinion.
Caguioa, Reyes,  Jr., A., and Gesmundo, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Hernando.
Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see dissenting opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Hernando.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 13-14.

^[2] Id. at 20-22.

^[3] Id. at 13.

^[4] Id. at 15-19.

^[5] Id. at 4.

^[6] Id. at 7-8.

^[7] Id. at 10.

^[8] Id. at 58-59.

^[9] Id. at 61-77.

^[10] Id. at 91.

^[11] Id. at 95-97.

^[12] Id. at 96

^[13] Id. at 104-119.

^[14] Id. at 119.

^[15] Id. at 114-115.

^[16] Id. at 116-117.

^[17] Id. at 115-116.

^[18] Munsayac-De Villa v. Reyes, A.M. Nos. RTJ-05-1925, RTJ-05-1926, RTJ-05-1927, RTJ-05-1928, RTJ-05-1929, RTJ-05-1930 & P-05-2020, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 404, 426.

^[19] Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, November 13, 2001, 368 SCRA 503, 508.

^[20] Office of the Ombudsman v. Asis, G.R. No. 237503 (Notice), June 20, 2018.

^[21] A.M. No. P-03-1715, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 1.

^[22] A.M. No. RTJ-06-1996 (Resolution), July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 416.

^[23] Section 11, Rule 140, Rules of Court.

---

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.;

I join the able dissent of Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando and add the following thoughts for emphasis. In my view, the death of respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. prior to the promulgation and finality of a decision moots the administrative case against him. Proceeding further and imposing any penalty that will be suffered by his widow violates the principle of due process of law, a fundamental part of our Constitution.

To recall, a judicial audit was conducted based on a complaint filed by Reverend Father Antoni A. Saniel, the director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of Butuan, alleging that respondent was demanding money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their release or the cases' dismissal.^[1]

The judicial audit team subsequently filed their investigation report, in which the witnesses interviewed confirmed respondent's alleged extortion activities. On February 28, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution placing him on preventive suspension and requiring him to comment on the complaint and investigation report.^[2]

In his Comment/Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that they were "false, baseless[,] and concocted by an evil and malicious mind with the sole purpose of besmirching his unblemished record of service in the judiciary."^[3]

On August  5, 2017, respondent  was killed by an  unidentified motorcycle-riding assailant outside his house.^[4] This Court was informed of his death in a September 13, 2017 letter sent by his widow.^[5]

In a February 20, 2018 Report and Recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent guilty of grave misconduct. While the offense is punishable by dismissal from service, the Office of the Court Administrator instead recommended the penalty of a fine of P500,000.00, to be deducted from respondent's retirement gratuity in view of his death.^[6]

The majority adopted the Office of the Court Administrator's findings. However, it modified the recommended penalty to the forfeiture of all benefits, including retirement gratuity, on the ground that the death of a respondent in an administrative case does not oust this Court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the case or to impose accessory penalties.^[7]

I disagree.

I
The fundamental right to due process of law is found in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution:

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Procedural due process is canonically a part of this provision. Due process has no controlling and precise definition but is generally premised on the idea of fairness or "freedom from arbitrariness."^[8] It is considered to be "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."^[9] In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila:^[10]

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch" in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.^[11]

Due process encompasses both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process "concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere."^[12] In his opinion in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company.,^[13] now-retired Associate Justice Arturo Brion traced the history of procedural due process:

At its most basic, procedural due process is about fairness in the mode of procedure to be followed. It is not a novel concept, but one that traces its roots in the common law principle of natural justice.

Natural justice connotes the requirement that administrative tribunals, when reaching a decision, must do so with procedural fairness. If they err, the superior courts will step in to quash the decision by certiorari or prevent the error by a writ of prohibition. The requirement was initially applied in a purely judicial context, but was subsequently extended to executive regulatory fact-finding, as the administrative powers of the English justices of the peace were transferred to administrative bodies that were required to adopt some of the procedures reminiscent of those used in a courtroom. Natural justice was comprised of two main sub-rules: audi alteram partem - that a person must know the case against him and be given an opportunity to answer it; and nemo judex in sua cause debe esse - the rule against bias. Still much later, the natural justice principle gave rise to the duty to be fair to cover governmental decisions which cannot be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.

While the audi alteram partem rule provided for the right to be notified of the case against him, the right to bring evidence, and to make argument - whether in the traditional judicial or the administrative setting - common law maintained a distinction between the two settings. "An administrative tribunal had a duty to act in good faith and to listen fairly to both sides, but not to treat the question as if it were a trial. There would be no need to examine under oath, nor even to examine witnesses at all. Any other procedure could be utilized which would obtain the information required, as long as the parties had an opportunity to know and to contradict anything which might be prejudicial to their case."^[14]

In Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission^[15] procedural due process has been summarized as:

. . . the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of the right in the matter involved.^[16]

In this jurisdiction, Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations^[17] states the seven (7) cardinal primary rights in "trials and investigations of an administrative character"^[18] for due process to be satisfied:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.  In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., . . ., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.  In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, . . ., "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to  support it is a nullity,  a place when directly attached."  This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." . . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy....

(6) [The tribunal or officer], therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. . . .

(7) [The tribunal or officer] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.  The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.^[19] (Citations omitted)

In Gas Corporation of the Philippines v. Inciong,^[20] this Court clarified that while Ang Tibay remains to be good law, the failure to strictly apply the formalities of an adversarial proceeding before an administrative tribunal does not necessarily result in a denial of due process:

The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of due process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople,  Nation Multi Service  Labor Union  v.  Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation. From the Comment of the office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The opportunity to present its side of the case was given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity could then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.^[21] (Citations omitted)

Thus, due process in administrative proceedings generally does not require that the respondent must be heard. It merely requires that the respondent is given the opportunity to be heard.^[22] This opportunity to be heard, however, is not lost even after a judgment is rendered. Due process in administrative proceedings requires that the respondent still be given the opportunity to question the unfavorable judgment.

In Lumiqued v. Exevea,^[23] this Court further explains:

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.^[24] (Emphasis supplied)

The opportunity to be heard should be present in all aspects of the procedure until the finality of the judgment, decision, or resolution. It is not a mere formality but an intrinsic and substantial part of the constitutional right to due process. This is what inspires the Revised Penal Code provision that dismisses a case against an accused for any crime when he or she dies.^[25]

II
This Court's disciplinary powers should always be read alongside the guarantee of any respondent's fundamental rights. After all, it is this Court that is granted both the power of judicial review and the competence to promulgate rules for the enhancement and protection of constitutional rights.

It is settled that this Court's jurisdiction over a disciplinary case against a court official or employee, once acquired, is not lost simply because the respondent has ceased holding office during the pendency of the case.^[26]

Cessation from public office during the pendency of the case may occur in three (3) different ways: (1) resignation; (2) retirement; or (3) death.

On resignation, this Court stated:

[T]o constitute a complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment . . . and a resignation implies an expression by the incumbent in some form, express or implied of the intention to surrender, renounce, or relinquish, the office, and an acceptance by competent and lawful authority.^[27]

Resignation requires intent. It is a voluntary cessation from public office. Sometimes, however, respondents in disciplinary proceedings opt to resign to avoid being forcibly dismissed from service. Thus, this Court has stated that resignation "should be used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction."^[28]

Therefore, once this Court assumes jurisdiction-that is, after an administrative case has been filed-resignation from public office will not render the case moot. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. :^[29]

Petitioner argues that a government employee who has been separated from service, whether by voluntary resignation or by operation of law, can no longer be administratively charged. Such argument is devoid of merit.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.

Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.^[30]

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez:^[31]

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable.^[32]

Retirement, meanwhile, may be optional or compulsory. Optional retirement for government employees may be availed after 20 to 30 year's of service, regardless of age.^[33] Judges and justices may also opt to retire upon reaching 60 years old as long as they have rendered 15 years of service in the judiciary.^[34] Optional retirement, like resignation, is a voluntary cessation from public office. Thus, the same rationale is applied to those who avail of optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case. In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda:^[35]

A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The timing of respondent's application for leave, for optional retirement, and her sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent's acts reveal a calculated design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against her.

Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.^[36]

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Ruiz:^[37]

The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May 27, 2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting that he "be allowed to optionally retire effective November 30, 2013." He later requested, in another letter, that the effectivity date of his optional retirement be changed from November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.

The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for optional early retirement in view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to suffer accessory penalties affecting his qualification to retire from office should his convictions stand. The OCA records also show that he is currently on "on leave of absence" status. In any case, that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the service.^[38] (Citations omitted)

In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar:^[39]

Judge Bugtas contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the instant case because of the approval of his optional retirement effective 31 January 2006. This is unacceptable. In Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, the Court held that cessation from office because of retirement does not render the administrative case moot or warrant its dismissal[.]^[40]

Respondents in an administrative case could apply for optional retirement to evade liability. Thus, optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case, like resignation, will not render the case moot.

Unlike resignation, however, retirement may also be involuntary. Retirement from public service is compulsory for government employees who have reached 65 years old^[41]   or for judges and justices who have reached 70 years old.^[42]

In the leading case of Perez v. Abiera,^[43] this Court was confronted with the issue of whether an administrative complaint against a judge, was rendered moot when he compulsorily retired while the case was pending. Citing Diamalon v. Quintillan,^[44] respondent Judge Carlos Abiera argued that he could not be meted the penalty of dismissal since he was no longer in service.

In Quintillan, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Jesus Quintillan since he had already resigned from service before a judgment could be rendered:

[T]he petition for dismissal must be granted. There is no need to inquire further into the charge imputed to respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. As an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for.^[45]

In Abiera, however, this Court clarified that Quintillan was not meant to be a precedent to immediately dismiss complaints against judges who resigned or retired while the administrative cases were pending:

It was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be renders (sic) moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully, if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.^[46] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court, thus, established that:

In short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat.^[47]

As this doctrine developed, this Court has interpreted "some other similar cause" to include death. Death, however, cannot be placed on the same footing as resignation or retirement. Resignation and optional retirement are voluntary modes of cessation. The respondent may avail of them as a way to escape or evade liability. This Court, therefore, should not be ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the administrative complaint even if the resignation is accepted or the application for retirement is approved.

Death, unless self-inflicted, is involuntary. Respondents who die during the pendency of the administrative case against them do not do so with the intent to escape or evade liability. The rationale for proceeding with administrative cases despite resignation or optional retirement, therefore, cannot apply.

It  is conceded that compulsory  retirement is also involuntary. Respondents or this Court cannot fight against the passage of time.

Abiera, however, had a different rationale for respondents who have reached the compulsory age of retirement:

A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public.^[48] (Emphasis supplied)

In formulating the doctrine, this Court was trying to guard against corrupt and unscrupulous magistrates who would commit abuses knowing fully well that after retirement, they could no longer be punished.

It is this certainty of cessation that differentiates compulsory retirement from death as a mode of cessation from public service. A respondent judge knows when he or she will compulsorily retire. In contrast, nobody knows when one will die, unless the cause of death is self-inflicted.  Even those with terminal illnesses cannot pinpoint the exact day when they will die.

The essence of due process in administrative cases is simply the opportunity to be heard. Respondents must be given the opportunity to be informed of and refute the charges against them in all stages of the proceedings.

Only in resignation and retirement can there be a guarantee that respondents will be given the opportunity to be heard. Even if they resign or retire during the pendency of the administrative case, they can still be aware of the proceedings and actively submit pleadings. Thus, they should not be allowed to evade liability by the simple expediency of separation from public service.

It would be illogical and impractical to treat dead respondents as equal to resigned or retired respondents. Dead respondents are neither aware of the continuation of the proceedings against them, nor are in any position to submit pleadings. Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. Continuing with the administrative proceedings even after the respondent's death, therefore, is a violation of the right to due process.

III
Indeed, here, had respondent's liability been proven, the penalty of dismissal should have been meted out to him. However, the entire process had not yet been completed before he died.

It is settled that "[p]ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."^[49] Public trust requires mechanisms for public officers and employees to be accountable to the people. Any party may file administrative complaints against any erring public officer or employee. If, after investigation, the public officer or employee is found guilty, he or she is penalized accordingly.

Penalties against erring public officers or employees will vary according to the type of infraction or the frequency of its commission. What is certain, however, is that civil service regulations and jurisprudence reserve the highest penalty for the gravest infraction: dismissal from service.

Thus, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

SECTION 46. Classification of Offenses. - Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

A.    The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:   

1. Serious Dishonesty;
   
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
   
3. Grave Misconduct;
   
4. Being Notoriously Undesirable;
   
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
   
6. Falsification of official document;
   
7. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;
   
8. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded to other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;
   
9. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee has business relations;
   
10. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his/her official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of his/her office. The propriety or impropriety of the foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the motivation.  A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very nature;
    
11. Nepotism; and
    
12. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people.

When a civil servant commits the most deplorable of crimes against the Republic and the Filipino people, it is in the public interest to remove him or her from public service, so that this person can no longer pollute the ranks of civil service and diminish the public's confidence in its government institutions. In City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals,^[50] this Court meted out the penalty of dismissal on a city veterinarian found guilty of grave misconduct by the Civil Service Commission, instead of reinstatement with full backwages as previously declared by the Court of Appeals. It explained:

Indeed, to reinstate private respondent to his former position with full backwages would make a mockery of the fundamental rule that a public office is a public trust and would render futile the constitutional dictates on the promotion of morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the government service. Likewise, reinstatement would place private respondent in such a position where the persons whom he is supposed to lead have already lost their respect for him and where his tarnished reputation would continue to hound him.^[51]

Members of the judiciary are held to an even higher standard. In Astillazo v. Jamlid:^[52]

The Court has said time and time again that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the administration and disposition of justice - from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk - should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the well-guarded image of the judiciary. It has always been emphasized that the conduct of judges and court personnel must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all times, but must also be above suspicion. Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel, hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Thus, every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.^[53] (Citations omitted)

A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC^[54] provides that justices and judges found guilty of serious charges, or the worst possible offenses that may be committed, are sanctioned with the following penalties:

SECTION 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1.  Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to  any public  office,  including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

For the first two (2) sanctions to be satisfied, they require the respondent judge or justice to still be in public service.

For obvious reasons, a person who is no longer in the public service cannot be removed, either temporarily or permanently, from public service. This was why this Court formulated the doctrine in Abiera, ruling that its jurisdiction "at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case."^[55]

This doctrine was further refined in Gonzales v. Escalona:^[56]

Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the service. His resignation, however, does not render this case moot, nor does it free him from liability. In fact, the Court views respondent Escalona's resignation before the investigation as indication of his guilt, in the same way that flight by an accused in a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will not be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while in the active service. While we can no longer dismiss him, we can still impose a penalty sufficiently commensurate with the offense he committed.

We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case. In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, we held that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a finding of administrative liability[.]^[57] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In its ponencia, the majority merely reiterates Gonzales as basis for continuing with the case against respondent, who had died before the judgment was rendered.^[58] What Gonzales failed to explain, however, was that in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,^[59] while this Court asserted its jurisdiction despite the respondent's death, it also conceded that the penalty could no longer be served. Thus, this Court was constrained to actually dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated:

To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is now declared closed and terminated.^[60]

Indeed, if the respondent could no longer be removed from the Bench, the full effect of the penalty can no longer be carried out. Even this Court in Gonzales found that the respondent's liability must be tempered "with compassion in light of his untimely demise"^[61] and limited the imposable penalty to a P10,000.00 fine.

This is not the first time that this Court addresses the impracticability of imposing an administrative penalty on a respondent who had already died.

In Government Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission,^[62] this Court upheld the Civil Service Commission's ruling that back salaries could be released to the deceased employees' heirs. This, despite this Court's prior Resolution that any payment should await the outcome of the disciplinary cases filed by the Government Service Insurance System against them:

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender extinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before final judgment. In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substantiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned orders of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post -mortem investigation of the character contemplated.^[63] (Emphasis supplied)

Even the doctrine in Gonzales was not without exceptions. There, this Court held that when the respondent dies while the disciplinary case was pending, the presence of any of the following circumstances is enough to warrant the dismissal of the case against him or her: "first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed."^[64]

In Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon,^[65] this Court found it inappropriate to proceed with the investigation of a judge "who could no longer be in any position to defend himself as it "would be a denial  of his right to be heard, our most basic understanding of due process.^[66]

The respondent judge's submission of a comment or explanation before death is likewise not enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. As stated in Lumiqued, the right to due process "is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."^[67]

In Apiag v. Cantero,^[68] respondent Judge Esmeraldo Cantero (Judge Cantero), who had been charged with gross misconduct for committing bigamy and falsification of public documents, was able to submit a comment. The Office of the Court Administrator later submitted a Report and Recommendation finding him guilty and recommending his dismissal from service. However, Judge Cantero died while the case was pending before this Court. In dismissing the case and allowing the release of his retirement benefits to his heirs, this Court held:

[W]e . . . cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage - children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.^[69]

In Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig and the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zamboanga del Sur,^[70] Judge Ricardo Salvanera was able to submit his explanation but died before this Court could rule on his case. Thus, despite finding him guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, this Court was constrained to dismiss the case and release his retirement benefits to his heirs.

The same procedural antecedents are present here. This Court was informed of respondent's death in a September 13, 2017 letter^[71] after he had been killed by an unidentified motorcycle-riding assailant.^[72] While he was able to submit his Comment/Answer to the investigation report of the judicial audit team, the Office of the Court Administrator only concluded its investigation on the allegations against respondent on February 20, 2018, when it submitted its Report and Recommendation to this Court.^[73]

The Office of the Court Administrator is not precluded from making its own findings on the administrative complaint, or even to make contrary or additional findings of fact. It is not exclusively bound by the factual findings of the judicial audit team. Just the same, this Court has the full discretion not to adopt the Office of the Court Administrator's findings, or to consider other evidence that it may have taken for granted. Thus, a respondent's knowledge of and comment on the judicial audit team's initial findings cannot be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. He or she must also be informed of the eventual findings of the Office of the Court Administrator or this Court.

In this instance, respondent had only been aware of the investigation report at the time of his death. His Comment/Answer was in response only to the judicial audit team's findings. It would have been impossible for him to know, before his sudden death, that the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court would merely adopt the factual findings of the judicial audit team.

Respondent is no longer in a position to defend himself from the Office of the Court Administrator's findings. He can no longer be informed of the conclusions of this Court. The recommended penalty can no longer be served. He is not in any position to move for reconsideration, to plead his innocence, or to express his remorse. It would be inappropriate to impose a penalty without running afoul of the basic tenets of procedural due process.

Likewise, the forfeiture of respondent's retirement benefits is unusually cruel. The only people who will be affected by the penalty are his heirs, who had nothing to do with the administrative charges against him. It will punish respondent's widow, who had sustained gunshot wounds during the attack on him, and who had explained before this Court that she was a homemaker without any other source of income.^[74] This Court should not make respondent's grieving family bear the burden of his faults.

I disagree with the majority that the dismissal of this case weakens our ability to retain integrity within the ranks of the judiciary.

In the first place, respondent did not choose to die. In all indications, he was assassinated. To believe, then, that death would be a way to escape administrative liability is beyond the rational. Besides, perhaps death is a penalty supreme to what this Court could ever impose. Perhaps, even, it is a judgment that the universe has imposed more definitely and profoundly than this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, in view of his death during the pendency of this case.

---

^[1] Ponencia, p. 2.

^[2] Id. at 3.

^[3] Id. at 3-4.

^[4] J. Hernando, Opinion, p. 2.

^[5] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id. at 10.

^[8] Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil 306 319 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[9] Id. citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1938)

^[10] 127 Phil. 306 (1967) [Per J.Fernando, En Banc].

^[11] Id. at 318-319 citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 32-33 (1938); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 1230  (1961); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); and Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U.S. 313 (1939).

^[12] White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

^[13] 602 Phil. 522, 544 (2009) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

^[14] Id. at 545-546 citing DAVID PHILLIP JONES AND ANNE DE VILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 148-149, 157-160 (1985 ed.), and Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L.)

^[15] 272 Phil. 107 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

^[16] Id. at 115 citing Black's Law Dictionary, 590 (4^th ed.).

^[17] 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc],

^[18] Id. at 641-642.

^[19] Id. at 642-644.

^[20] 182 Phil. 215 (1979) [Per CJ. Fernando, Second Division].

^[21] Id. at 220-221.

^[22] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

^[23] 346 Phil. 807 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

^[24] Id. at 828 citing Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310 Phil. 549 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 268 Phil. 37 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) v. Civil Service Commission, 311 Phil. 573 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc]; and Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission 322 Phil. 579 (1996) [Per J. Puno, Second Division],

^[25] See REV. PEN. CODE, art. 89, which provides:

ARTICLE 89.  How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]

^[26] Perez v. Abiera, 159-APhil. 575, 580 (1975) [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc].

^[27] Gonzales v. Hernandez, 112 Phil. 160, 165 (1961) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc] citing 43 Am. Jur. p. 22; Nome v. Rice, 3 Alaska 602; and 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 2407.

^[28] Cajot v. Cledera, 349 Phil. 907, 912 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc],

^[29] 560 Phil. 96 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazaro, Third Division].

^[30] Id. at 104-105 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Baquerfo v. Sanchez, 495 Phil. 10 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, 497 Phil. 615 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division]; and Re: (1) Lost Checks Issued to the Late Roderick Roy P. Melliza, Former Clerk II, MCTC, Zaragga, Iloilo and (2) Dropping from the Rolls of Ms. Esther T. Andres, 537 Phil. 634 (2006) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[31] 495 Phil. 10 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[32] Id. at 16-17 citing Reyes v. Cristi, 470 Phil. 617 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, 482 Phil. 318 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Caja v. Nanquil, 481 Phil. 488 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc]; Tuliao v. Ramos, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575 [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc]; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 167 Phil. 42 (1977) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, Third Division]; Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; and Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, 480 Phil. 495 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

^[33] See Republic Act No. 1616(1957), sec. 1.

^[34] See Re: Requests for survivorship benefits of spouses of justices and judges who died prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9946, A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, September 19, 2017, 840 SCRA  62,75 [Per J. Martires, En Banc].

^[35] 473 Phil. 216 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[36] Id. at 227-228 citing Perez v. Abiera, 159-APhil. 575 (1975) [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc].

^[37] 780 Phil. 133 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[38] Id. at 153-154.

^[39] 562 Phil. 301 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[40] Id. at 325 citing Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, 522 Phil. 247 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].

^[41] See Presidential Decree No. 1146 (1977), sec. 1l(b).

^[42] See Republic Act No. 9946 (2010), sec. 1.

^[43] 159-A Phil. 575 (1975) [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc].

^[44] 139 Phil. 654 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]

^[45] Id. at 656-657.

^[46] Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580-581 (1975) [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc],

^[47] Id. at 582.

^[48] Id. at 580-581.

^[49] CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.

^[50] 261 Phil. 936 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division],

^[51] Id. at 945.

^[52] 342 Phil. 219 (1997) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[53] Id. at 232-233.

^[54] Amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: the Discipline of Justices and Judges (2001).

^[55] Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580 (1975) [Per J. Mu oz Palma, En Banc].

^[56] 587 Phil. 448 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[57] Id. at 462-463.

^[58] Ponencia, p. 9.

^[59] 450 Phil. 38 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Bancl

^[60] Id. at 47.

^[61] Gonzalez v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448,465 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[62] 279 Phil. 866 (1991) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

^[63] Id. at 876.

^[64] Gonzalez v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 463 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[65] 427 Phil. 518 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

^[66] Id. at 525.

^[67] Lumiqued v. Exevea, 346 Phil. 807, 828 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

^[68] 335 Phil. 511 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[69] Id. at 526.

^[70] 509 Phil. 401 (2005) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First Division].

^[71] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[72] J. Hernando, Opinion, p. 2.

^[73] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[74] J. Hernando, Opinion, p. 7.

---

HERNANDO, J.:

I dissent in this case.

The death of an accused even after conviction but during the pendency of his/her appeal shall result in the dismissal of the criminal case against said accused. This dismissal is triggered by the presumption of innocence accorded every accused under the Constitution.

Meanwhile, the death of a respondent public servant during the pendency of a mere administrative case against him/her shall not result in the dismissal of said case except in the following instances: a) if respondent's right to due process was not observed; b) there is presence of exceptional circumstances in the case of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and c) the kind of penalty imposed. This principle is not founded on any express Constitutional or statutory provision. Its only basis, per jurisprudence, is public policy, and that is, that public office is a public trust.

I respectfully submit that the non-dismissal rule in case of death of a respondent public servant in administrative cases is against the Constitutional right to presumption of innocence of an accused, as I shall discuss below.

The case at bench involves the alleged extortion activities of Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul) wherein he purportedly asked for amounts ranging from PhP 200,000.00 to PhP 300,000.00 from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their release from prison or dismissal of their criminal cases. After the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a letter from Rev. Father Antoni A. Saniel alleging Judge Abul's activities, it conducted an investigation on the matter. Eventually, the OCA found that Judge Abul committed grave misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a serious offense, and thereafter recommended that he be fined in the amount of PhP 500,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.

It is important to note, however, that before the Court could render a judgment on Judge Abul's administrative case, he met an untimely death^[1] when he was targeted and killed by an unidentified motorcycle-riding shooter while he was about to leave his house. In fact, his spouse likewise sustained gunshot wounds during the ambuscade but fortunately survived.^[2]

Because of jurisprudence, Judge Abul's death does not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint against him since the Court already acquired jurisdiction over the case and continues to exercise the same until it is finally resolved.^[3]   In other words, "[t]he death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable."^[4]

The ponencia, while adopting the findings and recommendation of the OCA, modifies the penalty to be imposed on the late Judge Abul. Due to the latter's guilt as to the administrative charge of gross misconduct, the ponencia declares and orders the forfeiture of all of his retirement benefits, excluding accrued leaves.

According to Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is considered as a serious charge. Section 11 of the same issuance provides for the following penalties:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. -A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1.    Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.  Provided,  however,  that the  forfeiture  of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2.    Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3.    A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.^[5]

The second sanction can no longer be imposed since Judge Abul already passed away (although he was preventively suspended), while the third sanction appears to be too mild a penalty and not commensurate with the offense. Presumably recommending the first sanction and considering the gravity of his offense and his intervening death, the OCA recommended that Judge Abul be fined in the amount of PhP 500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement gratuity. However, the ponente went further and ordered the forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's benefits, excluding accrued leaves, even after his death.

Although I subscribe to the ponencia in finding that Judge Abul may be adjudged guilty of gross misconduct which is a serious offense, I am compelled to register my reservations to its pronouncement that the administrative case against the late jurist should continue notwithstanding his death and that all of his retirement benefits, excluding accrued leaves, should be forfeited.

I berth my reservations on the following grounds: (1) the presumption of innocence should stand before a decision on the administrative case is rendered; (2) since death of an accused extinguishes personal criminal liability as well as pecuniary penalties arising from the felony when the death occurs before final judgment in criminal cases, the standard for an administrative case should be similar or less punitive; and (3) humanitarian reasons call for the grant of death and survivorship benefits in favor of the spouse and the heirs, if the case will not be dismissed.

On the first ground

Article 3, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." Indeed, until an accused is adjudged guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is a presumption of his or her innocence. Even if the case at bench is an administrative case, We should apply this presumption by analogy since Judge Abul's death preceded the promulgation of the decision which imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Simply put, he should be presumed innocent until a decision is finally rendered, be it in his favor or not. Unfortunately, even if Judge Abul was able to file his Comment on the charges against him, he could no longer submit other evidence which could have helped his cause if he truly was innocent like he previously claimed. Nonetheless, the Court declared him guilty of gross misconduct based on the existing evidence and the investigation conducted by the OCA, and then imposed the ultimate penalty of forfeiture of all of his benefits despite his death.

On the second ground

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]

Based on the aforementioned provision, the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal liability. Meanwhile, the pecuniary penalties will only be extinguished if the accused dies before final judgment is rendered. If this is the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bar should be followed, even if the quantum of proof therein is substantial evidence.^[6]

I am aware,.however, that the Court has previously pronounced in Gonzales v. Escalona^[7] that an administrative case, which is not strictly personal in nature, is not automatically terminated upon the death of respondent. This is because public office is a public trust which needs to be protected at all costs, even beyond the death of the concerned public officer. I reiterate that this is against the Constitution. Even then, I wish to point out that if in criminal cases, death extinguishes criminal and civil liability (arising from the offense), why should it be so much stricter when it comes to administrative cases with exceptional or justifiable factors which require special consideration such as in this case? Not surprisingly, the Court, using its sound discretion, previously imposed fines or less stringent penalties upon respondents in administrative cases who were found guilty even if they already retired or passed away while their cases were still pending.

Relevantly, the said Gonzales case cited Sexton v. Casida^[8] "where the respondent, who in the meantime died, was found guilty of act unbecoming a public official and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), deductible from his terminal leave pay."

In Agarao v. Parentela, Jr.,^[9] Judge Parentela was found guilty of immorality, a serious offense penalized with dismissal from the service and forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine. However, since the respondent judge passed away before a decision on his case was rendered, the Court instead forfeited one half of all of his retirement benefits excluding his accrued leave credits.

In Kaw v. Judge Osorio,^[10] while the Court held that the respondent judge may not necessarily be held liable for extortion and graft and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he was instead found accountable for violating Canons 2 and 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a consequence, a fine in the amount of PhP 40,000.00 was ordered to be deducted from his retirement benefits given that he mandatorily retired before the penalty of dismissal or suspension could be imposed upon him.

In San Buenaventura v. Migri o,^[11] the respondent was found guilty of simple neglect of duty. The Executive Judge who investigated the case recommended that a penalty of fine equivalent to two months' salary should be imposed. After receipt of the said recommendation, the OCA modified and reduced the penalty to a fine equivalent to one-month salary for humanitarian consideration and by reason of the death of the respondent, then submitted it to the Court for final determination. Subsequently, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to just impose a fine.

In Re: Evaluation of Administrative Liability of Judge Lubao,^[12] Judge Lubao was only fined given that he has already retired. This is considering that he committed numerous serious, less serious, and light offenses^[13] while he was still in the service which would have merited the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all his benefits. Thence, if Judge Lubao, who admittedly committed more offenses than Judge Abul and yet previously received his retirement benefits^[14] in spite of his infractions, was only fined, then a similar concession should be extended to Judge Abul, especially since he was murdered while in service and while his administrative case was still pending.

As one can infer from the aforementioned cases, in spite of the death or retirement of the respondents while their respective administrative cases were still pending, only a fine or deduction from their benefits was eventually imposed upon each of them. Notably, their retirement or survivorship benefits were not all automatically forfeited. In light of this, it is clear that the Court can exercise its sound discretion in the imposition of penalties depending on the circumstances surrounding the case.

On the third ground

It should be emphasized that according to the ponencia, Judge Abul should be stripped of his retirement benefits even if he passed away around two years before the decision in his administrative case was released. This is in addition to the fact that he was actually murdered mere days after he turned 68 years old.^[15] Moreover, he would have turned 70 years old this year (2019), the compulsory age for retirement for judges,^[16] if not for his untimely demise.

Considering these circumstances, it is my opinion that all of Judge Abul's death and retirement benefits should not be forfeited because his death preceded the release of a judgment concerning his administrative case. More importantly, I believe that for humanitarian reasons,^[17] Judge Abul's death and survivorship benefits should be released.

Even if the general rule is that the death of the respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability,^[18] there are instances wherein such death necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case. According to Gonzales v. Espinosa,^[19] the recognized exceptions are anchored on the following factors: "first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend oil the kind of penalty imposed."^[20] I believe that the second exception pertaining to humanitarian reasons should be applied in this case. Thus, if the case will not be dismissed, then at least the death and survivorship benefits should not all be forfeited.

Relevantly, in a few cases, the Court mitigated the penalties of the respondents in view of humanitarian considerations.

In Geocadin v. Pe a,^[21] Judge Pe a was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct. However, since he was overcome by serious illnesses, he was not able to present his evidence during the investigation. The Court noted that there is a presumption of innocence in his favor and that due to his unfortunate condition, he deserved compassion and humanitarian consideration. Hence, the Court imposed a penalty of reprimand and forfeiture of three months' salary to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

In Re: Financial Audit on the Accountabilities of Restituto Tabucon, Jr.,^[22] the respondent, Tabucon, failed to remit Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collections for a time because he purportedly used the funds to feed his family. He eventually restituted the said amounts, after he borrowed money with interest from a friend. The Court ruled that his failure to remit the cash deposited to him on time constituted gross dishonesty, if not malversation. Yet, since dismissal from the service is no longer possible given that Tabucon has compulsorily retired from service, the Court held that forfeiture of all his retirement and other benefits may be too harsh under the circumstances. Since he restituted his shortages, a fine in the amount of PhP 10,000.00 was imposed upon Tabucon instead.

According to Liwanag v. Lustre,^[23] the Court found substantial evidence showing that the respondent judge sexually molested the complainant which constitutes gross misconduct. While the OCA recommended that he should be dismissed from service and that all his retirement benefits be forfeited, the Court modified the penalty by imposing a fine on his retirement benefits because he already retired from service. It further stated that the OCA's recommendation to forfeit all of the judge's retirement benefits, "while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity."^[24] Hence, the Court deemed it best to impose a PhP 40,000.00 fine taking into account the attendant circumstances.

In this case, notably, Judge Abul's wife, Bernadita C. Abul, who also sustained gunshot wounds but survived, wrote the Court a letter dated September 13, 2017.^[25] She explains that she is a housewife who has no work and other source of income and that ever since Judge Abul's preventive suspension from office, their family faced financial crisis. She therefore implores from the Court to release the accrued leave benefits of Judge Abul as well as other benefits or assistance which the Court could extend to them in order to help their family sustain their daily needs and to fund her son's education in medical school.

Given the specific circumstances of Judge Abul's case, it is my view that his mistakes should not unduly punish his spouse or his heirs, especially if they had no hand in or knowledge about the alleged extortions. Judge Abul's liability should be considered personal and extinguished by reason of his death, and should not extend beyond the said death only to be shouldered by his spouse or his son. Doing so would indirectly impose a harsh penalty upon innocent individuals who not only have to come to terms with the unjust death of a loved one but also live without one henceforth. Without a doubt, forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's death and survivorship benefits would add to the grief and hardships that his family is already enduring. Thus, it is my humble position that assuming that the Court would maintain the non-dismissal rule in administrative cases in case of death of the respondent, the Court should, instead of imposing such a strict and unforgiving punishment even when Judge Abul has already passed away, impose a fine to be deducted from his retirement benefits. This is what the OCA had in fact recommended in the first place.

Pertinent to the death of a member of the Judiciary while still in actual service, Sections 2 to 3-A of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9946^[26] state that:

SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, regardless of his/her age and length of service as required in Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs shall receive a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice or Judge has rendered at least fifteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a lump sum often (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum often (10) years gratuity shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has served in Government for at least five (5) years regardless of age at the time of death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the presumption is that the death is work-related.

SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of five (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, however, That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances aforementioned: Provided, further, That should the retirement under Section 1(a) hereof be with the attendance of any partial permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of retirement, he/she, shall receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she is entitled to under this Act: Provided, furthermore, That if he/she survives after ten (10) years or seven (7) years, as the case may be, he/she shall continue to receive a monthly annuity as computed under this Act during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, finally, That those who have retired with the attendance of any partial permanent disability five (5) years prior to the effectivity of this Act shall be entitled to the same benefits provided herein.

Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.

SEC. 3-A. All pension benefits of retired members of the Judiciary shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary of the same position from which he/she retired.

In line with this, according to A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, in case of permanent disability due to death while in actual service, a judge is entitled to the following benefits:

B.1 Where government service is at least 15 years, regardless of age -

(1)   Lump sum gratuity of 10 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2)
(2)   Full survivorship pension benefits (Section 1), to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);
(3)   Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).

Provided, The same benefits shall apply in respect to a justice or judge who, with at least 5 years of government service, was killed due to his/her work as such.

B.2 Where government service is less than 15 years, regardless of age -

(1)    Lump sum gratuity of 5 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2)
(2)    Pro-rated pension benefits (Section 1), to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);
(3)    Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).^[27]

E. Survivorship Pension Benefits

The legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who (1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension, shall be entitled to receive the said benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died, Provided, That the justice or judge who, regardless of age, died or was killed while in actual service shall be considered as retired due to permanent disability. Provided, further, That the survivorship benefit shall be pro-rated if the deceased justice or judge had rendered government service for less than 15 years. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.^[28]

In light of these, it is my view that Judge Abul's spouse and son (or heirs) should be given the death benefits granted under Section 2 of R.A. No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be equivalent to five (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period often (10) years has passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he served for less than 15 years).

In conclusion, it is my position that: 1) Judge Abul's death extinguished any administrative penalty that may be imposed upon him and that the administrative complaint against him should be dismissed in accordance with the Constitutional principle that every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty by the requisite quantum of proof; and 2) assuming the administrative complaint survives his demise, the spouse and son (or heirs) of Judge Abul should be granted the death benefits and survivorship pension benefits due to his death while in actual service, considering that no ruling was handed down prior to his death and no penalty yet has been imposed upon him before the said death and due to humanitarian considerations unique to his case.

Lastly, may I point out to my esteemed Brethren that this Court has been forgiving in the past when it gave due course to petitions for clemency of dismissed judges. Unlike those magistrates who were recipients of the Court's benevolent attitude, Judge Abul will never be able to file a petition for clemency simply because he has passed on to the Great Beyond. The least that can be extended to his heirs to tide them over in the aftermath of his death is some concrete form of pecuniary security.

I therefore vote to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint against the late Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.

---

^[1] Died on August 5, 2017 by multiple gunshot wounds at 68 years old

^[2] Rollo, pp. 95-96.

^[3] Gonzales v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 462-463 (2008).

^[4] San Buenaventura v. Migri o, 725 Phil. 151, 162 (2014).

^[5] Section 11, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, RE: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re- Discipline of Justices and Judges, September 11, 2001.

^[6] That amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; Office of the Court Administrator v. Yu, 807 Phil. 277, 293 (2017).

^[7] Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 465.

^[8] 508 Phil. 166 (2005), as cited in Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 465.

^[9] 421 Phil. 677 (2001).

^[10] 469 Phil. 896 (2004).

^[11] Supra note 4.

^[12] 785 Phil. 14 (2016).

^[13] Judge Lubao was found guilty of the following offenses: gross misconduct; violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars; undue delay in rendering a decision or order; and undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.

^[14] Except for an amount of PhP 100,000.00 withheld by the Court from his benefits which served as security until a final judgment in his case was rendered.

^[15] Judge Abul's birthday was on August 1, 1949.

^[16] Republic Act No. 9946, An Act Granting Additional Retirement, 'Survivorship, and Other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending For the Purpose Republic Act No. 910, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes (2009).

^[17] Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, 443 Phil. 732, 736 (2003).

^[18] Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3, citing Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38, 47 (2003).

^[19] Supra note 3.

^[20] Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 3 at 463, citing Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, supra note 17, which cited Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, supra note 18; Baikong Akang Camsa v. Rendon, 427 Phil. 518 (2002); Judicial Audit Report, 397 Phil. 476 (2000); Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Br. 1, Bangued, Abra 388 Phil. 60 (2000); Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); Ma ozca v. Domagas, 318 Phil 744 (1995); and Hermosa v. Paraiso, 159 Phil. 417 (1975).

^[21] 195 Phil. 344 (1981).

^[22] 504 Phil. 512 (2005).

^[23] 365 Phil. 496 (1999).

^[24] Id. at 510.

^[25] Rollo, p. 91.

^[26] Republic Act No. 9946, An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending For the Purpose Republic Act No. 910, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes (2009).

^[27]   See Republic Act No. 9946.

^[28] Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices and Judges Who Died Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, September 19, 2017.